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SUMMARY 
The study makes a descriptive and analytical study of the development of the dynamic 
concept of the rule of law with special reference to the African contribution. 
First, the study shows that the Diceyan concept of the rule of law was narrow and 
peculiar to the Western liberal legal culture, and that more specifically, the substantive 
content of the concept of the rule of law was limited to the first generation of human 
rights. In its international and African context the concept was expanded to include 
all three generations of human rights and also identified with the concepts of 
democracy and the right of peoples and nations to self-determination. The expanded 
concept came to be known as the Dynamic Concept of the rule of law. 
Secondly, the study traces the origins and development of the principle of equal rights 
and self-determination and their extension to all peoples and nations and shows that 
these rights are universal, not relative, as they derive from the inherent worth and 
dignity of the individual. Also, the study shows that in the African context the three 
generations of human rights have been interlinked, made inter-dependent, and then 
identified with the rule of law, human rights and the right of self-determination 
(perceived as a right to democratic self-governance). Hence, the worth and dignity of 
the human personality has been made the fountainhead of human rights and have been 
elevated to the substantive elements of the Dynamic Concept of the rule of law and the 
basis of the modern African Constitutional State. 
Under the Colonial Rule both the Diceyan and the dynamic concept of the rule of law 
were not recognised. Instead, Colonial and racist regimes tried to create alternative 
institutions of government which denied the oppressed peoples the right to democratic 
self-governance and independence. However, Colonial and oppressed peoples relied on 
the dynamic concept of the rule of law in their freedom struggles and in the 
elaboration of their policies. Hence, the constitutions of all the former colonies in 
southern Africa under discussion were to different degrees informed by the Dynamic 
Concept of the rule of law. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: ON THE PROBLEM AND THE METHODOLGY 
British Colonialism and apartheid Colonial rule did not recognise the worth and 
dignity of black people and their inherent basic rights. Thus blacks, especially 
Africans, were denied basic human rights and in particular, the right to 
participate in the government of their own Country. Instead, parallel 
institutions of government were established for blacks who were excluded from 
the Central political process. However, these institutions were merely advisory 
bodies which ensured that the colonial authorites maintained full control of 
Government and the State institutions. These Constitutional arrangements 
were accompanied by a host of racially discriminatory laws. 
Thus the doctrine of the rule of law that our legal system inherited from the 
United Kingdom did not protect blacks to the same extent as whites. The 
doctrine was eroded further after the introduction of apartheid when the law 
became the main instrument for the enforcement of the inhuman policy of 
apartheid. 
Successive Colonial governments were able to introduce these racially -
discriminatory policies and to deny blacks their right of self-determination and 
equal rights as customary international law did not offer Colonial people any 
protection. When the right of self-determination was recognised after World 
War I it was only limited to some European Nationalities and Trust Territories. 
After World War II the right of self-determination and human rights was 
extended to all peoples and nations. However, no measures were adopted to 
ensure their implementation, especially in Colonial territories. The further 
elaboration of the right of self-determination and human rights and their 
implementation was largely left to Colonial and oppressed people. These 
resulting struggles for the achievements of these rights offered African peoples 
1 
an opportunity to contribute to the development of Public International Law, 
especially International Human Rights law and the dynamic concept of the Rule 
of Law. 
The study is descriptive and analytical based on a vast body of available 
literature in most of the convential areas, but less so in others, especially most 
recent developments in South Africa and on the right to self-determination. 
The object of this study is manifold. 
(a) It traces the development of the dynamic concept of the rule of law and its 
constitutive elements, such as equality, freedom, justice and the right to 
democratic governance. 
(b) It traces the origins and nature of the doctrine of human rights and the right of 
self-determination and their relationship to the principle of democracy. 
(c) It traces the development of the right of self-determination and human rights 
and their incorporation in various international and regional human rights and 
their elevation to peremptory rules of customary international law. 
In particular, 
(d) It traces the development of the dynamic concept of the rule of law and its role 
in the efforts of African countries and national liberation movements to achieve 
their rights of self-determination and equal rights. 
This study confines itself to selected African countries, with special reference 
to Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. These countries have been chosen 
because of their proximity to one another, historical ties, and the similarity of 
racial policies and the efforts of the United Nations to encourage constitutional 
transformation in each of these countries. 
The constitutional transformations in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa are 
analysed and compared. In particular, the study traces the role of the United 
Nations, the international human rights law and the dynamic concept of the 
rule of law in the transformation process, the management, duration and 
2 
implementation of the constitutional process in these countries, especially South 
Africa, to show that it is in modern times the epitome of the realisation of the 
dynamic concept of the rule of law. 
3 
CHAPTER II 
TOWARDS A DYNAMIC CONCEPT OF THE RULE OF LAW 
2.1 English, American and South African interpretations: a brief 
overview 
Most discussions of the modem concept of the rule of law begin with Dicey. 1 
Phillips2 identified the core of Dicey's threefold exposition as -
(a) the absence of arbitrary power; 
(b) equality before the law; and 
(c) the importance of the general principles of the British constitution.3 
According to Yardley4 the first two elements of the rule oflaw are closely related 
According to Dicey the rule of law forms a fundamental principle of the English 
Constitution and has the following three meanings: 
1. " ... no man is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body or goods except 
for a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary 
courts of the land. In this sense the rule of law is contrasted with every system of 
government based on the exercise by persons in authority of wide, arbitrary, or 
discretionary powers of constraint" ... " It means, in the first place, the absolute 
supremacy or predominance of regular law as opposed to the influence or arbitrary 
power, and excludes the existence of arbitrariness, of prerogative or even a wide 
discretionary authority on the part of the government." 
2. " ... every man, whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the 
realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals." 
3. " ... the general principles of the Constitution (as for example the right to personal 
liberty or the right to public meeting) are with us as the result of judicial decisions 
determining the rights of private persons in particular cases brought before the courts; 
whereas under many foreign Constitutions the security (such as it is) given to the rights 
ofindividuals results, or appears to result, from the general principles of the Constitution 
... Our Constitution, in short is a judge-made Constitution .... " 
See AV Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 10th ed. (1959) 188, 
202-203. 
2 0 Hood Phillips and Paul Jackson Constitutional and Administrative Law (1978) 36. 
3 Wade and Phillips take the view that the general principles of the constitution are not, as 
Dicey claimed, empirical principles of the English constitution but elements of the legal idea -
that is, an aggregate of directive principles as to what the law ought to be: ECS Wade and GG 
Phillips Constitutional and Administrative Law 9th ed. (1977) 89-90. 
4 DCM Yardley Introduction to British Constitutional Law 7th ed. (1990) 75. 
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and amount to equality before the law for all citizens. Dicey5 related the rule 
of law to basic rights (or civil liberties) when he stated that the concept meant 
the security given under the English constitution to the rights of the individual. 
These rights or liberties include: the freedom of the person, freedom of 
expression, freedom of movement and the right to hold meetings.6 Mathews7 
points out that the notion of civil liberties is broader today than Dicey's 
description and includes the freedom of conscience, speech, information and 
association. 
To Jennings8 the rule of law involves the notion that all governmental powers, 
except legislation, should be determined and distributed by reasonably precise 
laws. In other words, any person acting on behalf of the state must be 
empowered by a specific rule of law which authorises his or her action. 9 In 
short, the rule of law requires that the state as a whole must be regulated by 
law. Hence, Marsh10 identifies the rule of law with the German notion of the 
Rechtsstaat. 11 This requires, first, that all state activities must have a legal 
basis and second, that legal authority must respect fundamental human rights. 
Jennings, 12 like Yardley, 13 divided the rule of law into criminal- and 
5 See Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 184. 
6 See note 1 above. Also see Anthony Mathews Freedom, State Security and the Rule of 
Law (1986) 15. 
7 Mathews ibid. Yardley's catalogue of civil liberties includes: freedom of the person to 
behave as he pleases, equality before the law, freedom of property, the right to free elections, 
freedom of speech and to write freedom of public worship, freedom of assembly and association, 
and family rights. See Yardley Introduction to British Constitutional Law 96. 
8 See W Ivor Jennings The Law and the Constitution 5th ed. (1959) 48. 
9 Hayek formulated this principle in the following definite and emphatic terms: "Stripped 
of all technicalities this (the rule of law) means that government in all its actions is bound by 
rules fixed and announced beforehand - rules which make it possible to foresee with fair 
certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances, and to plan 
one's individual affairs on the basis of his knowledge": FA Hayek The Road to Serfdom (1944) 
54. 
10 Marsh "The Rule of Law as a Supra-national Concept" in AG Guest (ed.) Oxford Essays 
in Jurisprudence (1961) 228. 
11 On the history of this notion see DH van Wyk "Suid-Afrika en die Regstaatidee" 1980 
TSAR 152. The principle will be explained more fully below. 
12 See Jennings The Law of the Constitution 48-51. 
13 Yardley Introduction to British Constitutional Law 75. 
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constitutional-law aspects. In the criminal-law context he equated the rule of 
law with the maxim nulla poena sine Lege, which includes the following four 
notions: 14 
(a) the categories into which crimes fall should be determined by general 
rules of a more or less fixed character; 
(b) a person should not be punished except for a crime which falls within 
general rules; 
(c) penal statutes should be strictly construed, so that no act may be made 
criminal which is not clearly covered by statute; and 
(d) penal laws should not be made retrospectively. 
Under the constitutional-law aspect Jennings also identified four characteristics: 
(a) the limitation of state powers, except the powers of parliament; 15 
(b) the substitution of constitutional government (which he equated with the 
rule of law) for state absolutism; 
(c) the separation of powers; and 
(d) the notions of equality and liberty, which he regarded as fundamental or 
natural rights. 
To de Smith, 16 the rule oflaw lends itself to a wide range of interpretations, with 
one factor in common: it is accepted by everybody as something good. He 
distils two meanings out of the various interpretations: first, rule of law means 
legality; second, law should conform to certain minimum standards of 
substantive and procedural justice. Under these minimum standards he lists: 
certainty and predictability; adequate safeguards against abuse of discretion; 
14 See Jerome Hall "Nulla Poena Sine Lege" XLVII Yale Law Journal, 165 et seq. Also see 
John Rawls A Theory of Justice (1972) 235-243. 
15 This is in line with the English doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty which holds that 
parliament has "the right to make or unmake any law whatever and, further, that no person or 
body is recognised by the law as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of 
parliament": see Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 39. 
16 See SA De Smith Constitutional and Administrative Law (1970) 40. 
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equality of treatment; no unfair discrimination; a fair hearing before an 
impartial tribunal. 
0 Hood Phillips17 identifies the rule of law with the fundamental human rights 
incorporated in many modem constitutions. Among such rights he includes: 18 
personal freedom, equality before the law, freedom of property, free elections, 
freedom of speech, freedom of conscience and worship, freedom of contract, the 
right to assembly, the right of association and family rights. He points out that 
these rights are always restricted, expressly or impliedly, by concepts such as 
"public order" or "due process of law", and that the courts may or may not have 
jurisdiction to review legislation that infringes upon such rights. 19 
Civil liberties owe their place as the substantive (or material) aspect of the rule 
of law to their recognition and incorporation as higher law into Western 
constitutions. Fundamental human rights found their first definite and 
emphatic formulations in the American and French declarations of rights. To 
understand the contribution of the American Constitution to the modem 
concept of the Rule of Law, it is necessary to look briefly at the history of the 
relationship between England and its American Colonies that gave rise to the 
birth of the American Constitution. Towards the end of the Eighteenth century, 
the British Parliament, contrary to the English Constitution which stated that 
taxation could only be levied with the consent of those that paid it, decided on 
the imposition of various taxes on the American Colonies. The objections of the 
Colonies and their appeals to the English Courts fell on deaf ears. Open rebellion 
followed. From this episode the Colonists learnt an invaluable lesson, realising 
that in order to protect the individual's fundamental rights and freedoms, the 
powers of the individual branches of the government, including the Legislature, 
would in some way have to be limited. This lesson was conceptualised in the 
American Constitution (1787) whereParliamentarysovereigntywasreplaced by 
17 See Phillips and Jackson Constitutional and Administrative Law 16. 
18 Cf also note 7 supra. 
19 This depends on whether a legal system recognises judicial review (e.g. USA) or not (e.g. 
United Kingdom). See Joseph Jaconelli Enacting a Bill of Rights (1980) 122. 
7 
a sovereign written Constitution (in which Montesquieu's20 theory of the 
separation of powers was firmly embedded). Certain of the fundamental rights 
and freedoms of the individual that were deemed necessary to protect from 
growing governmental powers were entrenched in the Constitution in the form 
of a "Bill of Rights" (consisting of 10 Amendments added, in 1791, to the 
Federal Constitution of 1787). The following civil liberties were included: free 
exercise of religion, freedom of speech and the press, peaceable assembly, 
petition for redress of grievances (first amendment); security of the person, 
home, papers and effects from unreasonable search and seizures (second 
amendment); no deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of 
the law21 (fifth amendment); freedom of excessive bail or fines and from cruel 
and inhuman punishments (eighth amendment). The system of limiting 
government power reached a climax in 1803 in the now famous case of 
Marbury v Madison.22 Chief Justice Marshall found that the courts had the 
authority to test legislation against the fundamental law as laid down in the 
Constitution (a function referred to as (constitutional) judicial review, even 
though there is no such "testing right" contained in the Constitution. 23 This 
decision formed the cornerstone upon which future American constitutionalism 
was built. The American Colonists showed preference for a system of previously 
established and entrenched principles above the discretionary action of a 
transitory parliamentary majority. 
In the same year (1791) A Declaration of the Rights of Man was added as a 
preface to the French Constitution; it was subsequently confirmed by the 
preambles to the constitutions of 1946 and 1958. 
Some South African jurists, like their English counterparts, read substantive or 
20 Montesquieu De L'Esprit des Lois (1784). 
21 This action derives from Article 39 of the Magna Charter which some authors interpret 
as the first formulation of the principle of legality. See Lord Parker of Waddington Magna 
Charter and the Rule of Law (1965) 5. 
22 1 Cranch 137 (US). 
23 See Van der Vyver Die Juridiese Sin van die Leerstuk van Menseregte (Unpublished 
LLD-thesis, University of Pretoria 1974) 668 et seq. 
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higher values into the rule of law. For instance, Beinart24 interpreted it as a 
principle of legality as opposed to the doctrine of "law and order" which holds 
that every "act" emanating from Parliament, however, vague, absurd or unjust 
in the concrete sense, is law.25 Moreover, like de Smith, Beinart26 argued that 
the rule oflaw contains certain minimum standards of justice, among others the 
maxim nulla poena sine lege and equality before the law of all in rights and 
dignity. Beinart concluded that these substantive values constituted the legal 
idea.27 
Another South African jurist, Molteno, based his notion of a higher-law 
character (or substantive aspect) of the rule of law on Dicey's identification of 
the rule of law and civil liberties. More specifically, he based his view on three 
factors that are common to all three propositions of Dicey's exposition of the 
rule of law, namely:28 
(a) that the rule of law was concerned with the protection of individual legal 
rights and liberties; 
(b) that these rights and liberties were enforceable against, and protected by 
the State; and 
(c) that the organ for the protection of individual legal rights and liberties 
was the judiciary. 
The views of both Beinart and Molteno were echoed by Wiechers. 29 Like Beinart, 
he interpreted the rule of law as the principle of legality; and like Molteno and 
his English counterparts he concluded that the principle of legality did not only 
relate to wetsgebondenheid (Gesetzmdssigkeit; i.e. adhering to the letter of the 
law) but also to the wider principle of regsgebondenheid (i.e. adherence to the 
24 Beinart "The Rule of Law" 1962 Acta Juridica 100-101. 
25 Some authors interpret the rule oflaw as a law and order theoty. For a discussion of this 
theoiy see Mathews Freedom, State Security and the Rule of Law 1-2 and Mathole Serofo 
Motshekga "The South African State Security legislation" in 1980 Yearbook of African Law 97. 
26 Beinart "The Rule of Law" 131-132. 
27 Ibid. 
28 See DB Molteno "The Rules behind the Rule of Law" 1965-7 Acta Juridica 136. 
29 See Wiechers 1967 THRHR 309 and Wiechers Administrative Law (1985) 11 et seq. 
9 
law in general). In summary Wiechers, like his Anglo-South African 
counterparts, divided the rule of law into a formal and a material [or 
substantive) aspect. Moreover, he derived the substantive aspect of the concept 
from natural law or ethical jurisprudence. 
Wiechers' concept of a material aspect of the rule of law was unequivocally 
supported by Mathews30 who took the view that the rule of law did not only 
mean the rule of any law but also the rule of law with a liberal content. 
Elaborating on the latter, Mathews31 argued, like Wade and Phillips,32 that the 
rule oflaw gave expression to the idea oflaw [or the legal idea) itself. He divided 
the rule of law into three distinct but closely related principles.33 The first 
principle states that acts of the government towards the individual, particularly 
those affecting his civil liberties [such as the right to freedom of person, speech 
and association, and the right to choose representatives to make laws), should 
be in accordance with previously established general laws, having a reasonably 
specific reference. In terms of the second principle civil liberties, being essential 
to the operation of law as an order designed to regulate human affairs, should 
be incorporated into the legal system subject to the following three conditions: 
well-recognised limits upon their exercise; limitations consequential to the need 
to reconcile them with one another; and qualification of such rights in times of 
exceptional crisis. The third principle requires that the interpretation and 
application of the general rules referred to in the first principle, and adjudication 
of any limitations of the rights referred to in the second principle, should be 
under the control or supervision of an independent judicial body with effective 
remedial powers and acting according to fair trial procedures or the 
requirements of procedural due process. 
All in all, Mathews saw Dicey's exposition of the rule of law as an attempt to set 
· 
30 See AS Mathews "A Bridle for the Unruly Horse" 81 1964 SALJ 312 at 319. 
31 Ibid 320. 
32 See note 3 supra. 
33 See Anthony Mathews Law, Order and Liberty in South Africa (1971) 31. 
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out the basic requirements of the principle of legality. 34 His own reformulation 
of Dicey contains the following distinct but closely related requirements of this 
principle: 
(a) no one shall be subject to pains and penalties except for a distinct breach 
of law established before the ordinary courts;35 
(b) equality before the law; 
(c) the subject is better protected when rights and remedies are incorporated 
into the ordinary law of the land. 
These propositions36 do not only identify the rule of law with civil liberties, but 
also bring them into the sphere of operation of procedural justice, thus making 
the formal and substantive aspects of the rule of law complementary. 
In short, Mathews' concept of the rule of law includes the following central 
features: recognition of civil liberties and fair trial procedures and their 
incorporation into the law of the land; the limitation of state power through 
these substantive and procedural restraints; and ajudicially enforceable bill of 
rights. 
Sanders37 like Mathews, uses Dicey as the basis of his formulation of the Rule 
of Law. He defines the Rule of Law as follows: "It is that politico-legal code of 
34 Mathews states with reference to the principle of legality, that it "requires that the 
qualifications or limitations on the basic freedoms should be general, prospective, open and 
clear." AS Mathews "The Rule of Law - A Reassessment" in Kahn (ed.) Fiat Iustitia Essays in 
Memory of Deneys Oliver Schreiner (1983) 302. 
35 Mathews states that the phrase "distinct breach of the law" was Dicey's way of 
expressing the notion of clear, preannounced rules or standards as a guide to conduct: ibid 301. 
36 Diceys' theory, together with modem restatements of it, entails a combination of formal 
and substantive justice. Mathews formulates them in the following propositions:(a) The Rule of 
Law requires the observance of legality in the form of general and clear preannounced rules 
administered by independent courts. (b) It also requires that citizens should actually enjoy the 
basic civil liberties of person, conscience, speech, movement, meeting and association. (c) The 
substantive rights described in paragraph (b) are best secured by the procedural mechanisms 
described in paragraph (a) as the principle of legality. These rights therefore constitute the 
sphere of operation of the rules of procedural justice referred to in paragraph (a): ibid. 
37 Sanders "Die rule of Law - n Gemeenskaplike Westerse Gedragskode" 1971 THRHR 164 
ff. 
11 
conduct for the state authority which at a given time is in the best position to 
grant the individual the maximum joy and to guarantee those claims of the 
subject which in the light of the prevailing circumstances of the state 
community concerned are regarded as fundamental, taking into account the 
equal claims of other members of the state community and the justified 
demands of the state authority. "38 Basson and Viljoen39 state that the concept 
of the Rule of Law does not mean much for the protection of fundamental 
rights. They declare that the Rule of Law is too formal in legal terms because 
the emphasis is on procedure and formal requirements to which state actions 
have to conform. The Rule of Law means rather the structure of the legal 
system and not the content of the law and thus does not guarantee the 
protection of human rights. The Rule of Law should rather be seen as but one 
of the legal principles with an ethical foundation according to which the law 
must be actualised. Dugard40 agrees with these views when he says that the 
Rule of Law is only procedural in nature and does not guarantee the protection 
of human rights. 
Views opposed to the Rule of Law and the incorporation of fundamental rights 
are also to be found in South African legal literature. 
Venter41 opposed any extensive interpretation of the rule of law on the basis 
that it "presuppose(d) the notion of 'fundamental rights' accruing to the 
individual against (state, government) authority and thus reflects a humanist 
philosophy which is unacceptable in South Africa". He based this conclusion on 
the preamble and section 2 of the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act of 
1961, which acknowledged the sovereignty of God. Venter argued that "the 
Christian premise of the sovereignty of God stands in radical opposition to the 
humanistic point of departure which makes man the sovereign consideration". 
As a result, he suggested that South African lawyers reject the rule of law and 
38 Ibid. 
39 Basson and Viljoen South African Constitutional Law (1988) 224. 
40 Dugard Human Rights in Basson and Viljoen note 37 at 223. 
41 
"The Withering of the 'Rule of Law'" (8) 1973 Speculum Juris 69 at 86-88. 
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embrace "Christian government, necessarily including juridical ordering and 
administration of justice with a distinct Christian accent." However, in a recent 
publication,42 Venter does recognise certain individual rights (or competencies) 
including the following: the right to employment, social security and education, 
freedom of speech, conscience, and so on. Venter espouses a system of law 
regulated by modal juridical principles complemented with Christian justice. 
Carpenter43 states, with reference to Venter, that the ideal of Christian justice 
applied to the legal sphere would indeed ensure the recognition of the 
individuality of each person; ensure legal certainty; provide flexible and fair 
results; promote equality of treatment in comparable circumstances and 
engender legality and legitimacy (since both state and subject are bound by 
law). 
Unlike Venter, JD van der Vyver did not reject the idea of fundamental rights. 
According to him,44 Calvinism does not "deny the existence or relevance of a 
rule of law in the sense of legality, or of particularly precious human rights, but 
rebels against humanist endeavours to make man or human reason the 
measure and sole consideration of such rule or such rights". Van der Vyver 
maintained that Calvinism prefers a theocentric to an anthropocentric approach 
to the doctrine of human rights, because (he argued) Calvinism and historic 
Christianity taught that ethical norms as well as natural laws regulating the 
cosmic order have a fixed divine foundation. Van der Vyver himself rejected the 
liberal interpretation of the rule of law and adopted Dicey's view that the 
principles inherent in the rule of law were empirical rules of English 
constitutional law. He accordingly rejected any identification of the rule of law 
with an internationalisation of human rights. Accordingly, in its historical and 
literal sense, the rule of law simply meant formal legality.45 No wonder that he 
also opposed attempts to identify the rule of law with democratic or liberal 
political theories. 
42 Venter Die Publiekregtelike Verhouding (1985). 
43 Carpenter Introduction to South African Constitutional Law 97. 
44 Seven Lectures on Human Rights (1976) 120. 
45 Ibid 121. 
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In summary, Anglo-American and South African approaches to the rule of law 
can be grouped under three heads or categories: 
(a) law and order; 
(b) procedural-justice; 
(c) basic-rights. 
As it appeared above, the first category is generally rejected while the second 
and third categories are generally accepted and considered to be 
complementary. The basic-rights approach identifies the rule of law with 
democracy and requires that civil liberties should be incorporated into 
municipal laws. This approach constitutes the material (or substantive) aspect 
of the rule of law. Its weakness, at least in English and South African law,46 is 
that the individual is allowed the enjoyment of his or her civil liberties only to 
the extent that they are not limited by law, which is at the mercy of a sovereign 
parliament. 47 
2.2 International Law Interpretations 
The traditional concept of the rule of law has certain serious limitations. First, 
its material (or substantive) content tends to concentrate on civil liberties or 
individual rights and does not extend to the search for justice in social, 
economic and political spheres. It avoids reference to the social, economic and 
political goals or values towards which legal enactments are or may be 
directed. 48 This narrow interpretation of the rule of law could not satisfy the 
social, economic and political aspirations of developing (or third-world) countries 
which emerged after World War 11.49 Secondly, the vast political, social and 
economic upheavals that followed the two world wars and, in particular, the 
46 Before the South African Constitution of 1993. 
47 Cf H Street Freedom, the Individual and the Law 4th ed. (1977) 12. 
48 See Mathews Freedom, State Security and the Rule of Law 11. 
49 These goals were embodied in the Atlantic Charter of 1941 and the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights which were embraced by colonial and dependent peoples the world over. 
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reaction against arbitrary government, discredited the "law and order" and 
procedural justice approaches to the rule oflaw, awakening world leaders to the 
need for concerted action to protect human rights under the rule of law. 50 
However, the United Nations Charter only incorporated the right of peoples and 
nations to self-determination and equality in rights and dignity51 and remained 
silent on the rule of law. This omission was cured by the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (1948)52 which proclaimed in its preamble that it is essential 
to protect human rights under the rule of law in order to prevent rebellion 
against tyranny and oppression. In its operative clauses the Universal 
Declaration, unlike the UN Charter, set forth specifically so-called first and 
second generation rights which should apply to human society without any 
form of discrimination whatsoever. These rights included certain attributes of 
a democratic government which are worth citing in full: 53 
( 1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or 
through freely chosen representatives. 
(2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country. 
(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will 
be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and 
equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free and fair 
voting procedures. 
Hardly two years after the adoption of the Universal Declaration members of the 
Council of Europe adopted the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950)54 which came into force in 
50 See International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) The Rule of Law and Human Rights 
(1966) 1. 
51 Article 1 (2) and 55. For the text see F van Panhuys, W Brinkhorst and HH Maas 
International Organisation and Integration (1968) 25. 
52 For the text see Rudolf Bernhardt and John Anthony Jolowitcz (eds.) International 
Enforcement of Human Rights (1985) 163 et seq. 
53 Article 21. 
54 For the text see Bernhardt and Jolowicz International Enforcement of Human Rights 
201 et seq. 
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1953. In the preamble the governments signatory to the Convention reaffirmed 
their common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule oflaw 
and resolved to take "the first steps for the collective enforcement of certain of 
the Rights stated in the Universal Declaration". 
The European Convention, like the Universal Declaration, neither redefined the 
rule oflaw nor specifically extended it to the search for social justice. During the 
fifties the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) realised that the principles 
of the rule of law required clearer definition and that they were indeed of 
universal application. 55 Thus at their first International Congress held in Athens 
in 1955 the ICJ extended the rule of law to the entire human family and 
affirmed its identity with civil liberties and democracy. The ICJ described the 
rule of law as springing56 
from the rights of the individual developed through history in the age- old 
struggle of mankind for freedom; which include freedom of speech, press, 
worship, assembly and association and the right to free elections to the end that 
laws are enacted by the duly elected representatives of the people and afford 
equal protection to all. 
The Act of Athens (as the Athens Congress Declaration came to be known),57 
reduced certain attributes of the rule of law to mandatory constitutional rules. 
It subjected the state to the law, enjoined governments to respect the rights of 
the individual under the rule of law, demanded effective means for the 
enforcement of these rights, and urged the judges to be guided by the rule of 
55 See ICJ The Rule of Law and Human Rights 1. 
56 Ibid 3. 
57 For the text see ibid 65. 
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law, protect and enforce it without fear and favour and resist any 
encroachments by governments or political parties on their independence as 
judges. 
At its second congress in Delhi, the ICJ re-affirmed the Act of Athens and 
expanded the material aspect of the rule of law by incorporating the second 
generation rights embodied in the Universal Declaration. 58 The ICJ described 
the function of this expanded (or dynamic) concept of the rule of law as not only 
to safeguard and advance the civil and political rights of the individual in a free 
society, but also to establish social, economic and cultural conditions under 
which his or her legitimate aspirations and dignity may be realised. Moreover, 
the New Delhi Declaration, like humanist philosophers, 59 derived both the first 
and second generation rights from the worth and dignity of the human 
personality and imposed a duty on the legislature to create and maintain the 
conditions which will uphold the dignity of the individual. As a result the ICJ 
elevated human dignity to the primacy of the legal and constitutional order and 
the fountainhead of all human rights. 
The final step in the development of the expanded or 'dynamic' concept of the 
Rule of Law was taken at the Lagos Conference (1961) which discussed the 
concept with particular reference to Africa. The Law of Lagos (as the Lagos 
Declaration came to be known)60 extended the dynamic concept of the Rule of 
58 Ibid 66. 
59 For example, Samuel Pufendorf Die Gemeinschajtspjlichten des Naturrechts 
(Ausgewahlte Stil.cke aus "De officio Hominis et Civis"} (1973) 14. 
60 See ICJ The Rule of Law and Human Rights 67. 
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Law to both dependent and independent peoples and identified it with 
democracy, human rights and the right of African peoples to self-determination 
and independence.61 The Law of Lagos enjoined African peoples to incorporate 
this dynamic concept of the Rule of Law into their constitutions and then set 
forth the attributes of an African constitutional state. These include: legislatures 
established in accordance with the will of the people who have adopted their 
constitution freely; democratic representation in the legislatures; incorporation 
into constitutions and entrenchment of fundamental rights such as the right to 
personal liberty and non-restriction of personal liberty in peacetime without trial 
in a court of law. Like its predecessors, the Law of Lagos based its concept of 
human rights on the Universal Declaration. Hence Mathews62 took the view that 
the Law of Lagos fused the rule of law and the Universal Declaration into one, 
reducing the former to a vehicle for the full achievement of justice in the 
material (or substantive) sense. 
The identification of the rule of law with justice in the broadest sense created 
a close affinity between the former and the German notion of the Rechtsstaat!33 -
a 'law state', or constitutional state. The Rechtsstaat, like the Rule of Law, has 
a formal and a material aspect. The formal aspect resembles the classical 
meaning of the Rule of Law:64 
61 They declared that "the principles embodied in the conclusion of this conference ... 
should apply to any society, whether free or otherwise, but that the Rule of Law cannot be fully 
realised unless legislative bodies have been established in accordance with the will of the people 
which have adopted their Constitution freely." See Ian Brow lie Basic Documentation on Human 
Rights (1981) 427. 
62 Mathews Freedom, State Security and The Rule of Law 11-12. 
63 Ibid. 
64 See JD van der Vyver "The Concept of Political Sovereignty" in Coenrad Visser (ed.) 
Essays in Honour of Ellison Kahn (1989) 336. 
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(1) the notion of regulating the powers of government by means of legal provisions, 
and in particular of controlling and confining the exercise of power by the 
executive branch of government; 
(2) the doctrine of separation of powers; 
(3) the notion that interference with civil liberties must be sanctioned by statute; 
(4) the principle of legality and independence of the judiciary; 
(5) protection of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
Other principles of the Rechtsstaat include: the principle of democracy, the 
right to vote, the right to opposition, legal certainty, the existence of natural law 
[ii.berpositives Recht), the right to a trial before an ordinary judge, protection 
against arbitrary arrest, the principle of no punishment without a law 
sanctioning such punishment, the prohibition of retroactive laws, and the right 
to a judicial hearing. 65 
Doehring66 regards all states in which public institutions are regulated by law 
as law-states. This confirms the affinity between the Rule of Law and the 
Rechtsstaat.67 However, as far as the historical development, philosophical 
foundation and substantive meaning are concerned, the Rechtsstaat is not the 
65 Ibid 337. 
66 See Karl Doehring Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1985) 47 et seq. 
67 Paul Bockelman described this affinity in the following terms: 
In its simplest meaning, the rule of law means that all activity within the State 
should have a legal (as opposed to a merely arbitrary) basis. In a more developed 
sense, which brings it closer to the European conception of the Rechtsstaat it 
implies that legal authority has certain express (or at all events, tacitly 
understood) limits; it must, in brief, respect fundamental human rights. 
See "Law and Security in the Modem State" in Law and State (1960) 60. 
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equivalent of the English concept of the Rule of Law.68 Like the dynamic 
concept of the Rule of Law, the Rechtsstaat idea seeks to subject the exercise 
of all manifestations of state authority to substantive constraints and norms 
contained in a supreme constitution and founded on the principle of human 
rights.69 The material conception requires measures for the establishment of a 
materially just society, i.e. measures based on the normative content of the 
constitution. 70 
2.3. Conclusion 
The Diceyan concept of the Rule of Law consists of a formal and material 
aspect. Its material (or substantive) content comprises civil liberties - "first 
generation rights" - such as those claimed to be found in the common law, and 
protected by the courts, or those incorporated into the French and American 
declarations of individual rights and subsequent human rights charters. The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights identified these rights with democracy, 
internationalised them and afforded them protection under the Rule of Law. 
Although the Declaration contains social and economic rights, it neither 
expressly nor impliedly incorporated them into the notion of the Rule of Law. 
During the fifties the ICJ expanded the Rule of Law by incorporating these 
rights (in addition to civil and political rights) into the material (or substantive) 
68 See DH van Wyk "Suid-Afrika en die Regstaatsidee" 1980 TSAR 152 at 156-7; LC Blaauw 
The Constitutional Tenability of Group Rights (Unpublished LLD thesis, University of South 
Africa 1989) 311-9. 
69 See HJ van Eikema Hommes "De Materiele Rechtstaatidee" 1978 TSAR 42 at 46-7. 
10 See Blaauw 'The Rechtsstaat Idea compared with the Rule of Law as a Paradigm for the 
Protection of Rights' 1990 SALJ 76 et seq. 
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aspect of the Rule of Law. This expanded (or dynamic) concept of the Rule of 
Law brought about a convergence of the Western and Third-World (including 
African) concept of a law (or constitutional) state (Rechtsstaat). 
In 1961 the ICJ added a new attribute to the international concept of a law-state 
by identifying the rule of law with democracy, human rights and the right of 
peoples to self-determination. In the context of Africa, the dynamic concept of 
the rule of law makes the recognition of the right of self-determination of 
colonial and oppressed peoples a prerequisite for the creation of constitutional 
states. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE RULE OF LAW, DEMOCRACY, SELF-DETERMINATION 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
3.1 General 
Although the development of the concept of self-determination and that of 
human rights in the era of the United Nations go hand in hand (mainly through 
the mutual recognition both concepts receive in many of the same human rights 
instruments), it is proposed here (for the purpose of clarity), to trace, first, the 
development of the concept of self-determination in International Law; secondly, 
the linkage of the Rule of Law with the said concept; and thirdly, the 
internationalisation of the linkage. 
3.2 Self-Determination 
3.2.1 Historical Background 
As to the origins of the concept of self-determination, there are many (and 
varied) opinions. There are those who feel that its origins go back to the Greek 
city states, with as its primary source the idea of self-government. 1 Others date 
the earliest beginnings from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 when a limited 
principle of "religious equality" was given the sanction of international law. 2 Yet 
others would attribute the concept to Emperor Napoleon III who, as part of his 
ideological programme, embraced the principle of the "awakening of 
nationalities".3 Winston Churchill (who would later play a role in the modem 
1 Toynbee Hellinism (1959) implies this throughout with Athens being the best example. 
See also JM Kelly A Short History of Western Legal Theory (1991) 24-26. 
2 See Gross "The Peace of Westphalia 1648-1949" 1948 American Journal of International 
Law20-24. 
3 See Woolsley "Two Treaties of Paris" 1919 American Journal of International Law 81-83. 
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development of the concept) attributed the first practical implementation of the 
principle to the Italian nationalist ideologue, Mazzini.4 
Others argue that the origins of the concept can be traced back to the doctrine 
of divine kingship,5 upon which the relationship between the state and the 
subject was based from prehistoric times6 up till the 18th and 19th centuries. 
This doctrine held that the King not only derived omnipotent (or plenary7) 
powers8 from God, but also that he or she was the representative of the 
Supreme Being (or God) on earth. Thus the doctrine vested State sovereignty 
(including legislative, executive and judicial powers) in the King. 9 These 
absolute arbitrary powers entitled the rulers to make any law and impose any 
punishments they pleased. 10 The subjection of the people to arbitrary rule in 
this manner resulted in popular resistance against the system of divine kingship 
and demands for popular sovereignty. 11 Consequently, during the 18th and 
19th centuries a number of monarchies were overthrown and replaced with 
republican governments, 12 that is, governments of the people by the people and 
for the people. 13 (Ironically, without overthrowing the monarchy, the same 
4 Churchill The World in Crisis (1929) 208-209. 
5 See HP Blavatsky The Secret Doctrine London (1888) 29; Samuel Sharpe The Early 
History of Egypt (1936) 8; Bomwick Egyptian Belief and Modem Thought (1928) 103 and HA 
Wieshoff The Zimbabwe-Monomotapa Culture of South East Africa (1941) 105. 
6 On this period generally see Brian Brown The Wisdom of the Egyptians (1923) l 0-11; W 
Marshall Adams The Book of the Master or the Egyptian Doctrine of the Light bom of the 
Virgin Mother (1898) 111-113, Youssef Farag The Copts (1981) 299 and Ivan van Sertima The 
African Presence in ancient America - They came before Colombus (1976) 209. 
7 I.e. full and absolute powers. 
8 This doctrine was based on Matthew 16 vl8 to 19. It is believed that St. Peter derived 
these powers from Christ after recognising Him as the long awaited Messiah at Mount Caeserea 
in Phillipi; see Laoge The Three Great Semitic Religions (1978) 19. 
9 Thus imperial laws, decrees and commands came to be regarded as the laws, decrees and 
commands of Christ, made known through the emperor. See Ullman A History of Political 
Thought (1968) 357. 
10 This position found better expression in the maxim Quod princeps placuit vigorem 
habet legis (that which pleases the king has the force of law). See CP Joubert "Die 
Gebondenheid van die Soewereine Wetgewer aan die Reg" in 1952 THRHR 7 et seq. 
11 See Rousseau Social Contract (1975) 201; Edward D Ingraham (trans) An Essay on 
Crimes and Punishments (1819) 17-19. 
12 See S Pomorski American Common Law and the Principle Nullum Crimen Sine Lege 
(1975) 10-13. 
13 See "The American Declaration of Independence" in James Kent Commentaries on 
American Law vol. 11 (1971) 1-2. 
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process played itself out in Britian.) The struggles for these republican (or 
popular) governments took the form of popular demands for the right to self-
determination. 
The two most striking examples of this were the French Revolution and the 
American Revolution. The latter can be traced back to the American Declaration 
oflndependence of 4 July, 1 776, which declared that governments derived their 
just powers from the consent of those whom it governed, and that whenever 
such a government becomes destructive to these ends, the people have the right 
to alter or abolish it. After the overthrow of the ancient regime, the French 
National Assembly further developed the concept of self-determination when it 
stated that: 14 
"In the name of the French people the National Assembly declares that it will 
give help and support to all peoples wanting to recall their freedom. Therefore, 
the Assembly considers the French authorities responsible to give orders to grant 
all means of assistance to those peoples to protect and compensate the citizens 
who might be injured during their fight for the cause of liberty." 
The National Assembly's doctrine of popular sovereignty further required the 
renunciation of all wars of conquest and contemplated annexations of territory 
to France only after plebiscites had been held in the said territories. 15 
Although European Colonial powers denied African and Asian peoples the right 
to equality and self-determination,. these principles received qualified 
international recognition during World War 1. 16 On 27 May, 1916 President 
Wilson17 proclaimed that: 
"every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live." 
14 See Ingrid Delupis International Law and the Independent State (1974) 6-7. 
15 See Thiirer Encyclopaedia of Public International Law vol. 8 4 70. 
16 1914-1918. 
17 See US Congressional Record L III (Part 9) 8854. 
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In his message to Senate on 22 January, 1917 President Wilson18 again stated 
that: 
"No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognise and accept the 
principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the 
governed and that no right anywhere exists, to hand people about from 
sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property." 
In his Fourteen Points delivered to Congress on 11 February 1918 President 
Wilson proclaimed the principle of self-determination in definite and emphatic 
terms: 19 
"National aspirations must be respected, peoples may now be dominated and 
governed only by their consent. 'Self-determination' is not a mere phrase. It is 
an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their 
peril." 
In his Fourth Point Wilson made the principle of self-determination the basis of 
friendly relations among nations. 20 
Upon his return from the Peace Conference President Wilson21 observed on 24 
February 1924 that: 
"the central principle fought for in the war was that no government or group of 
governments has the right to dispose of the territory or to determine the political 
allegiance of any free people." 
18 See US Congressional Record L IV (Part 2) 1742. 
19 Ibid. 
20 The Fourth Point reads: 
"all well defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can 
be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and 
antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe and consequently 
of the world." Ibid. 
21 US Congressional Record LXVI 3785. 
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Finally, Wilson included the principle of self-determination in his first and 
second drafts of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The drafts required the 
contracting powers to agree that all future territorial adjustments would be 
pursuant to the principle of self-determination. To his disappointment this 
principle found no place in the final draft. The Allies accepted self-determination 
only insofar as it applied to the disintegration and dissolution of the German, 
Austro-Hungarian, Turkish and former Russian Empires. They had no intention 
of applying the principle to their own colonies and subject peoples as they still 
regarded them as objects of colonial expansion.22 
Self-determination merely found indirect support in article 22 of the Covenant 
of the League of Nations23 by which a mandates system was devised as a 
compromise solution between the ideal of self-determination and the interests 
of the occupying powers. However, self-determination as a general principle did 
not form part of the Covenant and was therefore, for the duration of the League 
of Nations, a political rather than a legal concept. This was confirmed by the 
Leagues' Council and its commission of rapporteurs in the Aaland Islands 
dispute (1920-1921)24 even though certain autonomy rights were granted to the 
population concerned.25 
In the meantime, however, the principle of self-determination had gained 
unqualified support from the Bolshevik. Revolution which proclaimed such 
progressive ideals as democracy, the right of self-determination of peoples, and 
protection for minority rights as the true aims of the allied cause in World War 
I. 26 The New Soviet State invested a revolutionary content in the principle of 
self-determination, viewing it as a programmatic principle in the struggle for 
22 See Tunkin [ed) International Law [1989) 42. 
23 See Harold S Johnson Self-determination within the Community of Nations [1967). 
24 See LoN, Official Journal, Vol. 21 [1921 2) 699. 
25 Ibid. These being mainly arrangements for the non-fortification and neutralisation of the 
island, and protection for the ethnic character of the island . 
26 See Slonim "Origins of the South West Africa Dispute: The Versailles Peace Conference 
and the Creation of the Mandates System" in IV The Canadian Yearbook of International Law 
[1968) 116. 
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abolishing social and national oppression and achieving socialist revolution. In 
this new formulation the principle of equality and self-determination of nations 
and peoples was viewed as "a consistent expression of struggle against all 
national oppression. "27 
In his Decree of Peace at the end of World War I Lenin formulated the principles 
of equality and self-determination of nations and peoples in more certain and 
definite terms. He proposed that:28 
"all the belligerent peoples and their governments ... start immediate 
negotiations for a just, democratic peace", 
and stressed that by: 
"such a peace the government means an immediate peace without annexations 
(i.e. without the seizure of foreign lands, without the forcible incorporation of 
foreign nations) and without indemnities." 
The Soviet Union took the lead by breaking with the tsarist colonial policy, 
denouncing all tsarist treaties of a colonial or unequal nature.29 
In practical terms, the Soviet Union incorporated the principles of equality and 
self- determination of nations and peoples in her treaties with eastern countries 
which certain European imperialist powers viewed as objects of colonial 
expansion. 3° For instance, in its treaty with Persia, the Soviet State condemned 
the policy of the former tsarist government that:31 
"not only violated the sovereignty of Asian States but were also conducive to the 
27 See Tunkin International Law 48. 
28 Ibid 146. 
29 See Lenin's concluding speech following the discussion on the report on peace (26 
October to 8 November) cited in Tunk.in International Law 48. 
30 See Tunk.in International Law 48. 
31 Ibid. 
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use of crude force by European predators in their relations with Eastern 
peoples." 
Thus the Soviet Union and other parties to the treaties recognised32 
"the right of each people to choose its own political destiny freely and without 
obstacles." 
In line with this principle the Soviet Union proclaimed the idea that unequal 
treaties had no legal force and accordingly annulled everything contained in her 
secret treaties33 with other countries insofar as it was aimed, as was mostly the 
case, at securing advantages and privileges for the Russian landowners and 
capitalists and the retention, or extension, of the annexations by the great 
Russians. This was probably the first time in history that a great power 
voluntarily renounced treaties that gave it rights and privileges in other 
countries.34 What is most significant, however, is that the Soviet Union 
represented the principle of self-determination as one oflnternational Law, 35 and 
not merely as something that was largely political, having no legal validity 
within the Law of Nations. 
The denial of equality and self-determination to African peoples aroused the 
spirit of African nationalism and anti-colonialism. As a result, African leaders 
in South Africa and other parts of the continent began to demand recognition 
of the right of African peoples to self-determination. 36 For two reasons the Allied 
Forces during WW II supported this demand. First, the dependent colonies had 
made great contributions in person power and resources to the war effort and, 
32 Ibid. 
33 From 1914 to 1916 Allied leaders, in anticipation of victory in World War I, had 
concluded a series of secret treaties for dividing up colonial spoils severed from Germany and 
Turkey. See Slonim "The Origins of the South West Africa Dispute" 115-116. 
34 See Tunkin International Law 49. 
35 See Thiirer Encyclopaedia of Public International Law vol. 8 4 70. 
36 See Jack and Ray Simons Class and Colour in South Africa 1850-1950 (1983) 386. Also 
see Pallo Jordan "Socialist transformation and the Freedom Charter" in 1986 African Journal 
of Political Economy 148. 
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secondly, there was the general feeling that the world should be put to rights, 
that richer and older nations should help people who were poor and 
underdeveloped to build themselves into new nations. 37 These factors forced the 
President of the United States of America, Mr. Roosevelt, and the Prime Minister 
of the United Kingdom, Mr. Churchill, to proclaim a new policy towards colonial 
peoples and territories. They incorporated this policy in the Atlantic Charter38 
of 14 August 1941. 
The Atlantic Charter affirmed the territorial integrity of dependent and 
independent territories and extended the right of self-determination to colonial 
peoples. More specifically, the signatories to the Charter39 
"desire[d] to see no territorial changes that [did] not accord with the freely 
expressed wishes of the people concerned" 
and they 
"respect[ed] the right of all people to choose the form of government under 
which they will live ... " 
and they wished to see 
"sovereign rights and self-determination restored to those who have been forcibly 
deprived of them ... ". 
At an inter-allied conference held in September 1941, the Soviet Union declared 
its agreement with the basic principles of the Atlantic Charter. 40 
37 See Andrew Cohen British Policy in Changing Africa (1959) 35, Hough Botswana 
Konstitusionele Ontwikkeling (1970) 8. 
38 For a text see 1941 AJIL 35 supp 19. 
39 See "The Atlantic charter" (14 August 1941) in US Senate Sub-Committee on the United 
Nations Charter Review of the United Nations Charter Senate Document no 87 Eighty-third 
congress (second session) 37-38. 
40 See Tunkin Theory of International Law (197 4) 62. 
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The Atlantic Charter came to be accepted throughout the colonial world as a 
proposal to give colonial peoples the right of full self-determination of their 
political affairs.41 Those who held such hopes were disappointed by Prime 
Minister Churchill42 who asserted that the Charter was not intended to apply to 
colonies but was concerned with the restoration of the sovereignty, self-
government, and national life of the States and Nations of Europe under the 
Nazi yoke. In all parts of the colonial world as well as many circles of Great 
Britain and the United States, Churchill's statement was interpreted as an 
exclusion of the colonial peoples from the high ideals of the Atlantic Charter. It 
was obvious from the pronouncement that Churchill sought to revert to the 
British policy of trusteeship which professed to grant self-government when it 
deemed the appropriate time had come.43 On the contrary, the Atlantic Charter 
had unequivocally extended the right of self-determination to colonial peoples. 44 
In his broadcast to the world in February 1942, President Roosevelt refuted 
Churchill's statement and reaffirmed the universality of the Atlantic charter by 
declaring that it was applicable "to all humanity. "45 
41 See H A Wieschhoff Colonial Policies in Africa (1944) 73. 
42 Shortly after his return from the meeting, on 9 September 1941, Mr Churchill declared 
in the House of Commons as follows: 
"The Joint Declaration does not qualify in any way the various statements of policy 
which have been made from time to time about the development of constitutional 
government in India, Burma, or other parts of the British Empire. We are pledged by the 
Declaration of August 1941 to help India to attain free and equal partnership in the 
British Commonwealth with ourselves, subject, of course, to the fulfilment of obligations 
arising from our long connection with her and our responsibilities to her many creeds, 
races, and interests ... At the Atlantic meeting we had in mind, primarily, the restoration 
of the sovereignty, self-government, and the National life of the states and nations of 
Europe now under the Nazi yoke and the principles governing any alternations in the 
territorial boundaries which may have to be made. So that it was quite a separate 
problem from the progressive evolution of self-governing institutions in the regions and 
peoples which owe allegiance to the British Crown. We have made declarations on these 
matters which are complete in themselves, free from ambiguity, and related to the 
conditions and circumstances of the territories and peoples affected. They will be found 
to be entirely in harmony with the high conception of freedom and justice which 
inspired the Joint Declaration." 
43 Cf the terms of Mandate B. See Louis "The South West African Origins of the 'Sacred 
Trust' 1914- 1919" in 66 African Affairs - Journal of the Royal African Society no 262 
(January 1967) 34. 
44 See§ (a) of the Atlantic Charter. 
45 See Wieschoff Colonial Policies in Africa 7 4. 
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The controversy surrounding the interpretation of the Atlantic Charter 
notwithstanding, pressures for decolonisation increased. These pressures came 
from various quarters including African political organisations46 and anti-
colonialist groups in Great Britain47 and the United Nations forum. 48 As late as 
April 1943 the West African Students' Union in London addressed to the 
Secretary of the Colonies an appeal which amounted to a demand for dominion 
status49 for the British territories of West Africa. A group of West African 
editors who had visited London in the same month issued a statement on "The 
Atlantic Charter and West Africa"50, demanding more precisely an expansion 
of self-governing institutions in this area. More specifically, they demanded the 
immediate abandonment of the "Crown Colony" system of government and the 
substitution thereof by a representative government for a period of ten years, 
to be followed thereafter by a responsible self-government for the territory. 
During the period of representative government, a British administration would 
remain in control of policy, subject, however, to local legislation. The 
legislative Council, while continuing to have some nominated official members 
without the right to vote, should be composed chiefly of unofficial members, 
elected by universal adult suffrage. These demands found support, inter alia, 
in a special issue of the Empire's Bi-monthly Record of January 1943. It 
46 These organisations included the African National Congress of South Africa which 
adopted a document entitled "African Claims in South Africa, including the Atlantic Charter, 
from the standpoint of the Africans within the Union of South Africa" [see James Leatt, Theo 
Kneiffell and Klaus Nurnberger Contending Ideologies in South Africa (1986) 90) as well as 
from the Pan African Congresses of the time. See Basil Davidson Africa in History (1984) 316. 
47 See Lord Hailey "A Colonial Charter", an address to the annual meeting of the Anti-
slavery and Aborigines Protection Society on 28 May, 1942. 
48 See The International Colonial Convention, issued in May 1943 by the Anti-Slavery and 
Aborigines Protection Society. Cited by Wieschhoff Colonial Policies in Africa 75. 
49 It is interesting to note that Britain had only granted dominium status to those colonies 
which were suitable for white settlement and self-government within a reasonable time. These 
colonies (which included South Africa and Southern Rhodesia) were granted self-government, 
and in the case of South Africa also independence, yet without ensuring that the white minority 
were not placed in such a position as to exercise undue political control. See James Hales "The 
Reform and Extension of the Mandate System; A Legal Solution of the Colonial Problem" in The 
Grotius Society (1941) 1 and Wieschoff Colonial Policies in Africa 77. 
50 See Memorandum by the West African Press Delegation (N Azikiwe, I B Thomas, Mallum 
Abubakar Imam, T G Tackie, RB Wuta Ofei, CV Jarret, TD J. Thompson, CW Downes 
Thomas, representing newspapers in Nigeria, Gold Coast, Sierra Leone and Gamiba). Ibid note 
4. 
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reproduced an open letter51 to the Secretary of State for the Colonies requesting 
the democratisation of the Commonwealth and the extension of the Atlantic 
Charter. The British resisted this under the pretext that the great diversity of 
social and political circumstances rendered it impossible to grant self-
government to their dependencies at that stage. 52 In other words, the British 
reaffirmed their policy of trusteeship over their dependencies. 53 
The British opposition to the right of African and Asian peoples to self-
determination suffered a deadly blow during the Big Four consultation on the 
formation of the United Nations organisation at San Francisco in 1945. Here, 
the Soviet Union first proposed the insertion among the purposes of the 
organisation of a clause that relations among the nations be based on respect 
for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. 54 During a 
press conference, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov indicated that his government 
supported the movement for dependent countries to achieve national 
independence as soon as possible. 55 The technical committee responsible for 
outlining the purpose and principles of the new organisation did not clarify the 
issue further. It merely recognised the principle of self-determination and went 
on to state that the principle56 
"conformed to the purposes of the charter only in so far as it implied the right 
of self-government of peoples and not the right of secession." 
51 The pertinent part of this letter read as follows: 
"You no doubt know that we, in this Bureau, have been pressing for an extension of the 
Atlantic Charter to the colonies ever since that Charter was formulated and Mr Churchill 
hedged about including the colonies in its scope. We have used whatever channel we 
could to bring home to your office and to the public in this country what a grave 
psychological error it was to omit the dependencies from an international proclamation 
of that sort. We asked that the Atlantic Charter should be declared unequivocally to be 
universal and in addition that a special Colonial Charter should be formulated in order 
to make our intentions for the future of the Colonies more specific and exact than the 
Atlantic charter itself is ... The Americans were asking for it. We in this country were 
asking for it. The Colonies were asking for it." 
52 See Wieschhoff Colonial Policies in Africa 76. 
53 See Slonim "The Origins of the South West Africa dispute" 116. 
54 See Ruth B Russel A History of the United Nations Charter (1958) 810. 
55 Ibid 811. 
56 UNCIO Documents (VI) 296. 
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The Belgian delegate attempted to narrow the application of the principle to 
freedom of self-government within the sovereignty of member states. He 
observed that the word "people" could mean either a state or a national group 
which did not identify itself with the population of a particular state, and that 
to adopt the latter meaning would be to open the door to intervention by one 
state into the affairs of another in order to champion the desires of such a 
group. 57 These arguments were refuted by the Report of the Rapporteur for the 
Committee. At the San Francisco Conference it indicated that the principles of 
equal rights and of self-determination of peoples were complementary parts of 
one standard of conduct, adding that an essential element of these principles 
was a free and genuine expression of the will of the people. 58 
The increased influence of the Soviet state on the international scene and the 
upsurge of national liberation movements generated by the struggle against 
fascism during World War II led to the incorporation of the principles of equal 
rights and self-determination of nations and peoples into the charter of the 
United Nations, which in tum catapulted it into the forefront of the international 
arena where it would develop into a basic tenet of modern International Law.59 
3.2.2 Development under the Aegis of the United Nations. 
3.2.2.1 Incorporation into the Charter of the United Nations 
The principle of self-determination as provided for in the Atlantic Charter, was 
restated in the declaration by the Allies signed in Washington on 1 January, 
1942. Ultimately, the Atlantic Charter's provisions had considerable influence 
on the San Francisco Conference ( 1945) where the concept of self-determination 
was further reshaped and ultimately incorporated into the United Nations 
Charter. 
57 Ibid 300. 
58 Ibid 396. 
59 See Tunkin International Law 142. 
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The United Nations Charter60 mentions self-determination twice: in Articles 1 
and 55. Article 1(2), which deals with the purposes of the organisation, states 
that one of these shall be 
"to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle 
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and to take other appropriate 
measures to strengthen universal peace." 
In Chapter IX [which is titled "International Economic and Social Co-
operation"), Article 55 lists several goals the UN should promote in the spheres 
of economics, education, culture and human rights: 
"with a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well being which are 
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for 
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United 
Nations shall promote higher standards of living, full employment, and 
conditions of economic and social progress and development." 
Apart from these general articles there is nothing in the Charter which specifies 
the right of developing countries to acquire independence and self-determination 
and no rules which safeguard such independence. 61 There is, however an 
implicit reference in the Charter in the part concerning colonies and other 
dependent territories. Article 73 affirms that : 
"Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the 
administration of territories whose people have not yet attained a full measure 
of self-government recognise the principle that the interests of the inhabitants 
of these territories are permanent, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to 
promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security 
established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these 
territories ... ". 
60 For a text of the UN Charter see F van Panhuys et al. International Organisation and 
Integration (1968) 18. 
61 See Ingrid Delupis International Law and the Independent State (1974) 7. 
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Further, Article 76(b) provides that one of the basic objectives of the trusteeship 
system is to promote the "progressive development" of the inhabitants of the 
trust territories towards "self-government or independence", taking into 
account, amongst others, "(t)he freely expressed wishes of the peoples 
concerned." Here, the obligations of the mandatories, as under the Covenant 
of the League of Nations,62 included an obligation to report to the UN on the 
developments in the mandated territories. 
Although there are those who would argue that the UN Charter thus made the 
concept of self-determination a legally binding principle according to 
international law,63 this view is to be doubted. The mere fact of its 
incorporation into the UN Charter would not seem to be enough evidence that 
the concept has becomejus cogens. It is true that the provisions concerning non 
self-governing and trust territories create binding international obligations, but 
the general principles of "self-determination" and of "equal rights" of peoples are 
framed too vaguely and are also too complex to entail specific rights and 
obligations. The Charter neither defines what constitutes "peoples" nor 
specifies the content of the principle. Thus, in the absence of any concrete 
definition, it cannot be realistically interpreted, applied or implemented in the 
framework of international law. More practically, the concept of self-
determination according to the Charter of the UN would seem to be an 
important guiding principle for the organs of the UN in the exercise of their 
powers and functions. This interpretation seems to be borne out in the text of 
Article 1(1) of the Charter where the concept is described as being one among 
several possible "measures to strengthen universal peace," and must therefore 
be of highly flexible nature in order to fulfil its instrumental function. This is 
borne out by the following observation made at the San Francisco Conference: 
62 See note 23 supra. 
63 See Tunkin International Law 142; also Cristescu "A study of the Historical and Current 
Development of The Right to Self Determination" cited from Lawson (ed) Encyclopaedia of 
Human Rights (1989) 1337; MK Nawaz "Colonies, Self-government and the United Nations" 
1962 Indian Yearbook of International Affairs 3-47. 
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"Self-determination was considered only as a means of furthering the 
development of friendly relations among states and to strengthen universal 
peace. It was regarded, not as independent value, but only as second to the goal 
of peace, with the obvious consequence that it might and indeed should be set 
aside, when its fulfilment would give rise to tension and conflict among states. "64 
The Charter perspective on self determination comes to the fore most clearly in 
the Chapters on Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, where the term self 
determination is not specifically mentioned.65 In these chapters independence 
is never stated as an absolute and immediate goal for all dependent territories. 
The emphasis is rather on "self-government", which may or may not include 
independence, on the "progressive development" of a territory's free political 
institutions, and on permissible variations in the governing regimes in 
territories, based on the "particular circumstances of each territory and its 
peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned." 
At most, self-determination represented, in the words of a noted author,66 "one 
of the desiderata of The Charter." The UN Charter thus failed to provide for an 
adequate decolonisation strategy. 
3.2.2.2 Development through UN practice. 
A turning point in the attitude of the UN towards self-determination occurred 
on 14 December, 1960, when the General Assembly adopted The Declaration 
on The Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. 67 In the 
Declaration the UN recognised "the passionate yearning for freedom in all 
dependent peoples" and declared that: 
64 Antonio Cassese "The Helsinki Declaration and Self-Determination" in Thomas 
Buergenthal (ed.) Human Rights, International Law and The Helsinki Accord (1977) 84. 
65 Michla Pomerance "Self-determination Today: The Metamorphosis of an Ideal" 1984 
Israel Law Review 311. 
66 Yehuda Z Blum "Reflections on the Changing Concept of Self-Determination" 1975 Israel 
Law Review 511. 
67 Resolution 1514 (XV). This resolution originated as a proposal of a group of Afro-Asian 
states and was passed 89 to 0 with 9 abstentions. (Portugal, Spain, USA, UK, South Africa, 
Australia, Belgium, France and the Dominican Republic). 
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"The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination, and exploitation 
constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of 
the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and 
cooperation. "68 
And further that 
"[A]ll peoples have the right to self-determination: by virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development. "69 
The Declaration goes further to say that immediate steps are to be taken to 
transfer, without reservation, all powers to the peoples in the trust and non-self-
governing territories or all other territories which had not yet attained 
independence, "in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire. "70 
Thus for the first time the UN declared self-determination to be a right to which 
all peoples were entitled, and further, gave the right an economic, social and 
cultural content. The head of India's delegation, Jha, was so pleased with the 
declaration that he called it "one of the noblest declarations, one of the noblest 
resolutions coming out of the United Nations .... There is nothing further that 
can be done - no pretext can be advanced for delaying the freedom of dependent 
peoples. "71 
This Declaration can be seen as the source of the modern legal right of self-
determination, a view echoed by Dugard.72 To many members (of the UN) this 
declaration legitimised the view of many newly independent states that 
colonialism was an illegality while it also emphasised the need for 
decolonisation. 
68 Art 1. 
69 Art 2. 
70 Art 5. 
71 Miljan Peter Ilich Newly Independent Nations and their Radical Perspectives on 
International Law (LLD-Thesis City University of New York 1977) 133. 
72 Dugard Recognition and The United Nations (1987) 158. 
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The next step in the development of the concept of self-determination by the 
General Assembly was the adoption of the International Covenants on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and on Civil and Political Rights on 16 
December, 1966. These covenants further interpreted and greatly expanded the 
principle of self-determination. The Covenants share an identical Article 1 
which states that all people have the right to self-determination. 
By its inclusion in the common Article 1 of the Covenants, the concept of self-
determina tion was firmly established as a fundamental human right or, put 
more accurately, it was established as a source or essential prerequisite for the 
existence of individual human rights, since these rights could not genuinely be 
exercised without the realisation of the (collective) right to self-determination.73 
At its twenty fifth session (1970), the General Assembly unanimously passed 
the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the 
UN.74 Critescu75 describes this declaration as the most "authoritive and 
comprehensive formulation so far of the principle of self-determination". The 
declaration first proclaims that self-determination is a basic principle of 
international law pertaining to friendly relations and co-operation between 
states. It goes further to say that the right to self-determination encompasses 
the right of all peoples to choose for themselves their political status and to seek 
their economic, social and cultural development. 
3.2.2.3 The International Court of Justice 
The International Court of Justice at The Hague has given the right of self-
determination considerable recognition, mainly through views voiced by its 
members in the Barcelona Traction case, and the South West Africa and 
Western Sahara advisory opinions. 
73 Thilrer Encyclopaedia of Public International Law vol. 8 4 72. 
74 GA Resolution 2625 (XXV). 
75 Critescu "A study of the Historical and Current Development of the Right to Self 
Determination" in Lawson (ed.) Encyclopaedia of Human Rights (1989) 1338. 
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In the Barcelona Traction case, 76 it was not the official judgement that is 
relevant to the present subject, but the concurring opinion of Justice Amoun 
(from Lebanon). The judge emphasised that the right of self-determination was 
now one of the "imperative rules of law." He indicated that it became a rule of 
law largely due to the General Assembly resolutions and declarations 
elaborating and applying UN Charter principles. He stated that the 
"international law-making nature of these declarations and resolutions cannot 
be defined, having regard to the fact that they reflect well-nigh universal public 
feeling." Amoun J. goes on to say that against those who proclaim that self-
determination is not a right in International Law, "there stands arrayed, once 
again, with the support of a Western minority, the serried ranks of the jurists, 
thinkers and men of action of the Latin-American and Afro-Asian countries, as 
well as of the socialist countries. For all of them self-determination is now 
definitely part of positive international law. "77 
In the 1971 South West Africa advisory opinion the International Court of 
Justice also gave a great degree of recognition to the existence of the right to 
self-determination. 78 From the opinion of the court it is clear that the crucial 
reason for its decision that South Africa's rule of Namibia was illegal was that 
the principle of self-determination was violated by that rule. This decision was 
reinforced by the GA resolutions and actions to remove South African control 
over Namibia. The court stated emphatically:79 
"Further, the subsequent development of international law in regard to the non-
self-goveming territories, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, 
made the principle of self-determination applicable to all of them ... A further 
important state in this development was the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples ... which embraces all peoples 
and territories which have not yet attained independence ... ". 
76 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company (Ltd) /CJ Reports (1970) 310. 
77 Ibid 312. 
78 Legal consequences for states of the continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) /CJ Reports (1971) 
75. 
79 Ibid 31-32. 
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In the Western Sahara Advisory opinion80 the International Court of Justice 
again saw fit to decide in favour of the legal nature of the principle of self-
determination. The court took as its main source for its finding on the 
international standing of the said principle, the General Assembly, and cited a 
number of relevant resolutions, especially 1514(XV) and 2625(XXV). In its 
decision the court ruled against the claims of Morocco and Mauritania to the 
Spanish Sahara which would have denied the residents the right of self-
determination. The Court stated that it: 
"has not found legal ties of such a nature as might affect the application of 
resolution 1514[XV) in the decolonization of Western Sahara, and in particular, 
of the principle of self-determination through the free and genuine expression of 
the will of the peoples of the territory ... " .81 
Under the auspices of the UN, mainly through the General Assembly and the 
International Court of Justice, the principle of self-determination was developed 
from being a guiding principle for the UN to become a basic principle of 
International Law. Recognition for this has come from many quarters. The 
I 
International Law Commission mentioned it as a possible peremptory norm in 
its commentary on the Draft Articles of the Law of Treaties. 82 Dugard argues 
that once the right to self-determination is recognised asjus, it would seem to 
follow by necessary implication that it is jus cogens in the light of the pivotal 
position it occupies in the contemporary international public order.83 On the 
basis of these developments and practice in the UN, Espiell boldly declares that 
"today no-one can challenge the fact that, in the light of contemporary 
international realities, the principle of self-determination necessarily possesses 
the character of jus cogens. "84 
80 Western Sahara Advisory Opinion ICJ Reports (1975) 31-34. 
81 Ibid 68. 
82 Dugard Recognition and the United Nations (1987)159. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
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3.2.2.4 Self-Determination and Human Rights 
The historical and current development of the right to self-determination shows 
that it has become an important concept in contemporary International Law, 
and that it influences all aspects of the modern international arena, be it of a 
political, legal, social or cultural nature. But its influence is of special 
importance in the matter of the fundamental human rights of individuals and 
peoples. 
As shown, the ICJ linked the rule of law with fundamental human rights. 85 The 
latter were endorsed almost universally as the substantive content of the rule 
oflaw. 86 With the development of the UN, third world or emerging states gained 
an important forum through which they could voice their concerns. They had 
a decided influence in the development of modern international law. Thus, as 
the numerical influence of the non-aligned new nations grew in the GA, and as 
the balance of power between the US and the USSR made them more eager to 
court the third world's favour, the newly independent states were enabled to 
influence the GA in such a way as to bring to the forefront of the world stage 
many of their grievances. In particular, the third world played an important part 
in the development of the right to self-determination.87 This can be seen by the 
readiness with which many scholars from third world nations proclaimed self-
determination as a principle of International Law. 88 Rahmatullah Khan89 goes 
even further by stating that not alone was self-determination part of 
International Law, but that it was "responsible for the universalization of 
85 See chapter 2 paragraph 2 supra. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Thiirer states that "(t)he principle of self-determination in its modem conception also 
appears as a principle of legitimacy underlying and inspiring the evolution of International 
Law." Thiirer Encyclopaedia of Public International Law vol. 8 4 75. 
88 See Umozurike Self Determination in International Law (1972) 270; Tunguru Huoraka 
"The 1971 Advisory Opinion on South West Africa (Namibia)-Colonial International Law 
Rejected" 1972 East African Law Review 5 192-195; Sagay "The Legal Status of Freedom 
Fighters" 1973 East African Law Review 6 24; S. Jayakumar "The Philipine claim to Sabah and 
International Law" 1968 Malay Law Review 10 327; RC Hingarani (ed.) International Law 
through the United Nations (1972) 193-194. 
89 Rahmatullah Khan "International Law - Old and New" 1966 Indian Journal of 
International Law 6 496. 
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international law . . . It is common knowledge that this principle wrought a 
revolution in the character and content of International Law." 
The principle of self-determination of peoples is a vital feature of International 
Law as it is regarded as being the basis for development on the one hand, and 
more importantly, it is the most important principle of International Law 
concerning friendly relations and co-operation amongst states. If one keeps in 
mind that one of the four aims of the UN as laid down in the Charter is the 
promotion of friendly relations amongst nations, 90 then it follows that UN 
activity is incompatible with any form of subjection or pressure exerted by the 
strong against the weak and that all relations between states must be based on 
the sovereign equality of states, and further, that the equal rights and self-
determination of peoples have as their corollary sovereign equality. 
It can thus be said that self-determination for many states did have the effect 
of bringing awareness for fundamental human rights to many comers of the 
world where these had been absent. This is because self-determination has 
become a prerequisite for the meaningful recognition and effective protection 
of fundamental human rights. 
This is, however, not a new idea in International Law at all. An early landmark 
concerning the relationship between human rights and self-determination was 
GA Resolution 637(vii), passed on 16 December 1952, which states in its 
preamble that 
"the right of people and nations to self-determination is a prerequisite to the full 
enjoyment of all fundamental human rights." 
The resolution goes on to confirm that 
90 See in this regard GA Resolution 637(VII) The Right of Peoples and Nations to Self-
Determination. 
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'(t)he Charter of the United Nations, under Articles 1 and 55, aims to develop 
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the equal rights and self-
determination of peoples in order to strengthen universal peace ... " 
There can, however, be no achievement of the high ideals of the United Nations 
as long as peoples continue to be dominated by aliens, thus denying them the 
right to determine their own destiny, and preventing them from exercising their 
fundamental right to freedom, independence and self-determination. 
The right to self-determination is a collective right, it is a fundamental human 
right91 which forms part of the international legal order that was established by 
the Charter of the UN. The beneficiaries of this right are peoples. Individuals 
participate directly and through the realisation of their human rights in the 
exercise of this right. Thus the collective right of self-determination concerns 
each individual, as the deprivation of that right would mean the loss of 
individual rights. 92 As Pomerance93 states: 
"Within the United Nations it has become axiomatic that self-determination is 
the imperative basis of all human rights." 
The General Assembly, in Article 1 of Resolution 1514 stated unequivocally that 
the denial of self-determination was a denial of fundamental human rights. Alex 
Quaison-Sackey,94 the statesman from Ghana, said that this declaration 
"made it clear that the subjection of peoples to alien forces is in itself a denial of 
91 See CC Mojekwu "Self-Determination: The African Perspective" in Friedlander Self-
Determination: National, Regional and Global Dimensions (1980) 232, 234. 
92 Cristescu states that the "universal realisation of the right to self-determination is of great 
importance for the effective guarantee and observance of fundamental human rights. At the 
same time, the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
contributes to the implementation of the right to self-determination; the guarantee and 
observance of the various individual human rights and freedoms contribute, in the area of their 
exercise, to the realisation of the different aspects - political, economic, social and cultural - of 
the right to self-determination.". See Critescu "A study of the Historical and Current 
Developments of the Right to Self Determination" 1339. 
93 Pomerance "Self-determination Today: The Metamorphosis of an Ideal" 332. 
94 Alex Quaison-Sackey Africa Unbound (1963) 139. 
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fundamental human rights and therefore contrary to the Charter of the United 
Nations ... ". 
The International Covenants95 in their common Article 1 once again established 
the dependence of individual human rights on the collective right of self-
determination. States were, through those Covenants, given an obligation to 
respect the right of peoples to freely determine their political status and to 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development. 
By endowing "peoples" with the right to freely determine their political status, 
it is implied that governments owe their existence and powers to the consent 
of those they govern. Thus· the will of the people is the basis of the 
government's authority (this being classic democratic theory). That democracy 
is part and parcel of self-determination is borne out by the many definitions 
given to the concept of self-determination. Higgins96 defines it as the "right of 
the majority within an accepted political unit to exercise power." Johnson97 
defines it as the "the process by which a people determine their own sovereign 
status." Umozurike98 argues that the first basic characteristic of self-
determination is "government according to the will of the people." 
Thomas99 defines self-determination as including: 
"the right of a people to determine freely and without compulsion, the form of 
their government, the people who shall administer their government, the 
governmental machinery and the rules to which their government must 
conform." 
Although these definitions only take into account the political content of self-
determination, they serve to emphasise that, as Pomerance states: 100 
95 See para 2.2.2 supra. 
96 Higgins The Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the 
United Nations (1963) 105. 
97 Johnson Self-Determination within the Community of Nations (1972) 27. 
98 Umozurike Self-Determination in International Law 270. 
99 Amy van Wynen Thomas et al Non-Intervention (1956) 369. 
100 Pomerance "Self-determination Today: The Metamorphosis of an Ideal" 337. 
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"Democracy, human rights and representative government within the state are 
part and parcel of the concept of self-determination." 
It can thus be said that peoples have the right to self-determination. This right 
is part of International Law101 and is a prerequisite for recognition and 
protection of individual human rights and a democratic form of government is 
needed after self-determination has been granted. 102 
3.3 Development of International Human-Rights Law 
3.3.1 Historical and Philosophical Background 
The roots of international human rights law stretches back to the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century humanist philosophy103 and is inextricably linked with the 
101 Thiirer suggests that a new rule of International Law has emerged which holds that "a 
state established in violation of the right to self-determination (and basic human rights such as 
racial discrimination) is a nullity in International Law." As a basis for this argument he points 
to the fact that the international community recognised neither Southern Rhodesia before the 
elections on the basis of one man one vote, nor the "homelands" established on the territory of 
South Africa: Encyclopaedia of Public International Law vol. 8 4 75. 
102 Thi.irer states that "(i)f finally, at the close of the age of colonialism, self-determination 
as a principle is to become truly universal in scope, it should be developed in the sense of a 
continuing process of internal self-government - i.e. democratic government..." ibid. 
103 Samuel Pufendorf summed up the principle of humanity in the following words: 
"Das Wesen des Menschen besteht in seiner sittlichen Freiheit. Gott steht i.iber dem 
Gesetz weil er sich selbst Gesetz ist. Die Tiere stehen ausserhalb des Gesetzes und 
werden von ihren Naturtrieben beherrscht. Die Wiirde der menschlichen Natur verlangt 
dagegen eine sittlich gewordene Freiheit, ohne welche, Ordnung, Zucht und Schonheit 
im Menschlichen leben nicht denkbar waren. Schon im blossen Namen Mensch liegt 
eine Wi.irde und da diese allen Menschen Gleichermassen zukommt, ist jeder dem 
anderen von Natur gleich. Diese natiirliche Gleichheit ist keine physisiche, sondern eine 
"rechtliche" Gleichheit, die darauf beruht, dass die Pi1icht zur Geselligkeit und 
Humanitat alle Menschen gleichermassen bindet, weil sie mit der menschlichen Natur 
als socher verkni.ipft ist. Darum gibt es keine Sklaven von Natur; 
Herrschaftsverhaltnisse konnen nur durch freie Zustimmung begri.indet werden ... ". 
Pufendorf derived certain human rights, namely the principles of equality and non-
discrimination, from this humanist philosophy. See Die Gemeinschaftspjlichten des 
Naturrechts (Ausgewahlte Sti.icke aus "De Officio Hominis et Civis") (1973) 14. Note that 
Hermetic ancient African and Greek philosophers derived the principle of equality from the 
principle of consubstantiality between the Logos of God and man. Thus the consubstantiality 
of God and man embued every person with worth and dignity making all persons equal in rights 
and dignity. See Deinhard Das Mysterium des Menschen (1910) 262. Also see Otto Willman 
Geschichte des Idealismus (1973) 43 and William Robson Civilisation and the Growth of Law 
(1941) 201. 
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right of peoples to self-determination. 104 The rudiments of international human 
rights law are traceable in the Declaration of the French National Assembly 
which recognised the right of other peoples to self-government. The National 
Assembly undertook not only to support struggles for freedom but also to adopt 
a policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other nations. 105 
Although the French National Assembly adopted this policy, it can be said that 
exactly the opposite policy, namely that of "humanitarian intervention" in the 
internal matters of a state, also provided a basis from which international 
human rights developed. The doctrine of humanitarian intervention in cases 
where a state committed atrocities against its own subjects which shocked the 
conscience of mankind thus provided a limited exception to the doctrine of 
national sovereignty. 106 In the nineteenth century it was used largely against the 
Ottoman Empire. 107 Strictly speaking, according to the doctrine of national 
sovereignty, those matters were the sole concern of the Ottoman Empire. Yet 
through the doctrine of humanitarian intervention liberal western powers 
interceded on behalf of the peoples concerned (especially the British under 
Gladstone in the case of the people of Bulgaria). 
Thus throughout the nineteenth century up till World War II there were some 
international commitments to the settling of disputes where the doctrine of 
human rights was invoked. However, those commitments did not involve the 
question of the individual's right to political freedom or to material welfare. 
They were limited to the right of European minority groups to self-
govemment. 108 The Berlin Treaty of 1885 extended the doctrine of human 
rights to the protection of colonial peoples in terms of the principle of 
trusteeship. More specifically, the Treaty protected their freedom of conscience 
104 See para 2.2.4 supra. 
105 See Delupis International Law and the Independent State (1974) 6-7. 
106 See Sieghardt The International Law of Human Rights (1983) 13. 
107 In 1827 on behalf of the Greek people, by France and Syria in 1860-1861, and again in 
1876 when 12000 Christians were massacred by irregular Ottoman troops in what is today 
Bulgaria: ibid 13. 
108 See Helle Kanger Human Rights in the UN Declaration (1984) 11-12. 
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and religion. 109 During World War I the Allied Forces increasingly lay emphasis 
on the moral and liberal goals of the war. Thus progressive ideals such as 
democracy, the right of self-determination of peoples, and protection of minority 
rights were proclaimed as the true aims of the war. The Bolshevik Revolution 
confirmed this development and gave cause to the principle of self-
determination to be extended to the peoples of Africa and Asia as well as of 
Europe. 110 
Hence, in his Fourteen Points President Wilson 111 called for 
"a free, open minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims" 
based on the principle 
"that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the 
populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the 
government whose title is to be determined." 
No wonder that at the end of World War I the Allied Forces incorporated, 
though vaguely, the right of people to self-determination in the covenant of the 
League of Nations. 112 
During the inter-war years some people felt that more could be done 
internationally to safeguard the basic rights of man. Under the League of 
Nations certain Minority Treaties were concluded. These sought to protect the 
rights of certain linguistic and ethnic minorities which fell within new state 
territories created by the Treaty of Versailles and St. Germain. Sieghardt113 sees 
theseas"precursorsofmoderninternationalhumanrightsinstruments."114 This 
109 See Article 6 of the Treaty. 
110 See note 26 supra. 
ll l See note 18 supra. 
112 See note 22 supra. 
u
3 See Sieghardt The International Law of Human Rights 13. 
114 In this regard Sieghardt refers especially to article 4 of the German Polish Convention 
on Upper Silesia of 1922. He states that it "broke new ground in guaranteeing rights of 
individuals - including the rights to life, liberty and the free exercise of religion, and equal 
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period also saw the beginning of international collaboration in a number of 
humanitarian fields. Examples of this include: 
( 1) International Treaties created under the influence of the Red Cross concerning 
prisoners of war. 
(2) The establishment of the International Labour Organisation in 1919. 
(3) The "Slavery Convention" of 1926. 
In 1929 therefore, the Institute of International Law took a step which had a 
tremendous influence on a movement which was to culminate in the human 
rights provisions in the Charter of the United Nations. That Institute was made 
up of distinguished international lawyers from Europe, the Americas and Asia. 
One of their aims was "the voicing of the legal conscience of the civilised world." 
In pursuit of this aim the Institute adopted the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man. 115 
Considering that the judicial conscience of the civilised world demanded 
recognition for the individual of rights, preserved from all infringements on the 
part of the state, and that it was important to extend to the entire world 
international recognition of the rights of man, the Institute adopted in six short 
Articles what it considered to be the duties of every state with respect to the 
rights of the individual. The Declaration proclaimed that it was the duty of 
every state to recognise: 
(a) the equal rights of every individual to life, liberty and property and to accord to 
all within its territory the full and entire protection of this right without 
distinction as to nationality, sex, race, language or religion;116 
(b) the right of every individual to the free practice, both public and private, of every 
faith, religion or belief, provided that the said practice shall not be incompatible 
treatment before the law - even against States whose own nationals they were": ibid. 
115 For a text see 35(2) Annuaire (1929) 298-300. 
116 Article 1. 
48 
with public order and good morals; 117 
(c) the right of every individual both to the free use of the language of his choice 
and to the teaching of such language;118 
(d) that no motive based directly or indirectly on distinctions of sex, race, language 
or religion empowered states to refuse to any of their nationals, private and 
public rights, especially admission to establishments of instruction, and the 
exercise of the different economic activities, and professions; 119 
(e) that the equality as contemplated in the Declaration is not to be nominal, but 
effective, and that it excludes all discrimination direct or indirect;120 
(0 that except for motives based upon its general legislation, no state shall have the 
right to withdraw its nationality from those whom have attained it for reasons 
of sex, race, language or religion, it should further not deprive individuals of the 
guarantees contemplated in the Declaration. 121 
Although the Declaration of the Institute of International Law did not have 
international validity it popularised the concept of human rights during the 
inter-war years. 122 
Consequently, when the Nazi regime deprived the individual of both civil and 
political rights, subjecting him to police tyranny and the most brutal oppression 
on the grounds of race or religion, the attention of the world focused acutely on 
the question of the protection of human rights internationally. As the Second 
World War progressed, opinions were voiced from different quarters all over the 
world as to the place of human rights in the international order which was to 
follow the cessation of hostilities. The statesmen of the United Nations took the 
lead in the international human-rights movement. They insisted that the 
foundations of peace must be built on a respect for the rights of man. 123 
117 Article 2. 
118 Article 3. 
119 Article 4. 
120 Article 5. 
121 Article 6. 
122 See Ezejiofor Protection of Human Rights under the Law (1964) 53. 
123 Ibid 53-54. 
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In his message to Congress in January 1941 President Roosevelt124 lent support 
to the international human rights movement when he referred to the "Four 
essential human freedoms" to which he looked forward as the foundation of the 
future world. These freedoms were: 
( 1) freedom of speech, and expression; 
(2) freedom of every person to worship God in his own way; 
(3) freedom from want and 
(4) freedom from fear, for all peoples everywhere in the world. 
Moreover, the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great 
Britain set out in the Atlantic Charter of 1941: 125 
"the common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on 
which they based their hopes for a better future of the world." 
They included among these principles the right of peoples to self-determination 
and went on to say that after the destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hoped 
"to establish a peace which will afford assurance that all men in all lands may 
live out their lives in freedom from fear and want." 
The Atlantic Charter had a profound influence upon the thinking of other world 
leaders. Thus in the preamble to the Declaration of "26" United Nations issued 
on 1January1942126 it was stated that these nations subscribed to the purpose 
and principles of the Atlantic Charter. They also believed that the destruction 
of the Nazi regime was necessary to defend life, liberty, independence and 
religious freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice in their own as well 
as in other lands. 
124 See 35 1941 American Journal of International Law suppl 193. 
125 See note 38 supra. 
126 See UNYB (1946-4 7) 1. 
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Late in the summer of 1944 the representatives of four super powers127 had 
conversations at Dumbarton Oaks in Washington in connection with the future 
world order following the end of the war. 128 The declarations by world leaders 
and governments on the one hand, and the pressures of private human rights 
organisations and individuals on the other hand, persuaded the Dumbarton 
Oaks Conference to put the question of human rights high on their agenda. The 
Conference agreed upon the following human rights provision: 129 
"With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well being which are 
necessary for the peaceful and friendly relations among nations, the 
organisations should facilitate solutions of international economic, social and 
other humanitarian problems and promote respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. Responsibility for the discharge of this function should 
be vested in the General Assembly, in the Economic and Social Council." 
Less than a year after the Dumbarton Oaks Conference sponsoring powers 
invited other countries to send representatives to a United Nations Conference 
in San Francisco. 
The San Francisco Conference was convened to prepare "a charter for a general 
international organisation for the maintenance of international peace and 
security. "130 Several delegations, particularly from small countries and the 
United States, attended the conference determined to exert pressure sufficient 
to bring about the strengthening of the human-rights provision in the 
Dumbarton Oaks text. Contrary to the racial policies of his government, the 
Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa, General Smuts, strongly supported 
the demand for the amendment of the Dumbarton Oaks text. He said: 
127 They included the USSR, USA, UK and China. See Ezejiofor Protection of Human 
Rights under the Law 55 note 16. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid. 
130 The Conference lasted between 25 April and 26 June 1945. Ibid 56 note 19. 
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"I would suggest that the Charter should contain at its very outset, and in the 
preamble, a declaration of human rights and of common faith which had 
sustained the Allied Peoples in their bitter and prolonged struggles for the 
vindication of these rights and that faith ... We have fought for justice and 
decency and for the fundamental freedoms and rights of man, which are basic 
to all human advancement and progress and peace." 
Finally, the sponsoring powers gave their support to the proposed amendment 
to the Dumbarton Oaks text and adopted the United Nations Charter. 131 The 
"International human rights movement" also forced the Paris Peace Treaties of 
194 7 to include human rights provisions. Each of the defeated enemy states 
undertook: 132 
"to take all measures necessary to secure to all persons under its jurisdiction without 
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, the enjoyment of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms including freedom of expression, of the press and publication, 
of religious worship, of political opinion and of public meeting." 
3.3.2 International Human Rights Instruments 
3.3.2.1 General 
The development of the international human rights law culminated in the 
adoption of the United Nations Charter (1945) 133 and the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (1948). 134 These instruments gave further impetus to the 
development of international human rights law and its incorporation into 
131 See note 60 supra. 
132 See Italy (Article 5); Rurnania (Article 3(1); Bulgaria (Article 2); Hungary (Article 2(1)); 
and Finland (Article 6). See 1947 BAYIL 392-398 and Interpretation of Peace Treaties ICJ 
Reports (1950) 221. 
133 For the text see F van Panhuys L J Brinkhorst and H H Maas International 
Organisation and Integration (1968) 25. 
134 Ibid. 
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regional and municipal laws. In this paragraph these UN documents are briefly 
analysed and their impact on the further developments of international human 
rights law is traced. 
3.3.2.2 The United Nations Charter 
In June 1945 the founding members signed the United Nations Charter at San 
Francisco. The charter entered into force on 24 October of the same year. 135 
The adoption of the UN Charter marked the birth of a new international politico-
legal order based on the principles of equal rights and self-determination of all 
peoples and nations. These principles are incorporated in Articles 1 (2) and 55 
of the Charter. 136 
Articles 11, 12 and 13 of the Charter which concern the administration of non-
self- governing territories and trust territories reflected the international concern 
for such territories. 137 To achieve the objectives embodied in articles 1 (2) and 55 
of the Charter regarding these territories the UN adopted a decolonisation 
strategy138 requiring colonial powers to promote to the utmost, in terms of the 
UN Charter, the well-being of colonial peoples and 
(a) ensure their political, economic, social, and educational advancement, their just 
treatment and their protection against abuses; 
(b) to develop self-government and to assist them in the progressive development 
of their free political institutions. 
Similar obligations were imposed on States which administer trust territories. 139 
The UN Charter, like the covenant of the League of Nations, imposed a duty on 
colonial powers to report to the UN on the developments in trust territories, but 
failed to provide safeguards to ensure that peoples of such territories actually 
135 See AH Robertson Human Rights in the World (1970) 23. 
136 See para 2.2.1 supra. 
137 See Delupis International Law and the Independent State 7-8. 
138 See article 73 of the UN Charter. 
139 See article 76. 
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do attain independence. Arguably, chapter 11 was devised to replace colonial 
aspirations with the concept of self-government of territories under the 
administration of members of the UN, but it failed to provide the UN with the 
machinery to deal with colonial questions. 140 
3.3.2.3 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
In the autumn of 1945 the preparatory commission of the UN General Assembly 
recommended that the Economic and Social Council should immediately 
establish a commission on human rights and direct it to prepare an 
international Bill of Rights. The General Assembly approved that 
recommendation on 12 February 1946. The Commission on Human Rights was 
constituted within a matter of months. 
The first regular session of the Commission opened in January 1947, and its 
task was the drafting of the International Bill of Rights. In 1948 the 
Commission submitted a draft Bill of Rights through the Economic and Social 
Council to the GA. The Commission also submitted at the same time a draft 
Covenant prepared by the drafting committee. At its third session held in Paris 
in the autumn of 1948 the GA decided to consider only the draft declaration 
which was subsequently adopted on 1 O December 1948. 141 
In its preamble the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) recognised 
the humanist doctrine which holds that the inherent dignity and the equal and 
inalienable rights of all persons is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace. 
The preamble acknowledged that disregard and contempt of human rights was 
an impediment to the enjoyment of human rights. 142 Thus the preamble 
identified the rule of law and the concept of human rights in the following 
terms: 
140 See Delupis International Law and the Independent State 8. 
141 See A H Robertson Human Rights in the World 25-26. 
142 See Atlantic Charter, note 39 supra. 
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" ... It is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse as a last resort, 
to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be 
protected by the rule of law." 
Furthermore, the preamble established a direct link between the Universal 
Declaration and the UN Charter making the former an integral part of the 
latter. 143 It declared that: 
"the peoples of the United Nations have in the charter reaffirmed their faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and 
in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social 
progress and better standards of life in larger freedom." 
The preamble imposes a duty on member states to co-operate with the United 
Nations in the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. 144 Finally the preamble declared the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights a common standard of achievement for 
all peoples and nations and made it applicable to both dependent and 
independent peoples. In short, the preamble of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, like ancient and humanist philosophers, derived the concept of 
human rights from the worth and dignity of the human personality and reduced 
them to the substantive (or material) content of the rule of law. 
The preamble provides a framework for the thirty Articles which form the 
corpus of the Declaration and without which many of the provisions of those 
articles would not be easy to understand. The thirty articles of the Declaration 
may be classified into four main categories: 
143 See Elias Africa and the Development of International Law (1988) 185. 
144 Cf preamble of the UN Charter. 
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1. Personal rights of the individual 
The Declaration captures the humanist doctrine which holds that all human 
beings are born free in equal dignity and rights and that they should act 
towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. 145 On that basis it extended all 
rights and freedoms to every person without distinction of any kind, such as 
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status. 146 Then the Declaration set out the rights 
and freedoms in question: 
(a) that everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person;147 
(b) that slavery or servitude and the slave trade are forbidden; 148 
(c) that no one may be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment;149 
(d) that the right of everyone to recognition everywhere as a person before the law 
is guaranteed; 150 
(e) that all are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to 
equal protection of the law;151 
(f) that every person is entitled to an effective judicial protection of his 
constitutionally or legally guaranteed rights; 152 
(g) that everyone is guaranteed freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention or exile;153 
(h) that, in the determination of his legal rights, and obligations and of any criminal 
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal; 154 
(i) that an accused person is entitled to be presumed innocent until proved guilty 
according to law, and that no one may be found guilty of any criminal offence 
145 Article 1. 
146 Article 2. 
147 Article 3. 
148 Article 4. 
149 Article 5. 
150 Article 6. 
151 Article 7. 
152 Article 8. 
153 Article 9. 
154 Article 10. 
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which was not such an offence at the time of its commission, nor may a heavier 
penalty be imposed than the one applicable when the offence was committed; 155 
UJ that everyone is entitled to freedom from arbitrary interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence or from attacks upon his honour and 
reputation; 156 
(k) that everyone is entitled to freedom of movement and residence within the 
borders of each state, and to leave any country, including his own, and to return 
to his country; 157 
(1) that the right of asylum is guaranteed except for crimes or acts contrary to the 
purpose and principles of the United Nations; 158 
(m) that everyone is entitled to a nationality, and may not be arbitrarily deprived of 
it or denied the right to change it;159 
(n) that the right of all men and women of full age to marry and found a family, 
without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, is guaranteed and that 
society and the state must protect the family as the natural and fundamental 
group unit of society; 160 
(o) and that everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association 
with others, and that he must not be arbitrarily deprived of it. 161 
2. Civil and political rights 
The Universal Declaration did not incorporate the right of peoples to self-
determination but it embodies rights and freedoms which are conditions 
precedent to the enjoyment of the right to self-determination. 162 These rights 
and freedoms include: 
(a) freedom of thought, conscience and religion including freedom to change one's 
religion or belief and to manifest it, either alone or in community with others, 
155 Article 11. 
156 Article 12. 
157 Article 13. 
158 Article 14. 
159 Article 15. 
160 Article 16. 
161 Article 17. 
162 See Elias Africa and the Development of International Law 186. 
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in teaching, in practising, worshipping and observance, in freedom of opinion 
and expression, including freedom to hold opinions without interference and in 
seeking, receiving and imparting information and ideas is also guaranteed; 163 
(b) that everyone is entitled to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, and 
a person cannot be compelled to belong to an association. 164 
Finally the Declaration impliedly elaborated on the right of peoples to self-
determination by guaranteeing the right of every person to take part in the 
government of his country either directly or through freely chosen 
representatives, and providing that every person is entitled to equal access to 
public service in his country, and that the basis of the authority of government 
must be the will of the people as expressed in periodic and genuine elections 
conducted on a universal and equal suffrage and held by secret ballot or equally 
free voting procedures. 165 
3. Economic, social and cultural rights 
The Declaration did not only recognise the worth and dignity of the human 
personality166 and its inherent rights, but also his or her right to social security 
and to realisation of the econontic, social, and cultural rights necessary for his 
or her dignity and free development. In line with the worth of the human 
personality and its right to development and social security the Declaration 
provides: 
(a) that everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and 
favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment; that 
everyone, without discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work; that 
everyone who works is entitled to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for 
himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity and supplemented, 
if necessary, by other means of social protection; and that everyone has the right 
163 Articles 18 and 19. 
164 Article 20. 
165 Article 21. 
166 Article 22. 
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to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests; that everyone 
has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working 
hours and periodic holidays with pay;167 
(b) that everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and 
well-being of himself and of his family, and motherhood and childhood are also 
entitled to special care and assistance and all children, whether born in or out 
of wedlock must enjoy the same social protection; 168 
(c) everyone is entitled to have free education from the elementary and fundamental 
stages and compulsory in the elementary stage, and education should be 
directed to the full development of the human personality and to the 
strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; 169 
(d) that everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the 
community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its 
benefits, as well as the right to the protection of the moral and material interests 
resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the 
author; 110 and 
(e) that everyone is entitled to a social and international order conducive to the full 
realisation of the rights and freedom set forth above. 171 
4. Social obligations of the individual 
The Declaration recognises the interdependence between the rights of the 
individual and those of society and the limitations of individual rights resulting 
from the rights of others. 172 Thus it imposes duties on every member of the 
society. Finally the Declaration warns member states against any manipulation 
of its provisions. 173 
The Universal Declaration succeeded in capturing the principle of humanity and 
167 Article 24. 
168 Article 25. 
169 Article 26. 
170 Article 27. 
171 Article 28. 
172 Article 29. 
173 Article 30. 
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its inherent doctrine of equal rights and dignity of individual members of the 
human family and reducing it to the substantive (or material) content of 
contemporary international law. Furthermore, it internationalised the 
seventeenth end eighteenth century rights of the individual and introduced 
social, cultural and economic rights as well as the duties of the individual 
towards society and the state. Finally, and most significantly the Universal 
Declaration derived the concept of human rights from the worth and dignity of 
the human personality and identified these rights with the doctrine of the rule 
of law. 
3.3.2.4 The Covenants 
Resolution 217(111) of 10 December 1948 not only approved the text of the 
Universal Declaration but also decided that work should go ahead on the two 
other parts of the International Bill of Rights - namely the Covenant containing 
legal obligations to be assumed by states, and measures of implementation.174 
The first draft Covenant produced by the Commission on Human Rights was 
devoted to the classical civil and political rights. When the GA was consulted 
on the matter in 1950 it decided that economic, social and cultural rights 
should also be included. 175 After a long debate the GA decided in 1952 that 
there should be two separate Covenants, with as many similar provisions as 
possible, and that both should include an article on the right of all peoples to 
self-determination. 176 These resolutions not only affirmed the right of peoples 
and nations to self-determination but also recognised it as a prerequisite to the 
full enjoyment of all fundamental human rights. 177 Thus it recommended that 
member states of the United Nations should 
174 See Robertson Human Rights in the World 28-29. 
175 See General Assembly [GA) Resolution 42l[V) of 4 December 1950. 
176 See GA Resolutions 543[VI) and 545[VI) of 5 February 1952. 
177 See Louis B Sohn and Thomas Buergenthal International Protection of Human Rights 
(1973) 516. 
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"uphold the principle of self-determination of all peoples and nations; recognise 
and promote the realisation of the right of self-determination of the peoples of 
non-self-governing and trust territories who are under their administration and 
shall facilitate the exercise of this right by the peoples of such territories 
according to the principles and spirit of the UN Charter in regard to each 
territory and to the freely expressed wishes of the people being ascertained 
through plebiscites or other recognised democratic means, preferably under the 
auspices of the UN; 
take practical steps, pending the realisation of the right of self-determination and 
in preparation thereof, to ensure the direct participation of the indigenous 
populations in the legislative and executive organs of government of those 
territories, and to prepare them for complete self-government or independence." 
During the protracted debates on the proposed Covenants various UN members 
insisted that the Covenants should contain an article defining the principle of 
self-determination. 
Consequently a serious debate ensued concerning whether or not, in Covenants 
dealing with the rights of individuals, the principle of self-determination of 
peoples could be considered a correlative. Into this discussion developing 
countries managed to inject the principle of permanent (or inalienable) 
sovereignty over natural wealth and resources. In the jargon of the Human 
Rights Commission, as well as its draft article on self-determination, this 
principle came to be known as economic self-determination. 178 
The Commission on Human Rights completed its work by 1954, and submitted 
its draft texts to ECOSOC and the GA (Report of the Tenth Session of the 
178 See James N Hyde "Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Wealth and Resources" in 50 
1956 American Journal of International Law 855. 
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Commission). 179 When the draft Covenants prepared by the Human Rights 
commission were being considered by the Third Committee of the GA, it 
devoted its attention largely, over a period of nearly 10 years, to the substantive 
rights. There was also much discussion of the right of all peoples to self-
determination, which was incorporated in the Common Article 1180 of the 
Covenants. 
During the years 1956-58 the Articles relating to economic and social rights 
were approved with a good deal of detailed revision but with little major 
amendment. In 1958 the UN General Assembly noted that the right of peoples 
and nations to self- determination as affirmed in the two draft Covenants 
included the principle of permanent sovereignty over their natural resources 
and resolved to establish a Commission to conduct a full survey of the status of 
this basic constituent of the right of self-determination. 181 Further, in 1960 the 
General Assembly reiterated the duty of the UN to accelerate the economic and 
social advancement of developing countries so as to contribute to safeguarding 
their independence and helping to close the gap in standards of living between 
developing and developed countries. 182 
In the same year ( 1960) the UN General Assembly consolidated the relationship 
179 See document E/2573 62-72. 
180 The adopted text read: 
"l. All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of this right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development. 
2. The peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and 
resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international 
economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and 
international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of 
subsistence. 
3. The States parties to the Covenant having responsibility for the administration 
of non-self-governing, and trust territories shall promote the realisation of the 
right of self-determination in such territories in conformity with the provisions 
of the United Nations Charter". 
See UN Doc NC3 l L 489. 
181 See Johnson Self-determi.nati.on within the Community of Nations 40. 
182 See GA Resolution on "Concerted Action for Economic Development of Economically 
Developed and of Economically Less Developed Countries." Resolution l 5 l 5(IV) of 15 December 
1960. 
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between the right of political and self-determination of peoples under the 
Declaration on the Granting oflndependence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. 
This Declaration reaffirmed, first, the UN's faith in fundamental human rights 
and, secondly, in line with the broad right of self-determination elaborated on 
the decolonisation strategy of the UN contained in Article 73 of the UN 
Charter. 183 The 1960 UN decolonisation strategy is so important to this thesis 
that it must be reproduced in full. It holds that: 184 
(a) the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation 
constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the UN Charter 
and is an impediment to the promotion of World Peace and co-operation; 
(b) all peoples have the right to self-determination and by virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development; 
(c) inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should 
never serve as a pretext for delaying independence; 
(d) all armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent 
peoples shall cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their 
right to complete independence, and the integrity of their national territory shall 
be respected; 
(e) immediate steps shall be taken, in trust and non-self-governing territories or all 
other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers 
to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in 
accordance with their freely expressed will and desire without any distinction as 
to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence 
and freedom; 
(0 any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the 
territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purpose and principles 
of the charter of the United Nations; 
(g) all states shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the 
United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the present 
183 See note 138 supra. 
184 This resolution incorporated the principle of self-determination embodied in the 
proposed Covenants. See Johnson Self-determination within the Community of Nations 41. 
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Declaration on the basis of equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of all 
states, and respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples and their territorial 
integrity. 
In sum, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples invalidated the principle of trusteeship embodied in the Berlin 
Treaty of 1885, the Covenant of the League of Nations and the UN Charter itself. 
It outlawed colonialism in all its forms. 185 Furthermore, it outlawed the 
suppression of popular struggles against colonial rule, violation of the integrity 
of colonial territories, called on all colonial powers to transfer all power to 
colonial countries and peoples. And finally and perhaps most significantly, the 
Declaration called on all states to bring their social, economic and social orders 
in line with the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration as well as its own 
provision. 
The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples has been described as an important landmark in the anti-colonialist 
trend. Put mildly, the Declaration was described as a bold interpretation of 
Article 73 of the UN Charter. 186 No wonder that even the (mainly Western) 
states which had abstained when the resolution was adopted in 1960 later came 
to accept it as an accurate statement of modern international law, 187 a view 
which was later echoed by the International Court of Justice. 188 
During the first half of the sixties the UN General Assembly reaffirmed the 
185 Note that as early as 1955 colonialism was outlawed by the Bandung Charter which 
stated that colonialism is an evil that must be brought to an end, and that "the subjection of 
peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constituted a denial of fundamental 
human rights contrary to the UN Charter and an impediment to the promotion of freedom and 
independence for all such peoples", and, finally, called upon colonial powers to grant freedom 
and independence to colonial countries and peoples. See The Institute of Pacific Relations 
Selected Documents of Bandung Coriference 1955. 
186 See Michael Akehurst A modem introduction to International law 6th edit. (1987) 294. 
187 Ibid. 
188 Ibid. 
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principle of economic self-determination in a number oflandmark resolutions. 189 
For instance, in 1962 the General Assembly190 declared: 
(a) that the right of peoples to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and 
resources must be exercised in the interest of their national development and of 
the well being of the state concerned; 
(b) nationalisation, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds or 
reasons of public utility, security or the national interest which are recognised 
as overriding purely individual or private interests, both domestic and foreign. 
In such cases the owner shall be paid appropriate compensation in accordance 
with the rules in force in the state taking such measures in the exercise of its 
sovereignty and in accordance with international law; 
(c) violation of the rights of peoples and nations to sovereignty over their natural 
wealth and resources is contrary to the spirit and principles of the UN Charter. 
In short, this resolution invalidated the colonial policy of exploitation of the 
resources of colonial territories without regard to the economic interests of those 
territories. This resolution (together with the 1960 Declaration) therefore, dealt 
a deadly blow to the colonial system. 
To implement the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to the Colonial 
Countries and Peoples the GA established a special committee on the situation 
with regard to implementation of the Declaration (the committee of seventeen) 
and charged it with the duty to study the application of the Declaration and 
make suggestions and recommendations on the progress and extent of its 
implementation. 191 The committee was enlarged in 1962 by the addition of 
seven members. 192 In 1963, the GA dissolved the committee on information 
from non-self-governing territories, 193 which with the transfer of responsibilities 
189 For a full discussion of these resolutions see Fritz Visser "The Principle of Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources and the Nationalisation of Foreign Interests" 1988 CILSA 
177. Also see James W Nickel Making Sense of Human Rights (1987) 6. 
190 See UN GA Resolution 1803 [XVII) of 14 December 1962. 
191 See UN GA Resolution 1654 [XVI) of 27 December 1961. 
192 See GA Res 1810 [XVII) of 7 December 1962. 
193 See GA Res 1970 (XVIII) of 16 December 1963. 
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previously assigned to special committees relative to designated territories made 
the Special Committee of Twenty-Four the only body responsible for matters 
relating to dependent territories with the exception of the Trusteeship 
Council. 194 Membership on the Committee was tailored to the wishes of the 
anti-colonial interests, with special regard to geographical distribution. It has 
with only two exceptions remained constant. 195 
Since its establishment, the Special Committee has in general become a 
Steering Committee for much of the activity of the GA. 196 It received human 
rights petitions and held hearings with petitioners. On the basis of these 
petitions and hearings they made recommendations to the GA. Subsequently 
the GA adopted a number of other resolutions on equality and on natural 
resources. 197 These resolutions were also of great importance to the position of 
developing nations under international law and to their right of self-
determination. 198 
During the Seventeenth Session, the General Assembly invited the Special 
Committee to appraise the Security Council of any developments in the 
dependent territories which might threaten international peace and security. 199 
The Committee consistently drew the attention of the Security Council to the 
situation in the dependent territories in Southern Africa and other parts of the 
world. Three years later200 the General Assembly requested the Special 
Committee to recommend a deadline for the accession to independence of each 
territory, in accordance with the wishes of the people. The Committee was 
further requested to pay particular attention to the small territories, 
194 See Johnson Self-determination within the Community of Nations 42. 
195 Ibid 37. 
196 Ibid 42. 
197 These resolutions include: GA Resolutions 626 (VIII), 1236 (XII), 1301 (XIII), 1495 (XV), 
1565 (XV) 1686 (XVI), 1803 (XVIII), 1815 (XVII), 1904 (XVIII), 1966 (XVIII) and 2158 (XXI). See 
Detter "The Problem of Unequal Treaties" in 1960 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 1071. 
198 See Delupis International law and the Independent State 10. 
199 See GA Res 1810 (XVII) of 17 December 1962. 
200 See GA Res 2105 (XX) of 20 December 1965. 
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recommending the most appropriate ways, as well as the steps to be taken, to 
enable their population to exercise fully their right to self-determination and 
independence. In its reports the Special Committee repeatedly emphasised that 
the principle of trusteeship no longer applied to small nations.201 Thus the 
Special Committee saw its mandate in the efforts to find the most effective ways 
of enabling small nations to achieve a status of self-government by 
independence. It had come to be accepted that a full measure of self-
government was satisfied either by "emergence as a sovereign independent 
state," "free association with an independent state", or "integration with an 
independent state". 202 
The 1965 resolution recognised "the legitimacy of the peoples under colonial 
rule to exercise their right to self-determination and independence" and invited 
"all states to provide material and moral assistance to the national liberation 
movements in colonial territories." In effect, this resolution granted legitimate 
nationalist movements an international status. 
Henceforth support for national liberation movements increased. For instance, 
a year later the General Assembly adopted a resolution which affirmed not only 
the principle of the prohibition of the use of force in international relations, but 
also the right of peoples to self-determination. 203 This resolution recognised that 
peoples subjected to colonial oppression were entitled to seek and receive all 
support in their struggles which were in accordance with the purposes of the 
charter. Thus it declared that any force which deprived peoples of this right 
was itself a violation of the UN Charter. Numerous speakers during the debate 
took the view that oppressed peoples were free to use force in their struggle for 
independence. 204 Thus in the resolution condemning all forms of intervention 
201 The Special Committee rejected the principle on trusteeship on the basis of GA Res 1514 
of 16 December 1960 which stated that 
"inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve 
as a pretext for delaying independence." 
202 See Johnson Self-determination within the Community of Nations 43-44. 
2ro See GA Res 2160 (XXI) of 30 November 1966. 
204 See Johnson Self-determination within the Community of Nations 154. 
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in the domestic affairs of States205 it was stated that assistance to national 
liberation movements would not be considered an intervention in the domestic 
affairs of other states and that under certain circumstances it could be strongly 
recommended in defence of the right of self-determination of the peoples 
concerned. In an earlier resolution of 13 December, 1966, the GA reaffirmed all 
its previous resolutions, approved the sending of visiting missions to the 
dependent territories, declared the continuation of colonial rule a threat to 
international peace and security and reaffirmed, further, "its recognition of the 
legitimacy of the struggle of the peoples under colonial rule to exercise their 
right to self-determination and independence" and urged "all states to provide 
material and moral assistance to the national liberation movements in colonial 
territories." 
Three days later, the GA unanimously approved the draft Covenants on human 
rights. 206 In accordance with the decision of the GA taken in 1952, both 
Covenants start off in identical terms, with a common Article 1 on the right of 
self-determination. This Article reaffirmed the termination of the principle of 
trusteeship207 and stated that the right of self-determination was an existing 
right, was of immediate application and resulted in the right of All Peoples to 
determine freely their political status. In subsequent paragraphs it reaffirmed 
the right of economic self-determination and its interlinkage with the right of 
political self-determination. 
Articles 2-5 of both Covenants constitute Part II thereof. These Articles contain 
in each case an undertaking to respect, or to take active steps to secure 
progressively, the substantive rights contained in Part III of both Covenants. 
Article 2(1) of the Covenant on Civil and Political rights imposes an immediate 
obligation on states to respect and to ensure to all individuals within their 
territory and subject to their jurisdiction the rights recognised in the Covenant. 
205 See GA Res 2225 (XXI) of 19 December 1966. 
206 See GA Res 2200 of 16 December 1966. 
201 See Article 1(3). 
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In short, it imposes on states parties the obligation to maintain a defined 
common standard. To accommodate states who could not meet this standard 
immediately, Article 2(2) provided for a progressive (rather than an immediate) 
obligation to take the necessary steps to adopt such legislative or other 
measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognised by the 
Covenant, in cases where they were not already provided for in the municipal 
law. 
Article 2(1) of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights contains a standardised 
non-discrimination clause while Article 2(3) provides for a remedy for persons 
whose rights have been violated. The remaining articles in Part II provides for: 
the equality of the sexes (Art 3); the possibility of derogation in times of public 
emergency (Art 4); prohibition against the abuse of these rights (Art 5).208 
Unlike its counterpart, the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
contains a progressive (not an immediate) obligation in terms of which states 
parties accept standards which they intend to promote and which they pledge 
themselves to secure progressively, to the maximum extent possible having 
regard to their available resources. This is the natural result of the difference 
in the nature of the rights recognised in the two Covenants. In short, the former 
is a mandatory, while the latter is a promotional Convention.209 
Of the remaining general provisions in the Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, the non-discrimination clause (Art 2(2)) is similar to that in the 
other Covenant, as are the texts on the equality of sexes (Art 3) and the 
prohibition on the abuse of the rights secured and the Articles containing the 
General Saving clause. The Article on limitations (or derogations) is very 
different. It only permits derogations which are determined by law and are 
solely made for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic 
208 Cf article 30 of the Universal Declaration. 
209 See Robertson Human Rights in the World Today 39 et seq. 
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society.210 No reference is made to a state of emergency, which is the condition 
precedent for derogations in the other Covenant. Finally, Article 2(3) contains 
a provision designed to protect developing countries from economic exploitation 
by their more powerful neighbours. The harshness of this provision is mitigated 
by protection of the right of property by the Covenant. 
The rights which the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is designed to 
protect are set out in Part III. They are the following: the right to life; freedom 
from torture and inhuman treatment; freedom from slavery and forced labour; 
right to liberty and security; right of detained persons to be treated with 
humanity; freedom from imprisonment for debt; freedom of movement and of 
choice of residence; freedom of aliens from arbitrary expulsion; right to a fair 
trial; protection against retroactivity of the criminal law; right to recognition as 
a person before the law; right to privacy; freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion; freedom of opinion and of expression; prohibition of propaganda for 
war and of incitement to national, racial or religious hatred; right of assembly; 
freedom of association; right to marry and found a family; rights of the child; 
political rights; equality before the law; rights of minorities.211 
A comparison of the Covenant of Civil and Political Rights with the Universal 
Declaration shows that the rights set out in the former are generally defined in 
greater detail and include rights which were not incorporated in the latter 
instrument.212 The right of property (which was included in Article 17 of the 
Universal Declaration) is not included in either covenant as states parties could 
not reach agreement owing to their different political philosophies.213 
It is not proposed to examine in detail the definitions of any of the Civil and 
Political Rights set out in the Covenant save to observe that Articles 25 and 27 
further amplified the right of self-determination. Article 25 affirms and 
210 See Article 4. 
211 Articles 6- 27. 
212 These Articles include 10, 11, 20, 24 and 27. 
213 See Robertson Human Rights in the World Today 37. 
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amplifies certain political rights embodied in Article 21 of the Universal 
Declaration. Article 25 provides: 
"Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the 
distinctions mentioned in Article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions: 
(a) to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives; 
(b) to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by 
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot guaranteeing the 
free expression of the will of the electors; 
(c) to have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country." 
To prevent the domination of the minorities by majorities resulting from the 
application of Article 25 the Covenant in Article 27 provides that: 
"In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons 
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with 
the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and 
practice their own religion, or to use their own language." 
It is quite clear that Article 25 seeks to implement the right of peoples to self-
determination, while Article 27 merely seeks to protect minority rights within 
a democratic society. In other words, Article 27 does not grant minority groups 
the right of political self-determination within existing states. It merely protects 
their right to use their own language, practise their own culture and religion. 
The Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, like its counterpart, 
contains a somewhat longer list and more detailed definitions than those in the 
Universal Declaration. Owing to the admission of an increasing number of 
developing countries as new members of the UN, the original six Articles in the 
Universal Declaration were increased to ten in the Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights. The rights protected by the latter are the following: 
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the right to work; the right to just and favourable conditions of work, including 
inter alia fair wages, equal pay for equal work and holidays with pay; the right 
to form and join trade unions, including the right to strike; the right to social 
security; protection of the family, including special assistance for mothers and 
children; the right to an adequate standard of living, including adequate food, 
clothing and housing and the continuous improvement of living conditions; the 
right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health; the right 
to education, primary education being compulsory and free for all, and 
secondary and higher education generally accessible to all. 214 Article 14 permits 
the progressive implementation of this right. Finally, Article 15 grants the right 
to participate in cultural life and enjoy the benefits of scientific progress. The 
other provisions relate to implementation mechanisms. 215 As was said, the 
major difference between the two Covenants is that the first is a mandatory 
while the latter is a promotional convention. 216 
In 1970 the General Assembly adopted "The Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. "217 This Declaration 
further amplified aspects of the right of self-determination which it considered 
necessary to guarantee in order to implement the UN Charter and to secure 
international peace and security. In this resolution the General Assembly 
recalled that the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and 
exploitation constituted a major threat to the promotion of international peace 
and security and declared that: 
"By virtue of the principles of equal rights and self-determination for peoples 
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have the right freely 
to determine, without external interference their political status and to pursue 
214 See Articles 6 - 13. 
215 For a discussion of these articles see Robertson Human Rights in the World Today 37 
et seq. 
216 Ibid 40. 
217 See GA Res 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970. 
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their economic, social and cultural development, and every state has the duty 
to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the charter." 
Under this resolution, therefore, the right of self-determination involves not only 
to remain free from foreign domination, but also a right of the citizens to elect 
a government representing the people of a territory as a whole. In other words, 
the right of self-determination is applicable to sovereign (or independent states 
such as South Africa) where only a section of the population elect the 
government. At the same time the resolution guaranteed the territorial integrity 
of states.218 
Finally, in resolution 130of1977 219 the General Assembly explicitly extended 
the right of self-determination to "sovereign" states such as South Africa. In 
this resolution the General Assembly decided that the approach to future work 
within the United Nations system with respect to human rights questions 
should take account of certain concepts, including the following: 
"In approaching human rights questions within the United Nations system, the 
international community should accord, or continue to accord, priority to the 
search for solutions to the mass and flagrant violations of human rights of 
peoples and persons affected by situations, such as those resulting from 
apartheid, from all forms of racial discrimination, from colonialism, from foreign 
domination and occupation, from aggression and threats against national 
sovereignty, national unity and territorial integrity, as well as from the refusal 
to recognise the fundamental rights of peoples to self-determination and of every 
nation to the exercise of full sovereignty over its wealth and natural resources." 
In 1979 the General Assembly recalled that disregard and contempt for human 
rights have resulted in barbarous acts which outraged the conscience of 
mankind and reaffirmed that mass and flagrant violations of human rights were 
of special concern to the United Nations. Thus it urged the appropriate UN 
218 See Delupis International Law and the Independent State 11. 
219 See GA Res 32\136 of 16 December 1977. 
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bodies, within their mandates, particularly the Commission on Human Rights, 
to take timely and effective action in existing and future cases of mass and 
flagrant violations of human rights. 
Finally, the Commission on Human Rights invited the sub-commission to bring 
to its attention any situation which it had reasonable cause to believe revealed 
a consistent pattern of violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
in any country, including policies of racial discrimination, segregation and 
apartheid, with particular reference to colonial and other dependent 
territories. 220 
3.3.3 Regional Human Rights Instruments 
3.3.3.1 General 
The UN Charter and Universal Declaration of Human Rights gave impetus to the 
development of regional human rights instruments such as the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights and 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights. The object of this paragraph 
is not to analyse at any great length any of these regional human rights 
instruments, but to trace the role of international human rights instruments on 
the evolution of regional human-rights law and its incorporation in the 
municipal laws of European and African countries. The focus will fall mainly 
on the European Convention, the Inter-American Convention and the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. 
3.3.3.2 Europe 
3.3.3.2.1 Background 
The same factors which led the United Nations to concern itself with the 
protection of human rights, led to the growth of European concern therein. 
These factors are, first, a natural reaction against the Nazi and fascist tyrannies 
which suppressed human rights as a deliberate instrument of national policy 
220 See BG Ramcharan The Concept and Present Status of the lnternati.onal Protecti.on of 
Human Ri.ghts (1989) 6. 
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and even as a precondition of their establishment and secondly, during the 
immediate post-war years it soon became evident that the democratic systems 
of Europe needed protection against the possible revival of Nazism and Fascism. 
European leaders realised that the preservation of democracy and the 
maintenance of the rule of law required foundations on which to base the 
defence of human personality against all tyrannies and forms of 
totalitarianism. 221 
After World War II Western Europe sought the defence of the human personality 
in the doctrine of human rights of the seventeenth century222 and the 
international Human Rights instruments.223 The history of the European 
Convention on Human Rights dates back to 1947. Immediately after the war 
there came into being a number of important private organisations in different 
countries campaigning for European unity.224 In December 1947 these 
organisations decided to form the International Committee for the Movements 
for European Unity, to co-ordinate their actions and to conduct a joint campaign 
throughout the continent. This committee in 1948 organised the historic 
Congress of Europe at the Hague. The objects of the Hague Conference were:225 
(a) to demonstrate the widespread support for the cause of European unity existing 
throughout the free countries of Europe; 
(b) to make practical recommendations to governments for its realisation; 
(c) to provide a fresh impetus and inspiration to the campaign. 
The Congress adopted a political resolution in which it demanded the convening 
of a European Assembly chosen by the Parliaments of the participating nations 
from among their members or others, which, inter alia, was to advise upon 
immediate practical measures designed progressively to bring about the 
221 See Robertson Human Rights in the World Today 51. 
222 See Ezejiofor Protection of Human Rights under the Law 97. 
223 See Robertson Human Rights in the World today 51. 
224 Ibid 51 et seq. 
225 See Ezejiofor Protection of Human Rights under the Law 98. 
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necessary economic and political union of Europe; to examine both the juridical 
and constitutional implications and the likely economic and social consequences 
of the creation of such a Union or Federation, and to prepare the necessary 
plans for the above purposes. The resulting Union or Federation was to be open 
to all democratically governed European Nations which undertook to respect a 
Charter of Human Rights. 
The Congress set up a commission and charged it with the function of 
undertaking immediately the double task of drafting a Charter of Human Rights 
and of laying down standards to which a State had to conform if it was to 
deserve the name of a democracy. The bottom line for a democratic State 
required any aspirant State to guarantee to its citizens liberty of thought, 
assembly, and expression as well as the right to form a political opposition. 
Furthermore, the European Assembly was required to make proposals for the 
establishment of a Court of Justice with adequate sanctions for the 
implementation of the Charter and to this end any citizen of the associated 
countries was to have redress before the court, at any time and with the least 
possible delay, for any violation of his rights as formulated in the Charter.226 
Further, the Congress adopted a Cultural Resolution in which it affirmed its 
commitment to human rights as the basis of their efforts for a united Europe, 
but expressed the view that human rights would be insufficiently protected by 
an agreement only. Hence it stated that it:227 
"(c)onsiders it essential for the safeguard of these rights that there should be 
established a Supreme Court with supra-state jurisdiction to which citizens and 
groups can appeal; and which is capable of assuring the implementation of the 
charter." 
226 Ibid 99. 
221 Ibid. 
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Finally, the Congress issued a "Message to Europeans" stating that:228 
"We desire a United Europe throughout whose area the free movement of 
persons, ideas and goods is restored; 
We desire a charter of Human Rights guaranteeing liberty of thought, assembly 
and expression as well as the right to form a political opposition; 
We desire a Court of Justice with adequate sanctions for the implementation of 
this Charter; 
We desire a European Assembly where the forces of all our nations shall be 
represented." 
Pursuant to the resolutions of the Hague Congress, the Council of Europe, made 
up of a consultative Assembly and a Committee of Ministers was formed on 5 
May, 1949. 
The primary aim of the Council of Europe was to achieve greater unity between 
its members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and 
principles which they claimed as their common heritage, and to facilitate their 
economic and social progress. They sought to achieve this aim, inter alia, by 
agreements and common action in the maintenance and further realisation of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. Further, and perhaps m:ore 
significantly, the Council of Europe made a condition of its membership 
acceptance of the principles of the rule of law and the enjoyment by all persons 
within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
The European Movement drew up a draft Convention on Human Rights and 
referred it to the Committee of Ministers in July 1949 requesting the Committee 
to place the matter on the agenda of the Consultative Assembly. In August 
228 Ibid. 
77 
1949 the Assembly placed the matter on its agenda under the item "measures 
for the fulfilment of the declared aim of the Council of Europe, in regard to the 
maintenance and further realisation of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms". After discussion, the Assembly instructed the Committee of 
Ministers to draw up a Convention providing a collective guarantee and 
designed to secure the effective enjoyment of the rights and freedoms 
proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December 1948. 
Following a long debate in both the Committee of Ministers and the 
Consultative Assembly the Committee of Ministers signed the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms at 
their sixth session held in Rome on 4 November 1950. The convention came 
into force on 3 September 1953. Soon after, a Committee of Experts drew up a 
Protocol defining the rights which were omitted from the Convention. The 
Protocol, including the rights of election, property and education, was signed on 
30 March 1952 and it came into force on 18 May 1954.229 
3.3.3.2.2 The Rights and Freedoms guaranteed 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) had a major influence on the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 230 This appears in the preamble of the 
convention in which the Signatory Governments, Members of the Council of 
Europe, recalled, inter alia, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
reaffirmed their profound belief in fundamental freedoms as the foundation of 
justice and peace in the World and that these freedoms could best be 
maintained by an effective political democracy. Secondly, the convention linked 
political democracy and fundamental freedoms by resolving that: 
"as governments of European Countries which are like-minded and have a 
229 Ibid 99-101. 
23° For a text see De Villiers et al (ed.) Human Rights Documents that Paved the Way 
(1992) 45. 
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common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law, to 
take the first steps for collective enforcement of certain of the rights stated in the 
Universal Declaration." 
Pursuant to this resolution the high contracting parties took twelve rights from 
the Universal Declaration and incorporated them into the European · 
Convention.231 Further, they took three more rights from the Universal 
Declaration and included them in the Protocol.232 
The rights and freedoms guaranteed to everyone within the jurisdiction of the 
High Contracting Parties are: 
(a) the right to life; 
(b) freedom from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; 
(c) freedom from slavery or servitude; 
(d) the right to liberty and security of person; 
(e) the right to fair trial; 
lO freedom from retroactive legislation; 
(g) the right to respect for private and family life; 
(h) the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; 
(i) the right to freedom of expression; 
Ul the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association; 
(k) the right to marry and found a family;233 
(1) the right to seek an effective local remedy for the violation of any of the rights 
and freedoms set out in the Convention and Protocol;234 
(m) freedom from discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set 
forth in the Convention and Protocol;235 
(n) the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions;236 
231 Cf Articles 2-12 and 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
232 Cf Articles 1 7, 21 and 26 of the Universal Declaration and Articles 1-3 of the Protocol. 
233 Articles 2-12 
234 Article 2. 
235 Article 13 of the Convention and Article 5 of the Protocol. 
236 Article 1 of the Protocol. 
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(o) the right to education;237 
(p) the right to free election. 238 
Although these rights and freedoms were derived from the Universal Declaration 
they are more extensively defined and qualified than in the Declaration. The 
reason is that they were intended to be enforced through a judicial system 
which requires reasonable certainty and precision. 239 Hence, even where 
derogation was allowed it had to be in accordance with the law. Furthermore, 
the principle of humanity, though not alluded to in the preamble, exercised a 
profound influence on the High contracting parties. No wonder they prohibited 
any derogation with respect to the following rights and freedoms, even during 
a public emergency:240 
(a) the right to life, freedom from torture or inhuman or degrading punishment; 
(b) freedom from slavery or servitude; 
(c) freedom from punishment for acts or omissions made criminal by retroactive 
legislation. 
The Convention and Protocol only took over from the Universal Declaration 
those rights and freedoms which were capable of judicial enforcement and left 
it to the signatory states to extend the scope if they so desired.241 The next 
steps to extend the scope of the Convention were taken in 1960 under the 
Second Protocol242 which guaranteed the following six civil and political rights 
and freedoms: 
(a) freedom from imprisonment on the ground of inability to fulfil a contractual 
237 Ibid Article 2. 
238 Ibid Article 3. 
239 See Ezejiofor Protection of Human Rights under the Law 104. 
240 See Article 15(2). 
241 Hence Article 60 provided: 
"Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting or derogating from any of the 
human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured under the laws of any 
high contracting party or under any other agreement to which it is a party." 
242 See Ezejiofor Protection of Human Rights under the Law 107. 
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obligation; 
(b) freedom of movement within a State and to leave any State; 
(c) freedom from exile; 
(d) freedom from expulsion save in excepted cases; 
(e) the right to recognition as a person in the eyes of the law; 
(fl the right to equality before the law.243 
Meanwhile the Council of Europe had adopted a common social policy which led 
the Consultative Assembly to lay down the basic principles for a European 
Social Charter which was adopted in July 1961 and signed in October of the 
same year.244 Part II of the Social Charter comprises the following nineteen 
articles containing undertakings agreed on by the parties: 
(a) the right to work; 
(b) the right to just conditions of work; 
(c) the right to safe and healthy working conditions; 
(d) the right to a fair remuneration; 
(e) the right to organise; 
(fl the right to collective bargaining; 
(g) the right of children and young persons to protection; 
(h) the right of employed women to special protection; 
(i) the right to vocational guidance; 
Ul the right to vocational training; 
(k) the right to protection of health; 
(1) the right to social security; 
(m) the right to social and medical assistance; 
(n) the right to social welfare services; 
(o) the right of the disabled to special facilities; 
(p) the right of the family to social, legal and economic protection; 
(q) the right of mothers and children to social and economic protection; 
243 These articles were inspired by the draft Covenants on Human Rights - notably Articles 
11, 13, 14 and 15. Ibid note 4. 
244 For a text see Brownlie Basic Documents on Human Rights (1993) 363 ff. 
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(r) the right to engage in gainful occupation; and 
(s) the right of migrant workers and their families to protection and assistance. 245 
A number of these rights already formed the subject of the conventions and 
agreements previously concluded by the member States of the Council of 
Europe. Part III of the Charter contains the provisions which permit progressive 
implementation of social rights. Only seven of these rights were then regarded 
as of particular importance. The European Convention on Human Rights and 
its protocols contain mechanisms for its implementation. It is not proposed in 
this thesis to deal with these mechanisms or to analyse these instruments any 
further as the object of this paragraph was merely to trace the influence of the 
Universal Declaration on the European Convention. 
3.3.3.3 The Americas 
3.3.3.3.1 Background 
The origin of Latin American unity can be traced back to the early nineteenth 
century when many Latin American countries gained their independence. 246 
This unity was strengthened by the recognition given it by Britian, and 
especially by the American "Monroe Doctrine", which forbade any European 
interference in American affairs. 247 
The first concrete moves towards unity was made in 1822 by Simon Bolivar 
who called for a meeting of plenipotentiaries of the Americas, with the aim of 
establishing a confederation of the newly independent republics. Through his 
insistence, the "First Congress of American States" was held in Panama in June 
and July, 1826, which produced the ambitiously titled "Treaty of Perpetual 
Union, League and Confederation". This treaty, however, died in its infancy as 
only one state ratified it. 
245 See Articles 1-19. 
246 See Robertson et al Human Rights in the World 161 et seq. 
247 Ibid. 
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In 1889 the USA stepped forward and arranged the "First International 
American Conference" in Washington DC.248 At this conference, attended by 
seventeen American Republics, the International Union of American Republics 
was founded (more commonly referred to as the Pan American Union). The 
principal functions of this Union was the promotion of economic co-operation 
and the peaceful settlement of disputes. 
From the beginning of the twentieth century, until the outbreak of the Second 
World War in 1939, eight conferences of American states were held in various 
Latin American capitals. During the war three more conferences were held to 
discuss the problems confronting the American states which had arisen on 
account of World War II. 
Mindful that the international community would experience change due to the 
influence of the War, the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and 
Peace was held in Mexico in February and March of 1945. The aim of this 
conference was to consider the organisation of the Inter-American system in the 
post war world. The conclusions reached at this conference were instrumental 
in the adoption of Chapter VIll249 of the United Nations Charter in San Francisco 
a few months later. In 194 7 the Inter-American Conference in Rio de Janeiro 
devoted itself mainly to the question of the maintenance of peace and security 
in the continent. The product of this conference, the Inter-American Treaty of 
Reciprocal Assistance, 250 still serves today as the basic instrument of collective 
security of the Inter-American system. 
By 1948 it had, however, become clear that the regional co-operation system 
under the Pan-American Union was in need of review. An important step in this 
regard was taken at the 1948 Inter-American Conference held in Bogota, where 
the "Charter of Bogota" was adopted. This charter laid the constitutional 
foundation for the establishment of the Organisation of American States (OAS). 
248 The conference lasted from October 1889 to April 1890. 
249 This chapter concerns "Regional Arrangements". 
250 Signed on 2 September 194 7. 
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The Charter proclaims that the OAS is a regional agency within the United 
Nations251 whose purposes include: 
(1) the strengthening of peace and security; 
(2) the peaceful settlement of disputes; 
(3) the provision of common action in the event of aggression; 
(4) the promotion of economic, social and cultural development. 
The Charter goes on to reaffirm the significance of international law and 
fundamental human rights. Further, the Charter provides for certain economic, 
social and cultural standards for states parties to adhere to. 
Another important text adopted at the Bogota Conference was the American 
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man. 252 Although this declaration is 
similar in content to the Universal Declaration, it is interesting to note that it 
was adopted seven months before the Universal Declaration (i.e. in May 1948), 
and further, that in addition to 28 articles proclaiming the individual's rights, 
it contains 10 articles setting out the duties of the individual. 
The Bogota Conference gave new impetus to the OAS by reorganising it along 
the following lines; 
(1) The Inter-American Conference was established to serve as the supreme policy-
making organ; 
(2) The Economic, Social, Cultural and Judicial Councils were organised; 
(3) The Council of Permanent Representatives was retained (seated in Washington 
DC) as the organ of direction for current business. 
A milestone in the region's initiatives in the field of human rights was reached 
in a meeting of consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs held in Santiago 
251 Article 1. 
252 For a text see Sieghardt The Lawful Rights of Mankind (1985) 214 et seq. 
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in 1959. At this meeting the Ministers adopted a "conclusion" stating that 
" ... eleven years after the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 
was proclaimed, the climate in the hemisphere is ready for the conclusion of a 
Convention - there having been similar progress in the United Nations 
Organisation and in the Union known as the Council of Europe in the setting of 
standards and in the orderly study of this field, until today a satisfactory and 
promising level has been reached. "253 
The task of preparing a draft Convention on Human Rights was given to the 
Inter-American Council of Jurists. That Council met in Santiago later that year 
and prepared a draft Convention, this being based largely on the European 
model. 254 This draft was laid before the Second Special Inter-American 
Conference held in Rio de Janeiro in 1963 for consideration. 255 
It was soon realised that due to time constraints the competent committee 
would not be able to produce a new draft Convention. Thus the three drafts 
were referred to the Council of Permanent Representatives who, after 
consultation with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, would 
produce the new draft Convention. This draft would then be sent to the various 
governments for comment, after which the Council would call a special 
conference to produce the final text, which would then be opened for signature. 
Accordingly, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights was requested 
to examine the drafts and to submit its proposals on the matter. Before it could 
do this, the general Assembly of the United Nations, in December 1966, 
approved the texts of the Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
and on Civil and Political Rights. The Council of the OAS decided to approach 
the member governments as to whether or not they still wanted to proceed with 
253 See Robinson Human Rights in the World 163. 
254 Ibid. 
255 In fact, three drafts were considered at the Second Special Inter American Conference, 
the one from the Council of Jurists, and two revised drafts prepared by Uruguay and Chile. Ibid 
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the preparation of a separate Inter-American Convention now that the United 
Nations had prepared the two previous Covenants. With the majority of the 
member states answering in the affirmative, the Council proceeded to submit 
to the member governments the revised draft Convention, prepared by the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, for their comment. These comments 
were then reviewed at a Specialised Conference on Human Rights held in San 
Jose, Costa Rica, in November 1969, and the final text was drafted.256 
The American Convention on Human Rights257 (also known as the Pact of San 
Jose) was drafted at this conference and opened for signature on 22 November 
1969. The Convention entered into force on 18 July, 1978, with the deposition 
of the eleventh instrument of ratification. 258 
3.3.3.3.2 The Rights and Freedoms Guaranteed in the American 
Convention on Human Rights 
The authors of the American Convention drew substantial inspiration from not 
only the Universal Declaration and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, but also from the European Convention on Human Rights. 259 
This is borne out in the preamble to the American Convention where it is stated 
that 
"These principles have been set forth in ... the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, and that they have been reaffirmed and refined in other international 
instruments, world-wide as well as regional in scope ... ". 
The inspiration the authors took from the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
256 Nineteen of the twenty-four member states were present at this conference. The 
absentees being Bolivia, Barbados, Haiti, Jamaica, and Cuba. Ibid 
257 For a text see Sieghardt 220 et seq. 
258 To date the following states have ratified the Convention: Barbados, Bolivia, Columbia, 
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, 
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Venezuela. 
259 See Andrews et al The International Protection of Human Rights 18. 
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can be seen clearly from the question that arose as to the necessity of the 
American Convention shortly after the promulgation of the UN Covenant in 
1966, and in particular from the content and wording of the American 
Convention. 260 
Further, there is no other regional human rights instrument which has had the 
success and influence of the European Convention on Human Rights. Frowein 
suggests that the preamble of the American Convention was influenced by the 
European Convention. 261 
In the preamble the state parties reaffirm their belief in a "system of personal 
liberty and social justice based on respect for the essential rights of man ... ", 
with the further provision that this could best be attained within the 
"framework of democratic institutions." Thus the protection of human rights 
can only be effectively achieved in a democracy. 
The American Convention contains provisions, on the most, for civil and 
political rights, these being contained in Chapter II. The rights and freedoms 
guaranteed to everyone within the jurisdiction of the state parties, under 
Chapter II are: 
(a) the right to juridical personality; 
(b) the right to life; 
(c) the right to humane treatment; 
(d) freedom from slavery; 
(e) the right to personal liberty; 
(0 the right to a fair trial; 
(g) freedom from ex postjacto laws; 
(h) the right to compensation; 
(i) the right to privacy; 
200 Ibid. 
261 Frowein "The European and American Conventions on Human Rights- a comparison" 
1980 Human Rights Law Journal 45. 
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Ul freedom of conscience and religion; 
(k) freedom of thought and expression; 
(l) the right of reply; 
(m) the right of assembly; 
(n) freedom of association; 
(o) the rights of the family; 
[p) the right to a name; 
[q) the rights of the child; 
[r) the right to nationality; 
[s) the right to property; 
(t) freedom of movement and residence; 
(u) the right to participate in government; 
[v) the right to equal protection; 
(w) the right to judicial protection. 262 
The Convention contains no guarantees concerning economic and social rights 
as such. It does, however, contain a provision.263 in which the states parties 
undertake to adopt various measures designed to achieve "progressively ... the 
full realisation of the rights implicit in the economic, social, educational, 
scientific and cultural standards set forth in the Charter of the OAS as revised 
by the Protocol of Buenos Aires. "264 
As with the European Convention, the rights and freedoms in the American 
Convention are to a large extent derived from the Universal Declaration, but are 
also further defined and qualified as they too are meant to be enforced through 
a judicial system. The American Convention does permit the imposition of 
various restrictions and limitations by state parties on the enjoyment of many 
of the rights and freedoms it guarantees. 265 Article 27 specifically allows for the 
derogation by states parties from a number of the obligations the Convention 
262 Articles 3-25. 
263 See Article 26. 
264 See Buergenthal et al The Inter-American System (1983) Part 1 Chpt 2 3. 
265 Ibid 3. See for example Articles 16(2), 29, 30 and 32. 
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contains in certain emergencies.266 However, the American Convention267 
underlines the importance it attaches to certain basic human rights and 
freedoms by prohibiting any derogation whatsoever from the following articles: 
( 1) Article 3 - the right to juridical personality; 
(2) Article 4 - the right to life; 
(3) Article 5 - the right to humane treatment; 
(4) Article 6 - freedom from slavery; 
(5) Article 9 - freedom from ex post facto laws; 
(6) Article 12 - freedom of conscience and religion; 
(7) Article 1 7 - the rights of the family; 
(8) Article 18 - the right to a name; 
(9) Article 19 - the rights of a child; 
(IO) Article 20 - the right to nationality; 
( 11) Article 23 - the right to participate in government; 
"or any of the juridical guarantees essential for the protection of such 
rights." 
Thus, the American Convention contains in itself a comprehensive limitation 
on derogations from the rights and freedoms contained therein. The American 
Convention further contains mechanisms for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms therein, namely the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.268 For the purpose of this thesis 
it is not necessary to expand on these mechanisms, as the aim of this paragraph 
is to trace the influence of the Universal Declaration and the European 
Convention on the American Convention. 
266 These emergencies include times of war, public danger, or other emergencies which 
threaten the independence or security of a state party: see Article 27(1). 
267 See Article 27(2). 
268 Article 33. 
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3.3.3.4 Africa 
3.3.3.4.1 Background 
The history of African declarations of human rights are directly traceable to the 
Western Declarations of Human Rights and, in particular, the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Article 63(3) of the Convention authorised the 
signatory states to extend it to their colonial territories269 provided that in such 
territories the provisions of the Convention would be applied with due regard 
to local requirements.270 Pursuant to this provision the United Kingdom 
extended the Convention to forty-five territories in October 1953. 271 Among the 
African territories included were Nigeria, Kenya and the High Commission 
Territories. The first African territory to receive a Bill of Rights was Nigeria. 272 
The bills of the other territories were modelled on that of Nigeria. 273 Hence they 
were known as Neo-Nigerian bills. For this reason it is proposed to begin the 
enquiry into the evolution of African regional human-rights law with Nigeria. 
3.3.3.4.2 Nigeria 
It was seen in the previous paragraphs that the atrocities committed by the Nazi 
regime and the resulting threat to World peace gave impetus to the development 
of international human-rights law. To prevent the re-emergence of Nazism, 
European Countries incorporated international human-rights law in the 
European Convention274 and their Constitutions. 275 
269 See also Article 4 of the Protocol. 
270 See Article 63(3). 
271 See Ezejiofor Protection of Human Rights Under the Law 109 note 19. 
272 See Lawrence Silas Zimba The Constitutional Protection of Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms in Zambia (LLD Thesis London 1979) 225. 
273 See D 0 Aihe "Neo-Nigerian Human Rights in Zambia" in (1971 - 1972) Zambia Law 
Journal 3 & 4 43. 
274 See notes232 and 233 supra. 
275 These States incorporated European Community laws through Treaties of accession. 
For instance, in 1972 the UK enacted the European Communities Act of 1972. Section 2 of this 
Act provided: 
"All such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to time created 
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In Nigeria (and Africa in general) the incorporation of human-rights norms in 
the Constitutions resulted from concerns with the protection of minorities from 
domination by majorities. 276 Here, the processes of constitution-making in 
Nigeria will be used to illustrate how minority fears led to the adoption of a bill 
of rights. Britain was traditionally opposed to the incorporation of written and 
enforceable bills of rights in the independence constitution of her colonies. For 
instance, India and Ghana did not receive any bills of rights at independence. 
But in Nigeria the dynamics of the constitutional settlement process forced 
Britain to change her mind. 277 
Pursuant to her post-World War II policy to grant self-government to her African 
Colonies, the Imperial Government issued a constitution for Nigeria in 1951.278 
This constitution (known as the MacPherson Constitution) provided for one 
central and three regional governments. At the same time there were three 
main political parties in the country each of which formed a government in one 
of the regions. In the northern region, which had more than half of the 
population of Nigeria, the party in power was the conservative and traditionalist 
Northern Peoples Congress. This Party (NPC) derived its main support from the 
northerners including the Hausa, Fulani and Kanuri ruling circles made up of 
the autocratic Emirs and prominent native authority officials. In the western 
region the government party was the Action Group (AG) which derived its main 
support from the Yorubas - by far the largest tribe in the region. In the east the 
National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), which derived its 
support from the lbos, was in power. 
Owing to its massive support in the northern region the NPC had as many 
or arising by or under the Treaties, and all such remedies and procedures from time to 
time provided for by or under the Treaties, as in accordance with the Treaties are 
without further enactment to be given legal effect or used in the United Kingdom shall 
be recognised and available in law, and be enforced, allowed and followed accordingly; 
and the expression "enforceable Community right" and similar expressions shall be read 
as referring to one to which this subsection applies." 
276 See Ezejiofor Protection of Human Rights under Law 1 78 et seq. 
211 Ibid. 
21s Ibid. 
91 
members in the House of Representatives as the other parties put together. In 
other words, the former discredited colonial structures controlled the new 
government. But their power was checked by the structure of the political 
parties and the constitutional provision requiring each region to be represented 
in the council of Ministers. This resulted in an uneasy coalition government. 
When the southern parties, the AG and NCNC, attempted to recruit supporters 
in the north, through their own members and political allies, their efforts were 
regarded by the NPC and its supporters as an unwarranted intrusion in the 
affairs of the region. It was claimed that the native authority police were used 
by the NPC government to intimidate and victimise political opponents and that 
the Muslim courts, staffed by the Alkalis, who were controlled by the Emirs, 
also victimised political opponents. 
In 1953 the AG and NCNC called for self-government. This move was opposed 
by the NPC. The tensions resulting from this and the harassment of the AG and 
NCNC supporters in the northern region forced the colonial secretary to invite 
all political leaders to London for a review of the Constitution. 
The AG/NCNC alliance saw the London Conference as an opportunity to propose 
a measure which would permit free political activity in the north. Hence they 
proposed an amendment to the Constitution incorporating a declaration of 
certain basic human rights for Nigerian citizens in all parts of Nigeria. In line 
with the traditional attitude of Britain the Colonial Secretary rejected that 
proposal. Instead the London Conference agreed on a federal State structure 
made up of three considerably autonomous regions. At the Lagos conference 
held in 1954 certain minority groups in these regions expressed fears and 
anxieties about their future in those regions in view of the structure of the 
political parties and their control of the regional governments. As a result they 
asked to be recognised as regions or separate States. 
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At the 1957 Conference the AG led a number of minority groups who demanded 
their recognition as separate States. Furthermore, the AG once more proposed 
the incorporation of a Bill of Rights in the Constitution. These measures were 
calculated to weaken the NPC in the North. The Conference accepted the idea 
of a Bill of Rights but rejected the creation of new States.279 The Colonial 
Secretary then appointed the Willink Commission to enquire into the fears of 
the minorities and the means of allaying them, to advise on the safeguards 
which should be included in the Constitution for this purpose and to 
recommend the creation of new States, but this as a last resort. 280 The 
Commission found genuine, though sometimes exaggerated, fears among 
minority groups, but came to the conclusion that a case had not been made out 
for the creation of new States. In any case, it further remarked, new States 
would themselves have minority groups in them. The Commission also found 
less support for a Bill of Rights; but nevertheless it recommended the 
incorporation of one in the Constitution on the ground that it 
"defines beliefs widespread among democratic countries and provides a standard 
to which appeal may be made by those whose rights are infringed." 
In suggesting clauses for the proposed Bill of Rights the Commission relied on 
the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights. 281 In its proposals 
the Commission copied the rights and freedoms embodied in the European 
Convention word for word. 282 
The 1958 Conference accepted practically all the Commission's 
recommendations on fundamental human rights but rejected the question of 
new States. However, the Constitution made provision for the creation of new 
States after independence. To placate the minority groups demanding new 
279 See Ezera Constitutional Developments in Nigeria (1961) Chapter 8. 
280 The Report of the Commission under the chairpersonship of Sir Henry Willink is 
contained in Crnnd 505 (1958) 97. 
281 Ibid. 
282 See Ezejiofor Protection of Human Rights under Law 180. 
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States the Conference agreed to incorporate a Bill of Rights in the Constitution 
in time to allow free political activity for the federal election due to take place 
late in 1959. Thus Nigeria received a Bill of Rights from the imperial 
Government before independence in 1960. 283 
Cursory examination of the Nigerian Bill of Rights shows that this Bill was 
derived from the European Convention and other Western declarations of 
human rights. The rights and freedoms guaranteed to the individual by the 
Nigerian Constitution were in most part declaratory of existing rights and 
privileges. They include: the right to life; freedom from torture or inhuman 
treatment, slavery and forced labour; the right to personal liberty, to be 
informed promptly of reasons for arrest or detention and to be brought to trial 
without delay;284 the right to a fair hearing in the determination of one's civil 
rights and obligations285 by a court or other tribunal established by law;286 the 
right to be presumed, on a criminal charge, innocent until proved guilty;287 to 
be informed promptly and in detail of the nature of alleged offence; the right to 
adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence personally or by legal 
representatives of one's own choice; to examine personally or by legal 
representatives witnesses called by the prosecution; to assistance without 
payment of an interpreter at the trial; to copies of courts' records of proceedings 
on payment of prescribed fees; the right not to be subjected to retroactive penal 
legislation, not to be subjected to a penalty heavier than that in force at the time 
of the Commission of the offence, not to be subjected to "double jeopardy", not 
to be compelled to give evidence at criminal trial, and not to be convicted for an 
offence unless it is defined and the penalty thereof is prescribed in a written 
law, the right to private and family life;288 freedom of thought and 
conscience;289 freedom of expression; the right to peaceful assembly and 
283 Ibid. 
284 See Sections 17-20. 
285 See Gokpa v Inspector General of Police (1961) 1 All NLR 423. 
286 See Merchant Bank v Federal Minister of Finance (1961) 1 All NLR 598. 
287 See lbeziako v Police Commissioner (1963) All NLR 88. 
288 See Sections 21-22. 
289 See Ojiebe v Ubani (1961) 1 All NLR 400. 
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association; freedom of movement; freedom from discrimination based on tribe, 
place of origin, religion or political opinion and the right to property.290 
Like the European Convention, the Nigerian Constitution permitted the 
restriction of individual rights and freedoms in a period of emergency291 
provided that such derogations would only be limited to the extent reasonably 
justifiable to deal with the emergency. Furthermore, in peacetime the rights 
guaranteed by Sections 22-26 could only be derogated from by any law that is 
"reasonably justifiable in a democratic society". To ensure the enjoyment of 
these rights the constitution made the bill of rights justiciable. 292 
3.3.3.4.3 The Incorporation of Human Rights Goals in African Regional 
Human Rights Law 
3.3.3.4.3.1 Background 
The New International Politico-Legal Order (created with the influence of the 
Third World) and the International Human-Rights Law in particular had a 
profound impact on African nationalist leaders. Thus after World War II they 
began to demand the right of self-determination and independence. These 
pressures for decolonisation led to the independence of many African countries 
during the fifties. 293 From 15-22 April 1958, independent African States held 
their first Conference in Accra, Ghana.294 Although African nationalist leaders 
were inspired, inter alia, by international human-rights law, they did not place 
the question of human rights on the agenda of their first conference. They were 
more concerned with safeguarding their independence and solidarity and 
assisting dependent African territories to gain self-government and 
independence. 295 
290 See Section 24-27 and 30. 
291 See Section 28. 
292 See Section 22-26. 
293 See Okoye International Law and the New African States (1972). 
294 See Africa Special Report April 1958 (vol. 3 no 4) 1-4 and 10-11. 
295 See Okoye International Law and the New African States 122. 
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In December 1958 independent African States held their first All-African Peoples 
Conference of political parties in Accra, Ghana. This Conference laid the 
foundation of African unity and reaffirmed the commitment of independent 
African States to the total liberation of Africa from imperialism and 
colonialism. 296 The aims and objects of this Conference were reaffirmed in 
1960. 
In the meantime three black African states (namely Ghana, Guinea and Liberia) 
adopted the SANN! Declaration297 which reaffirmed their support for the 
struggles of African peoples for national independence and self-determination. 
Furthermore, and perhaps more significantly, this declaration placed the issue 
of human rights on the agenda. In the preamble the signatories also resolved 
to assist the struggles of dependent African peoples for racial equality and 
human dignity and apparently recalling the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, stated:298 
"that freedom, equality, justice and dignity are noble objectives of all peoples 
and are essential to the achievement of the legitimate aims and aspirations of the 
African peoples". 
The Declaration proposed a Special Conference in 1960 of all independent 
States of Africa, as well as non-independent States which had fixed dates on 
which they would achieve independence to discuss and work out a Charter 
which would achieve their ultimate goal of unity between independent African 
States. The signatories to this Declaration also agreed on a declaration of 
principles which would be presented to the proposed Conference for discussion. 
The principles included: 
(a) the inherent right of African peoples to independence and self-determination and 
296 See Louis B Sohn Basic Documents of African Regional Organisations (1971) 33. 
297 For a text see ibid 40-41. 
298 Cf Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
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to decide the form of government under which they wished to live;299 
(b) non-interference in the domestic matters of other States;300 
(c) friendly relations among independent African States based on the objectives of 
freedom, independence, unity, and the African personality; 
(d) the interests of the African peoples; and 
(e) the commitment to help other African territories still under foreign domination 
with a view to accelerating their achievement of self-government and 
independence. 
In their second conference held in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) in 1960 African 
leaders condemned, inter alia, the suppression of national liberation movements 
and the indiscriminate detention and restriction of nationalist leaders. 301 A year 
thereafter independent African States adopted the historic African Charter of 
Casablanca302 which not only reaffirmed the new International Politico-Legal 
Order with respect to Africa, but also the belief of independent African States 
in the United Nations Charter. Further, the Casablanca Charter reaffirmed the 
faith of signatories in the conferences held in Accra (1958) and Addis Ababa 
(1960) and, apparently inspired by the Council of Europe, called for the creation 
of the African Consultative Assembly which would hold periodical sessions. 
From 15-22 May 1963 the Foreign Ministers of thirty independent African States 
met in Addis Ababa. Their agenda included; 
(a) establishment of an organisation of African States; 
(b) decolonisation; 
(c) apartheid and racial discrimination; and 
(d) Africa and the United Nations.303 
299 Cf Article l (2) and 55 ibid. 
300 Ibid. 
301 See Brownlie Basic Documents on Human Rights (1987) 103. 
302 For a text see Sohn Basic Documents of African Regional Organisations 42-43. 
303 See Zdenek Cervenka The Organisation of African Unity and its Charter (1968) 28. 
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' The Charter of the Organisation of African Unity was signed by thirty 
independent African States in Addis Ababa from 22-25 May 1963. 304 
In its preamble the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) reaffirms 
the principles embodied in earlier Charters and Declarations of independent 
African States. In particular, it linked the right of self-determination and the 
concept of human rights by reaffirming the inalienability of the right of African 
peoples to self-determination and the idea that freedom, equality, justice and 
dignity were the essential objectives for the achievement of the legitimate 
aspirations of the African peoples.305 Furthermore, the preamble reaffirmed the 
principles of development and African solidarity, territorial integrity and the 
resolve of independent Africa to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa. 
Finally the preamble reaffirmed the belief of independent Africa in the UN 
Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as the foundations for 
peaceful and positive co-operation among States. 
The purpose of the OAU Charter was set out as follows:306 
(a) to promote the unity and solidarity of the African States; 
(b) to co-ordinate and intensify their co-operation and efforts to achieve a better life 
for the peoples of Africa; 
(c) to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence; 
(d) to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; 
(e) to promote international co-operation, having due regard to the Charter of the 
United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
The purposes of the OAU clearly implied the duty to encourage the promotion 
and protection of internationally recognised human rights within member 
States. Furthermore, the OAU Charter incorporated the principles of the UN 
304 For a text see Sohn Basic Documents of African Regional Organisations 62-63. 
305 Cf the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
306 See Article 11 of the OAU Charter. 
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Charter3°7 regarding peaceful co-existence among nations and reaffirmed its 
absolute dedication to the total emancipation of dependent African territories. 
A close examination of the OAU Charter (and its antecedents) shows that for a 
significant part of their existence OAU member states devoted most of their 
energies to the eradication of colonialism from the African continent, the 
struggle against apartheid in South Africa, and the maintenance of regional 
peace and stability. By contrast, the Council of Europe concerned itself with 
human rights from its inception. In fact, it stipulated the protection of human 
rights as one of its principal goals right from its inception in 1949. 308 Further, 
it prescribed the observance of human rights as an obligation ofmembership309 
and set forth the sanctions that could be imposed as a result of any violations. 310 
These differences highlight the special circumstances in which the OAU was 
formed and their effect on its prioritisation of goals. In particular, the need to 
forge African unity in terms of the principle of non-interference in the domestic 
affairs of member states and the struggles against colonialism and apartheid 
relegated human rights to the background and made their priority the defence 
of their hard-won independence, the struggle for the right of self-determination 
of dependent African peoples and the maintenance of peace and security among 
member States.311 
307 See Articles 1 (2) and 55. 
308 Article 1 of the Statute of the Council of Europe reads: 
"(a) The aim of the council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its members 
for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are their 
common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress; 
(b) This aim shall be pursued through the organs of the Council by discussion of 
questions of common concern and by agreements and common action in economic, 
social, cultural, scientific, legal and administrative matters and in the maintenance and 
further realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms ... ". 
309 Article 3 of the Statute provided: 
"Every member of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the rule of law 
and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, and collaborate sincerely and effectively in the realisation of the 
aim of the council." 
310 Article 8 provided: 
"Any member of the Council of Europe which has seriously violated Article 3 may be 
suspended from its rights ofrepresentation and requested by the Committee of Ministers 
to withdraw ... If such member does not comply with this request, the committee may 
decide that it has ceased to be a member of the council ... ". 
311 See EL-Ayouty The OAU After Ten Years (1975) 161. 
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3.3.3.4.3.2 The Antecedents of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights 
The idea of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (also known as 
the Banjul Charter) dates back to the Lagos Conference on the rule of law held 
under the auspices of the International Commission of Jurists (1961). The 
conference adopted a resolution (known as the Law of Lagos) which declared:312 
"that in order to give full effect to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 
1948, this conference invites the African Governments to study the possibility 
of adopting an African Convention on Human Rights in such a manner that the 
conclusions of this Conference will be safeguarded by the creation of a court of 
appropriate jurisdiction and that the recourse thereto be available for all persons 
under the jurisdiction of the signatory States". 
But the idea of the Convention did not find much favour during the sixties. The 
reasons for this, as shown in the previous paragraph, are that the OAU was then 
solely concerned with the defence of the sove~ignty and inde~ndence of 
member States, maintenance of peace and security and the struggles for the 
right of dependent and oppressed African peoples for self-determination. 
Following the adoption of the UN Covenants in 1966, Nigeria took the lead 
towards the adoption of an African Convention on Human Rights. In 1967, on 
a Nigerian initiative, the UN Commission on Human Rights took up the call for 
African human rights institutions. 313 On 8 March 1972, the Commission 
adopted a resolution314 inviting the OAU to create a Regional Human Rights 
Commission. These calls were followed by a number of important conferences 
held in various parts of Africa which contributed to an increasing awareness of 
human rights in Africa, in particular in Cairo (1969), Addis Ababa (1971) and 
Dar-es-Salaam ( 1973). 315 But of special significance was a colloquium of African 
jurists held at Dakar in 1978 which succeeded in drafting concrete proposals on 
312 See Brownlie Basic Documents on Human Rights 416. 
313 See Gino J Naldi The Organisation of African Unity - An Analysis of its Role (1989) 
109. 
314 See Resolution 24 (XXIV) of 8 March 1972. 
315 See Roger Chongwe "African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights" (1987) 13 
Commonwealth Law Bulletin 1605. 
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a human rights document. 316 
The OAU Summit Meeting held in July 1979 in Monrovia passed Resolution 115 
instructing the Secretary-General of the OAU to appoint a Committee of experts 
with a mandate to draw a preliminary draft on an African Charter on Human 
and Peoples' Rights providing inter alia for the establishment of organs for the 
promotion and protection of human and peoples' rights. 317 At the end of 1979 
African legal experts met in Dakar to prepare the first draft of the proposed 
charter. The stated objective of these experts was to prepare a Charter based 
on African legal philosophy and responsive to African needs. These experts 
believed that problems unique to Africa required a departure from such regional 4-
human rights instruments as the European Convention ( 1950) and the 
American Convention (1969).318 Thus in preparing the draft the experts took 
into consideration the virtues of African culture and collective rights which had 
been denied the African peoples by imperialism and colonialism. 
In order to produce a truly African Convention, a ministerial conference 
comprising mainly African ministers of justice and legal experts met in Banjul 
(the Gambia) in June 1980 to continue and complete consideration of the Draft 
Charter on Human Rights. In June 1981 this draft was adopted in Nairobi 
(Kenya) as the African Charter on Human and People's Rights. This Charter 
came into force on 21 October 1986 after Niger became the twenty-sixth state 
to ratify it, thereby creating binding legal obligations on all the parties thereto 
to give effect to the rights enumerated therein. 319 
The Banjul Charter is the third regional human rights instrument to take effect. 
316 See Naldi The Organisation of African Unity 109-110. 
317 See Theo van Boven "The Relationship between Peoples' Rights and Human Rights in 
the African Charter" 1986 (1) Human Rights Law Journal 186-7. 
318 See International Commission of Jurists Human and Peoples' Rights in Africa and the 
African Charter (Report of a Conference held in Nairobi from 2 to 4 December 1985) 25. 
319 Article 63 of the Banjul Charter provides that the Charter would come into force three 
months after the OAU Secretary-General received notification that a simple majority of OAU 
member States, twenty six, had ratified it. 
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Although its authors sought to produce an indigenous document, many view 
the Charter as reflecting internationally recognised fundamental rights as 
contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International 
Covenants on Human Rights. The Banjul Charter is composed of four sections, 
a preamble and three main parts. 
3.3.3.4.3.3 Analysis of the Charter 
Many writers have produced scholarly analyses of the Banjul Charter. 320 It is 
therefore not proposed to plough the same field again. Here, the distinctive 
features of the Charter will be highlighted and some comparisons drawn 
between it and other regional and international human rights instruments. 
The preamble of the Banjul Charter is not only inspired by but also elaborates 
on the OAU Charter to the extent that it could be considered as an integral part 
of the latter just as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is an integral 
part of the UN Charter. First, the preamble acknowledges: 
(a) that the OAU Charter strives for freedom, equality, justice and dignity; 
(b) that it seeks to eradicate colonialism and endeavours to improve the lives of the 
peoples of Africa. 
The Banjul Charter reaffirms these principles through a commitment to 
eliminate colonialism in its various guises and all its forms of discrimination, 
including apartheid, and to dismantle aggressive foreign military bases. This 
320 On the Banjul Charter generally see R Disa "Human and Peoples' Rights: Distinctive 
Features of the African Charter" 29 1985 Journal of African Law 72; Gittelman "The African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights : A Legal Analysis" 22 1982 Virginia Journal of 
International law 667; 0 Ojo and A Sesay "The OAU and Human Rights: Prospects for the 
1980s and beyond" 8 1986 Human Rights Quarterly 89; U 0 Umozorike, "The African Charter 
on Human and Peoples' Rights" 77 1983 American Journal of International Law 902 and 
Mathole Motshekga "The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights - its Importance to 
Human Rights Thinking in South Africa" Codicillus XXX (October 1989) 31 et seq. 
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commitment is clearly an attempt to contribute to the maintenance of 
international peace and security.321 
Furthermore, and perhaps most significantly, the Banjul Charter consolidated 
the interlinkage between the rule of law, the right of self-determination and 
human rights and firmly established the relationship between human and 
peoples' rights.322 In short, the doctrine of human and peoples' rights embodied 
in the Banjul Charter holds, first, that '?~~nd poli!!£_al rig~ts (also known as 
first generation rights) cannot be disassociated from social, economic and 
cultural rights (also known as second generation rights) in the.ir conception as 
well as in their universality. Thus the preamble stated that the satisfaction of 
the second generation rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment of the first 
generation rights.323 Secondly, the preamble of the Banjul Charter, like that of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, derived basic rights and freedoms 
from the attributes (i.e. worth and dignity) of the human personality and thus 
made them a common heritage of all members of the human family. Thirdly, 
the preamble firmly established the relationship between human and peoples' 
rights by stating that the reality and respect of the latter should necessarily 
guarantee the former. Fourthly, and lastly, the Banjul Charter stated more 
clearly than any of its predecessors that the enjoyment of rights and freedoms 
also implied the performance of duties on the part of all subjects. 324 Another 
distinctive feature of the Banjul Charter was the realisation that colonialism, 
neo-colonialism, apartheid and other forms of domination were the greatest 
impediments to the enjoyment of human and peoples' rights. Thus the 
preamble reaffirmed the duty of African States to eradicate these evils from 
Africa. 
321 See Naldi The Organisation of African Unity 111-112. 
322 For a discussion of the term "peoples" see E Bondzie-Simpson "A Critique of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples Rights" 1988 Howard Law Journal 656-657. 
323 This conception was subsequently reaffirmed by eminent Commonwealth jurists. See 
Commonwealth Secretariat Judicial Colloquium in Bangolore 24-26 February 1985. 
324 See Ziyad Motala "Human Rights in Africa ; A Cultural, Ideological and Legal 
Examination" in 2 1989 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 403. 
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In short, the Banjul Charter contains the basic civil and political rights and 
economic, social, and cultural rights postulated in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(1966).325 Thus the Banjul Charter guarantees the first generation rights 
(Articles 2-13), the second generation rights (Articles 14-18), thirdly and perhaps 
more significantly, the third generation rights (Articles 19-24). It is not proposed 
here to deal with all the three categories of the rights nor with any particular 
right or freedom in detail. The primary object of this analysis is to highlight the 
distinctive features of the Charter which relate to the concept of a constitutional 
state. 
Article 1 of the Banjul Charter requires State parties to the Charter not only to 
recognise individual, people's and State's duties, rights and freedoms arising 
from the Charter, but also obligates them to give effect to these duties by 
incorporating them into their domestic laws and other measures.326 In sum 
Article 1 makes the Charter a contract327 between signatory States and reduces 
the rights and freedoms contained in the Charter to the substantive (or material) 
content of African human rights law. Article 2 directly responds to the colonial 
legacy of racial discrimination, degradation of persons by colonial authorities 
and general violations of civil and political rights. Thus it proposes procedures 
for the protection of the human personality and the administration of justice 
according to the law. More specifically, Article 2 prohibits all forms of 
discrimination based on race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or any other opinion, etc. 328 Article 3 guarantees the principle of non-
discrimination embodied in Article 2 by not only reaffirming the equality of all 
persons before the law but also affording each person equal protection of the 
325 See El-Ayouty The DAU After Ten Years 166. 
326 For a text see Rudolf Bernhardt and John Anthony Jolowicz (eds.) International 
Enforcement of Human Rights (1987) 250 et seq. 
327 See Okoye International Law and the New African States 126. 
328 Cf Article 2 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights. For text see Bemardt and 
Jolowicz International Enforcement of Human Rights 164. 
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laws. To underline the protection of the individual Articles 4 and 5 recaptures 
and elaborates on the attributes of the human personality (viz. sanctity, 
integrity and dignity) which forms the foundation of the principle of humanity 
from which individual rights and freedoms are derived. In line with the worth 
and dignity of the human personality these Articles prohibit all forms of 
treatment or punishment which violates these attributes.329 Article 4, in 
particular, prohibits any arbitrary deprivation of the right of the individual to 
life and violation of the integrity of his personality. The overall safeguard of 
individual liberty is embodied in Article 6 which incorporates the principle of 
legality (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege) in the following terms:330 
"no one may be deprived of his freedom except for reasons and conditions 
previously laid down by law. In particular, no one may be arbitrarily arrested 
or detained." 
Furthermore, the charter incorporated two important procedural rules which 
guarantee the efficacy of the principle of legality. 
These procedural rules are: 
(a) the right to be heard (audi alterem partem)331 and 
(b) the principle of non-retroactivity of penal statutes.332 
The former includes four procedural rights: 
329 Cf Articles 3-5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
33° Cf Article 11 of the Universal Declaration which reads: 
"l. Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until 
proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees 
necessary for his defence. 
2. No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of an act or omission 
which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time 
when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was 
applicable at the time the penal offence was committed." 
331 In its Latin dress this principle was formulated by Von Feuerbach Lehrbuch des 
peinlichen Rechts [1907) 20. This principle also found its way into article 7(1) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights [1950). 
332 See Article 7(1). 
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(a) the right to an appeal to competent national institutions against violations of 
fundamental rights;333 
(b) the presumption of innocence until proved guilty by a competent court or 
tribunal; 
(c) the right to legal representation;334 and 
(d) the right to a speedy trial by an impartial court or tribunal. 335 
Other first generation rights guaranteed by the charter include: the freedom of 
conscience;336 freedom of association and the right to information and 
emigration. 337 These rights are only limited by the principle of social 
solidarity338 which seeks to promote national unity and the integrity of African 
Nation States. Like the other regional human rights instruments the Banjul 
Charter obligated State parties to guarantee the independence of the judiciary 
in the enforcement of the first generation rights and to establish appropriate 
institutions for the promotion and protection of individual rights and 
freedoms. 339 
Furthermore, the Banjul Charter, unlike the other regional instruments, does 
not make provision for derogation from human rights in times of emergency.340 
The Charter compensated for this omission by making extensive use of "claw-
back" clauses which made the enforcement of the right dependent on national 
law or at the discretion of the national authorities. Article 10(1) is one such 
example, stating that "Every individual shall have the right to free association 
provided that he abides by the law." It is submitted that these clauses were 
designed to cater for the one-party political systems which were arguably, in 
333 The latter is a corollary of the principle of legality. See Jerome Hall "Nulla Poena Sine 
Lege" 47 1937 The Yale Law Journal 165. 
334 Article 7(l)(a). 
335 Article 7(l)(b). 
336 Article 79l)(c). 
337 Article 7(l)(d). 
338 Article 8. 
339 Article 26. 
340 See Naldi The Organisation of African Unity 112-113. 
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some respects, incompatible with the first generation rights. 341 
Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights granted every person 
the right to participate freely in the government of his country directly or 
through freely chosen representatives. This right has been incorporated in 
Article 13 of the Banjul Charter. Standing on their own Articles 13 and 21 do 
not take into account the situation of colonial and oppressed peoples. The 
Banjul Charter remedies this situation in terms of Articles 19 and 20. Article 
19 provides for the equality of all peoples (including colonial peoples) and 
affords them the same respect and rights and secondly prohibits the domination 
of one people by another. In these respects, therefore, Article 19 recaptured 
Articles 1 (2) and 55 of the UN Charter pertaining to the basis of friendly 
relations between nations. To guarantee the freedom and independence of 
colonial and oppressed peoples Article 20 not only guaranteed their right to 
political self-determination but also recognised their right of resistance against 
colonial or oppressive rule and a right to assistance of the State parties to the 
Banjul Charter in their liberation struggle against foreign domination, be it 
political, economic or cultural. 
Furthermore, the Banjul Charter recaptured the right of economic self-
determination embodied in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights and reaffirmed the inalienability342 of this right and provided for 
repatriation where the dispossessed people have suffered damages.343 The 
Banjul Charter further distinguished itself from the other regional instruments 
in that it incorporated the right to development344, the right to peace and the 
right to a liveable environment.345 
341 Note that in 1977 the ICJ had resolved that, in principle, the concept of a single-party 
democracy was consistent with the Rule of Law. See International Commission of Jurists 
Human Rights in a One-Party State (1978) 7. 
342 Article 21 (2). 
343 Article 22. 
,
344 Article 21(1). 
345 Article 24. 
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A further distinctive feature of the Banjul Charter is that it stipulated "duties" 
that individuals owe to the family, society, the State, "other legally recognised 
communities" and the international community.346 These include the duty to 
respect and consider fellow human beings without discrimination; to preserve 
the harmonious development of the family; to serve the national community; 
not to compromise the security of the State; to preserve and strengthen social 
and national solidarity; and to preserve and strengthen national independence 
and the territorial integrity of one's country.347 
Whilst the European Convention provided for a court of human rights, the 
Banjul Charter seeks to protect the rights guaranteed through a Commission on 
Human and Peoples Rights composed of eleven members who serve in their 
personal capacities. 348 They are elected by secret ballot by the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government from a list of persons nominated by the States' 
parties to the Charter. 349 
The Commission is empowered to receive, investigate, and endeavour to settle 
complaints concerning violations of the rights guaranteed in the charter. States' 
parties have the right to bring up complaints concerning other states' parties.350 
It would appear that the Commission can also entertain communications from 
individuals, groups of individuals, or organisations; but this is not explicitly 
stated.351 
If no amicable settlement is found, the Commission shall prepare a report 
stating the facts and its findings and submit it to the States concerned as well 
as the assembly of Heads of State and Government. The report may include 
any recommendations that the Commission may deem appropriate. 
346 Article 27. 
347 Article 28 and 29(1)-(5). 
348 Article 31. 
349 Article 33. 
350 Article 52. 
351 Article 53. 
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It was shown earlier that the UN approach to human rights prohibited any 
series of serious or massive violations of human and peoples' rights. To enforce 
this prohibition the Banjul Charter provided that when the Commission receives 
complaints suggesting the existence of "a series of serious or massive violations 
of human and peoples' rights" it shall draw the attention of the Assembly of 
Heads of States and Government to these situations. Article 58 then empowers 
the latter to ask the Commission to make an investigation. Last but not least, 
States undertook to submit every two years, from the date of the Charter came 
into force, a report on the legislative and other measures taken with a view to 
giving effect to the rights and freedoms recognised and guaranteed. 352 In other 
words, States parties recognised that their domestic legal systems had not yet 
achieved the constitutional state envisaged in contemporary international law 
and therefore they committed themselves to strive for its realisation. 
3.3.3.5 General Conclusions 
The idea of human rights derived from the concept of the worth and dignity of 
the human personality which was originally espoused by the Hermetic and Stoic 
philosophers and later by the humanist philosophers - notably, Samuel 
Pufendorf and Hugo Grotius. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
the right of self-determination and human rights found their way into the 
revolutionary constitutions of France and the USA. But third-world peoples 
were denied these rights by the imperialist and colonialist powers. The rights 
of African peoples, in particular, were limited to humanitarian treatment under 
the principle of trusteeship embodied in the Berlin Treaty of 1885. 
During World War I a controversy broke out as to whether or not the right of 
self- determination, in particular, applied to Africans. The USSR and USA (for 
example) sought to extend the right to all peoples and nations while the UK and 
South Africa (for example) limited it to Europeans and former German 
352 Article 62. 
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territories. 
The struggles waged by colonial peoples during the inter-war period ( 1919-1939) 
and the atrocities committed by the Nazis during World War II forced the 
international community to recognise the right of colonial peoples to both 
political and economic self-determination. To give effect to this the UN adopted 
a deliberate decolonisation strategy and an international bill of rights to 
guarantee the right of colonial peoples to self-government and independence. 
The UN Charter, unlike the Berlin Treaty of 1885 and the Covenant of the 
League of Nations of 1919, extended the right of self-determination to all 
peoples and nations and identified the right With human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, though it failed to set forth the rights and freedoms in 
question. In 1948 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights elaborated on the 
UN Charter by recapturing individual rights and freedoms embodied in the 
revolutionary constitutions of France and the USA and incorporating them, 
thereby making them an integral part of the United Nations Law. More 
specifically the Universal Declaration of Human Rights elaborated on the UN 
Charter by (a) deriving both the first and second generation rights from the 
principle of humanity and (b) underpinning the legitimacy and legality of 
governments on the will of the people. In short, the UDHR exploded the myth 
that human rights were an exclusive common heritage of European peoples and 
nations. 
The UDHR had a profound influence on Western European and Latin American 
Countries resulting in the incorporation of both the first and second generation 
rights in the European and American Conventions on Human Rights. 
During the fifties the UN became a forum for the further refinement and 
development of international human rights law. In particular the UN developed 
the principles of economic, social and cultural self-determination of peoples and 
nations. The principles of political and economic self-determination, inter alia, 
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were finally incorporated in the I ternational Covenants of 1966 and reduced 
to mandatory rules of internatio al law. To ensure the achievement of these 
rights the UN recognised the rig t of resistance (including armed struggle) of 
colonial or oppressed peoples. F rthermore, the UN charged member states 
with the duty of assisting colo ·al or oppressed peoples in their liberation 
struggles. 
With respect to colonial and oppressive regimes the UN prohibited, in particular, 
racial discrimination and violations of the integrity of the territories of colonial 
or oppressed peoples. Finally and perhaps more importantly, the UN 
underpinned the legitimacy and legality of governments on both the right of 
self-determination and respect for the rule of law and human rights, thereby 
making these concepts the foundation of a modern constitutional state. 
The international human-rights law, in particular the right of political and 
economic self-determination, gave much impetus to African struggles for self-
government and independence. Upon independence many third-world countries 
received bills of rights from the UDHR through the European Convention on 
Human Rights. 
But during the post-colonial era newly independent African States challenged 
some aspects of international law stating that circumstances unique to Africa 
required indigenous approaches to human rights. Thus during the second half 
of the sixties they made earnest efforts to develop an African Charter on Human 
and Peoples Rights. This Charter made a very significant contribution to 
international human-rights law by not only consolidating the interlinkage and 
inter-dependence of the first, second and third generation rights but also closely 
identifying the right of self-determination, rule of law and human rights and 
reaffirming them as hallmarks of a modern constitutional state. Furthermore, 
it imposed a duty on State parties to transform their States into constitutional 
states and provided for a monitoring system. In sum, international and regional 
human rights law created a new international constitutional order which all 
states and governments are required to strive for. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE RULE OF LAW AND COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION IN FOUR 
SOUTHERN AFRICAN TERRITORIES 
4.1 General 
The dynamic concept of the rule of law has become an internationally 
acceptable organising principle of modern constitutionalism. This chapter 
traces the life of the traditional (Diceyan) and the dynamic concepts of the rule 
of law under colonial administration in Southern Africa. The chapter deals 
with South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Bechuanaland (Botswana) 
and South West Africa (Namibia). More specifically, it deals with the evolution 
of institutions of government, resistance against colonial administration, the 
development of alternative constitutional visions and attempts by colonial (or 
white minority) governments to find internal settlements to prevent the 
implementation of the dynamic concept of the rule of law. 
4.2 Botswana 
4.2.1 Colonial Background 
The territory of Bechuanaland came under the protection of the Crown in 1885 
in terms of a treaty between the Chiefs and Great Britain. 1 The conclusion of 
the Treaty coincided with the signing of the Berlin Treaty which regulated, inter 
alia, the relationship between colonial powers and their overseas territories. 
In 1891 Great Britain adopted an Order in Council which laid the foundation for 
the administration of Bechuanaland.2 It vested the power of administration in 
the High Commissioner and also authorised him to appoint so many persons as 
1 See The Cape of Good Hope Govemment Gazette no. 6583 (March 6 1885) 494. 
2 See M Hough Botswana Konstitutionele Ontwikkeling (1970) 3. 
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he pleased to be Deputy Commissioners, or Assistant Commissioners, or 
Resident Commissioners, or Judges, Magistrates, or other officers, and to define 
the districts within which such officers would respectively discharge their 
functions. 3 Further, the High Commissioner was authorised to legislate by 
proclamation provided that in issuing such proclamations he would respect 
any native laws or customs by which the civil relations of any "native" chiefs, 
tribes or populations under His Majesty's protection were regulated, except in 
so far as they were incompatible with the due exercise of his power and 
jurisdiction. 4 
In 1894 the Imperial Government sought to transfer Bechuanaland to the 
British South Africa company, but this failed due to, inter alia, opposition by 
African Chiefs.5 From time to time after 1899 certain areas were created as 
blocks for white settlement (mostly Afrikaner farmers and ranchers) while 
others were set aside as tribal reserves. 6 The Bechuanaland Order in Council7 
defined as crown lands all lands over which the chiefs had abandoned their 
rights and jurisdictions. 
As shown below,8 Britain initially intended to incorporate the protectorates of 
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland into the Union of South Africa. Provision was 
made for the incorporation of these territories (known as High Commission 
Territories)9 under Section 151 of the South Africa Act, 1909. 10 This section also 
3 See Sections 2-3 of the 1891 Order in Council. 
4 See Section 4 of the 1891 Order in Council. 
5 See Hough Botswana Konstitusionele Ontwikkeling 4. 
6 See Marshall From Independence to Statehood in Commonwealth Africa 69. 
7 Ibid. 
8 See note 187 irifra. 
9 These territories have been described as follows: 
"In its character a British protectorate is a territory in which the Crown has acquired 
control of foreign relations and defence. Whatever other powers the Crown may have 
acquired (and they usually amount to a great deal more than this) are not essential to 
the protectorate status. For, legally, a protectorate is a dependency that has not been 
annexed; it is not part of the dominions of the Crown, and its inhabitants are not British 
subjects ... whether because it was originally desired only to provide jurisdiction for 
British residents without undertaking the administration of the country, or because it 
was not desired to give the natives the status of British subjects, which would follow 
from annexation, or in order to leave the possibility of diplomatic retreat or for other 
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provided for the government of these territories after their incorporation into 
South Africa. It vested the powers of government in the Governor-General in 
Council and enjoined him to exercise those powers upon the terms and 
conditions embodied in the schedule to the South Africa Act, 1909. Article 7 of 
the Schedule vested the legislative authority in the Governor-General in Council 
and authorised him to make laws by proclamation for the peace, order and 
good government of the High Commission territories. The Schedule limited the 
powers of the Governor-General in Council by requiring him to lay his laws 
before both Houses of Parliament within seven days after the issue of the 
proclamation or, if Parliament be not then sitting within seven days after the 
beginning of the next session. Such laws were effectual unless Parliament 
passed a resolution in the same session requesting the Governor-General in 
Council to repeal the same, in which case they would be repealed by 
proclamation. 
Article 2 the Schedule charged the Prime Minister with the administration of the 
High Commission territories. It required the Prime Minister to act on the advice 
of a commission consisting of not fewer than three members with a secretary 
appointed by the Governor-General in Council. Members of the Commission 
would also be appointed by the Governor-General and would hold office for ten 
years. 
The incorporation clause notwithstanding, the High Commission territories 
objected to being included in the Union of South Africa due to its racial policies. 
Thus the United Kingdom continually deferred its decision on the matter 
despite South Africa's persistent request for incorporation. 11 
reasons." See M Wight British Colonial Constitutions (1952) 96. 
10 Section 151 provided: 
"The King, with the advice of the Privy Council, on addresses from the Houses of 
Parliament of the Union, transfer to the Union Government of any territories, other than 
the territories administered by the British South Africa company, belonging to or under 
the protection of His Majesty, and inhabited wholly or in part by natives, and upon such 
transfer the Governor-General in Council may undertake the government of such 
territory upon the terms and conditions embodied in the schedule of the Act" 
11 See Marshall From Independence to Statehood in Commonwealth Africa 1 7. 
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During the inter-war years the Imperial government introduced the system of 
indirect rule in Bechuanaland. In accordance with this system the Imperial 
government sought to make "Native authorities" the local agents of the 
colonial authorities and to lend their influence to the type of change the colonial 
administration thought desirable. To achieve this the Resident Commissioner, 
who was placed at the immediate apex of the territory's central government, 
introduced the Native Administration Proclamation 12 and the Native Tribunal 
Proclamation. 13 These two Proclamations sought to define the powers of the 
chiefs so as to bring them under control and in line with the concept of indirect 
rule. They made some radical changes in the indigenous from of government 
and its administration of justice. 
In the mid-thirties, Chiefs Tshedi Khama and Bathoen II decided to sue the High 
Commissioner over the validity of Proclamations 74 and 75 of 1934. The 
chiefs' actions14 were based on the following grounds: 
[a) that the High Commissioner, in these proclamations, purported to make 
alterations to certain "native" laws and customs, and that he had no power to 
do so because the Order-in-Council of 9 May, 1891, from which he derived his 
powers, directed him to respect "native" law and custom; 
[b) that the High Commissioner, in these proclamations, violated certain rights 
reserved to two "native" tribes and their chiefs by treaty with Great Britain, and 
[c) that the proclamations were void for uncertainty and unreasonableness. 
In respect of the third ground, which the court considered first, it ruled that as 
the powers delegated to the High Commissioner by the Order-in-Council were 
discretionary, their exercise within the limit of discretion was not open to 
challenge in a court of law. Regarding the first ground, the court held that the 
use of the word "respect" in the Order-in-Council was not intended to forbid the 
12 no 74 of 1934. 
13 no 75 of 1934. 
14 See Tshedi Khama and Another v The High Commissioner in 1936 High Commission 
Territories Law Reports (1926-53) 9. 
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alteration of "native" law and custom but rather to impose upon the High 
commissioner the duty of treating the same with consideration, which the High 
Commissioner, in the opinion of the court, had done. The court referred the 
second question to the Secretary of State in conformity with the Foreign 
Jurisdiction Act of 189015 who concluded that the High Commissioner's 
proclamations were not limited by treaty or agreement. 16 The court confirmed 
that the Secretary's reply was conclusive against the plaintiffs, and dismissed 
their claims. Proclamations 3217 and 3418 tried to ameliorate the effects of the 
1934 Proclamations by reinstating the Kgotla as the main consultative body 
and restoring its judicial function. But the traditional authorities remained 
very much subordinate to the territory's central government. Thus the 
Protectorates' system was unmasked as a colonial system neither more nor less 
than its counterpart in South Africa or elsewhere. 19 
4.2.2 Evolution of Institutions of Government 
The development of national institutions of government in Bechuanaland did 
not begin until 1920 when the Native Advisory Council was established 
administratively. 20 This body consisted of representatives of all tribes. Its 
15 Section 4(1) of this Act provided: 
"if any proceedings in a court in Her Majesty's dominions ... any question arises as to the 
existence or extent of any jurisdiction of Her Majesty in foreign country a Secretary of 
State shall on the application of the court send to the court ... his decision on the 
question and his decision shall for the purposes of the proceedings be final." 
16 On the legal significance of treaties or agreements between African chiefs and colonial 
powers, see John Mugambwa "Treaties or Scraps of Paper ? A Second Look at the Legal 
Character of the 19th century British/African colonial agreements." in 1987 CILSA (XX) 79 et 
seq. 
17 no 32 of 1943. 
18 no 34 of 1943. 
19 Thus Hough described High Commission Territories as follows: 
"Kolonia! protektorate is gebiede wat in elke opsig, behalwe in wetlike status, kolonies 
is. Die administrasie van die gebiede is soortgelyk aan die van kroonkolonies en dit 
verskil slegs van laasgenoemde daarin dat hulle administrasie waarskynlik uit die 
Foreign Jurisdiction Act instede vanuit die British Settlements Act voortspruit. The 
Foreign Jurisdiction Act thus appears to make the jurisdiction, acquired by the Crown 
in a protected country, indistinguishable in legal effect from what might be acquired by 
conquest." See Hough BotswanaKonstitutsionele Ontwikkeling 5. 
20 no 9 of 1958. 
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function was to discuss with the Resident Commissioner all matters affecting 
African interests which the members desired to bring forward. In 1940 the 
name was changed to African Advisory Council. In 1958 the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate African Advisory Council Proclamation21 made the African 
Advisory Council a statutory body. Section 2 of the proclamation described it 
as the official body representing the African people of the territory and stated 
that its function should be to advise the Resident Commissioner on matters 
directly and indirectly affecting the African residents of the Territory. The 
African Advisory Council consisted of: 
(a) the Deputy Resident Commissioner and not more than six public servants 
appointed by the Resident Commissioner; 
(b) chiefs of various tribes; 
(c) thirty one appointed or elected members from the twelve electoral divisions; and 
(d) not more that two non-official members appointed by the Resident 
Commissioner. 
In 1920 an European Advisory Council was established administratively to 
which was elected one member from each of the electoral areas of the 
protectorate. 22 The European Advisory Council was made a statutory body by 
proclamation in 1947.23 Section 2 of the proclamation declared the function of 
this body to be: 
"to advise the Resident Commissioner on matters directly affecting the European 
residents of the Territory: provided that neither the High Commissioner nor the 
Resident Commissioner shall be under any obligation to accept the advice 
tendered by the Council". 
The European Advisory Council consisted of the Deputy Resident Commissioner 
and six other officials appointed by the Resident Commissioner as well as seven 
21 no 9 of 1958. 
22 See Marshall From Independence to Statehood 70. 
23 no 44 of 1947. 
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members24 elected from one of the electoral divisions. 25 At this time the 
representation given to Europeans was remarkably restricted in nature, 26 
particularly in view of the limited powers of the European Advisory Council. 27 
In 1950 a Joint Advisory Council was established administratively, consisting 
of eight members of the African Advisory Council and seven government 
officials. 28 On 12 April 1954 the South African government renewed its claim 
to the High Commission territories urging for the resumption of negotiations 
between itself and the United Kingdom. Once again the UK deferred its decision 
on the matter. South Africa suffered a major setback in April 1958 when the 
Joint Advisory Council resolved that in their opinion the time had come when 
a legislative council should be formed and empowered to assist in the 
government of Bechuanaland. The British government welcomed this 
resolution. Thus in April 1959 they informed the Joint Advisory Council that 
the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations would be happy to 
consider the proposal for the establishment of a legislative council for 
Bechuanaland. To that end the Resident Commissioner was requested to 
formulate and submit proposals to the High Commissioner after consultation 
with the Joint Advisory Council and consideration of any views submitted by 
interested persons in the protectorate. 29 A Constitutional Committee was 
appointed to assist the Resident Commissioner in the formulation of proposals. 
The Committee consisted of representatives of the Joint Advisory Council and 
government officials. 30 In May 1959 South Africa stopped its efforts to secure 
the incorporation when it became clear that a "first stage" Constitution would 
be granted to Basutoland by the United Kingdom. 31 However South Africa still 
24 This number was increased to 8 in 1948. See Proclamation of 7 of 1948. 
25 These electoral divisions are described in Section 3 of Proclamation 44 of 194 7. 
26 See Section 4 of Proclamation 44 of 194 7. 
27 See Section 2 of Proclamation 44 of 194 7. 
28 See§ 2 of Constitutional Proposalsfor the Bechuanaland Protectorate 1960. 
29 See§ 3 ibid. 
30 See§ 4 ibid. 
31 For earlier details of the Incorporation Controversy see "Basutoland, the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate and Swaziland: History of discussions with the Union of South Africa 1909 to 
1939" in Command Papers of the United Kingdom Government no 8707of1952. 
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aspired to some other form of South African jurisdiction such as "economic or 
constitutional guardianship" over Bechuanaland.32 
These aspirations were dealt a deadly blow when the report of the 
Constitutional Committee was unanimously endorsed by the Joint Advisory 
Council and published as "Constitutional Proposals for the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate (Constitution) Order in Council 1960."33 
For the purpose of this thesis the focus shall fall on the composition of the 
legislature and the executive and the status of hereditary rulers. The proposed 
Constitution empowered the High Commissioner, acting on the advice of a 
legislative council, to make laws for the peace, order and good government of 
the protectorate. 34 The Legislative Council would consist of thirty to thirty five 
members with the Resident Commissioner as President.35 The other members 
of the Legislative council would include: 
(a) three ex-officio members, namely the Government Secretary, the Secretary for 
Finance and the Legal Secretary; 
(b) 21 elected members of whom 10 would be Europeans, 10 Africans and one 
Asian; 
(c) seven official nominees; 
(d) nominees of the High Commissioner. 
The proposed Constitution abolished the European36 and African37 Advisory 
Councils. The latter was replaced by an African Council38 composed of: 
(a) the Resident Commissioner as President and not more than seven other official 
members; 
(b) the chiefs of the eight principal tribes as permanent ex-officio members; 
32 See House of Assembly Debates vol. 101 cols. 5254-5256. 
33 Ibid 503-513. 
34 See Section 6 of the South Africa Act, 1909. 
35 See Section 7. 
36 See Section 8. 
37 See Section 20. 
38 Ibid. 
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(c) 32 members appointed or elected from 13 divisions in the protectorate, 
appointed or elected by the Kgotlas or tribal or district councils whatever the 
case might be; and 
(d) not more than two non-official members appointed by the Resident 
Commissioner. 
The electoral system to the legislative council was discriminatory in that 
European members were elected directly by European voters in ten 
constituencies while African members were elected by an African Council and 
the Asian member would be elected by Asian voters. 39 
The constitutional proposals provided for an Executive Council40 consisting of 
the Resident Commissioner; the Government Secretary; the Secretary for 
Finance; the Legal Secretary and two other officials appointed by the High 
Commissioner, together with four members nominated by the High 
Commissioner from among the unofficial members of the Legislative Council, 
of whom two would be European and two African. The Resident Commissioner 
reserved the right to hear representations form any person he pleased. 41 Also, 
he would reserve the right to reject the advice of the Executive Council. 
Late in 1960 the Bechuanaland People's Party was formed. It protested and 
agitated against the new Constitution which was denounced as racial. 42 The 
main objections against the Constitution were:43 
39 See Sections 8 and 9. 
40 See Section I 7. 
41 See Section 18. 
42 See Marshall From Independence to Statehood in Commonwealth Africa 76. 
43 To pave the way for constitutional talks two orders were made: 
[a) The Bechuanaland [Bangwato Succession Amendment) Order 1963: Statutory 
Instruments 1963 no 1628 [vol. II) 3027. This order reinstated some powers of 
chiefs which were curtailed in 1952. 
[b) The Bechuanaland Protectorate [Constitution Amendment) Order 1963: Statutory 
Instruments 1963 no 1628 [III) 3027. This order amended the 1960 Order in 
Council by constituting the office of Her Majesty's Commissioner for Basutoland, 
the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland and conferred the necessary 
functions on him and made consequential amendments to the 1960 Order in 
Council. 
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(a) that African members of the Legislative Council would not be directly elected; 
(b) that it was undemocratic in that it consolidated the old and simple system of 
African representation through chiefs who seldom consulted the people they 
were supposedly representing; 
(c) that chiefs should have abdicated some of their responsibilities to the masses 
and remained symbols of local unity in line with the British monarchy; 
(d) that the African Council was unnecessary and it prevented direct representation 
in the legislative Council; 
(e) that equal representation of Europeans and Africans was unfair as the latter 
were in the majority. 
Notwithstanding this criticism the proposed Constitution came into force in 
1961 and Seretse Khama was elected to the Legislative Council in his 
individual capacity and he was also appointed to the Executive Council. 
Dissatisfaction with the Bechuanaland People's Party forced Seretse Khama to 
form the Bechuanaland Democratic Party as a counterweight against the BPP. 
In the meantime political unrest forced the Bechuanaland government to 
initiate moves for the review of the 1961 Constitution. 
Meanwhile, in South Africa, during the debate on the Constitutional Bill in 
January 1961 the Prime Minister of South Africa stated that these territories 
would never be incorporated into South Africa as they were then being granted 
self-government by the United Kingdom. But in September 1963 he asked for 
British co-operation in planning the administration of the territories as an 
integral part of the South African Bantustan scheme. The UK rejected this 
proposal. The UK refused to transfer the High Commission territories to South 
Africa for the following reasons:44 
(a) the indigenous African population was opposed to incorporation into South 
Africa owing to its inhuman native policies; 
44 See Marshall From Independence to Statehood in Commonwealth Africa 53-54. 
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(b) the UK had hoped that eventually British, and not Afrikaner, native polices 
would prevail; 
[c) the British had envisaged a transfer of the High Commission territories to a 
Union under the Crown of Great Britain with safeguards that could be enforced 
by the British government. (This was made impossible by the achievement of 
legislative sovereignty by the Union of South Africa in 1931);45 
(d) the introduction of the policy of apartheid in 1948; and 
(e) the UN decolonisation strategy. 
In the meantime (April 1963) the British Government directed the Resident 
Commissioner to initiate constitutional talks with a view to further political 
advance in Bechuanaland. In July 1963 preliminary talks were attended by the 
Resident Commissioner, representatives of the three major parties of the 
European and Asian Communities and the chiefs. Despite attempts by a group 
of Afrikaner farmers to obtain independence for the Tull district, constitutional 
talks were successfully concluded in November 1963.46 
The constitutional talks resulted in Bechuanaland Constitutional Proposals 
which were implemented by the making of the Bechuanaland Protectorate 
(Constitution) Order 1965. 47 This pre-independence Act made provision for a 
House of Chiefs in recognition of some support which they still command 
especially in the rural areas. This body was separate from the unicameral 
legislature and was given merely advisory responsibilities, and then only on 
chieftainship and tribal matters. Moreover, three months before independence 
the Chieftainship Act of 1965, was put into effect. This Act further tightened 
government control over the chiefs and rounded off the process of turning 
them into government agents. 48 
45 Note that in granting independence to South Africa the imperial British Government 
failed to give any safeguards to the black majority. See HA Wieschoff Colonial Policies in Africa 
(1944) 77. 
46 Marshall From Independence to Statehood in Commonwealth Africa 76. 
47 See AJGM Sanders "Chieftainship and Western Democracy in Botswana" in 1987 CILSA 
(XX) 365. 
48 Ibid. 
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Following a successful Constitutional Conference in London in February 1966 
the Bechuanaland Protectorate achieved independence under the name of 
Botswana. The Bechuanaland Constitutional proposals were implemented by 
the Botswana Independence Act 196649 of the United Kingdom and the 
Botswana Independence Order 1966. 50 The former was an enabling Act which 
conferred sovereign status on Bechuanaland and made consequential 
amendments relating, inter alia, to citizenship, appeals, and so on. The latter 
fixed the date of independence for Botswana at 30 September 1966. 
The Botswana Constitution Act of 1966 restored the sovereignty of the people 
of Bechuanaland which had been surrendered to Great Britain by the people of 
Botswana as a whole. To protect the citizens [including the white minority) the 
Constitution incorporated a bill of fundamental rights and freedoms of the 
individual. 51 
4.2.3 General Conclusions 
The Imperial Government did not intend to colonise the High Commission 
territories nor did these territories intend to permanently surrender their 
sovereignty to Great Britain. The Imperial Government agreed to the eventual 
incorporation of these territories into South Africa in the hope that liberal 
democratic values would eventually prevail in South Africa. However, as the 
High Commission territories were in opposition to South Africa's racial policies 
the UK constantly deferred the incorporation of these territories into South 
Africa. Furthermore, the new international politico-legal order and its 
underlying human-rights philosophy forced the UK to begin to prepare 
Bechuanaland for self-government and independence contrary to the South 
Africa Act, 1909. 
49 See Bechuanaland Independence Coriference Report 1966. 
50 See Statutory Instruments 1966 no 11 71. 
51 See Sections 3-16 of the Constitution of Botswana. 
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Thus the Imperial Government established parallel institutions (the white and 
African Advisory Councils) which were subsequently brought together as a bi-
racial Joint Advisory Council. This Council introduced a New Constitution 
(with the approval of the UK) providing for direct representation for whites and 
indirect representation (through Chiefs) for Africans. The Africans objected to 
this system of representation on the grounds (a) that the chiefs seldom 
consulted the people they supposedly represented and (b) that the system did 
not provide for African majority rule. In the meanwhile the UK refused to 
incorporate Bechuanaland into South Africa in accordance with the will of the 
African majority and international human rights law. Thus the UK finally 
granted Bechuanaland independence and incorporated a bill of rights in the 
Independence Constitution. 
It is remarkable, yet not totally beyond understanding, 52 that in the case of 
South Africa the UK granted self-government and finally independence to the 
white minority without any adequate safeguards for the black majority and 
contrary to their will. Hence the legitimacy crises of successive white minority 
governments. 
The status of South Africa and Bechuanaland differed. However, by providing 
for the incorporation of Bechuanaland into South Africa Britain would have 
subjected the people of this territory to the overriding authority of the white 
minority government in South Africa. As in the case of South Africa the 
imperial government reserved the powers of disallowance over the acts of the 
Botswanan Parliament. (This meant that Britain could prevent South Africa 
from unilaterally incorporating Bechuanaland.) Indeed, Britain rejected South 
African attempts to incorporate Bechuanaland into a racially segregated society 
and eventually granted independence to Bechuanaland according to the wishes 
of the people of that territory. The Constitution of Bechuanaland (renamed 
52 This can be subscribed to the fact that South Africa's colonisation predates that of 
Botswana by more than a century. There was a marked difference between "white" world 
opinion about "natives" in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and that after WW II. 
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Botswana at independence) contains a bill of rights similar to the European 
Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In other words, this 
new Africa state incorporated universal human rights norms which had become 
the foundation of modern constitutional states. 
4.3 Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) 
4.3.1 Colonial Background 
During the Anglo-Boer War53 (1899-1902) the Imperial government began to 
increase its supervisory powers over the British South Africa Company. 54 In 
furtherance of this policy they granted as a parallel measure to Order in Council 
of 1898, a supplementary charter55 in June 1900 varying terms of the original 
charter and setting out the British Government's new powers of control over the 
Board of Directors of the company. These powers included: 
[a) the termination of the company's power to make ordinances as for the date when 
the new legislative council should assemble; 
[b) directing the company to communicate the resolutions, minutes and orders of 
the proceedings of its Board of Directors or of any of its committees relating to 
the administration of Southern Rhodesia to the Secretary of State who was given 
power to amend or cancel them;56 
[c) the Secretary of State was given access to the company's records and a power 
of removal of any recalcitrant director or official. 57 The company was denied the 
right to establish or maintain any force or military police. 58 
After the Anglo-Boer War differences of opinion emerged between elected and 
nominated members of the legislative council. To deal with the situation the 
53 During the war Southern Rhodesia fought on the side of Great Britain. See Marshall From 
Independence to Statehood in Commonwealth Africa 34. 
54 See Kenneth Young Rhodesia and Independence 1967 52 et seq. 
55 Published in Command Papers of the United Kingdom Government 7645 (1914). 
56 See Article 2. 
57 See Article 5. 
58 See Article 4. 
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Southern Rhodesia Order in Council 190359 was made, amending the 1898 
order. A new Article 17 A provided in subsection (1) that the Legislative Council 
should consist of the Administrator, the Resident Commissioner and 14 other 
members, of whom seven should be nominated and seven elected. The new 
Article also authorised the High Commissioner, with the approval of the 
Secretary of State to amend by proclamation any provision of the order of 1903 
or 1898 relating to the Constitution of the legislative Council of the Council 
should resolve that such amendment be made provided that any resolution 
providing for the equality of nominated and elected member should be passed 
by a three-quarters majority of the whole legislative Council. 
The continued dispute between the company and the elected members of the 
legislative council forced the former to concede the idea of eventual self-
government of the white minority in Southern Rhodesia. Thus in 1907 the 
company agreed that the elected members should have a majority of seats in 
the legislative Council. In 1908 Southern Rhodesia attended the South African 
National Convention which adopted a draft constitution providing of its 
incorporation into the Union of South Africa.60 
In 1911 the British Government granted the Southern Rhodesia Order in 
Council61 which reduced the number of members of the executive Council 
appointed by the company from four to three62 and reduced the overall 
membership of the Legislative Council to twelve, seven of whom were to be 
elected and five appointed by the company, with the approval of the Secretary 
of State. 63 Thus the white minority settlers achieved majority representation in 
59 See Statutory Rules and Order 1903 no 122. 
60 The incorporation clause read: 
"The King, with the advice of the Privy Council, may on addresses from the Houses of 
Parliament of the Union admit into the Union the territories administered by the British 
South Africa Company on such terms and conditions as to representation and otherwise 
in each case as are expressed in the addresses and approved by the King, and the 
provisions of any Order in Council in that behalf shall have effect as if they had been 
enacted by the Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland". 
61 See Statutory Rules and Order no 439 of 1911. 
62 See Section 2. 
63 See Section 3. 
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the Legislative Assembly.64 But the effective control of the country remained in 
the hands of the company as the Order in Council had imposed restrictions on 
the Legislative council, which led to this system not lasting long. 
In 1914 the High Commissioner made a declaration of British Government 
policy indicating that Responsible Government would be granted to Southern 
Rhodesia, though the incorporation of the territory into the Union of South 
Africa remained the ultimate goal. A Further Proclamation of 191465 provided 
for the increase of seats to a maximum of 15. The number of elected members, 
however, had only increased to 13 by 1920. 
It was agreed during World War I that no major constitutional change should 
take place until the cessation of hostilities. Thus the Six Orders in Council 
issued between 1914-1918 related to minor issues.66 In the meanwhile the 
settlers, through their elected representatives in the legislative council, had been 
raising the question of the ownership of the unalienated land of the territory 
disputing the claim to it by the British South Africa Company. This claim was 
based on the concessions obtained by the company from Lobengula. On 1 7 
April 1914 the Legislative Council passed a resolution stating that the company 
did not own the unalienated land in Southern Rhodesia and when it ceased to 
be the government of that territory the ownership of the land should remain 
with the government. 67 But the Imperial Government refrained from settling the 
land question in isolation from any general settlement of all questions then 
remaining between the crown, the company and the settlers. It was therefore 
agreed that the question should be resolved by the Judicial Committee of the 
64 The powers of the Legislative council were subject to a provision in the Order in Council 
that the Legislative council should not consider any vote, resolution or order for appropriation 
of any part of the public revenue or any tax that had not first been recommended to the council 
by the administrator during the same session. See Section 6. 
65 See Proclamation 4 7 of 1914. 
66 See Standing Rules and Orders (SRO) no 1270 of 1914 (relating to customs duties); no 
147 of 1915 (Auditor-General); SRO no 475 of 1916 (police on active service); SRO no 2223 of 
1920 (native reserves); SRO no 353 of 1921 (the Administrator) and SRO no 355 of 1923 
(command of the police). 
67 See Marshall From Independence to Statehood in Commonwealth Africa 38. 
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Privy Council on a special reference under Section 4 of the Judicial Committee 
Act 1833. The reference was made in 1914. 
The report of the Judicial Committee on the Land Reference was made in 
1918.68 The committee decided that the Crown, not the Chartered Company, 
owned the unalienated land. That decision deprived the company of one of its 
major assets. This factor, coupled with the continuing and increasing pressure 
of the elected members of the legislative council for the grant of responsible 
government, persuaded the company to surrender its political control over, and 
its administrative functions, in, Southern Rhodesia. 
The General election of 1920 returned to the Southern Rhodesian legislative 
assembly an overwhelming majority of elected members in favour of 
Responsible Government. In May 1920 the Legislative Council passed a 
resolution requesting the Imperial Government to grant responsible government 
to Southern Rhodesia. The resolution claimed that the settlers were capable of 
fulfilling, in the interests of all the habitants of the territory, regardless of race, 
the duties of self-government and that they were equally as able to bear 
responsibility thereof as other peoples of the empire who had been granted self-
govemment. The British High Commissioner delayed the granting of self-
government to the Southern Rhodesia to 1923 on the ground that there was an 
influx of settlers into the territory who would need to be consulted on the New 
Constitution. 
As in the case of South Africa, the Commissioner did not consider the 
alternative course of developing the territory towards self-government under the 
Crown with African participation or partnership. This approach was followed in 
the case of Botswana. Unlike in the case of Botswana this decision was based 
on the notion that Southern Rhodesia, like South Africa, was a white man's 
country. Thus Southern Rhodesia, like the Union of South Africa, fell under the 
category of British dominions. 69 
68 Ibid 39. 
69 Ibid 39-41. 
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As a result of the insistence of the settlers on responsible government the New 
Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr Winston Churchill) appointed a 
committee under the chairpersonship of Lord Buxton 70 and commissioned it to 
consider the following matters: 
(a) when and with what limitations (if any) Responsible Government should be 
granted to Southern Rhodesia; 
(b) what procedure should be adopted with a view to working out the future 
constitution and 
(c) pending the coming into effect of responsible government what measures would 
be required to enable the British South Africa Company to carry on the 
administration. 
The Buxton Committee recommended, first, that a scheme for responsible 
government should be drawn up in detail and placed before the electors of 
Southern Rhodesia for their acceptance or rejection and that their opinion be 
ascertained by means of a referendum rather than by a general election; 
secondly, the Committee made detailed recommendations as to conduct of the 
referendum and the material that should be placed before the voters; and 
thirdly, the Committee recommended the method of granting Responsible 
government, the main provisions ensuing from the Constitution. In Conclusion, 
the report commended the British South Africa Company for the Great Imperial, 
commercial, and colonising work that it had accomplished. 
In October and November 1921 the elected members of the Legislative Council 
of Southern Rhodesia attended a conference with the Secretary of State in 
London. As a result of this conference a Draft Constitution for Responsible 
Government was drawn up. In January 1922 a White Paper71 was published 
containing a Dispatch to the High Commissioner for South Africa transmitting 
70 See the First Report of the Buxton Committee CMD 12 73 (1921) Appendix 1. 
71 See CMD 15 73 of 1922. 
129 
a draft order in Council annexing the territory of Southern Rhodesia to the 
Crown, draft letters patent providing for the Constitution of Responsible 
Government in the colony, draft letters patent constituting the office of 
Governor and draft royal instructions to the Governor. Many of the clauses of 
the draft letters patent for the constitution were derived from corresponding 
sections of the Constitutions of the Transvaal of 1906, Natal of 1893 as well as 
of the Southern Rhodesia Order in Council of 1898.72 In other words, the 
constitution-making approach in Southern Rhodesia was modelled on the one 
adopted in the case of South Africa. 
The letters conferred on the "people" of Southern Rhodesia (excluding Africans) 
a full and satisfactory control of their government and administration subject 
to the incorporation clause of the South Africa Act, 1909. 73 Thus the letters 
patent urged the colonial authorities to negotiate the terms of incorporation with 
South Africa and to ascertain the wish of the settlers by means of a referendum. 
A conference between the colonial authorities in Salisbury and General Smuts 
held in April 1922 proposed that Southern Rhodesia should become a province 
of the Union and have at first ten and later seventeen members in the Union 
Parliament and four in the Senate. The conference also proposed a Provincial 
Council for Southern Rhodesia as was the case with the provinces of the Union. 
In the meantime the Southern Rhodesian Legislative council had passed the 
Referendum Ordinance 1922. A referendum was duly held in October 1922 at 
which the majority of voters voted against incorporation in the Union of South 
Africa. Thus in 1923 Southern Rhodesia was granted self-government with 
certain reservations. 74 Although Southern Rhodesia as a Colonial territory fell 
under the same category as the Union of South Africa in 1931 Britain did not 
grant her legislative independence along with South Africa and other British 
dominions. 
72 See Marshall From Independence to Statehood in Commonwealth Africa 44. 
73 See note 18 7 irifra. 
74 Like South Africa it became a British colony subject to the Colonial Laws Validity Acts 
of 1865. 
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4.3.2 Evolution of Institutions of Government 
In 1958 the struggle between Britain and Southern Rhodesia on the issue of 
independence began. Southern Rhodesia approached Britain for a revision of the 
Southern Rhodesian Constitution of 1923 with the object of achieving some 
degree of legislative sovereignty identical with that gained by South Africa in 
1931. Negotiations between the Southern Rhodesian and the British 
Governments resulted in a series of constitutional conferences beginning in 
December 1960.75 
In February 1961, Sandys, the British Commonwealth Relations Secretary and 
Whitehead, the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister, announced an agreement 
in principle, on the decolonisation of Southern Rhodesia. 76 The leader of the 
then National Democratic Party, Mr Joshua Nkomo,77 accepted that strategy. 
Pursuant to this agreement Britain published two white papers (Cmn. 1399 and 
1400) on 13 June 1961. These papers contained the terms of the post-colonial 
Southern Rhodesian constitution approved by the House of Commons on 21 
July 1961. Before the adoption of this constitution, a referendum of the 
electorate was taken on the 21st of July 1961, resulting in the acceptance of the 
new constitution by some 42,000 votes to 22,000. When the referendum took 
place all the balloting officers were instructed to ensure that each registered 
voter is given a ballot form and takes it to a cubicle and votes for or against the 
proposals contained in Parliamentary White papers published in the 
Government Gazette of the 30th of June 1961. 
The first White Paper (Command 1399) professed to eliminate all the reserve 
powers then vested in the government of Great Britain save for certain matters 
set out in paragraph 50. This paragraph made it quite clear that under the new 
constitution Southern Rhodesia would be free to make amendments to any 
75 See Marshall From Independence to Statehood in Commonwealth Africa 44 et seq. 
76 Ibid. 
77 But Nkomo later changed his mind. 
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section of the Constitution without reference to Britain with the exception of 
those affecting the position of the sovereign and the governor and the right of 
the British government to safeguard the position regarding certain international 
obligations and undertakings. This provision not only preserved the colonial 
status of Southern Rhodesia, but also failed to grant her a dominion status. In 
other words Great Britain did not grant Southern Rhodesia the status granted 
to South Africa and other dominions in 1931. 
The colonial status of Southern Rhodesia was clarified further when the 
Constitutional Bill78 was tabled in the House of Commons. The Bill failed to 
follow the White papers by including Section III in the New Constitution. This 
section reserved full power and authority to the Queen-in-Council to amend, add 
to or revoke the provisions of certain sections and also the power to vary or 
revoke section Ill, and any order in Council made by virtue of this section, 
provided that the Queen would not exercise these powers and authority for the 
purpose of amending section III or adding to it a reference to any Section of this 
Constitution not included in this section on the appointed day. 
Another section made quite clear that no Bill could become law until it had the 
assent of the Governor in the Queen's name. It stated clearly that the executive 
authority of Southern Rhodesia was vested in the Queen and might be exercised 
on her behalf by the Governor or such other person as may be authorised by the 
Governor. The Governor also in the Queen's name could grant any person 
concerned in or convicted of any offence a pardon either free or subject to lawful 
conditions or could grant to any person a respite of a sentence. He could also 
substitute a less severe form of punishment; he could remit the whole or part 
of any sentence and the offences to which this section of the Constitution 
applied were offences against any law in force in Southern Rhodesia other than 
a law of the Federal Legislature. 79 It appears quite clearly from these provisions 
that Section III, increased the powers of the Queen - in reality the British 
Government - to alter the legislature and Executive of Rhodesia. Thus instead 
78 See Report of Southern Rhodesia Constitutional Conference (London 1961). 
79 See note 83 irifra. 
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of granting independence to Southern Rhodesia Britain tightened her colonial 
rule over the territory. 
Henceforth Britain began to take positive steps to protect the interests of the 
people of Southern Rhodesia (including Africans) as a whole. She introduced a 
bill of rights to prevent discriminatory legislation and to safeguard from laws 
infringing his/her civil liberties every person in the Country whatever his/her 
race, tribe, place of origin, political opinion, colour or creed. Any aggrieved 
person could apply to the High Court for redress with an ultimate appeal to the 
Privy Council in London. The Constitution also provided for a Constitutional 
Council empowered to consider if any bill presented to the Legislative Assembly 
was consistent with the Declaration of Rights. The Constitutional Council in 
effect had some of the powers of the House of Lords in England. 
The demands of the white minority in Southern Rhodesia for independence 
coincided with a shift in the British colonial policy resulting from the new 
international politico legal order. 80 The new order required metropolitan powers 
to grant unqualified independence to colonial countries and people. 81 Thus, 
instead of granting independence to the white minority in Southern Rhodesia, 
as was the case in South Africa in 1931, 82 the 1961-62 Constitution opened up 
the franchise for Africans to a greater extent than ever before. Under it the vote 
was extended to persons of all races registered on one of two rolls and extended 
to all citizens aged 21 or over. These constitutional reforms met severe 
resistance from the Dominion Party which became the Rhodesia Front (RF) in 
1962. The RF, like the National Party of South Africa, opposed this franchise 
systems as it would eventually bring about black majority rule. 
Thus in the 1962 elections the RF, like the National Party of South Africa in 
80 See Chapter V below. 
81 This decolonisation strategy was based on the UN Declaration on the Granting 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of 14 December 1960. 
82 At the time the right of self-determination of African peoples was disputed by both 
Britain and South Africa who saw themselves as trustees or guardians of African peoples in 
terms of the Berlin Treaty as amplified by the Covenant of the League of Nations. 
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1948, campaigned on the basis of a racially-discriminatory programme. They 
based their programme on the following premises:83 
(a) that each community had the right to preserve its own identity, traditions, and 
customs provided it gave undivided loyalty to the Country; 
(b) that power should remain in responsible hands - that is, the white minority 
should hold on to the control of affairs and not hand over to the people not 
trained and not versed in the art of government; 
(c) that there should be no compulsory (though no voluntary) integration of black 
and white; 
(d) that the right of the government to provide separate amenities for black and 
white should be recognised. 
After the dissolution of the Federation in 1963, 84 the Southern Rhodesian 
Government began lengthy negotiations with Britain on the issue of 
independence. The Rhodesian Government premised its talks on its racial 
policies. These negotiations failed as they were dramatically opposed to the new 
British policy. 85 
Thus on 11 November 1965 the Smith regime made a Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence (UDI) but retained allegiance to the British Crown as a member 
of the Commonwealth. This was a constitutional coup d'etat committed in the 
face of the Constitution of 1961.86 The British labour government reacted by 
passing the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 affirming continuing UK responsibility 
and jurisdiction for and in respect of the colony. The Act made drastic 
modifications to the 1961 Constitution in order to deal with the situation 
created by rebellion. It deprived the Southern Rhodesia legislature of the power 
83 See Kenneth Young Rhodesia and Independence (1967) 52 et seq. 
84 The Constitutional developments in the Federation of Nyasaland, Southern and Northern 
Rhodesia are left out of account as they are not relevant to this thesis. For a discussion of those 
developments, see Marshall From Independence to Statehood in Commonwealth Africa 112 
et seq. 
85 See Young Rhodesia and Independence 52. 
86 See T 0 Elias Africa and the Development of International Law (1972) 111. 
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to make laws and vested those powers in Her Majesty in Council, suspended the 
ministerial system and provided for the exercise of ministerial functions by the 
British Commonwealth Secretary. The British government appointed Sir 
Humphrey Gibbs as the only legitimate Governor of the self-governing colony 
of Southern Rhodesia, a status he had held since 1923. 
The Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, laid down six principles for negotiations 
between the British government and the rebel regime. These principles were: 
1) the principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule, already 
enshrined in the 1961 Constitution, would have to be maintained and 
guaranteed; 
2) there would also have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the 
Constitution; 
3) there would be immediate improvement in the political status of the African 
population; 
4) there would have to be progress towards ending racial discrimination; 
5) the British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for 
independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole; 
6) it would be necessary to ensure that, regardless of race, there was no oppression 
of a majority by minority or of minority by majority. 
These terms proved to have been unacceptable to the Smith regime.87 
At the Commonwealth Conference held in London in 1966 an ultimatum was 
issued to the white minority regime in Southern Rhodesia to settle on the basis 
of the aforegoing six principles or face mandatory sanctions imposed by the 
United Nations before the end of 1966. 88 All subsequent efforts to restore 
legality to Southern Rhodesia failed. The whole question of the illegal Smith 
regime in Southern Rhodesia was put in issue in the case of Madzimbamuto v 
87 Ibid. 
88 See Resolution 232 (1966) of December 1966. 
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Lardner-Burke. 89 The court held that the Smith regime was valid. Subsequently 
most Rhodesian judges acknowledged the illegal regime as the only lawful 
government of Southern Rhodesia, and recognised the Constitution promulgated 
by that regime as the only valid constitution, forcing the British Governor to 
leave the Country.90 
In 1970 the illegal regime purported to adopt a republican Constitution (the 
1969 Constitution) without even the very distant prospect of majority rule 
offered by the 1961 constitution. This constitutional dispensation introduced a 
franchise based on race, providing for eventual parity of African and European 
representation in the House of Assembly, and by excluding majority rule, 
further, the dispensation made the Declaration of Rights non-justiciable and 
designed the constitution to underpin an overtly discriminatory state system. 91 
The Republican Constitution of 1969 did not envisage the return to legality 
under British colonial rule, however temporarily, so as to accept an independent 
constitution from the UK in the traditional manner.92 
However, internal and international pressures against the Smith regime forced 
them to enter into talks with successive British governments. 93 These talks were 
designed to tinker with the 1961 Constitution in a way that would provide for 
an independence settlement consistent with the British "six principles" in terms 
of which majority rule would be delayed for many years after independence. 
However, one of the principles required a Constitutional Settlement acceptable 
to the Rhodesian people as a whole. This principle represented a major British 
colonial policy shift regarding the decolonisation of Southern Rhodesia as it 
accepted the principle of self-determination as embodied in the Declaration of 
Independence for Colonial Countries and Peoples. 94 
89 1968 (2) SA 284 (RAD). 
90 See R v Ndlovu 1968 (4) SA 515 (RAD). 
91 See Peter Slinn Zimbabwe Achieves Independence 1041-1042. 
92 See GA Resolution 2022 (XX). 
93 For a full discussion of these talks see Leo S Baron "The Rhodesian Saga" in 1969 
Zambian Law Journal (Vol. 1 no 1) 38 et seq. 
94 Resolution 1514 (XV). 
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In 1971 the new Conservative Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Sir Alec 
Douglas-Home reached an agreement with Mr Ian Smith. In terms of that 
agreement the British Government would accept the Southern Rhodesian 
Constitution of 1969 as the constitutional framework for legal independence 
subject to amendments, which, while significant, were not likely to produce 
majority rule between thirty and fifty years. The implementation of this 
agreement was subject to the principle of self-determination for the people as 
a whole. 95 As an integral part of the agreement a commission under Lord Pearce 
visited Southern Rhodesia to test African opinion. The Pearce Commission 
found that the proposals were not acceptable to the African majority. Thus the 
British attempts to procure a constitutional settlement through bilateral 
dealings with the illegal regime failed. 96 
Then the regime vigorously pursued an alternative strategy designed to procure 
an "internal settlement" acceptable to a substantial section of the black majority 
inside the country. The settlement provided for majority rule but with adequate 
"safeguards" for the white community. Mr Ian Smith and a number of African 
political leaders, including Bishop Abel Muzorewa, who had emerged as a leader 
during the 1971 Douglas-Home proposals, signed the internal settlement 
agreement in March 1978. Like the Anglo-American proposals, this agreement 
provided for the establishment of a transitional administration to oversee the 
drafting of a new constitution to provide for "majority rule on the basis of 
universal adult suffrage". Further it allowed the 1969 Constitution to remain in 
force (and the Parliament elected thereunder to continue to sit) subject to minor 
modifications to accommodate the replacement of the existing ministry by a 
transitional government. 97 
The transitional government produced a Zimbabwe-Rhodesia constitution of 
1979 which brought Muzorewa to power as the first black Prime Minister. The 
95 This approach was consistent with the UN decolonisation strategy embodied in the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Ibid. 
96 See Peter Slinn Zimbabwe Achieves Independence 1042. 
91 Ibid. 
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majority of the provisions of the constitution were designed to limit the impact 
of the concession of majority rule and to ensure that the administration of the 
country remained in white hands. This was affected through reservation of 
white seats in parliament and the white veto guaranteed for a minimum period 
of ten years. But the Constitution also ensured that even after the expiry of that 
period the white privileges might be retained. 98 
4.3.3 General Conclusion 
The colonial character of Southern Rhodesia did not differ from that of South 
Africa, they were both acquired through conquest and annexation, forcibly 
depriving the indigenous African peoples of their land and the right to self-
determination. The South Africa Act 1909 made provision for the incorporation 
of Southern Rhodesia into South Africa. The British government respected the 
right of self-determination of the white minority in South Africa and granted 
them self-government. In respect of Southern Rhodesia, unlike South Africa, 
Britain refused to grant independence to the white minority before black 
majority rule. There are two reasons for this: first, the rise of African 
nationalism and the resistance against colonialism and secondly, the 
international pressures for decolonisation. In short, Britain failed to grant 
independence to the white minority in Southern Rhodesia under the Statute of 
Westminster of 1931 as she was overtaken by the New International Politico 
Legal Order which developed after World War II. Thus during the sixties Britain 
felt obliged to find an internationally acceptable solution to the Southern 
Rhodesia question. 
The Smith regime, like its South African counterparts, embarked on various 
internal settlements designed to bypass or qualify the right of self-determination 
of the black majority. The signatories to the Salisbury Agreement had hoped 
that their settlement would induce guerrillas to abandon the armed struggle and 
98 See Blaustein A, Gisbert P & Franz H Constitutions of the Countries of the World (1986) 
17. 
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the international community to recognise the Rhodesian Independence and lift 
economic sanctions. The internal settlement failed to achieve these goals. 
However, the election of a conservative government in May 1979 raised hopes 
in Salisbury that Britain might be prepared to confer legitimacy on the internal 
settlement arrangements by legislative action. On the contrary, the New British 
government adopted the firm view that Rhodesia could only be brought back 
to legality through a fresh constitutional settlement acceptable to all the 
Rhodesian parties and to the international community, particularly the Front 
Line States. 99 The internal settlement attempts failed to meet the requirements 
of an internationally acceptable constitutional order in that they severely 
restricted the civil and political rights of the black majority, and as in South 
West Africa and South Africa itself, were rejected by the national liberation 
movements and the international community on the ground that they did not 
satisfy the mandatory rule of self-determination and equal rights which had 
become the foundation of modem constitutional states. 
4.4 South West Africa (Namibia) 
4.4.1 Origins and Nature of International Status 
The territory of South west Africa was a colony of Germany until 1915.100 
During World War I it was conquered by the Union of South Africa with the 
assistance of the indigenous population. 101 The territory remained under a 
military government established by South Africa until December 1920. 102 
At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 President Wilson of the United States of 
America and the Dominion Prime Ministers hammered out a "great 
99 See opening speech by Lord Carrington (Chairman) in Zimbabwe Rhodesia Report of the 
Constitutional Conference Lancaster House (London 1979) 6-7. 
100 See John Dugard South West Africa/Namibia: Review of the International dispute 
(1973) 2. 
101 See "Namibia the Historical Legacy" in Gerhard Totemeyer, Vezera Kandetu and 
Wolfgang Werner (eds.) Namibia in Perspective (1987) 18. 
102 See Marshall From Independence to Statehood 28. 
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compromise" which produced a three-tiered system of mandates which reflected 
in a sliding scale a varied balancing of national and international interests. 
South West Africa became one of the C-mandated territories. 103 An 
understanding of the international status and constitution-making approaches 
in this territory requires a historical background of the mandate system. 
The historical roots of the mandates system stretches to the concepts and 
principles enunciated in earlier international arrangements such as the Berlin 
Treaty of 1885.104 None the less the system did not result from an organic 
development in international relations, but was a direct result of diplomatic 
events of World War I and the Paris Peace Conference. 
The initiative came from General Smuts. Hardly a month after the war, 105 
Smuts106 published a small pamphlet entitled, "The League of Nations: A 
practical suggestion", which was destined to have a profound influence on the 
formulation of the mandates system. The key point was that the collapse of the 
old empires should not be made the occasion for "National annexation" of 
derelict territories. Further, Smuts declared that as Europe was being 
liquidated, the League of Nations must be the heir of that great estate. In other 
words, the League of Nations had to be made the reversionary, in the broadest 
sense, of the peoples and territories formerly belonging to Russia, Austria, 
Hungary and Turkey. 107 The Smuts plan clothed the League of Nations with the 
right of ultimate disposal in accordance with the principles of "no annexations, 
103 See S Slonim "Origins of the South West Africa Dispute: The Versailles Peace Conference 
and the Creation of the Mandates System" in 1968 IV The Canadian Yearbook of International 
Law 115. 
104 See Pittman B Potter "Origin of the System of Mandates under the League of Nations" 
in 16 American Political Science Review (1922) 563. Also Luther H Evans "Some Legal and 
Historical Antecedents of the Mandatory System" in 5 Proceedings of the Southwestern Political 
Association (1924) 143. 
105 11 November, 1918. 
106 See Jan C Smuts The League of Nations: A Practical suggestion (1918) 
107 The exclusion of African and Asian peoples from the Smuts plan was a deviation from 
the international "plan for the betterment of backward peoples" embodied in the Berlin Treaty. 
It was also opposed to President Wilson's plan which envisaged ultimate self-government and 
independence for all peoples and nations. See President Wilson "The origins of the Mandates 
System" 6 Foreign Affairs (1928) 281. 
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and self-determination of nations". 108 Since the peoples involved differed in their 
preparedness for self government, Smuts called for a scheme of graded 
mandates. The terms of each mandate would be spelled out in a special charter 
which would not only reserve ultimate control to the League, but would also call 
for periodic reports, and even for appeal against gross breaches of the mandate 
by the people of the mandated territory. 
Smuts, 109 however, excluded Africa and the Pacific Islands from the mandates 
principle on the ground that 
"The German colonies in the Pacific and Africa are inhabited by barbarians who 
not only cannot possibly govern themselves but to whom it would be 
impracticable to apply any idea of political self determination in the European 
sense ... The disposal of these colonies should be decided on the basis of the 
principles which President Wilson has laid down in the fifth of his celebrated 
fourteen points." 
The Smuts plan was not only contrary to the Berlin Treaty of 1885 but also to 
the emerging progressive ideals of democracy, the right of self-determination ?f 
peoples, and protection of minority rights which had been confirmed by the 
Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. 110 
In addition, the Smuts plan was controvy to Wilson's fourteen points plan111 
which was set against the background of these ideals. Wilson's Points were 
enunciated before a joint session of Congress of January 8, 1918. The Fifth 
Point envisaged, contrary to the Smuts Plan, a free, open-minded, and 
absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based on the principle 
that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the 
population concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the 
government whose title was to be determined. 
108 See Smuts The League of Nations 10. 
109 Ibid 12. 
110 See Slonim "The Origins of The South West Africa Dispute" 116. 
111 See Point 5. For a text see James Brown Scott (ed.) Official Statements of War Aims 
and Peace Proposals {December 1916 to November 1918) (1921) 234-39. 
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Shortly after the end of the war President Wilson visited Europe where he met 
Lloyd George [the British Prime Minister) who presented him with a copy of the 
Smuts plan and raised the topic of mandates for discussion. There was basic 
agreement on the principle to be applied, but Wilson rejected the case for South 
African annexation of South West Africa. 112 
After their meeting Wilson left for Paris and proceeded to draw up a draft 
covenant, incorporating therein much of the thought and language of General 
Smuts. 113 His reliance on Smuts' plan was particularly evident in regard to the 
mandates section, which was appended as a supplementary agreement to the 
body of the draft covenant. 114 Wilson's plan, however, extended the mandates 
system, with a clear pledge to the principle of self-determination, to all German 
colonies - including those in Africa and the Pacific - something which Smuts 
had specifically excluded. Smuts had envisaged a mandates system purely as 
a means of resolving the nationality problem of Eastern Europe and the near 
East, while Wilson regarded it as a concept of universal applicability and one 
that could resolve the colonial problem of Africa and the Pacific as well. 115 The 
first official American draft Covenant was circulated to the Allied governments 
on January 10, 1919. 116 
The Americans received the British "Draft Convention regarding the Mandates" 
on 25 January, 1919. The draft contained details regarding the proposed 
mandate system. Among other things, it dealt with two types of mandates. 
First, the "assisted states" for those mandates close to independence and 
secondly , "vested territories" for those areas requiring direct administration by 
the mandatory power. The state placed in charge of a "vested territory" would 
be invested with all powers and rights of sovereign government. Such a state 
would hold the territory "upon trust to afford the inhabitants peace, order and 
112 See Slonim "The Origins of the South West Africa Dispute" 122. 
113 Ibid 125. 
114 See Potter "Origin of the System of Mandates under the League of Nations" 563. 
115 See Slonim "Origins of the South West African Dispute" 125. 
116 Ibid. 
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government". 117 It also provided for annual reports by a mandatory power and 
included a provision for the creation of a Commission to assist the League in its 
supervisory role and to receive the annual reports. 118 
Therefore there was in effect basic agreements between the United States and 
Great Britain on the mandates principle. During 1918 both powers advanced 
from a simple commitment to the ideal of self-determination to a recognition 
that this ideal would best be implemented through the creation of a mandates 
system integrally linked to the League of Nations. They also agreed on the 
general features of the system. The only outstanding issue centred on the 
extent of the mandates system, particularly the question of exceptions to allow 
for annexations in certain cases. This question was addressed at the Paris 
Peace Conference. 
On 18 January 1919, the Peace Conference opened in Paris. The first major 
issue dealt with by the Conference was the disposition of colonial territories. 
There was general agreement on not returning the colonies to Germany. Great 
Britain, in particular, declared that she was prepared to accept the mandates 
system for those territories that had come under British control. Moreover, the 
mandates system, with its concern for native interests and equality of 
commercial access was, in essence, already a part of the British colonial system. 
But Britain felt that the territories conquered by the Dominions (including South 
Africa) should be treated differently. More specifically, Britain felt that South 
West Africa was a wilderness and could only be developed as an integral part 
of South Africa upon which it bordered. At the same time Smuts claimed South 
West Africa on the grounds of contiguity to the Union and undesirability of a 
separate administrative system. 119 
Although President Wilson was sympathetic (perhaps for personal reasons) with 
General Smuts, he opposed the annexation of South West Africa by South 
117 Ibid 125-126. 
118 Ibid 126. 
119 Ibid 127. 
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Africa for various reasons. In January 1919 Wilson was forced to explain why 
mandatory control over South West Africa would be preferable to annexation: 120 
"South West Africa had very few inhabitants, and these had been so maltreated, 
and their numbers had been so reduced under German administration, that the 
whole area was open to development that could not yet be determined. 
Therefore, either it must be attached to its nearest neighbour and so establish 
what would seem to be a natural union with South Africa, or some institution 
must be found to carry out ideas all had in mind, namely, the development of 
the country for the benefit of those already in it, and for the advantage of those 
who would live there later. This he assumed to be the principle; it was not 
intended to exploit any people; it was not intended to exercise arbitrary 
sovereignty over any people. 
The purpose was to serve the people in undeveloped parts, to safeguard them 
against abuses such as had occurred under German administration and such as 
might be found under other administrations. Further, where people and 
territories were undeveloped, to assure their development so that , when the 
time came, their own interests, as they saw them, might qualify them to express 
a wish as to their ultimate relations - perhaps lead them to desire their union 
with the mandatory power". 
In the light of these considerations, Wilson envisaged that in the event South 
Africa became a mandatory of the League of Nations for South West Africa, the 
League would lay down certain general principles in the mandate - namely: 
(a) that districts be administered primarily with a view to the betterment of the 
conditions of the inhabitants; 
(b) that there should be no discrimination against the members of the League of 
Nations, so as to restrict economic access to the resources of the districts. 
120 See Rogers Louis "The South West African Origins of the 'Sacred Trust' 1914-1919" in 
66 African Affairs-Journal of the Royal African Society no 262 (January 1967) 33. 
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Subject to these limitations, the Union of South Africa would extend such of its 
laws as were to be applicable to South West Africa and administer it as an 
annex to the Union so far as consistent with the interest of the inhabitants. The 
fundamental idea, however, would be that the world was acting as trustee 
through a mandatory and would be in charge of the whole administration until 
the day when the true wishes of the inhabitants could be ascertained. Thus 
Wilson made it incumbent upon the Union of South Africa to make conditions 
so attractive that South West Africa would come into the Union of its free will. 121 
The public interest in these questions forced Great Britain to bring her war aims 
into alignment with those of the United States. In July 1917 the British Prime 
Minister, Lloyd George, announced that the desire and the wishes of the peoples 
must be the dominant factor in the determination of the fate of the German 
colonies. Finally, in his British War Aims' speech delivered on 4 January 1918 
(a year before the Peace Conference), Lloyd George122 declared: 
"With regard to the German Colonies, I have repeatedly declared that they are 
held at the disposal of a conference decision which must have primary regard to 
the wishes and interests of the native inhabitants of such colonies. None of those 
territories are inhabited by Europeans. The governing consideration, therefore, 
in all these cases must be that the inhabitants should be placed under the 
control of an administration acceptable to themselves, one of whose main 
purposes will be to prevent their exploitation for the benefit of European 
capitalists or governments. The natives live in their various tribal organisations 
under chiefs and councils who are competent to consult and speak for their 
tribes and members and thus to represent their wishes and interests in regard 
to their disposal. The general principle of national self-determination is, 
therefore, as applicable in their cases as in those occupied European territories." 
But Great Britain was not fully committed to the principle of national self-
determination for African peoples in the former German colonies. 
121 Ibid 33-34. 
122 Ibid 25. 
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Thus before his War Aims speech Lloyd George sent secret telegrams to the 
Governors-General of South Africa, Australia and New Zealand requesting them 
to provide evidence of anxiety of natives to "self-determine" themselves in 
favour of incorporation into the British Empire. The Governor-General of South 
Africa replied as follows: 123 
"I cannot see how the principle of 'national self-determination' could be applied 
to it [South West Africa] and it will always be more a European than a native 
territory, since, thanks to the Germans, there are comparatively few natives .... 
while the natives, both Ovambos and the rest, would almost all certainly elect 
to remain under British rule, they could hardly be given a more influential voice 
than the German inhabitants. If the latter had to vote on the future of the 
territory the result would scarcely be in doubt, but if the territory were annexed 
to Union most of the Germans would probably remain and become loyal and 
useful citizens." 
Consequently, South Africa and other dominions remained firm in their 
campaign to obtain the territories outright, without mandatory obligations. The 
British reiterated their acceptance of the mandates principle, stating that it was 
not very different from the principles laid down by the Berlin Conference. 124 To 
avoid a deadlock, General Smuts worked out a resolution heavily predicated on 
the earlier British draft convention, which in tum had been developed from the 
original Smuts plan. But in contrast to that plan, no explicit reference was made 
to the principle of self-determination, nor was the League classified as the 
ultimate reversionary. The object of the mandates system was couched in broad 
terms. The resolution was a compromise proposal designed, on the one hand, 
to meet the Wilson demands by defining specific international obligations to be 
assumed by the mandatory power, while on the other hand it refrained from 
imposing a uniform set of standards upon all mandatories indiscriminately. It 
made the degree of obligation vary in accordance with the type of mandate. 
123 Ibid 26. 
124 See Slonim "The South West Africa Dispute" 128-129. 
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Three categories of mandates were designated, depending on the stage of 
development achieved. These mandates came to be known as Mandates A, B 
and C. 125 
Mandate A covered the territories severed from the Turkish Empire which were 
deemed to have reached a stage of provisional independence, so that the rule of 
the mandatory power would be limited to the rendering of administrative advice 
and assistance until such time as the mandate would be able to stand alone. 
Mandate B was made up of former German colonies in central Africa which 
required the mandatory to be responsible for administration, subject to 
conditions guaranteeing preservation of the open door policy as well as 
prohibition of the slave trade, traffic in arms and liquor, militarisation and 
fortification. 126 Mandate C consisted of such territories as South West Africa and 
the islands of the south Pacific which were scarcely populated or small in size, 
or remote from the centres of civilisation. This third category had to be 
administered under the law of the mandatory state as integral portions thereof 
subject to the safeguards mentioned above in the interests of the indigenous 
population. Finally, a formal resolution presented by Great Britain confirming 
the Mandates System was adopted and published [with minor changes) on 7 
May 1919.127 
4.4.2 Evolution of International Institutions 
The Union of South Africa passed the South West Africa Mandate Act 49 of 
1919 to empower the Governor-General to implement the Paris Peace Treaty 
and any mandate under the Treaty pertaining to South West Africa. 128 The Act 
authorised the Governor-General: 
125 Ibid 133-134. See also Louis "The South West African Origins of the 'Sacred Trust' 
1914-1919" 34. 
126 This prohibition was based on the provisions of the Berlin Treaty. 
127 See Slonim "The Origins of the South West Africa Dispute" 138. 
128 See the Preamble. 
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(a) to make such appointments, establish such offices, issue such proclamations and 
regulations as were necessary to give effect to any of the provisions of the Treaty 
or to any mandate under the Treaty; 
(b) to give the Acts of the South African government overriding authority over those 
of the German colonial authorities. 129 
Further, the Act authorised the Governor-General to carry out the following 
functions by proclamation: 
(a) make laws applicable to the mandated territory; 
(b) delegate his authority in regard to (a) to any officer as he might designate to act 
under his instructions. 130 
The Act contained a penalty clause empowering the Governor-General to visit 
any breaches of its provisions with punishment. Any proclamation or regulation 
made under the Act had to be laid before parliament as soon as possible. 131 This 
provision left much to be desired as prejudicial consequences could result from 
the application of such laws before parliament intervened. Moreover, the Act 
provided for the extension of certain racially discriminatory South African laws 
to South West Africa. They included the provisions of all or any laws such as 
the Land Settlement Act of 1912, The Land Settlement Act of 191 7, the Crown 
Land Disposal Ordinance of 1903 of the Transvaal and the Crown Land Disposal 
Amendment Ordinance of 1906 of the Transvaal. 132 Finally, it placed "native" 
reserves and the mineral wealth of the territory within the absolute powers of 
the Union Government. 133 
Although South Africa was at that stage not a sovereign state and so could not 
legislate extra-territorially, she passed the Bill into law. Notwithstanding this 
irregularity the Council of the League of Nations, apparently with the 
129 See section 1. 
130 See section 2. 
131 See section 3. 
132 See Section 4(1). 
133 See Section 4(2). 
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concurrence of Great Britain issued South Africa with a formal mandate 
agreement. 134 
Under the Mandate for South West Africa the League of Nations recognised that 
Germany had renounced in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers 
all her rights over her overseas possessions, including South West Africa, and 
these powers had agreed that in accordance with Article 22 of the Covenant of 
the League of Nations135a mandate should be given to the British Crown, and 
that South Africa should exercise the mandate on behalf of the Crown and that 
the terms of the mandate would be defined in the formal agreement. 136 
The Agreement granted Great Britain a mandate for and on behalf of South 
Africa (the Mandatory) over South West Africa. The mandatory was vested with 
134 For a text of the Mandate see Marshall From Independence to Statehood in 
Commonwealth Africa 183-184. 
135 Article 22 reads: 
"To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the hate war have 
ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and 
which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous 
conditions of the modem world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being 
and development of such peoples form the sacred trust of civilisation and that securities 
for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this covenant. 
The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of 
such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, 
their experience or geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who 
are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as 
mandatories on behalf of the League. 
There are territories, such as South West Africa ... , which, owing to the 
sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres 
of civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the mandatory, and 
other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the mandatory as 
integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguard abovementioned, in the 
interests of the indigenous population. 
In every case of mandate, the mandatory shall render to the Council an annual 
report in reference to the territory committed to its charge. 
The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the mandatory 
shall, if not previously agreed upon by the members of the League, be explicitly defined 
in each case by the council. 
A permanent commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual 
reports of the mandatories and to advise the council on all matters relating to the 
observance of the mandates." 
For a full text of the Covenant of the League of Nations see Ellis The Origins, Structure and 
Working of League of Nations 493 et seq. 
136 See the Preamble. 
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full powers of administration and legislation over German South West Africa as 
an integral portion of the Union of South Africa and authorised it to apply its 
own laws to the territory subject to such local modifications as circumstances 
required. 137 The powers of the mandatory were only limited by fundamental 
principles analogous to those embodied in the Berlin Treaty of 1885. 138 In those 
principles the mandatory was obliged: 139 
(a) to promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social 
progress of the inhabitants of the territory subject to the mandate. 
(b) to prohibit slave trade and permit forced labour only for essential public works 
and services and the only adequate remuneration; 
(c) to control traffic in arms and ammunition in accordance with principles 
analogous to those laid down in the convention relating to the control of the 
arms traffic, signed on 10 September, 1919 or in any convention amending the 
former; 
(d) to prohibit the supply of intoxicating spirits and beverages to the African 
population; 
(e) to prohibit the military training of Africans, otherwise than for purposes of 
international police and the local defence of the mandated territory; 
(0 to prohibit the establishment of any military or naval bases or the erection of 
fortifications in the territory; 
(g) to guarantee, subject to certain reservations, freedom of conscience and the free 
exercise of all forms of worship; and 
(h) to allow all missionaries, nationals of any state member of the League of Nations, 
to enter into, travel and reside in the territory for the purpose of prosecuting 
their calling. 
This "trust" agreement failed or neglected to set out in clear and concrete terms 
the international obligations of the mandatory. Instead, it detailed safeguards 
137 See Article 2. 
138 See Lindley The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in International 
Law (1969) 334. 
139 See Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations in Ellis The Origins, Structure 
and Working of the League of Nations 493. 
150 
for the interests of the mandatory and the Allied and associated powers. A 
further and more serious omission is that it failed to set forth the right of self-
determination of the African inhabitants of the mandated territory in clear and 
definite terms. This is not surprising as the provisions of the Mandates System 
were a compromise between the enlightened American and conservative South 
African war aims. 140 
Neither the Act not the mandate affected the position of Walvis Bay which 
remained an enclave of the Union of South Africa. Upon the cessation of 
military government in 1920 the Act granted full legislative and executive 
powers to the administrator of the territory who was assisted by the Advisory 
Council. 141 
In June 1921 the South African Parliament passed the Treaties of Peace Act 32 
of 1921. The object of this Act was to give effect to certain treaties of peace 
between the British Crown and other powers142 and to extend the operation of 
the Treaty of Peace and South West Africa Mandate Act 49 of 1919. 143 The same 
parliament also passed the South West Africa Affairs Act 24 of 1922 which 
provided that the port and settlement of Walvis Bay, which then formed part of 
the province of the Cape of Good Hope, to be administered as if it were part of 
the mandated territory of South West Africa and as if inhabitants of the said 
port and settlement were inhabitants of the mandated territory; and that the 
powers conferred upon the Governor-General144 by Act 35 of 1884 of the Cape 
might be delegated by the Governor-General to the administrator of the 
mandated territory to the extent that the administrator might, by the repeal, 
140 See Louis "The South West African Origins of the 'Sacred Trust' 1914-1919" 32 et seq. 
141 See Marshall From Independence to Statehood 30. 
142 These treaties included the treaty of peace with Austria, signed at Saint German-en-laye, 
on 10 September 1919, the treaty of peace with Bulgaria, signed at Neuilly-Sur-Seine on 27 
November 1919, etc. See the preamble. 
143 See the Preamble. 
144 The assertion that the powers had been conferred upon the Governor-General by Act 35 
of 1884 was not strictly correct. That Act had conferred the powers on the Governor of the Cape 
Colony and all the powers, authorities and functions of the Governor-General had been 
transferred to the Governor-General by Section 16 of the South Africa Act 1909. 
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alteration, amendment or modification of the laws in force in the port or 
settlement, bring them in conformity with the laws of the mandated territory. 
This structure remained unaltered until the passing of the South West Africa 
Constitution Act 42 of 1925. 
In its preamble the South West Africa Act recognises: 
[a) that the mandate issued by the Council of the League of Nations in pursuance 
of Article 22 of the Treaty of Versailles conferred full powers of administration 
and legislation to South Africa over the territory of South West Africa as an 
integral part of the Union; 
[b) that under the Treaty of Peace and South West Africa Mandate Act of 1919 the 
Governor-General of the Union of South Africa was authorised to give effect to 
this mandate. 
Further, the Act recognised the international obligation of South Africa under 
the mandate145 "to promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and 
the social progress of the inhabitants of the territory". 
But the Act discriminated against the indigenous population by admitting only 
the European inhabitants of the territory to representation in its administration 
and legislature. 146 
The South West Africa Act of 1925 was modelled on dominion statutes such as 
the South Africa Act, 1909. 147 It vested the Governor-General with powers to 
establish the institutions of government, namely, the executive and the 
legislature with limited self-government. The Act excluded African inhabitants 
from the institutions of government and instead established a white's only 
advisory council to advise the colonial authorities on the administration of 
145 Cf Article 6 of the Berlin Treaty 1885. 
146 See the preamble paragraph 3 of the South West Africa Act 42 of 1925. 
147 In this Act the State President of South Africa replaced the British Crown. For a detailed 
discussion of the parallel between South West Africa and the dominions see F Venter "Suidwes-
Afrika: n Dominium van die Republiek?" in 6 Speculum Juris (1970) 70-78. 
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African affairs. 148 The legislature consisted of elected and nominated members 
and just as in the dominions the laws passed by the legislature were subject to 
powers of disallowance or reservation of the legislature. 149 In addition the High 
Court was authorised to pronounce upon the validity of any ordinances passed 
by the legislature. 150 
South Africa had hoped that eventually South West Africa would be 
incorporated into the Union (later the Republic) of South Africa. Thus it not 
only treated that territory as a dominion but also one of its provinces. Thus in 
1962 it appointed a commission similar to the South African Native 
Commission of 1903 to investigate a uniform "native" policy. The South West 
Africa Commission was headed by Mr FH Odendaal. 
In January 1964 the Odendaal Commission reported. 151 The main findings and 
recommendations of the Commission were that there were twelve different 
population groups in South West Africa, the divergencies between which, and 
the numerical predominance of one group, the Ovambo, rendered it 
impracticable for them to be represented in one central authority; and therefore 
that as far as practicable a "homeland" of which there should be ten must be 
created for each population group. 
Further, Odendaal recommended that there should also be a white area which 
should include coloured townships in certain towns. This recommendation was 
clearly inspired by the homeland policy in South Africa which had already 
resulted in the granting of self-government to the Transkei in 1963. 
Indeed, in 1965 Ovambo Chiefs had a sponsored visit to the self-governing 
territory of Transkei and on their return announced that they wished for their 
148 See the preamble: fourth and last para of the South West Africa Act 42 pf 1925. 
149 Ibid section 13. 
150 Ibid section 39. 
151 See Suidwes-Afrika/Namibie: Verslag van die kommissie van ondersoek na diefinansiele 
verhouding tussen sentrale, verteenwoordigende en plaaslike owerhede Windhoek, 1980. 
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people similar constitutional and governmental structures to those in force 
there. 152 
In March 1968 the South African Parliament passed the South West African 
Constitution Act 39 of 1968, a consolidating Act which repealed the Acts of 
1925 and other amending Acts. Then South Africa paved the way for the 
implementation of the homeland policy in South West Africa by passing the 
Development of Self-government for the Native Nations of South West Africa Act 
54 of 1968. This Act provided for the creation of legislative and executive 
councils for the homelands and the eastern Caprivi strip. Amendments were 
made to this Act by the Development of Self-government for Native Nations in 
South West Africa Amendment Act 20of1973. This Act set out the conditions 
under which homelands that had achieved legislative councils could later be 
given self-government. The degree of self-government would be similar to that 
granted to the Transkei in 1963 and presumably the other "homelands" under 
the Homelands Constitution Act 21 of 1971. In May 1973 Ovamboland and 
Kavango both became self-governing on these terms. 
In addition the South African Prime Minister established an Advisory Council 
in 1973. Invitations to be represented on the councils were extended to 
organisations representing the white and coloured groups, the African legislative 
councils, and Bantu authorities. Those political organisations which opposed 
the Odendaal plan and demanded a unitary state were not invited. They 
included the South West Africa People's Organisation (SW APO) and South West 
Africa National Union (SW ANU) and the National Convention of Freedom 
Parties. 
The Advisory Council held several meetings in Namibia and South Africa. The 
Council reaffirmed that Namibia consisted of many ethnic groups and focused 
on the necessity for higher wages and improved race relations, admission of 
152 See Marshall From Independence to Statehood in Commonwealth Africa 38. 
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blacks to white hotels and the control of towns and homelands. The Advisory 
Council failed to achieve anything of importance. Thus it failed to win popular 
support. 153 
In the meantime popular resistance to apartheid increased. Internally, the 
church leaders condemned the South African Government for having failed to 
take cognisance of human rights as declared by the United Nations Organisation 
in the year 1948 with respect to the African population. They objected to the 
denial of freedom of expression, movement and association, to the migrant 
labour system, job reservation and absence of the franchise. 154 In a 
simultaneous letter to their congregations, the church leaders inter alia rejected 
the South African system of self-government. The letter stated that the 
application of the homelands policy to South West Africa contributed to 
divisions between the races, and that leading small race groups to self-
government and independence in the homelands would deny them the chance 
to take part in the development of the country. 155 
The church opposition to the migrant labour system was given forceful 
expression by a strike against contract labour in.December 1971. By 1972 the 
strike had turned into a more general rebellion. The target widened to an 
attack on the entire system of apartheid, with its Bantustan structures and 
leaders. 156 Members of the Ovambo Legislative Assembly and their homesteads 
were attacked and burned down. The Bantu Investment Corporation was 
accused of exploiting the Ovambos and several stores were gutted by arson. 
The border fence established to prevent the infiltration of Swapo guerrillas was 
also cut as it was regarded as unconstitutional and undemocratic. Rejection of 
apartheid structures culminated in a boycott of the Bantustan elections in 
153 Note that a planned National Council in South Africa did not even get off the ground as 
it was rejected by both homeland leaders and the 'mass democratic movement'. 
154 See JHP Serfontein Namibia? (1976) 54. 
155 Ibid 408. 
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Namibia 1915-72" in 17 Journal of Southern African Studies (1977) 71-82. 
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Ovambo which were scheduled to be held in 1973. 
These events were a clear message to the SA Government that its apartheid 
policies were being rejected. More specifically, the recommendations of the 
Odendaal Commission which not only set out to balkanise South West Africa 
along tribal lines but also envisaged the creation of a moderate petty bourgeois 
class in the rural areas by providing for a program of capital investment in 
those areas, was thoroughly discredited. 157 Moreover, the coup d'etat in Portugal 
in April 197 4 and subsequent independence for Angola and Mozambique in 
1975 had changed the conditions for armed struggle in Southern Africa forcing 
South Africa to lose control of its periphery. 158 Consequently, the SA 
Government had to retreat from its earlier colonial strategy of establishing 
independent homelands and search for alternative models for political 
incorporation (or accommodation) of Africans. 
In September 1974 the National Party of South West Africa issued a statement 
in which it stated that the time had come for the whites in the territory to take 
positive action to hold talks with members of other population groups with a 
view to reaching an agreement as to the political future of the territory. The 
constitutional talks envisaged would take the form of an ethnic convention, 
rather than negotiations between political parties. Thus the new strategy for 
maintaining white supremacy while appearing to negotiate the future of South 
West Africa was to embody ethnicity as the organising principle for any 
constitutional talks. This strategy was predicated on the fear that political 
representation would result in a united black front. 159 
The leader of the National Party in South West Africa, Dirk Mudge, 160 expressed 
the white fear of a united black front as follows: 
157 See John Kane-Berman Contract Labour in SWA (1972) 36. 
158 See Wolfgang Werner "Ethnicity and Reformism in Namibia" in Totemeyer et al 
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"There is also another danger which may wreck the success of the consultations. 
That is group formation. And we should not think of the possibility of group 
formation amongst the black group only. Whites may also become involved. 
Group formation betrays motives which are not pure and which should be 
avoided. Co-operation between groups to protect certain common interests can, 
however, not be avoided entirely". 
Here, the National Party had in mind group consultations rather than normal 
constitutional negotiations. Thus they opted for the principle of consensus 
decision-making which would ensure that the white delegation at the talks 
could veto any decision with which they did not agree. 
In September 1975 a constitutional conference opened in the Turnhalle at 
Windhoek under the aegis of the administrator of the territory. 161 The 
conference was attended by representatives of all eleven South West African 
tribes and from the white and coloured populations. A number of committees 
were formed to investigate and make recommendations on various subjects 
including the solution of practices of discrimination, economic improvement, 
social advancement, education and finance. The conference also established a 
Constitutional Committee and charged it with the task of drawing up a 
constitution for South West Africa. 162 
The Turnhalle conference proposed a three tier government structure, rising 
from local government via ethnic representative authorities (the second tier) to 
a central government. In contrast to the Odendaal Commission, however, the 
Turnhalle extended the apartheid concept from a geographical to an ethnic one 
incorporating urban Africans. 163 In August 1977 the Constitutional Committee 
underpinned its constitutional proposals on the group-rights ideology. Thus it 
reaffirmed the apartheid notion of the interdependence of the different 
161 Boulle "The Turnhalle Testimony" SALJVol. 95 (1978) 49-62. 
162 See Marshall From Independence to Statehood 41-42. 
16.1 See Green, Reginald and Kijijunen, Kimmo "Unto What End? The crisis of colonialism 
in Namibia" in Green, Reginald, Kijijunen et al (eds.) Namibia - The last Colony (1981) 9. 
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population groups and proposed a system of government in which sufficient 
provision would be made for the protection of minority groups, especially in the 
central body. 164 
In 1977 the SA government began to implement the Turnhalle constitutional 
reforms. In June 1977 the SA parliament passed the South West Africa 
Constitution Amendment Act 95 of 1977. This Act authorised the State 
President to make laws by proclamations for the territory of South West Africa 
with a view to the eventual attainment of independence by this territory, the 
administration of Walvis Bay and the regulation of any other matter; and 
providing that any law made by any authority under the terms of section 38(1) 
of the South West Africa Constitution Act of 1968 should not be of force and 
effect until it had been approved by the State President. 
On 7 November 1977 the Turnhalle Constitutional Committee formally 
dissolved. In the meantime the Administrator-General had effected some liberal 
changes in the laws of the territory, e.g., the abolition of the colour bar in 
marriage laws, the pass laws and granting Africans the right to buy land in 
urban townships and to obtain loans from financial institutions and relaxation 
of emergency regulations in the North. 
On 27 January 1978 the SA State President in opening parliament stated that 
independence would be granted to South West Africa before the end of the year. 
That independence would be preceded by free elections for a constituent 
assembly which would decide on a constitution for South West Africa. The 
164 The statement said: 
"The Committee is in agreement that the date for independence for South West Africa 
can with a reasonable measure of safety be stated as 31 December 1978. Meanwhile 
negotiations will have to be entered into with South Africa regarding a variety of 
matters, for example, Walvis Bay, the South African railways, water and electricity 
supply, monetary and financial matters, security, etc. As soon as a constitutional basis 
has been agreed upon and the negotiations mentioned above, completed, we intend to 
establish an interim government in terms of such constitutional basis to attend to the 
transfer of function and the establishment of a permanent government based on a 
constitution to be finalised in the interim period." See Marshall From Independence to 
Statehood in Commonwealth Africa 42. 
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elections went ahead and polling ended on 8 December 1978. Swapo boycotted 
these elections. 
The result of the election was that the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance won 41 
of the 50 seats in the Assembly; the Aktur Party, which supported the SA 
National Party and polled most of the white votes, won 6 seats; and Herstigte 
Nasionale Party, the Coloured Namibian Christian Democratic Party and the 
Liberation Front won 1 each. 
On 2 May 1979 the ruling Democratic Turnhalle Alliance adopted a motion in 
Windhoek calling for an assembly with legislative powers to be set up in 
Namibia in the place of the existing Constituent Assembly. The SA Government 
assented to the proposal. Consequently, on 14 May the Administrator-General 
of South West Africa proclaimed a National Assembly in the territory. It would 
consist of the 50 members of the existing Constituent Assembly plus another 
45 members nominated to accommodate any other political parties which might 
wish to join. The Assembly would be a legislative body without official executive 
authority. In the meantime, Swapo intensified its armed campaigns killing a 
number of farmers and others in the outlying areas. To deal with the situation 
a modified form of martial law was declared over a security area stretching over 
half the country from Windhoek northwards. 
The Turnhalle draft constitution was never implemented. The Constituent 
Assembly elected between 4 and 8 December 1978, did not convene to give 
further attention to the construction of an independence constitution. Instead 
on 25 May 1979, the Constituent Assembly was transformed into a National 
Assembly, with legislative powers at the national level, parallel to those of the 
Administrator-General. 165 
165 Appointed to administer the territory with full executive and legislative powers, save 
those in connection with external defence and foreign relations, with a view to its transition to 
independence. The office was created by the South African State President in Proclamation 180. 
In Proclamation 181 the Administrator-General is given wide-ranging competencies and powers: 
see Official Gazette 3642 of 26 August 1977. 
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The Administrator-General enshrined in law the Tumhalle proposals for a three-
tiered government structure under Proclamation AG 8 of 1980. This 
Proclamation provided for the establishment of 'representative authorities for 
population groups.' In terms of the Proclamation each of the eleven 
representative authorities were given powers in regard to certain matters 
pertaining to what was perceived to be their own interests. Typically, those 
"own affairs" included matters of education, health, old age pension, social 
welfare services, agricultural support services, traditional law enforcement etc. 
The "own affairs" were to resort under the authority of second tier or 
representative government. 
The 1980 Proclamation consolidated and enlarged the powers of chiefs and 
headmen. In contrast to earlier versions of homeland rule, the AG 8 of 1980 
entrenched ethnicity more deeply by including urban members of defined ethnic 
groups. The new homeland system was no longer based on a certain territory, 
but on ethnic grouping and it operated extra-territorially. Thus the authority of 
representative authorities were to be extended to the various members of that 
population group, wherever they might be. The effects of AG 8, therefore, were 
that the homeland concept was extended to the urban Africans, thus increasing 
their political control by "ethnic" leaders. 166 
On 1 July 1980 a Council of Ministers with certain relatively broad executive 
functions was established. Elections to nine representative second-tier 
authorities based on the SW A "population groups" were also held in terms of 
Proclamation AG 8 of 1980. Although no elections were held among the 
Ovambo a representative authority was constituted for that group. This 
constitutional phase came to an end with the resignation of the Ministers' 
Council on 18 January 1982, and the resumption by the Administrator-General 
of all legislative and executive authority at a central level. 167 
166 See Werner "Ethnicity and Reformism in Namibia" 74. 
167 See Sean M Cleary "A Bill of Rights as a Normative Instrument: South West 
Africa/Namibia 1975-1988" in 3 1988 CILSA (XIX) 296. 
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On 18 November 1983 sixteen parties (eleven being constituent parties of the 
Democratic Turnhalle Alliance) or six political groupings -the DTA, the Labour 
Party, the National Party of South West Africa, the Rehoboth Liberated 
Democratic Party, the South West Africa National Union and the Swapo 
Democrats held a conference. This Multi-Party Conference (MPC) was boycotted 
by Swapo, the Damara Council and some other minor parties. The object of the 
MPC was to draft a "permanent constitution for the territory". 168 After initial 
debates, the MPC, on 24 February 1984, issued the Windhoek Declaration of 
Basic Principles. The philosophical underpinnings of the Declaration emerged 
from the objects of the conference - namely: 169 
"To draft a permanent constitution 
(a) within the framework of phase 1 of the western settlement plan; 
(b) consistent with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 
(c) in accordance with the international Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and 
(d) in accordance with the ambitions and desires of the different groups mentioned 
in the Covenant above. 
To create an economic order which aims at increasing our independence from 
foreign countries by developing and diversifying our economy mainly through 
our own efforts, and improving the quality of life of our people in all fields - from 
employment opportunities, health, education, housing to the rural economy. 
Both the public and private sector as well as foreign investment must serve this 
purpose. A sound, healthy and strong economy must be the basis of our 
economic thinking." 
The Windhoek Declaration incorporated the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. But it also incorporated the International Covenants of Civil and Political 
168 Ibid 297. Also see Marinus Wiechers "Namibia: The 1982 Constitutional Principles and 
their legal significance in (1989/1990) South African Yearbook of International Law 9. 
169 See Multi-Party Conference Windhoek Declaration of Basic Principles (1984). 
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Rights170 "to accommodate Namibia's cultural diversity in the constitutional 
structure which the conference intended to establish." It appears quite clearly 
from the proposals that the Windhoek Declaration sought to concede individual 
rights but to counterbalance their political implications by interpreting the 
International Covenants of Human Rights so as to accommodate political 
minority rights. Such an interpretation would enable the internal parties to 
appear to uphold international human rights while maintaining its 
consociational or race and ethnic based constitution. It is submitted that Article 
27 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights does not provide 
for political minority rights and thus may not be used to support a 
consociational or race and ethnic based constitution. 
Shortly after completing work on the Windhoek Declaration the Political 
Committee of the Multi-Party Conference (consisting of 18 persons representing 
all six institutions in the Conference) began work on a Declaration of 
Fundamental Rights. On 18 April 1984 the MPC reached agreement on a Bill of 
Fundamental Rights and Objectives. 171 On 25 March 1985 a delegation of party 
leaders172 presented a set of proposals together with the proposed Bill of 
Fundamental Rights and Objectives, to the South African State President 
requesting him to institute a Transitional Government of National Unity 
consisting of a National Assembly of sixty-two members, from whose ranks 
would be drawn a cabinet of eight persons with eight deputy ministers to assist 
them. The proposals also called for the establishment of a Constitutional 
Council of sixteen party nominees, and a non-voting chairperson drawn from 
the ranks of the judiciary. 
170 Article 27 of the Covenant reads: 
"In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons 
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other 
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own 
religion, or to use their own language." 
171 See "A Bill of rights as a Normative Instrument" 298. 
172 See Multi-Party Coriference MPC Proposals on the Issue of the Independence of South 
West Africa/Namibia Windhoek 25 March 1985. 
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Of particular interest in these proposals is § 2.5 entitled "Entrenched 
Provisions". It stated that: 
"The fundamental rights embodied in the Bill of Fundamental Rights and 
Objectives shall be entrenched in the Act of Proclamation of Establishment for 
the Transitional Government." 
In respect to the draft constitution which the constitutional council was to be 
changed to prepare the§ 263 provided that: 
"The fundamental Rights embodied in the Bill of Fundamental Rights and 
Objectives shall be entrenched in the Independence Constitution." 
The SA government included the MPC Bill of Fundamental Rights and 
Objectives in Proclamation RlOl as an integral part of the constitution of the 
interim government. 173 Both the Proclamation and the Bill raised vehement 
opposition from other political parties in Namibia. 174 
The preamble and the first eleven articles of the MPC Bill constituted Annexure 
I to the South West Africa Legislative and Executive Authority Proclamation 
(RlOl of 1985). Their entrenchment was affected in section 2, which accorded 
the National Assembly wide-ranging powers, including the power to amend or 
repeal and legal provision presently in force in the territory, including any act 
of the South African Parliament. However, the Assembly did not have the power 
to make any derogation from any fundamental right. 175 
The legislative protection of these fundamental rights was more limited than 
that provided for in article 12 of the MPC Bill of Fundamental Rights and 
Objectives. 
173 See Wiechers "Namibia: The 1982 Constitutional 
Significance" 9. 
174 Ibid 9-10. 
175 See Proclamation RlOl 1985 Section 2(2). 
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Principles and Their Legal 
Existing laws in conflict with the provisions of the Bill of Rights were to remain 
in force until amended. The Assembly was also authorised to pass security 
legislation which infringed a fundamental right to a lesser degree176 than the 
case previously. Because of the continuing Swapo armed resistance against 
these constitutional reforms the SA Government refrained from creating a 
situation whereby all existing laws were open to an immediate challenge, inter 
alia, by persons seeking to effect the collapse of the Transitional Government. 177 
Thus some restrictive provisions were not enacted. Subject to these limitations, 
however, a number of major human rights judgements resulted, both in the 
Namibian courts and the South African Appellate division. 178 
The Multi-Party Conference initially requested the South African government 
to institute a constitutional council responsible for the drafting of a national 
constitution which would ultimately be submitted to the electorate for approval. 
The South African Government, however, felt that the "internal" leaders should 
themselves work out their constitutional future. Some six month after the 
installation of the interim government, the constitutional council was 
established by Act 8 of 1985 of the Namibian National Assembly, under the 
chairpersonship of Mr Justice VG Hiemstra and with the representatives of 
eighteen political parties. 
The Constitutional Council worked for almost two years on a draft constitution. 
At the end of June 1987, the chairperson had to report to the Cabinet that it 
had failed to achieve unanimous support for its draft, since four of the eighteen 
participant parties refused to give their assent. Further, the draft constitution 
with its clear rejection of any form of institutionalised ethnic categories, failed 
to meet with the approval of the South African Government. 179 
176 See Proclamation RlOl 1985 Section 3(3). 
177 See Cleary "A Bill of Right as a Normative Instrument" 304. 
178 They include State v Nathaniel and others 1987 2 SA 225 (SWA); Staat v Angula en 
Andere 1986 2 SA 540 (SWA); State v Reita and Other 1987 1 SA 311 (SWA). For a discussion 
of these cases see Cleary ibid305 et seq. See also Ruppel "A Bill of Rights: practical implications 
for legal practice - A Namibian Perspective" 1992 (1) SAPR/PL 51 ff. 
179 See Wiechers "Namibia: the 1982 Constitutional Principles and their Legal Significance" 
10-12. 
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4.4.2.1 Conclusion 
During World War I the principle of trusteeship embodied in the Berlin Treaty 
(1885) developed into the right of self-determination of peoples and Nations and 
became the primary aim of World War I. Hence, this war was called the war for 
self-determination. But at the end of the war there were differences of opinion 
whether the principle of self-determination applied to African peoples. The 
Soviet Union and the United States extended the principles to all humanity 
while the United Kingdom and South Africa sought to limit it to former German 
territories. The UK and SA limited the application of this principle as they 
wanted to annex some former German territories by force or at least by consent. 
Thus the Covenant of the League of Nations did not make the right of African 
peoples to self-determination a mandatory rule of international law. 
Furthermore, the right of the mandated territories to self-government and 
independence was couched in vague and uncertain terms. 
In terms of the Mandates System South West Africa became a Mandate "C" 
territory - that is, it had to be administered as an integral part of an under the 
laws of the Union of South Africa. Here, the international community failed to 
provide safeguards against the subjection of the African population of Namibia 
to South African racial laws as the UK did in the case of the High Commission 
territories. Thus South Africa transplanted its racial laws to South West Africa 
with impunity. South Africa treated this territory as its dominion and 
introduced the homeland system to preserve white minority rule and deny the 
right of self-determination of the African people in the territory. 
Popular resistance against apartheid in South West Africa, like in South Africa 
itself, forced the government to introduce constitutional reforms. In South West 
Africa, like in South Africa, the government used the homeland system as a 
building block for its constitutional reforms. Like its South African counterpart, 
the South West African homeland system was challenged, inter alia, on the 
ground that it violated international human-rights norms. Popular resistance 
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and armed campaigns against apartheid in South West Africa, coupled with the 
collapse of the South African buffer states of Mozambique and Angola forced 
South Africa to introduce further reforms hoping to defuse popular struggles 
and gain international recognition for the neo-colonial authorities in Windhoek. 
The new approach was based on a divide-and-rule strategy which used ethnicity 
as an organising principle. This strategy reduced the Turnhalle negotiation 
forum to an ethnic rather than a National Convention. Thus the Turnhalle 
Constitutional Negotiations were essentially consultations of the South African 
Government with racial and ethnic groups in the territory, not constitutional 
negotiations properly so-called. The South African government merely sought 
to co-opt the various groups into apartheid structures in new forms. 
Those constitutional negotiations resulted in the removal of statutory apartheid 
and the extension of the homeland-system into urban areas. The Turnhalle 
Constitution, like its South African counterpart, would have introduced the 
concepts of "own" and "general" affairs. Thus it introduced a kind of a coalition 
government in the form of a council of Ministers representative of their racial 
or ethnic constituencies. This system of government was essentially based on 
the group rights (or consociational) theory which the South African government 
was also implementing at home. 
To len.d credibility to race- (or ethnic) based constitutional reforms the Multi-
Party Conference adopted certain international human-rights norms. But they 
interpreted these norms so as to justify the doctrine of human and group rights 
developed by the South African Law Commission. They sought to use this 
doctrine to freeze white domination and privilege and to introduce apartheid in 
new forms based on the principle of disassociation. 
In all the efforts to find a negotiated settlement to the South West Africa 
question South Africa acted as a metropolitan power. Thus measures providing 
for negotiations emanated from South Africa and any settlement had to be 
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enacted by them. Thus continued armed actions by Swapo and the commitment 
of South Africa to a race- (and ethnic) based constitution resulted in the failure 
of the Turnhalle Conference to find an internationally acceptable settlement. 
4.4.3 General Conclusions 
Since South Africa assumed political control over South West Africa (now 
Namibia) she made various attempts to annex it contrary to the right of this 
territory to self-determination. After World War II South Africa transplanted the 
Bantustan system to South West Africa and tried to use it to bypass the right 
of self-determination of the Namibian people as it did in the case of blacks in 
South Africa. During the sixties the right of colonial and oppressed peoples to 
self-determination and equal rights became a mandatory rule of international 
law. This new international constitutional order and resistance against 
apartheid in Namibia forced South Africa to embark on internal reforms based 
on a consociational structure rooted in the policy of separate development. This 
structure used apartheid institutions as building blocks and thus essentially 
preserved white domination and privilege. Thus all the internal settlements 
were rejected by the people of Namibia and the international community. 
4. 5 South Africa 
4.5.1 Colonial Background 
Originally the Cape colony was a Dutch possession (since the first settlement 
occurred in 1652). In January 1806 the Dutch forces at the Cape surrendered 
control of the colony to a British expeditionary force. Shortly thereafter the Cape 
colony was formally ceded to Britian by the Dutch after not being included in 
the territories to be returned to Holland under the Convention of London ( 13 
August 1814). Under British control the Cape colony had attained Responsible 
government by 1872. 
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The Battle of Blood River of 16 December 1838 cleared the way for the 
settlement of Natal, the first of the Boer Republics. However, Britain refused to 
recognise it and in 1842 British troops occupied Natal. In 1843 Natal was 
formally annexed by the British government and in 1856 became a British 
colony. In 1893 Natal attained Responsible government. 
After the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) the conquered Boer republics of the 
Transvaal and Orange River Colony were ruled by the High Commissioner with 
the aid of nominated executive and legislative councils. 180 In January 1906 the 
liberal administration of Henry Campbell-Bannerman took over from the 
conservative government and brought to an end the imperialist policy 181 and 
granted full responsible government to the Transvaal by letters Patent of 6 
December 1906 and to the Orange River Colony by letters Patent of 5 June 
1907. This was followed by the election of predominantly Afrikaner 
governments in the Transvaal and the Orange River colony in 1907 and in the 
Cape in 1908. 
The South African Native Congress opposed the granting of responsible 
government to the colonies on the ground that it prematurely tended to 
eliminate the imperial factor or the prerogative of veto which was a repository 
of the Crown, and which had a moderating influence between blacks and the 
white colonists. In particular, the South African Native Congress opposed 
responsible government due to the very low moral tone of the average colonist 
in regard to the treatment of blacks and their feeling and demeanour towards 
blacks. Thus the Congress felt that they would request the British government 
to take over black administration rather than place it under the retrogressive 
policies advocated in Natal and the Transvaal colonies. 182 
180 See Marshall From Independence to Statehood in Commonwealth Africa vol. II (1982) 
16. 
181 See Document 10: Resolutions of the South African Native Congress, April 10, 1906 
[extracts] in Thomas Karls and Gwendolen M Carter From Protest to Challenge: A 
Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa (1882-1964) (1972) 46. 
182 See The Selbome Memorandum: A Review of the Mutual Relations of the British South 
African Colonies in Command Papers of the United Kingdom Government No. 3564 of 1907. 
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In 1906 The Orange River Native Congress had petitioned the Crown requesting 
that when self-government was granted the problem of black representation 
should be considered. The Congress feared that without some form of 
representation in the legislatures of the colony their interests would remain in 
jeopardy, and that however they might conform to the rules of civilised life they 
could never hope to enjoy privileges such as freedom of trade and ownership of 
land. It was further felt that the terms of the Vereeniging Peace Treaty 
compromised the claims of blacks to their legitimate franchise. Thus the 
Congress requested that when the imperial government prepared a constitution 
for the self-government of the Orange River Colony it should insert a clause 
either granting some representation to its black subjects or retain the black 
administration under its direct control until their enfranchisement is 
accomplished. 183 The imperial government ignored these requests and granted 
self-government to the former Boer Republics. 
Soon after the granting of self-government to the British Colonies Lord Selborne 
was commissioned to investigate the relations between the four colonies and 
produced his memorandum 184 in 1907. The Selborne Memorandum 
recommended early political federation as an alternative to economic collapse. 
Soon thereafter Britain began to lead the four colonies towards a union without 
settling the question of African franchise. In May 1908 the representatives of 
the four colonies met in Pretoria where they agreed to call for a National 
Convention. 185 On 12 October 1908 the National Convention assembled in 
Durban under the chairmanship of Sir Henry de Villiers. The Convention was 
attended by white delegates representing the four colonies. 186 
During the four weeks of the Convention the question of African franchise was 
raised briefly. On 19 October Merriman moved that the existing colonial 
franchise laws should remain as they were subject to the proviso that they only 
183 See Marshall From Independence to Statehood 16. 
184 See Andre Odendaal Black Protest Politics in South Africa (1984) 72. 
185 Ibid 12 et seq. 
186 See Peter Walshe The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa (1987) 21. 
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be alterable under special conditions for amendment of the Union Constitution, 
namely, that the laws in question be alterable by a majority of not less than 
three-quarters of members of both houses sitting and voting together. On the 
other hand, Stanford moved that British subjects resident in South Africa 
should be entitled to the franchise rights irrespective of race or colour upon 
such qualifications as may be determined by the National Convention. In short, 
Stanford proposed the abolition of the colour-bar in all the colonies. 
After a lengthy debate from 20 to 22 October the Convention accepted the 
Merriman proposal. Thus the Cape retained its qualified non-racial franchise 
while the Boer republics and Natal retained their Colour-bar clauses. The 
Convention adopted a draft constitution and referred it to their respective 
colonial parliaments for ratification. All four parliaments ratified it and referred 
it to the British Imperial Parliament for enactment. The British turned a blind 
eye to the colour-bar clause and enacted the draft as the South Africa Act 
1909.187 
While the National Convention was sitting in Durban the South African Native 
Convention was convened at Bloemfontein from 24 to 26 March 1909. The 
Native Convention adopted a resolution addressed to the all-White National 
Convention which was preparing a constitution for a unified South Africa. They 
resolved that all persons within the Union should be entitled to full and equal 
rights and privileges subject only to the conditions and limitations established 
by law and applicable alike to all citizens, without distinction of colour, class or 
creed. 188 
The Native Convention objected, in particular to the Colour-bar clauses 25, 33 
and 44 of the draft South Africa Act and demanded that clause 35 entrenching 
the Cape franchise should be made unalterable. 189 The High Commission 
181 Ibid. 
188 The South Africa Act made provision for the incorporation of the High Commission 
territories in terms of section 151. 
189 Marshall From Independence to Statehood 1 7. 
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territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland all objected to being 
included 190 in the proposed new Union of South Africa. Despite these objections 
the draft was rapidly passed through the United Kingdom Parliament without 
amendment and received the royal assent on 20 September as the South Africa 
Act 1909 which established the four separate colonies of the Cape of Good Hope, 
Natal, the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony as constituent provinces of 
the Union of South Africa. 191 
In its preamble the South Africa Act 1909192 stated that it was desirable for the 
welfare and future progress of South Africa to unite several British colonies 
under one legislative union under the Crown of Great Britain and Ireland. The 
preamble recognised that the four colonies were united on terms and conditions 
to which they had agreed by resolution of their respective parliaments. The 
preamble stated three objectives of the South Africa Act. First, to define the 
executive, legislative, and judicial powers to be exercised in the government of 
the Union; secondly, to provide for the establishment of provinces with powers 
of legislation and administration in local and other matters; and thirdly to 
provide for the eventual admission to the Union or transfer to the Union of such 
parts of South Africa as are not originally included therein. 
Section 4 of the Act provided for the granting of self-government to the Union 
and for the appointment of the Governor-General. The constitution provided for 
three branches of government namely, the executive, 193 the legislature and the 
judiciary. It vested the executive government in the King and authorised him 
to administer the government in person or by a Governor-General as his 
representative. 194 The Governor-General was the appointee of the King and had 
such powers and functions of the King as His Majesty was pleased to assign to 
him.19s 
190 For a text see Document 1 (D.l) ibid 99 et seq. 
191 Part III 
192 Part IV. 
193 Part VI and articles 8 - 9. 
194 Section 12. 
195 Section 14. 
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The Governor-General acted on the advice of an executive council appointed by 
himself and holding office at his pleasure. 196 The Constitution also authorised 
the Governor-General to appoint heads of departments of State who also became 
members of the Executive Council. 197 Section 16 vested in the Governor-
General or Governor-General in Council or any relevant authority all the 
powers, authorities, and functions which at the establishment of the Union were 
in any of the colonies vested in the Governor or in the Governor in Council, or 
in any authority of the colony. 
The Act provided for a legislature comprising two houses of parliament - the 
House of Assembly and the Senate and the legislative power of the Union of 
South Africa in the King, the Senate and the House of Assembly. 198 The latter199 
consisted of directly elected members while the former consisted of nominated 
and indirectly elected members. 
The Act vested parliament with full powers to make laws for the peace, order 
and good government of the Union200 and authorised it to delegate specified 
powers201 to the Provincial Councils. 202 It also transferred to the provincial 
councils all powers, and functions which at the establishment of the Union were 
in any of the colonies vested in or exercised by the Governor or Governor in 
Council, or any minister of the colony. All ordinances passed by a provincial 
council were to be presented by the administrator to the Governor-General in 
Council for his assent. 203 The South Africa Act established a Supreme Court of 
South Africa204 consisting of a Chief Justice, the ordinary judges of appeal, and 
other judges of the several divisions of the Supreme Court of South Africa in the 
196 Section 19 
197 Section 32. 
198 Section 24. 
199 Sections 59 and 85. 
200 Section 78. 
201 Section 81. 
202 Section 95. 
203 Section 96. 
204 Section 98. 
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provinces. 205 The South Africa Act also transformed the several supreme courts 
of the colonies into provincial divisions of the Supreme Court206 and established 
an Appellate Division. 
The Act entrenched the Cape franchise207 and the equality of English and 
Afrikaans (initially Dutch).208 
Finally, the South Africa Act provided for the incorporation of territories 
administered by the British South Africa Company2°9 and territories other than 
those administered by the British South Africa Company. The former included 
Southern Rhodesia while the latter included the High Commission territories. 
In the event of the incorporation of the High Commission territories the South 
Africa Act vested their government in the Governor-General in Council upon 
the terms and conditions embodied in the Schedule to the South Africa Act. 
There were a number of restrictions on both the legislative and executive 
powers of the Union government. These restrictions included the entrenchment 
of the Cape franchise210 and language211 and the repugnancy clause contained 
205 Section 35. 
206 Section 118. 
207 Section 150. 
208 Sections 35, 135 and 137. 
209 See Schedule to the Act. 
210 Section 35 of the South Africa Act provided that: 
"Parliament may by law prescribe the qualifications which shall be necessary to entitle 
persons to vote at the election of members of the House of Assembly, but no such law 
shall disqualify any person in the province of Cape of Good Hope who, under the laws 
existing in the colony of the Cape of the Good Hope at the establishment of the Union, 
is or may become capable of being registered as a voter from being so registered in the 
province of the Cape of Good Hope by reason of his race or colour only, unless the bill 
be passed by both Houses of Parliament sitting together, and at the third reading be 
agreed to by not less than two-thirds of the total number of members of both Houses. A 
bill so passed at such joint sitting shall be taken to have been duly passed by both 
Houses of Parliament. 
(2) No person who at the passing of any such law is registered as voter in any province 
shall be removed from the register by reason only of any disqualification based on race 
or colour. 
211 Section 137 provided that: 
"Both the English and Dutch languages shall be official languages of the Union and shall 
be treated on a footing of equality, and possess and enjoy equal freedom, rights, and 
privileges; all records, all journals, and proceedings of Parliament shall be kept in both 
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in the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865,212 and the subjection of the South 
African judiciary to British Privy Council. 213 However, in the course of time a 
convention had grown that the United Kingdom Parliament would not legislate 
for a dominion except where the subject-matter was outside the legal 
competence of its legislature (e.g. in the case of extra-territorial legislation) or 
legislation prohibited by the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865, or legislation that 
involved foreign relations.214 
Freed from the "imperial factor"215 the South African government moved to 
consolidate white minority rule under the system established by the South 
Africa Act. For whites, not blacks, the South Africa Act had settled the 
franchise question postponed by the Vereeniging Peace Treaty. Thus soon after 
the formation of the Union the government shifted its focus to the vital issue of 
the land relationships between black and white. Around this question they 
spelled out their philosophy of unequal racial coexistence in all spheres of life. 
Hardly a year after the establishment of Union they introduced the "Squatters 
bill" which was opposed by Africans on the ground that it would only benefit 
white mine owners and white farmers as it would force Africans off the land into 
white hands on terms that would be equivalent to slavery. African opposition 
notwithstanding, the Natives Land Act of 1913 was passed through Parliament. 
In June 1913, it became the law of the land and the main hallmark of the 
African policy of the Union government. 
The kernel of the Land Act 27of1913 was the principle of territorial separation 
under which Africans and whites were to occupy and acquire land in separate, 
languages and all bills acts and notices of general public importance or interest issued 
by the Government of the Union shall be in both languages. 
212 The Act expressly conferred upon colonial legislatures the power of making laws even 
though repugnant to the English common law, but declared that a colonial law repugnant to 
the provisions of an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom extending to the colony either 
by express words or by necessary intendment would be void to the extend of such repugnancy". 
For a text see JP Verloren van Themaat Staatsreg (1956) Bylae IX article 48. 
213 See Part VI of the South Africa Act. 
214 See Marshall From Independence to Statehood 21. 
215 i.e. the power to disallow colonial laws repugnant to British laws. 
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designated areas. A commission was to be appointed to determine the exact 
designation of all land within the Union. In the interim, Africans were to be 
barred from purchasing land except from other Africans or in existing tribal 
reserves. 
The clear impact of the legislation was to restrict African land ownership to the 
so-called "scheduled areas", representing only about 7,3 percent of the total area 
of South Africa, the bulk of which was the tribal reserves, the areas from which 
the Africans could not be pushed by the advancing white settlers in the 
nineteenth century. The Act also envisaged the release of additional land, the 
boundaries of which should be determined by an expert commission. 216 Further, 
the Act put an end to leasing arrangements by Africans in the Orange Free 
State and forbade the practice of tenant farming. Africans living on white-
owned farms were left the alternatives of accepting labour service with white 
farmers, of seeking a share of communal land in the already overcrowded 
reserves, or migrating to burgeoning African locations on the outskirts of South 
African cities where freehold rights were scarce and only low-paid unskilled or 
semi-skilled work was possible. The imminent disenfranchisement and land 
dispossession of Africans had steered them towards greater unity which had 
resulted in the formation of the South African National Native Congress 
(SANNC) in 1912. In his opening address at the launch the convenor, Dr Pixley 
Isak ka Seme, pointing out that the Africans were treated as hewers of wood 
and drawers of water in the land of their birth and that they have no voice in 
the making of its laws and no part in their administration then called for 
national unity for the defence of the rights and privileges of Africans.217 
In a series of meetings during the brief parliamentary debate on the 1913 Land 
Act, the SANNC repeatedly declared its opposition to the legislation. In the 
216 See Karls and Carter From Protest to Challenge 62-63. The additional land was only 
released under the Land Act 18 of 1936 which increased the potential maximum African area 
to 13 percent. 
217 See Selope Thema "How Congress began" in Drum [August 1953). 
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months after its passage, the Congress drew attention to the great hardships the 
law was causing thousands of Africans. 
At a meeting in 1914 the Congress decided to organise a deputation to protest 
the legislation within South Africa and if necessary to proceed to England. The 
domestic campaign concentrated upon resolutions and petitions. In a petition 
to the Prime Minister, General Botha, the Congress declared that the Africans 
objected strenuously to the Native Land Act of 1913 as primarily a measure to 
compel Africans to accept service with whites upon disadvantageous terms. It 
also sent a delegation to Great Britain to present its grievances to the King, 
Parliament, and British pubic opinion. This approach, like the domestic 
campaigns, had little, if any, effect.218 
The insensitivity of Great Britain to black grievances notwithstanding, with the 
outbreak of World War I, Africans spontaneously declared their loyalty to the 
British cause and resolved to suspend the agitation against their disabilities for 
the duration of the war. 219 This, even though the war would undoubtedly 
weaken and overshadow their protest and resistance against land dispossession 
and disenfranchisement. This war (WW I) was described as the war for self-
determination. 220 However, before the end of the war General Smuts221 
reaffirmed his government's racial policies in the following terms: 
"We have realised that political ideas which apply to our white civilisation 
largely do not apply to the administration of native affairs. To apply the same 
institutions on an equal basis to white and black alike does not lead to the best 
results, and so a practice has grown in South Africa of creating parallel 
institutions - giving the natives their own separate institutions on parallel lines 
with institutions for whites. We have felt more that if we are to solve our native 
question it is useless to try to govern black and white in the same system ... . 
They are different not only in colour but in mind and in political capacity .. . 
218 Karls and Carter From Protest to Challenge 63-64. 
219 Ibid 64. 
220 See Omozurike Self-determination in International Law (1972) 20. 
221 Cited from Mokgethi Mothlobu Black Resistance to Apartheid (1985). 
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Thus in South Africa you will have in the long run large areas cultivated by 
blacks and governed by blacks, where they will look after themselves in all their 
forms of living and development, while in the rest of the country you will have 
your white communities which will govern themselves separately according to 
the accepted European principles." 
When the Beaumont Commission appointed in terms of the Natives Land Act 
of 1913 made public in mid-1916 its recommendations for land delimitation, the 
Congress reacted sharply. 
The Beaumont recommendations reflected the pressures of the entrenched 
white farmers and voters on the government. For instance, the areas it 
suggested for African occupation only slightly expanded the small amount 
scheduled for African ownership; furthermore, most of the recommended areas 
were recognisably inhospitable to human habitation or agriculture. The 
Congress stigmatised the land laws as a travesty of British rights and a return 
to the old system of the hoer Republics. In fact, in 191 7, the Botha government 
introduced the Native Administration Bill confirming the principle of territorial 
segregation. 222 
At the end of World War I the government made no effort to reward Africans for 
the wartime loyalty to the British cause. They merely suspended the Native 
Administration Bill (and a more limited Native Urban Areas Bill regulating 
African residence in the towns) pending agreement among white 
parliamentarians upon uniform terms by which segregation could be introduced 
for both land and politics in the light of the Cape franchise. 
In the economic sphere sharp post-war dislocations fell particularly hard upon 
African workers. The well organised skilled and semi-skilled white workers 
were able to exert pressures, including · strikes, to further their economic 
demands which often included additional entrenchment of their privileged 
222 Ibid. 
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position. In contrast, the low-paid African workers, many of whom were housed 
in isolated compounds under strict controls, were hamstrung by the terms of 
the pass laws and by their labour contracts which provided no legal means of 
exerting pressure on .their employers. A few attempts to exert pressures were 
forcibly suppressed. 223 
Following the Stallard Commission Report the government introduced two laws 
on the administration of African affairs. 224 These laws further encroached upon 
the African civil and political rights. In response the South African National 
Congress (renamed African National Congress) responded by adopting the Bill 
of Rights reaffirming the indisputable right of Africans to land and ownership, 
their inalienable right to the enjoyment ofliberty, justice and equality before the 
law, equality of rights for all, equality of treatment and equality of citizenship 
irrespective of race, class, creed or origin, an equal right to participate in the 
government of the country and, in particular, the right to direct representation 
in all the legislative bodies of the land.225 
These demands notwithstanding, the government introduced the Native 
Administration Act of 1927 consolidating its native policy. At a meeting 
convened to discuss the Native Administration Bill in 1926, the ANC called for 
more radical measures - other than petitioning and deputations - to meet the 
racialist legislative programme of the Hertzog government. They adopted the 
creed of African nationalism and called for black majority rule under the "Black 
Republic" slogan. Here, the ANC clearly challenged the legitimacy of the Union 
government and their authority to legislate in respect of the African majority.226 
In sum, the first years after the Union in 1910 saw the development of parallel 
223 Karls and Carter Form Protest to Challenge 65. 
224 See The Native Administration Act 23 of 1920 and the Native Urban Areas Act 25 of 
1923. 
225 See James Leatt et al Contending Ideologies in South Africa (1986) 91. 
226 See Pallo Jordan "Socialist Transformation and the Freedom Charter" in Whither South 
Africa (1988) 97-98. 
178 
institutions of government - namely, white institutions of National government 
and African local government under white minority tutelage. The 
administration of African local affairs were based on the system of indirect rule, 
and modelled on the administration of the High Commission territories. 
Africans were mostly relegated to urban locations (or townships) and "native" 
reserves. The resulting land hunger and loss of sovereignty steered Africans 
towards greater unity and the formation for the African National Congress 
(ANC) with the primary object of defending African civil and political rights and 
to strive for participation in the government and economic life of the country. 
The legislative programme of the Union Government confirmed earlier African 
fears of Afrikaner rule and its inhuman practices. The ANC protests against 
racial discrimination by the Union Government fell on the deaf ears of the 
Imperial British Government. None the less during World War I Africans fought 
on the side of the Allied Forces in defence of the right of peoples and nations to 
self-determination and independence. But at the end of the war Britain allowed 
the Union government to proceed with its racial policies and disregarded African 
protests. Furthermore, Britain failed or neglected to intervene when the Union 
Government used force to suppress African opposition to oppressive white 
minority rule. 
In response the ANC adopted a Bill of Rights reasserting the inalienable rights 
of the African people, in particular, the principles of equality and non-
discrimination and the right to participate in the government of the country 
through directly elected representatives. Finally when the government 
consolidated the system of indirect rule the ANC demanded the right of African 
peoples to self-determination and black majority rule. 
4.5.2 Evolution of Colonial and post-Colonial Institutions of 
Government and Black Resistance 
Despite African opposition to racially discriminatory laws and their demand for 
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the right of self-determination, the imperial government led South Africa to 
independence along with other self-governing dominions. This process began 
at the end of World War I when the Allied Forces recognised the contribution 
of the dominions, especially Ireland, Canada, New Zealand, Australia and South 
Africa, to the war by giving them independent representation at the Peace 
Conference. 227 These dominions were admitted to the League of Nations on 
condition that they would observe international obligations. 
At the 1926 Imperial Conference, South Africa (and Ireland) called for a 
definition of the relationship between Britain and the dominions. 228 The 
Conference defined and incorporated the definition in the Balfour Declaration 
which read:229 
"They (the colonies or dominions) are autonomous communities within the 
British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any 
aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common 
allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British 
commonwealth of nations." 
The Balfour Declaration paved the way for the dominions to achieve 
independence. 
After the Imperial Conference of 1926 the Conference on the operation of 
dominion legislation was appointed. Its report,230 completed in 1929, was 
considered and approved by the Imperial Conference of 1930,231 and the 
conclusions of the conferences were later put into statutory form as the Statute 
227 See Article 2 of the Covenant of the League of Nations in Howard Ellis The Origins, 
Structure and Working of the League of Nations (1928) 493. 
228 See Defenders of the Constitution Publication Crisis - The Real Issues (Unpublished 
manuscript ) 16. 
229 See Extract from the Imperial Conference, 1926 Summary of Proceedings CMD 2768 
(1926) in Marshall From Independence to Statehood in Commonwealth Africa 136. 
230 See Command Papers of the United Kingdom Government 3479 (1930). 
231 See Report in Command Papers of the United Kingdom Government 3717 (1930). 
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of Westminster of 1931.232 This Statute removed all restrictions on the powers, 
legislative233 and executive, of a self-governing dominion and gave statutory 
effect to the conventions and practices that had grown up over the years 
whereby many restrictions had been relaxed and certain powers of the United 
Kingdom government had ceased to be exercised.234 Consequently the Statute 
of Westminster declared and enacted that the parliament of a dominion 
(including South Africa) had full power to make laws having extra-territorial 
operation235 and that no Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom passed after 
the commencement of the Statute would extend, or be deemed to extend, to a 
dominion as part of the law of that dominion, unless it was expressly declared 
in that Act that that dominion had requested and consented to the enactment 
of such a law.236 
To consummate its legislative sovereignty under the Statute of Westminster the 
Union Parliament enacted the Status of the Union Act 69of1934.237 The objects 
of this Act were threefold. 238 First, to declare the status of South Africa, secondly 
to adopt the Statute of Westminster for South Africa, and thirdly to adapt the 
South Africa Act 1909 to the new situation. 239 In its preamble, the Status of the 
Union Act affirmed the Balfour Declaration, the resolutions of the 1929/30 
232 For a text of the statute see Marshall From Independence to Statehood in 
Commonwealth Africa 142-146. 
233 Section 2 of the Statute of Westminster provides: 
"2(1) The Colonial Validity Act 1865, shall not apply to any law made after the 
commencement of this Act by the Parliament of a dominion. 
(2)No law and Provision of any law made after the commencement of this Act by the 
Parliament of a dominion shall be void or inoperative on the ground that it is repugnant 
to the law of England, or to the provisions of any existing or future Act of Parliament of 
the United Kingdom, or to any order, rule or regulation made under any such Act, and 
the powers of the Parliament of a dominion shall include the power to repeal or amend 
any such Act, order, rule or regulation in so far as the same is part of the law of the 
dominion." 
234 See Marshall From Independence to Statehood 21. 
235 Section 3. 
236 Section 4. 
237 For a text see Marshall From Independence to Statehood 147-149. 
238 See the preamble. 
239 On this period of history in general see Verloren van Themaat Staatsreg (3rd ed.) 
Durban (1981) 205-212. 
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Imperial Conference and the achievement oflegislative sovereignty by the Union 
Parliament in terms of the Statute of Westminster. 
In its operative provisions it vested sovereign legislative powers in the Union 
Parliament as follows:240 
"The Parliament of the Union shall be the sovereign legislative power in and over 
the Union, and notwithstanding anything in any other law contained, no Act of 
the Parliament of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland passed after the 
eleventh day of December, 1931, shall extend, or be deemed to extend, to the 
Union as part of the law of the Union, unless extended thereto by an Act of the 
Parliament of the Union." 
The Act vested the executive government of Union in regard to both domestic 
and foreign affairs in the King acting on the advice of Union Ministers and 
charged the Governor-General or his representative with the administration of 
the affairs of the Union. 241 
The Status of the Union Act was complemented by the Royal Executive 
Functions and Seals Act 70of1934.242 This Act made the Prime Minister of the 
Union the Keeper of the great seal and signet of the Union, thus indicating the 
seat of formal and actual power in the Union.243 Further, it vested the powers 
of the King in Council in the Governor-General in Council. These statutes, in 
conjunction with the Statute of Westminster 1931, ensured that the legislature 
and executive of the Union were no longer subordinate to any legislature or 
executive outside the Union. However, South Africa remained a dominion 
under the Crown and a member of the British Empire, but she was 
"autonomous" and "freely associated" as such.244 
240 Section 2. 
241 Section 4. 
242 For the text see Marshall From Independence to Statehood 150-152. 
243 Section 5. 
244 See preamble of the Status of the Union. 
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Following the achievement of independence from Britain the Hertzog-Smuts 
coalition in which Hertzog now for the first time commanded a two-thirds 
majority of the joint membership of both houses of parliament pursued their 
policy of political segregation with even more vigour. In May 1935 a joint select 
committee of parliament tabled two measures: The representation of Natives Bill 
and the Native Trust and Land Bill. The first bill, a modified version of 
Hertzog's original proposal of 1926, provided for the exclusion of future African 
voters from the common roll with the 11 000 Africans already on the roll to 
remain there. As compensation, all Africans in South Africa were to elect four 
white senators (and possibly latter two additional white senators) through a 
cumbersome indirect process. 245 Later the government offered the compromise 
proposal that was finally enacted - namely a separate roll on which qualified 
Cape Africans voted for three white members of the House of Assembly and 
two white members of the Cape Provincial Council.246 In addition the Act 
created the Native's Representative Council consisting of indirectly elected 
Africans throughout the Union sitting with four Africans nominated by the 
government and with native commissioners under the chairmanship of the 
Secretary of Native Affairs. 247 The Native's Representative Council was merely 
an advisory body concerned with matters affecting Africans. Thus the 
Representation of Natives Bill dealt a deadly blow to the hopes of Africans that 
the Cape franchise would be a useful lever for the eventual extension of the 
franchise to all Africans. 248 
The government convened a conference of chiefs and leaders in the Transvaal 
and Orange Free State to hear their views on the bills. 249 In a resolution 
unanimously adopted at the close of the conference the chiefs and leaders 
declined to express any definite opinion on the bills noting that: they were only 
245 See Karls and Carter From Protest to Challenge 3. 
246 Ibid. 
247 Ibid 4. 
248 Ibid. 
249 For the text of the Report see Document 6.1 New Report and Resolution of the 
Conference of Chiefs and Leaders in the Transvaal and Orange Free State convened by the 
Government 6-7 September 1935. 
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given two weeks notice of the conference; they were not supplied with copies of 
the bills in advance; the policy underlying the bills was one of political, 
territorial and economic segregation; and that it was the intention of the 
government to further amend the Native Urban Areas Act to complete its 
general policy. Thus the chiefs and leaders resolved that due to the importance 
and gravity of the situation, the very limited time at their disposal and the fact 
that the policy affected their posterity, they were unable to give a matured and 
considered decision on the fundamental principles and details involved. The 
conference cited the following reasons for their decision: 
(a) The chiefs and delegates were not conversant with the principles involved; 
(b) They had no time to obtain the mandate of the people they represented; 
(c) The Bills were not available in the vernacular and were, therefore, beyond the 
comprehension of the majority of the chiefs and the delegates. 
The position of the chiefs was reinforced by the ANC in 1935. In mid-December 
1935 the ANC convened the All African Convention in Bloemfontein, bringing 
together Africans from all shades of the political spectrum and from all sections 
of South Africa. The All African Convention (AAC) adopted a resolution on the 
"franchise Bill". 250 In the preamble the AAC noted that the policy of political 
segregation of the white and black races embodied in the Representation of 
Natives in the Senate Bill was not calculated to promote harmony and peace 
between the two races as it would create two South African nations with 
conflicting interests. They noted further: 
(a) that the creation of two separate states was undesirable and impractical and was 
not even contemplated under the Lancl and Trust Bill; 
(b) that the denial to the African people of participation in the government of the 
country of which they are an integral part, on the basis of common citizenship, 
is not only immoral and unjust, but would sow the seeds of discontent and 
250 For a text of the report see Document 9 The All African Convention Proceedings and 
Resolutions of the AAC 15-18 December, 1935. 
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unrest; 
(c) that the denial to a people of the right to work through constitutional channels 
for the improvement of its conditions already proved dangerous in Europe during 
the first half of the nineteenth century. 
The AAC further noted that the Hertzog bill sought to set up whites as trustees 
of African people and to relegate the latter to a permanent position of a child 
race. Such a trust was rejected, inter alia., on the ground that where a trustee, 
as in the context of South Africa, formed part of the permanent population, the 
conflict of interests militates against the utmost good faith which a trustee 
ought to show in the discharge of his or her duties and responsibilities. 
Under these circumstances the AAC advocated a formula of interim power-
sharing based on the principle of partnership in all councils of the state. The 
AAC refuted the argument that the South African conception of trusteeship was 
identical with that evolved and pursued in other British colonies such as 
Nigeria, Uganda etc. The AAC maintained that in these other territories Great 
Britain followed a policy of trusteeship, which would be eventually superseded 
by full partnership, namely responsible government and dominion status.251 
Thus in these territories African interests were paramount in theory and very 
largely in practice, there were no rights, duties and obligations which were 
closed to Africans merely on the grounds of race or colour. 252 
The AAC took the view that as the interests of blacks and whites in South 
Africa were inextricably interwoven attempts to deal with them separately 
would defeat their own objects and the placement of the destinies of the 
underprivileged group in the hands of the dominant white group, however well-
intentioned, was fundamentally wrong and unjust. 
In the light of these considerations the AAC resolved that the only way in which 
251 Note that the full partnership approach was applied in the South Africa colonies 
regarding the white population. 
252 This approach was consistent with Article CCII of the Covenant of the League of Nations. 
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the interests of the various races which constitute the South African nation can 
be safeguarded was by the adoption of a policy of political identity, ensuring the 
ultimate creation of a South African Nation in which, while the various racial 
groups may develop on their own lines, socially and culturally, they will be 
bound together by the pursuit of common political objectives. Thus the AAC 
further resolved that a single political identity could only be achieved by the 
extension of the rights of citizenship to all the groups. However, the AAC 
accepted a qualified franchise during the transitional period. The AAC 
reiterated its opposition to the abolition of the Cape native franchise pointing 
out that it was a matter of such vital importance to all the African people of 
South Africa that it could not bargain or compromise with the political 
citizenship of the African people by sacrificing the franchise, as was proposed 
by the Representation of Natives Bill. 
Finally, the AAC contended that no permanent or peaceful solution of the 
franchise or land question was possible unless it was the result of mutual 
agreement between representatives of whites and blacks, which was only 
possible through negotiations. Thus the AAC called on the government to 
consider calling together a conference on these matters. 
Notwithstanding vehement African opposition to political and land segregation 
the Union government passed the Representation of Natives Act 12 of 1936 and 
the Native Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936.253 In the same year one of the 
aggrieved Africans, Ndlwana, challenged the constitutionality of the 
Representation of Natives Act on the ground that it had been enacted contrary 
to parliamentary procedure. The Supreme Court confirmed the legislative 
sovereignty of the Union Parliament and the demise of the "imperial factor":254 
"An Act of Parliament in the case of a sovereign law-making body proves itself 
by mere production of the printed form published by proper authority ... 
253 For a critical background of these Acts see Essy Letsoalo Land Reform in South Africa -
A Black Perspective (1987) l et seq. 
254 See Ndlwana v Hofmeyer NO 1937 AD 229 at 237. 
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Parliament's will, therefore, as expressed in an Act of Parliament, cannot now 
in this country, as it cannot in England, be questioned by a court of law, whose 
function it is to enforce that will, not to question it ... It is obviously senseless to 
speak of a sovereign law-making body as ultra vires. There can be no exceeding 
of power when that power is limitless." 
The deference of the judiciary to the legislature vested absolute arbitrary powers 
in the South African Parliament, enabling it to enact any law it pleased, 
however absurd and unreasonable. 255 
The rise of African nationalism and anti-colonialism during the inter-war years 
(1919-1939)256 and, in particular, the promulgation of the Atlantic Charter 
(1941)257 provided the ANC with a new weapon against the racial policies of the 
Union government. The AN C's position was also reinforced by the fact that the 
pronouncements of the Union government and, more significantly, the Allied 
Forces, sought to base the post-World War II International politico-legal order 
on the principles enunciated in the Atlantic Charter.258 
In view of the proposed new International politico-legal order and the 
participation of Africans in the war efforts of various allied nations, the ANC 
decided to convene a conference of leaders of African thought to discuss the 
problems of the Atlantic Charter in its relation to Africa in particular and the 
255 In an earlier decision the Supreme Court enunciated this doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty in the following terms: 
"Once we are satisfied on a construction of the Act, that it gives the Minister an 
unfettered discretion, it is no function of a court of law to curtail its scope in the least 
degree; indeed it would be quite improper to do so. The above observation is, perhaps, 
so trite that it needs no statement; yet in cases before the courts when the exercise of 
a statutory discretion is challenged, arguments are sometimes advanced which do seem 
to me to ignore the plain principle that parliament may make any encroachments it 
chooses upon the life or property of any individual subject to its sway, and that it is the 
function of courts of law to enforce its will": See Sachs vMinisterof Justice 1934AD 11. 
256 See Pallo Jordan "Socialist Transformation and the Freedom Charter" in 1986 Africa 
Journal of Political Economy 148-150. 
257 See Karls and Carter From Protest to Challenge 211. 
258 Ibid 211-212. 
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place of the African in post-war reconstruction. The terms of reference of the 
conference were:259 
(a) to study and discuss the problems arising out of the Atlantic Charter in so far as 
they relate to Africa, and to formulate a comprehensive statement embodying 
an African Charter, and 
(b) to draw up a Bill of Rights which Africans are demanding as essential to 
guarantee them a worthy place in the post-war world. 
The Atlantic Charter committee convened by the President General of the ANC, 
AB Xuma, met in Bloemfontein on 13 - 14 December 1943. Delegates from 
different parts of South Africa participated in the conference which divided its 
work into two parts: (a) the consideration and interpretation of the Atlantic 
Charter; and (b) the formulation of a Bill of Rights. In dealing with the first 
part, the conference discussed the Articles of the Atlantic Charter26° one by one 
and made certain observations under each Article. The work of the conference 
was informed by the internationally acknowledged position that in the post-war 
world population groups and peoples should enjoy the freedoms and liberties 
which the war fought to establish.261 
At the Atlantic Charter Conference the ANC adopted an all-African approach. 
First, they demanded that the status and independence of Abyssinia (now 
Ethiopia) and her right to sovereignty should be safeguarded - and that her 
economic independence and access to the sea should be respected. Secondly, 
the conference urged that as a fulfilment of the war aim of the Allied Nations, 
namely to liberate territories and peoples under foreign domination, the former 
Italian colonies in Africa should be granted independence and their security 
259 See document 296 "African Claims in South Africa", including "The Atlantic Charter 
from the standpoint of Africans within the Union of South Africa" and "Bill of Rights", adopted 
by ANC Annual Conference. 
260 For an original text of the Atlantic Charter see 1941 AJIL 35 suppl.19. On the Atlantic 
Charter, see also Chapter Iii paragraph 3. 2.1 supra. 
261 For a discussion of the war aims see Chapter III paragraph 3.2.1 supra. 
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provided for under the future system of world security. Thirdly, the conference 
disapproved the negotiations between the Union of South Africa and Great 
Britain for the incorporation of the High Commission territories as South 
Africa's reward for participation in the war. They took the view that Africans 
were not parties to the incorporation agreement and thus they regarded the 
schedule as morally and politically not binding on them. 262 They resolved to 
deprecate any action on the part of Great Britain which would extend European 
political control at the expense of African interests. 
Further, the conference urged that all territorial changes should be effected in 
consultation and in accord with the freely expressed wishes of the African 
peoples. Again and perhaps more significantly, the conference urged colonial 
powers to promote the objective of self-government for colonial peoples. In line 
with this objective the conference reaffirmed the right of self-determination of 
peoples and nations. It observed that:263 
"In the African continent in particular, European aggression and conquest has 
resulted in the establishment of alien governments which, however beneficent 
they might be in intention or in fact, are not accountable to the indigenous 
inhabitants. Africans are still very conscious of the loss of their independence, 
freedom and the right of choosing the form of government under which they 
will live. It is the inalienable right <;>f all peoples to choose the form of 
government under which they will live and therefore Africans welcome the 
belated recognition of this right by the Allied Nations." 
Pursuant to the right of African peoples to self-determination the conference 
urged colonial powers to accord Africans sovereign rights and allow them to 
establish administrations of their own in other parts of Africa and to afford 
262 For text of the Schedule (or agreement) see Eybers Select Constitutional Documents 
Illustrating South African History 1795-1910 (1918) 555-559. 
263 See the "Third point - The Right to Choose the Form of Government" in Karls and 
Carter From Protest to Challenge 214. 
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Africans full citizenship rights and direct participation in all the councils of state 
in African countries, especially South Africa, where politically entrenched white 
minorities ruled a majority of the indigenous black populations. 264 
The Africans' claims also urged colonial powers to respect the right of African 
peoples to economic self-determination265 and workers' rights. Thus they 
demanded (a) the removal of the colour bar; (b) training in skilled occupations; 
(c) remuneration according to skill; (d) a living wage and all other workers' 
benefits; (e) proper and adequate housing for all races and colours.266 Finally, 
the African claims condemned the suppression of legitimate ventilation of 
grievances by oppressed, unarmed and disarmed sections of population,. and 
incorporated a bill of rights.267 
The ANC Bill of Rights deals with citizenship rights; land; industry and labour; 
commerce; education; public health and medical services and discriminatory 
legislation. In its opening paragraph it states that African people in the Union 
of South Africa urgently demand the granting of full citizenship rights such as 
are enjoyed by all Europeans in South Africa. More specifically, it demanded 
(a) the abolition of political discrimination based on race, such as the Cape 
"Native" franchise and the Native Representative Council under the 
Representation of Natives Act; and the extension to all adults, regardless of race, 
of the right to vote and be elected to parliament, provincial councils and other 
representatives institutions; (b) the right to equal justice in courts of law, 
including nomination to juries and appointment as judges, magistrates, and 
other court officials; (c) freedom of movement; (d) freedom of press; (e) 
recognition of the sanctity and inviolability of the home as a right of every 
family; (fl the right to own, buy, hire or lease and occupy land and all other 
forms of immovable as well as movable property; (g) the right to engage in all 
264 Ibid 215. 
265 See the "Fourth-Point - The Open Door Policy in Trade and Raw Materials" ibid 215. 
266 See the "Fifth Point -The Abandonment of the Use of Force" ibid 217. 
267 For a full text of the Bill of Rights see ibid 217-222. 
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forms of lawful occupations, trades and professions, on the same terms and 
conditions as members of other sections of the population; (h) the right to be 
appointed to and to hold office in the civil service and in all branches of public 
employment on the same terms and conditions as Europeans; (i) the right of 
every child to free and compulsory education and of admission to technical 
schools, universities, and other institutions of higher learning; and Ul equality 
of treatment with any other section of the population in the state social services 
and the inclusion on an equal basis with Europeans in any scheme of social 
security. 
In addition to the aforegoing civil and political rights the Bill Rights embodied, 
inter alia, the following social and economic rights: 
(a) a fair redistribution of land as a prerequisite for a just settlement of the land 
question; 
(b) the right to own, buy, hire or lease and occupy land individually or collectively 
both in rural and urban areas; 
(c) the right to Land Bank facilities, state subsidies and other privileges provided to 
European farmers; 
(d) equal pay for equal work. 
In its closing paragraph the Bill of Rights summarised the demands of African 
people in definite and emphatic terms. First, it stated that African people 
regard as fundamental to the establishment of a new order in South Africa the 
abolition of all enactments which discriminate against the African on grounds 
of race and colour. It also condemned and rejected the policy of segregation in 
all aspects of national life in as much as that policy was designed to keep the 
African in a state of perpetual tutelage and militated against his normal 
development. Secondly, it protested strongly against discourteous, harsh and 
inconsiderate treatment meted out to Africans by officials in all state and other 
public offices and institutions. It found that such obnoxious practices were 
irreconcilable with democratic and civilised standards and were contrary to 
human decency. Thus it demanded the repeal of a host of racially 
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discriminatory laws.268 On 16 December 1945 the ANC adopted the African 
claims and published them. However, the African claims did not form the basis 
of ANC policy until 1949 269 when the ANC, responding to pressure from the 
Youth League, 270 adopted the African claims in its programme of action. In its 
preamble it stated that: 
"The fundamental principles of the programme of action of the African National 
Congress are inspired by the desire to achieve national freedom. By national 
freedom we mean freedom from white domination and the attainment of 
political independence. This implies the rejection of the conception of 
segregation, apartheid, trusteeship, or white leadership which are all in one way 
or another motivated by the idea of white domination of the white over the 
blacks. Like all other people the African people claim the right of self-
determination." 
With this object in mind the ANC adopted the Bill of Rights contained in the 
African claims of 1945. 
268 These laws included the Representation of Natives Act of 1936, the Land Acts of 1913 
and 1936, the Pass Laws, Natives Urban Areas Acts of 1923, the Natives Administration Act 
1927 and the Mines and Works Act 1926. 
269 See S. Trapido "African Opposition in South Africa 1949-1961" in University of London 
Institute of Commonwealth Studies October 1967 - March 1968 no. 4 Collected Seminar Papers 
on Opposition in the New African States 98-99. 
270 The ANCYL recaptured African Nationalism dating back to the late twenties and stated 
it in the following terms: 
"The starting point of African Nationalism is the historic and even prehistoric 
position. Africa was, and still is, a black man's continent. The Europeans who have 
carved up and divided among themselves, dispossessed by force of arms the rightful 
ownership of the land from the rightful owners-the children of the soil. Today, they 
occupy large tracts of Africa. They have exploited resources of Africa, not for the 
benefit of the African peoples but for the benefit of the dominant white race and their 
kin overseas. Although conquered and subjugated Africans have not given up and will 
not give up their claim to Africa. 
The fact that their land has been taken away and their rights withheld does not 
take away their right to their land. They will suffer white oppression and toleration of 
white domination as long as they have not got the material force to overthrow it. 
Possibility of compromise will be based inter alia, on the preparedness of the Europeans, 
(1) to agree to an equitable and proportional redivision of the land, and (2) to assist in 
the establishment of a free people's democracy in South Africa particularly and in Africa 
generally". 
See Exhibit TT in 1960 Treason Trial Exhibits [VII) 138-139. Also Document 48 Congress 
Youth League Manifesto issued by the Provincial committee of the Congress Youth League, 
March 1944 in Karis and Carter From Protest to Challenge 300-307. 
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In the meantime Afrikaner nationalism grew in leaps and bounds and the 
National Party (led by Malan) came to power on the platform of Apartheid (1948) 271 
which negated the right of self determination of the black majority. In line with 
this policy of apartheid the government introduced a host of laws aimed at 
consolidating social, 272 residential, 273 cultural, 274 economic, 275 and political 
apartheid276 with the ultimate goal of ending all interaction between racial 
groups except on a superficial level in the work place. 
To consolidate the sole political power of the Afrikaner minority the Minister 
of the Interior introduced a Bill purporting to remove Coloured voter in the 
Cape Province from the common voters' roll. During the first reading of the bill 
the leader of the opposition, Mr JGN Strauss, Q.C. contended that the Bill had 
to be passed in conformity with the entrenched sections of the constitution. On 
10 April 1951, the speaker of the House of Assembly ruled that the entrenched 
provisions were no longer valid on account of the Statute of Westminster 1931. 
Thus Parliament enacted the Separate Representation of Voters Act of 1951 
according to the ordinary,277 rather than the entrenched procedures. The 
Supreme Court declared the Act null and void throwing the country into an 
unprecedented constitutional crisis. 278 
On the day on which the court handed down its decision Dr Malan declared:279 
271 See Ivor Wilkins and Hans Strydom The Super-Afrikaners (1978) 35 et seq. 
272 In terms of the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act 55 of 1949, the Immorality 
Amendment Act 2 of 1950 (S 26) which forbade marriage and extramarital sexual intercourse 
between whites and blacks, Asiatic and coloureds. The Reservation of Separate Amenities Act 
49 of 1953 was the primary source of "petty apartheid". This legislation enforced the 
segregation of lifts, toilets, parks, beaches, cinemas etc. 
273 In terms of the Group Areas Act 41 of 1950 which provided for racially segregated 
areas. 
274 In terms of the Bantu Education Act 47 of 1953 and the extension of University 
Education Act 45 of 1959 both of which allowed for segregated education. 
275 In terms of the Native Labour Act 48 of 1953 and the Industrial Conciliation Act 28 of 
1956 which segregated trade unions and forbade blacks to strike. 
276 Bantu Local Authorities Act of 1952. 
277 The procedure required a simple majority of the members present, provided such 
members constituted a quorum. 
278 See Harris v Minister of the Interior 1952 (2) 428 (A). 
279 See House of Assembly Debates (78) col. 3124 (25 March 1952) 
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"neither Parliament nor the people of South Africa will be prepared to acquiesce 
in a position where the legal sovereignty of the lawfully and democratically 
elected representatives of the people is denied, and where appointed judicial 
authority assumes the testing right, namely, the right to pass judgement on the 
exercise of its legislative powers by elected representatives of the people - It is 
imperative that the legislative sovereignty of parliament should be placed 
beyond any doubt, in order to ensure order and certainty." 
Parliament employed its absolute power to enlarge the senate and thus secure 
the required two-thirds majority for passing legislation touching on entrenched 
clauses. 280 Following heavy constitutional battles the Supreme Court held that 
Parliament could virtually do what it pleased as long as it followed the 
prescribed procedure. 281 
The Separate Representation of Voters Act was reinstated under the South 
Africa Act Amendment Act 9 of 1956, with a two third majority at a joint sitting 
of Parliament. 
The policy of apartheid resulted in the defiance campaigns of the first half of the 
fifties. These campaigns were brought to an end by the combination of the 
Suppression of Communism Act 44 of 1950 and the Criminal Law Amendment 
Act of 1953. Notwithstanding the suppression of anti-apartheid organisations 
and activities, the ANC consulted widely with the masses and convened a 
Congress of the people in Kliptown, Johannesburg in 1955. The Congress 
adopted the Freedom Charter282 containing their vision of a free and 
independent South Africa. This vision was based on the basic human and 
peoples rights - notably, (a) the right to self-determination; (b) the principles of 
equality and non-discrimination; (c) the right to development, peace and 
security; (d) the integrity of the South African territory; and (e) the inalienable 
280 See HJ May The South African Constitution 3rd ed. (1955). 
281 See Collins v Minister of the Interior and another 1957 (1) SA 552 (a) 565 D. 
282 On the history of the Freedom Charter see Gilbert Marcus "The Freedom Charter: A 
Blueprint for a Democratic South Africa" (occasional papers 9 June 1985). 
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right of the African majority to their land. In 1956 the ANC adopted the 
Freedom Charter as its policy document. In the same year the leadership of the 
Congress Alliance was detained and prosecuted for high treason. Their case 
was only concluded in 1960.283 
During the years after World War II several factors brought South Africa under 
increasing pressure. These factors included the increased interest in human 
rights in the world at large, the reaction against racial discrimination caused by 
the Nazi's treatment of the so-called "inferior" races; and the emergence to 
independence and international status of a considerable number of former 
African colonies. The newly independent African states drew attention to, and 
brought about the condemnation of, the South African policy of apartheid and 
its denial of equal rights and opportunities to its non-white subjects, 
phenomena which had caused little comment before the war in a world where 
such treatment had been commonplace. 
The Afro-Asian members of the British Commonwealth repeatedly condemned 
South Africa for the refusal to change her racial policies or to alleviate the 
position of her black population. Great Britain and the other dominions were 
also compelled to support, albeit in more moderate and conciliatory terms, the 
views of the Afro-Asian members of the Commonwealth on the subject. 284 
Attacks on South Africa reached their peak in February 1960 when the British 
prime minister, Harold MacMillan, issued a warning to South Africa in his 
"Wind of change" speech285 in the South African Parliament. 
The repeated condemnations of South Africa within the Commonwealth fuelled 
republican sentiments among the white ruling group. Thus, in 1960 they held 
a referendum on the issue of a republic. The result was a vote (of whites only) 
of 52, 14 percent in favour of a republic and 4 7 ,42 percent against. Initially, the 
government wanted to become a republic, like India, within the Commonwealth. 
283 See Muriel Horrell "Terrorism" in South African Race Relations Survey (1968) 1 et seq. 
284 See Marshall From Independence to Statehood 24-25. 
285 For a text of the speech see Marshall ibid 153-157. 
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Soon after the referendum the Government began to give legal effect to the 
decision of the white minority. In January 1961 a Bill for a republican 
constitution was introduced into the House of Assembly. In the meantime the 
Prime Minister, Hendrik Verwoerd, had gone to London to attend in March the 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference (formerly known as the Imperial 
conference). At this conference the attack of the Afro-Asian members on South 
Africa for its racial policy were renewed with increased force, compelling 
Verwoerd to withdraw South Africa's request of continued membership of the 
Commonwealth. On 31 May 1961 South Africa was proclaimed a republic 
outside the Commonwealth. 286 
In the meantime African resistance to apartheid reached a peak, forcing the 
government to declare a state of emergency287 in 1960 and to introduce the 
Unlawful Organisations Act288 under which the ANC and PAC were outlawed. 
The banning of these organisations brought to a halt the previously lawful 
political activity directed against apartheid.289 
At the consultative conference of African leaders290 held in December 1960 
delegates reaffirmed the need for African unity and pledged themselves to work 
for it on the basis of the following broad principles: 
[a) the removal of the scourge of apartheid from every phase of national life; 
[b) the immediate establishment of a non-racial democracy; and 
[c) the effective use of non-violent pressures against apartheid. 
The Conference observed that: 
[i) the absence of fundamental rights and in particular the right to have a say in the 
286 Ibid 24-25. 
287 See John Dugard Human Rights and the South African Legal Order (1978) 112. 
288 See Act 34 of 1960. 
289 See Mathole Serofo Motshekga "The South African State Security Legislation and the 
Principle of Legality" in Jahrbuchjilr Ajrikanisches Recht (1980) 88. 
290 See Karls and Carter From Protest to Challenge 626-627. 
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affairs of the country was the basic cause of suffering, strife, racial tension and 
conflict in the country; 
(ii) that the banning of the ANC and PAC aggravated the situation; 
(iii) that the passage of the South Africa Constitution Act 1961 was a climax of the 
deteriorating situation in South Africa; and 
(iv) that the decolonisation process in South Africa was diametrically opposed to that 
in other parts of Africa. 
Thus the Conference resolved not to accept the result of the whites only 
referendum of 1960 and to call the African people to attend a Conference 
representative of African people in urban and rural areas whose purpose would 
be, inter alia, to demand the calling of a national convention, representing all 
the people of South Africa, wherein the fundamental rights of the people will be 
considered. A copy of the resolution was sent to the United Nations with the 
request that the UN send a commission of observers to Pondoland and to use 
its good offices to curb the alarming military operations against unarmed 
people which constituted a treat to peace in South Africa. The All-in Africa 
Conference291 was held in Pietermaritzburg from 25-26 March 1961. The 
Conference noted that after holding a referendum among the white minority the 
government decided to proclaim a republic on 31 May 1961 and that a new 
Constitution was under discussion in a whites only parliament. Fearing that 
such a republic would continue even more intensively the policies of racial 
oppression, political persecution and exploitation and the terrorisation of black 
people, the Conference called on all the African people irrespective of their 
political, religious or other affiliations to unite to speak and act with a single 
voice. 
Finally the conference refuted292 the legitimacy of the South Africa Constitution 
Act 1961 and demanded: 
291 Ibid 632-633. 
292 In this connection the Conference declared: 
"that no constitution or form of government decided without the participation of the 
African people who form an absolute majority of the population can enjoy moral validity 
or merit support either within South Africa or beyond its borders". 
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"that a National Convention of elected representatives of all adult men and 
women on an equal basis irrespective of race, colour, creed or other limitation, 
be called by the Union Government not later than May 31, 1961; that the 
Convention shall have sovereign powers to determine, in any way the majority 
of the representatives decide, a new non-racial democratic constitution for South 
Africa." 
Further the Conference resolved that should the minority government ignore 
their demands they would: 
(a) stage country-wide demonstrations on the eve of the proclamation of the 
Republic in protest against that undemocratic act; 
(b) call on all Africans not to cooperate or collaborate in any way with the proposed 
republic; 
(c) call on Coloureds, Indian communities and all democratic Europeans to join 
forces with Africans in opposition to White minority rule; and 
(d) call on the international community to impose sanctions on the White minority 
government whose disregard of all human rights and freedoms constituted a 
threat to world peace. 
Soon after the proclamation of the Republic on 31 May 1961,293 the ANC 
abandoned its peaceful struggle and embarked on an armed struggle. On 6 
December 1961 the ANC formed a military wing. Announcing the formation of 
Umkhonto We Sizwe, the ANC294 stated that: 
"The time comes in the life of any nation when there remains only two choices: 
submit or fight. That time has now come to South Africa. We shall not submit 
and we have no choice to hit back by all means within our power in defence of 
our people, our future and our freedom ... we are striking out along a new road 
for the liberation of the people of this country. The government policy of force, 
293 The Republic of South Africa Act 32 of 1961 made changes to the South Africa Act, 
1909 but in a large measure preserved the existing central and provincial government 
structures. 
294 See Gavin cawthra Brutal Force - the Apartheid War Machine (1986) 15. 
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repression and violence will no longer be met with non-violent resistance only. 
The choice is not ours; it has been made by the nationalist government which 
has rejected every peaceful demand by the people for rights and freedom and 
answered every such demand with force and yet more force." 
The resort to armed struggle by the ANC (and PAC) ushered a new era in the 
history of the South African struggle against "apartheid colonialism." 
To deal with the new situation the government introduced numerous draconian 
laws, notably the Sabotage295 and Terrorism Acts. 296 A South African lawyer 
Glenn Moss,297 analysed thirty trials involving politically motivated offences 
during the period 1976-79 and concluded that the conflict in South Africa had 
reached the proportions of a low intensity civil war. 
Internal and international pressures during the second half of the seventies 
forced the government to introduce some constitutional reforms. They 
introduced the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 110 of 1983.298 In line 
with the consociational theory299 this Constitution provided for the 
establishment of a tri-cameral (i.e. three-house) parliament -one for Whites, one 
for Coloureds and another for Indians. Under the terms of this constitution, each 
house would discuss its own matters (i.e. own affairs300] while joint deliberation 
would occur on matters of common interest. 301 Article 16 gave the State 
President the competence to designate a matter as the own affair of a particular 
group, thus reserving for him the power to "launder contentious matters 
295 See Section 21 of the General Law Amendment Act 76 of 1962 and Section 17 of the 
General Law Amendment Act of 1963. 
296 See Section 6 of The Terrorism Act 83 of 1967. This section was subsequently 
substituted by Section 29 of the Internal Security Act of 1982 (formerly the Suppression of 
Communism Act 44of1950). 
297 See Richard Leonard South Africa at war (1986) 23. 
298 For a detailed discussion of this constitution see Carpenter Introduction to South 
African Constitutional Law (1987) 277 ff (especially 280-291). See also W Boulle South Africa 
and the Consociational Option (1984) 149 et seq. 
299 See Boulle South Africa and the Consociational option. 
300 See section 14. 
301 Article 15 states that matters not falling under "own affairs" as described in article 14, 
are general affairs. 
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through the House of Assembly. "302 The government also rejected proposals 
for a Bill of Rights on the ground that it was based on a humanist philosophy 
which was unacceptable to South Africa and that it negated the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty which formed the cornerstone of the South African 
legal system. 
The Constitution distributed the parliamentary seats in such a way that the 
coloureds and Indians would never be able to threaten the power of the white 
minority. The government rejected calls for the creation of a fourth chamber 
for the African majority arguing that they will exercise their political rights in 
the homelands. 
4.5.2.1 Colonial Institutions of Black Rural Government 
4.5.2.1.1 South Africa 
The institutions of black local government in South Africa date back to pre-
union native policy. They grew out of the system of indirect rule. This system 
emerged from the forward looking policy of Sir George Grey (1854) who 
proposed to gain an influence over all black communities included between the 
then existing boundary of the Cape of Good Hope and the colony of Natal. This 
policy led to a series of annexations which began in 1855, and ended in 1894 
with the acquisition of Pondoland. In the process friendly communities were 
confirmed in the occupation of land while rebellion was usually punished by 
confiscation. At the same time large tracts of land were set aside for European 
settlement and ownership. 
4.5.2.1.1.1 Ciskei 
George Grey introduced institutions of a civil nature in British Kaffraria (later 
302 See W Boulle "The RSA Constitution: Continuity and change" in South Africa, a plural 
society in transition (1985) 6 - 7. 
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Ciskei) for black communities. He appointed European magistrates to control 
the districts. These magistrates presided over all trials. The chiefs were 
allowed to be present at all trials, but were not greatly encouraged to do so. The 
government paid them stipends instead of their customary court fees. In 1866 
Ciskei became an integral part of the Cape colony, and thereafter, but with 
minor exceptions, colonial law applied to the exclusion of indigenous law. The 
process of detribalisation was greatly accelerated, as the judicial, and also, in 
large measure, the administrative functions of the chief were assumed by the 
magistrate. 
4.5.2.1.1.2 Transkei 
Following the annexation of the Transkeian territories in 1877 the principle that 
European magistrates should gradually replace African chiefs was applied more 
vigorously than in the Ciskeian territories, though indigenous law was always 
to be administered in civil cases. In criminal matters it was replaced, in 1866, 
by a special Transkeian Penal code, which applied to both Blacks and Whites. 
In contrast to the colony proper, legislation was enacted by proclamation of the 
governor, and, prior to Union, no Acts of parliament were enforced unless 
expressly extended to these territories. The social status of Paramount Chiefs 
was recognised by the payment of stipends and by frequent consultation, while 
minor chiefs were appointed government headmen, and, as such, were still to 
play an important, though somewhat minor role in the administration of the 
affairs of black communities. 
As early as 1882 one of the pioneer European administrators, Captain Matthew 
Blythe, had anticipated that to maintain closer contact with African opinion a 
sort of municipal council should be formed in each district. In 1894 Cecil 
Rhodes chose the district of Glen Grey, in the Ciskei, to introduce such a 
council. The district was divided into arable and grazing land. The grazing (or 
pasture) land was held in common by the community while the arable was 
divided into individual holding on the principle of one person one plot. For each 
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plot an annual quitrent was payable to the government. The holders of these 
plots were prohibited form alienating or mortgaging their plots. 
In each location the plot holders were to elect a location board. For the district 
as a whole, a body called the Glen Grey District Council was set up. This 
council comprised six members nominated by the location boards and six by 
the Governor, with the district magistrate as chairperson. The council was 
empowered to levy local rate and to impose a labour tax on all adult male 
Africans employed outside the district. Before the Glen Grey Act came into 
force in Glen Grey it was actually applied by proclamation to the four Western 
districts of the Transkei. 
Each district council in the Transkei comprised six members, two being 
government nominees and four nominated from among their own number, by 
a meeting of all the headmen of the district. Since 1906, however, council 
ratepayers, in districts where individual quitrent tenure was applied, selected 
three representatives from each location who combined to nominate four of their 
number for council membership. In every case the district council was presided 
over by the local magistrate. 
The most original feature of the council system was the institution of the 
Transkei General Council consisting of the Chief Magistrate, the Magistrates of 
the districts concerned, one member appointed by the Governor from each 
district, two members nominated by each district, and two members nominated 
by each of the District Councils. The revenue of the General Council was 
derived primarily from the proceeds of an annual local rate payable by each 
adult person widowed or unmarried, occupying a separate portion of land or a 
hut in a council area. Expenditure might be incurred, subject to government 
approval, for such purposes as roads, dipping tanks, afforestation and 
agricultural improvements, including agricultural education. 
The object of the council system was to give Africans a voice in the 
management of their own affairs. The system was extended to other areas east 
of the Kei as and when the moment seemed opportune. By 1903, Councils were 
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established in thirteen districts and the central body was renamed the 
Transkeian Territories General Council. This body discussed general policy and 
authorised services paid for out of the common treasury. The District councils, 
on the other hand, were the executive organs of the general Council, 
performing a variety of duties on its behalf and also serving as a forum for the 
expression of local opinion. 303 
4.5.2.1.1.3 Natal 
The colony of Natal was annexed in 1843. Lieutenant Governor Scott304 
summarised the intentions of the Cape government at the time of annexation 
as follows: 
(1) to adjust claims between Europeans and Africans; 
[2) claims of Africans to land which they held or occupied were to be respected; 
[3) no pains to be spared to secure protection and justice to African communities 
around Natal; 
[4) Africans not to be restricted in locating themselves to any spot or district; 
[5) government not to disturb them in their occupations or selections; 
[6) if Africans desired grants in title they were to get them on the same terms as the 
farmers. 
It was therefore the desire of the imperial government to protect the interests 
of the indigenous communities in Natal. To that end Great Britain sent 
Theophilus Shepstone to Natal as a "Diplomatic Agent to the Native Tribes" in 
1845. 305 Shepstone was specifically mandated to provide for the peace and good 
government of the colony. This was in line with the principle of trusteeship 
which formed the basis of colonial administration. 
Contrary to this principle the Governor of the Cape, Dr Cloete, instructed 
303 See Evans Native Policy in Southern Africa (1934) 2-10. Also see Francois Venter Die 
Staatsreg van Afsonderlike Ontwikkeling (1981) 131 et seq. 
304 See JR Sullivan The Native Policy of Sir Theophilus Shepstone (1928) 34. 
3os Ibid. 
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Shepstone to arrange for the settlement of Africans in Natal on the lands set 
aside as locations. Shepstone forcibly removed Africans to locations for three 
reasons: 
[I) to ensure the steady supply of labour; 
(2) to divide them in order to hold them in subjection; 
(3) to ensure that the general "crown lands" might be more available for colonists. 
Thus the location system was set aside principally in the interests of the 
European settlers. 
Shepstone maintained that granting of the European franchise to Africans 
would transfer legislative power to blacks and that in South Africa the white 
man must rule. Thus he adopted the policy of control based on the principle 
of personal rule.306 This principle was "derived" from the belief that tribalism 
was the universal system of social organisation among the Bantu and that each 
member of a tribe recognised and gave willing allegiance to the chief as the 
hereditary representative of the tribal spirit. The individual was nothing, the 
tribe everything. Further, it was believed that the tribe system embodied an 
unbroken chain of responsibility from the individual to the chief i.e. a system 
whereby a man is bound to report to his immediate superior any crime he was 
aware of or any exceptional circumstance. The successive links in the chain 
were from the individual to kraal head, from the kraal head to headman, from 
headman to the chief and from the chief to supreme (or paramount) chief. 
Failure to report involved punishment. This principle of communal (or 
collective) responsibility was viewed as fundamental to the administration of 
African law and justice and to the economic organisation of African 
communities. It was therefore concluded that "all Native laws are based on the 
theory of absolute power residing somewhere".307 
306 Ibid 66 et seq. 
307 This was a misinterpretation of traditional African constitutionalism. See GMB Whitefield 
South African Native Law (1929) 2. 
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Following the establishment of African locations in Natal Shepstone 
consolidated the system of indirect control of African communities by restoring 
traditional rule. He recognised or appointed chiefs and proclaimed the 
Lieutenant-Governor the Supreme Chief in the place of the former Zulu 
King. 308 Further, Shepstone recognised indigenous law, subject of course to the 
doctrine of repugnancy.309 Although the chiefs' judicial authority was reserved 
their jurisdiction was nowhere expressly defined and they were under the 
control of white magistrates. The Supreme Chief assumed all the traditional 
powers and authority of the paramount chief and thus substituted him as court 
of appeal for chiefs' courts as well as for magistrates' courts. 
The Code of Native Law310 passed under the provisions of Law 44of1887 vested 
the following powers in the supreme chief: 
(a) To exercise in and over all Africans in the colony of Natal all political powers 
and authority, subject to the provisions of Section 7 of Law 44 of 1887. 
(b) To preside over tribes, or sections of tribes; and also divide existing tribes into 
two or more parts, or amalgamate tribes or parts of tribe . into one tribe, as 
necessity or the good government of the Africans might, in his opinion, require. 
(c) To remove (as Supreme chief in Council) any chief found guilty of any political 
offence, or for incompetency or other just cause, from his position as such chief, 
and might also order his removal with his family and property, to another part 
of the colony. 
(d) To call upon chiefs, district headmen, and all other Africans to supply armed 
men or levies for the defence of the colony, and for the suppression of disorder 
and rebellion within its borders, and might call upon such chiefs, district 
headmen, and all other natives to personally render such military and other 
services. 
308 See Section 7 of the Native Administration Act 44 of 1887. 
309 According to this doctrine indigenous law was recognised provided it was not "repugnant 
to the general principles of humanity and civilisation": see Sullivan The Native policy of 
Theophilus Shepstone 67. 
310 See GW Eybers Select Constitutional Documents Illustrating South African History 
1795-1910, 254 -255. 
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(e) To call upon all Africans to supply labour for public works, or for the general 
needs of the colony. 
The law authorised the Secretary for Native Affairs or the administrators of 
Native law or other officers to execute the orders and directions of the Supreme 
Chief, or the Supreme Chief in Council.311 In respect of all such acts the various 
officers employed were regarded as the deputies or representatives of the 
Supreme Chief, or of the Supreme Chief in Council, as the case might be. The 
Act also authorised the Supreme Chief to punish through a fine or 
imprisonment, or both, for disobedience of his orders or for disregard of his 
authority.312 
Further, the Supreme Chief (acting in conjunction with the Natal Native Trust) 
might, when he deemed it expedient in the general public good, remove any 
tribe or tribes, or portion thereof, or any African, from any part of the colony or 
location, to any other part of the colony on such terms and conditions and 
arrangements as he might determine. 313 The Supreme Chief was not subject to 
the Supreme Court or to any other court of law in the colony of Natal, for, or by 
reason of, any order or proclamation, or of any other act or matter whatsoever, 
committed, ordered, permitted, or done either personally or in Council.314 
4.5.2.1.1.4 Boer Republics 
In the Boer republics too, the indigenous law was originally not recognised. In 
the Transvaal republic change was brought about by law 4 of 1885 which 
recognised the application of indigenous law in civil disputes where the parties 
involved were black, subject of course to the doctrine of repugnancy. As in 
Natal the President became the paramount chief, assuming all the powers and 
authority of a paramount chief in indigenous law. The law provided for the 
311 See Section 37 of the Code of the Native Law. 
312 See Section 39. 
313 See Section 37. 
314 See Section 46. 
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appointment of superintendents of Native affairs to whom final appeals lay and 
commissioners charged with the duty of administering indigenous law. In other 
areas this duty was entrusted to magistrates ex officio. In addition to 
commissioners' courts, provision was furthermore made for the institute of 
chiefs' courts which had concurrent jurisdiction with commissioners' and 
magistrates' courts. The chiefs' courts were courts of first instance in civil 
matters between blacks. 315 
4.5.2.1.1.5 Post 1902 Native Policy 
It is apparent from the aforegoing exposition that indigenous systems were 
governed by a mass of diverse colonial legislation. The move towards a uniform 
native policy began in 1903 when the South African Customs Conference316 held 
in Bloemfontein resolved that in view of the coming federation of South African 
colonies, it was desirable that a South African commission be constituted to 
gather accurate information on affairs relating to Native administration and to 
offer recommendations to the several governments concerned with the object 
of arriving at a common understanding on questions of Native policy. 
Following this resolution the South African Affairs Commission came into being. 
The Commission comprised representatives of all four colonies. It travelled 
widely throughout South Africa to collect evidence. In 1905 it submitted its 
report which rejected the principle of political equality between Africans and 
Europeans and recommended separate voters' rolls for them. The Commission 
also recommended the restriction of the African franchise in the Cape as it was 
pregnant with future danger. The Commission made it absolutely clear that 
whatever representation was eventually granted to Africans had to keep them 
out of real political power. 317 Various Native congresses had appeared before the 
Commission and aired African grievances and views on inter-colonial matters 
315 See GJ van Niekerk "Indigenous Law in South Africa" in Cod.icillus XXXI no.l [May 
1990) 38-39. 
316 See A 7 - 1903 Cape of Good Hope Minutes of Custom Union Coriference opened at 
Bloemfontein [on 10 March 1903) 9 - 11. 
317 See Andre Odendaal Black Protest Politics in South Africa [1984) 46. 
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urging the government to extend the Cape franchise to other colonies and 
demanding land rights and greater economic and educational opportunities. 
The Commission ignored these demands. 318 
Upon the recommendations of the South African Native Affairs Commission the 
South Africa Act, 1909 provided for a uniform Native policy. Section 14 7 of the 
South Africa Act provided that: 
" The control and administration of Native Affairs ... shall vest in the Governor-
General in Council, who shall exercise all special powers in regard to Native 
administration hitherto vested in the governors of the colonies or exercised by 
them as Supreme Chiefs and any lands vested in the Governor or Governor and 
Executive Council of any colony for the purpose of reserves for Native locations 
shall vest in the Governor-General in Council, who shall exercise all special 
powers in relation to such reserves as may hitherto have been exercisable by any 
such Governor or Governor and Executive council, and no lands set aside for the 
occupation of Natives which cannot at establishment of the Union be alienated 
except by an Act of the colonial legislature shall be alienated or in any way 
diverted from the purposes for which they are set apart except under the 
authority of an Act of Parliament." 
This provision was informed by both the Shepstone Native policy and the South 
African Native Affairs Commission. 319 
4.5.2.1.1.6 Post Union Rural Native Administration 
As stated, the Native Land Bill, which became law in June 1913, was the 
Hallmark of the African policy of the Union government, this being the principle 
of territorial separation under which Africans and Europeans were to occupy 
318 Ibid 
319 See Sullivan The Native Policy of Theophilus Shepstone.(1928). 
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and acquire land in separate designated areas. 320 The Land Act also envisaged 
the release of additional land, whose boundaries should be determined by a 
commission. In terms of this provision, the government appointed the 
Beaumont Commission which released its report for land delimitation in mid 
1916. The areas suggested for African occupation only slightly expanded the 
small amount scheduled for African ownership under the 1913 Land Act. 
However, nothing was done until the 1930s when the Hertzog Land legislation 
of 1936 increased the potential maximum African area to 12,3 %. This area 
provided a territorial basis for black local government in South Africa. 321 
In line with General Smuts' philosophical basis of black local government in 
South Africa, the government introduced the Native Administration Bill of 191 7. 
The first section of the Native Administration Bill confirmed the principle of 
territorial segregation, while the second section formulated a plan for African 
Administration. This plan placed administration in the designated African 
areas under a permanent commission of whites chaired by the Minister of 
Native Affairs. The Governor-General was to be given authority to legislate for 
these areas by proclamation, a provision which, in effect, would have given 
almost unlimited powers to the union government. As a first step towards 
African involvement in this white-directed process, the measure proposed the 
gradual introduction of local Native Councils (roughly corresponding to those 
already in existence in the Transkei) through which Africans could voice 
opinions. The Bill was suspended at the end of the war pending a decision by 
parliament.322 After the war parliament passed the Native Affairs Act 23 of 
1920. This Act provided for the establishment of the Native Affairs Commission 
composed of whites who were supposed to be independent experts on African 
matters, and further authorised the Governor-General, on the recommendation 
320 The Act gave legal effect to the recommendations of the South African Native 
Commission. See Karls and carter From Protest to Challenge 62. 
321 See Motganthi Motlabi Black Resistance to Apartheid (1985). 
322 See Karls and carter From Protest to Challenge 64. 
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of this Commission, to establish local councils over areas set apart for Africans. 
These councils, like the Commission itself, were merely advisory bodies. 323 
The Native Affairs Act of 1920, as amended, provided that whenever it appeared 
that any of the powers conferred upon councils can, in any two or more areas 
for which local councils have been established, be more advantageously 
exercised by a single body with jurisdiction over all those areas, the Govemor-
General may, with the approval of the Native Affairs Commission, establish 
such a body to be called the General Council of such areas. This General 
Council consists of such number of representatives from each of the local 
councils as the Governor-General, with the advice of the Native Affairs 
Commission, may determine. An officer of the public service designated by the 
Minister of Native Affairs acted as chairperson. 324 The principles which guided 
the Native Affairs Commission in the discharge of its functions were apparently 
inspired by the Covenant of the League of Nations. These principles are: 
( 1) that the Commission was established primarily and essentially to be the friend 
of the Native peoples, and, as such, the needs aspirations and progress of the 
Natives should be considered sympathetically by it; 
(2) that the Commission was the adviser of the government in matters affecting the 
interests of the Natives; 
(3) that it should strive to educate public opinion so as to bring about the most 
harmonious relations possible between the white people and the black people in 
South Africa. 
The Commission also conducted its affairs on the basis of the principle of 
consultation with the people. Apart from travelling widely and discussing with 
the people the Commission summoned conferences of Native persons and bodies 
representative of Native opinion, with the object of enabling the government to 
gauge more accurately the state of Native thought and feeling, and of affording 
to those not otherwise represented the opportunity of expressing their views. 325 
323 Ibid. 
324 See Evans Native Policy in Southern Africa 15-16 
325 See HJ May The South African Constitution (1955) 318. 
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Seventeen years after Union the Government added new features to Native 
administration and consolidated the administrative systems which applied to 
the four colonies. This was achieved through the Native Administration Act 38 
of 192 7. 326 Section 1 of this Act made the Governor-General the Supreme chief 
of all Natives in the provinces of Natal, Transvaal and Orange Free State and 
vested him, in any part of the said provinces, with all such rights, immunities, 
powers, and authorities in respect of all Natives as were vested in him in respect 
of Natives in the province of Natal. 327 Under Section 2(7) chiefs were appointed 
by the Governor-General. This section reads: 
"The Governor-General may recognise or appoint any person as a chief or 
headman in charge of a tribe or of a location and is hereby authorised to make 
regulations prescribing the duties, powers and privileges of such chiefs or 
headmen. The Governor-General may depose any chief or headman so 
recognised or appointed". 
This provision effectively reduced African chiefs to agents of the dominion 
administration and almost destroyed the hereditary basis of chieftainship. 
Further, the Native Administration Act gave the Governor-General wide powers 
to remove any chiefs or tribe or section of a tribe from one place to another 328 
and to summarily arrest and detain any person whom he considered to be a 
threat to public peace.329 Moreover, the Act authorised the Governor-General 
to legislate by proclamation over all African areas already scheduled under the 
Land Act of 1913 and all future African areas330and excluded the jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court in respect of the powers of the Governor-General and his 
deputies. 
The Native Administration Act also established a special legal and court system 
326 See Venter Die Staatsreg van Afsonderlike Ontwikkeling 103. 
327 See May The South African Constitution 309. 
328 See Section 5(9). 
329 See Section 8. 
330 See Section 25(1). 
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for blacks.331 These "special" courts, which had jurisdiction over cases between 
Africans, were designed to suit the 'psychology' of the African, recreating as 
nearly as possible the atmosphere of the tribal court to which Africans were 
accustomed to submit their disputes. 332 These special courts (known as 
Commissioners' Courts)333 dealt with criminal offences and the pass laws, 
sending hundreds of thousand of "illegal" African workers to face jail sentences 
each year. 334 
Even when deciding civil cases between Africans, the special courts never 
performed by any means remotely comparable to traditional tribal courts, 
which generally reflected the interdependence of the courts' officers (chiefs and 
elders) and the community, including opposing parties in a dispute. Segregated 
from the community, these presiding officers conducted formalistic proceedings 
in which the party who is represented almost invariably prevailed over the 
unrepresented party, despite the claim that litigants did not need lawyers.335 
The rapid growth of the African population forced the Government to release 
additional land to blacks under the Native Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936. 
This Act provided for the addition of so-called open areas to the land 
"scheduled" for blacks in terms of the 1913 Act. The purpose of the Act was to 
create separate "states" for Blacks for the purpose of control and 
administration. In the same year (1936) the government introduced the 
Representation of Natives Act which provided for the representation of Cape 
Africans in the House of Assembly and the Provincial Council. The Act also 
provided for the institution of a Native Representative Council. This Council 
had no legislative functions and could only advise the Minister on matters 
331 See Section 11 (1). 
332 See Raymond Suttner "The Social and Ideological Function of African Customary Law 
in South Africa" 1984 (1) Social Dynamics 49-51. 
333 See Cloete Central, Provincial and Municipal Institutions of South Africa (1982) 198. 
334 See S Greenberg Legitimating the Illegitimate State, Markets, and the Resistance in 
South Africa (1987) 89. 
335 See Heinz J Klug "The South African Judicial Order and the Future: A Comparative 
Analysis of the South African Judicial and Judicial Transitions in Zimbabwe, Mozambique and 
Nicaragua" 1988 2 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 201. 
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concerning blacks. The relationship between the council and the government 
worsened until the council was eventually abolished in 1951. 
When the National Party came to power in 1948 it decided to consolidate the 
policy of racial segregation (henceforth known as apartheid). First, the policy of 
apartheid sought to separate backs from whites and secondly to divide the 
blacks ethnically into different nations. The statutory pillar of political 
separation of blacks and whites was the Bantu Authorities Act 68 of 1951. This 
Act discarded the British native policy of eventual assimilation of blacks into the 
colonial political institutions and consolidated the system of self-rule by rural 
black communities according to their traditional equivalents of public law.336 
The intention was to give the traditional tribal chiefs-in-council certain local 
management powers and to develop the whole black management system step 
by step by in the traditional way. The hierarchy of authorities which could be 
instituted statutorily consisted of three levels. The lowest level was the tribal 
authority which disposed oflocal management power which basically amounted 
to the rendering of aid to the chief or headman and advising government 
institutions at higher levels. The Act required the tribal authority to exercise 
its power in accordance with African Customary Law. The second level consists 
of regional authorities instituted with regard to two or more areas over which 
tribal authorities had been appointed.337 The members of regional authorities 
were elected from among the captains, chiefs and councillors. The function of 
the regional authority was to advise the Government on the general interests of 
Africans within the specific area of the regional authority. They also had 
executive functions regarding roads, hospitals, water supply, education and 
336 Venter summed up the character of law as follows: 
"The Bantu Authorities Act 68 of 1951 heralded the new approach regarding the 
government of blacks in South Africa. The British Colonial ideas of inculcating an 
appreciation for liberal democracy in the people of Africa was discarded, and a system 
of self-rule by rural black communities according to their traditional equivalents of 
public law was taken as a point of departure." See Dion A Basson and Henning P Viljoen 
South African Constitutional Law (1988) 309. 
337 See Section 2. 
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others.338 The most important power of the regional authorities was to issue 
ordinances and levy taxes. 339 However, their ordinances had to be approved and 
published by the Governor-General. The highest level (i.e. third level) was the 
territorial authorities which were instituted with regard to two or more regions 
for which regional authorities had been instituted.340 Just like the regional 
authorities the territorial authorities also had legislative powers to issue 
ordinances and levy taxes. Their other function was to guide the tribal and 
regional authorities in their areas, give advice to the Government and, since 
1959, maintain close links with the Commissioner-General. The Government 
exercised a great degree of control341 over these "Bantu" Authorities and also 
acted as guardians of Africans as shown above. This guardian/ward 
relationship was rejected by Africans. 
The report of the Commission of enquiry into the socio-economic development 
of the Bantu areas (known as the Tomlinson Commission) of 1954 identified 
seven so-called heartlands for various African ethnic groups within the borders 
of South Africa in which the different groups could govern themselves to an 
increasing extent. 342 The government accepted this recommendation and 
established it in the Promotion of Black Self-Government Act 46 of 1959 which 
divided the African population into eight national units and granted each of 
them a specific area in which a degree of self-government could be exercised 
within the framework of the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951. The Promotion of 
Black Self-Government Act also provided for the institution of the office of 
Commissioner-General. The function of the Commissioner-General was to serve 
as a type of a diplomatic representative for each of the National units and to 
advise these units, help them to develop a judicial authority and keep the union 
government posted of their needs. In the light of developments in Africa and 
338 See Section 5 
339 See Section 6. 
340 See Section 2. 
341 See para 4.2. l supra. 
342 See Petrus Arnold Pienaar The Nation-State Concept Applied to the Xhosa National 
Unit (1979) 57. 
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the growing demands for decolonisation the government proposed to develop 
these homelands to full independence. 343 
Hardly two years after the proclamation of the Republic of South Africa the 
Government passed the Transkei Constitution Act 48 of 1963 granting self-
governrnent to the Transkei. This involved the transformation of the territorial 
authority into a legislative assembly with the power to make laws on a variety 
of subjects, including the amendment of legislation of parliament obtaining in 
Transkei. The Act entrusted a cabinet with executive powers. This Act made 
Trankei a self-governing territory within the Republic of South Africa with its 
own national symbols, a citizenship of its own and with the real possibility of 
eventually becoming an independent state. 
In 1971 the South African Parliament passed the Bantu Homelands Constitution 
Act 21of1971 (later renamed the National States Constitution Act) which made 
it possible to transform a territorial authority by proclamation into a legislative 
assembly with extended legislative powers. But the powers of such legislative 
assemblies were not as wide as those of a self-governing territory. These 
responsibly governed territories obtained an executive council, which was not 
quite a cabinet, however. Thus not all the other homelands could, like Transkei, 
progress directly from territorial authority status to self-government. A 
responsibly governed territory qualified, in terms of chapter 2 of the National 
States Constitution Act to become, by proclamation, a self-governing territory 
with the Republic of South Africa in a form similar to that of the Transkei in 
1963. Finally a number of these self-governing territories achieved their 
"independence" from South Africa in terms of various Status Acts. 344 
343 See Basson and Viljoen South Africa Constitutional Law 310. 
344 See MP Vorster and M Wiebers (eds.) The Constitutions of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, 
Venda and Ciskei (1985) 6-10. 
215 
4.5.2.1.2 Conclusion 
In summary, colonial powers conquered and subjugated hereditary rulers and 
divided their kingdoms into small chieftainships. The colonial authorities 
deposed those chiefs that resisted colonial rule and appointed other persons as 
chiefs. Henceforth the chieftainship derived from appointment or recognition 
by the colonial authorities. Thus chiefs became the agents of and derived their 
powers from the colonial administration. In other words they became part and 
parcel of the colonial machinery. 
The colonial authorities instituted the location (or township) system and 
subjected Africans living in these areas to arbitrary administrative rule and 
economic exploitation contrary to the principle of trusteeship embodied in the 
Berlin Treaty (1885) and the Covenant of the League of Nations. District 
Councils were excluded from the central political process and accommodated 
in an advisory council system which served a consultative forum without any 
executive powers. The law vested absolute arbitrary powers in the Governor-
General or his deputies (as the Supreme chief of all Africans) and placed his 
powers beyond the reach of the Supreme Court. The relationship between black 
local government and the white institutions of government was based on 
consultation through a Native Commission composed of whites. Thus the 
colonial authorities debased the system of hereditary rule and its judicial 
system. These "reforms" culminated in the Native Representative Council 
through which Africans could be consulted nationally. This forum was also 
rejected as it had no executive powers and as Africans demanded direct 
representation in all bodies of state. 
Following the introduction of Apartheid in 1948 the "native" reserves were 
transformed into homelands (modelled on the British dominions) some of which 
(viz. the TBVC States) were granted independence. Like the Union of South 
Africa (which achieved independence through the Statute of Westminster) the 
TBVC States achieved their independence through various "Status Acts". In 
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other words, South Africa was divided into a white South African territory and 
African "colonial" territories within its borders. The "internal" decolonisation of 
these territories was modelled on the relationship between the British Imperial 
Government and its dominions including South Africa and Australia. The 
"internal" decolonisation of the homelands was designed to bypass the demand 
of the African majority for self-determination and independence from white 
domination. This homeland system violated the integrity of South Africa and 
the basic human and peoples' rights of the black majority. 
In short, the granting of independence to the homelands (and in fact to South 
Africa itself) was illegitimate as it was not based on the will of the people as a 
whole. Thus the Status of South Africa Act of 1934 (following the Statute of 
Westminster of 1931) and the various "status" Acts through which the TBVC 
States achieved their independence were ineffectual. 
4.5.3.1 Urban Local Government 
As shown above section 147 of the South Africa Act, 1909 vested in the 
Governor-General-Council the control and administration of Native affairs 
throughout the Union of South Africa. Section 85 of this Act granted provincial 
councils power to make ordinances in relation to local authorities and all 
matters which in the opinion of the Governor-General-in Council were of a 
merely local or private nature. Section 135 of the Act provided for the 
continuity of colonial laws. Thus since the formation of the Union local 
authorities derived their powers of regulation in Native matters from laws which 
were characterised by wide divergencies of policy between the legislatures of the 
pre-union colonies. 
The growth of mining, industrial and farm activities brought a huge influx of 
migrants of all races to the urban areas. For Africans this was a chance of 
escaping high land taxes imposed in the rural agricultural areas and the 
diminishing farm lands as a result of land ownership restrictions on them. The 
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African migrants to urban areas were settled in the locations created under the 
Land Acts of 1913 (and 1936). Initially, however, the colonial authorities 
neglected urban African local government and entrusted it to the adjoining 
white local authorities. These authorities were responsible for establishing 
locations for each of the various African ethnic groups and for providing single 
and family housing plus essential services to residents. The African locations 
were dormitory towns for the provision of labour to the white communities and 
the industry. The authorities only began to address the questio11 of Urban 
African Local Government towards the end of World War I. They introduced the 
Native Administration Bill of 191 7 which, inter alia, dealt with the place of 
Africans in non-African areas and specified that only limited categories should 
be given permission to reside outside the designated African lands. At the end 
of the war they suspended the. bill (and a more limited Native Urban Areas Bill 
regulating African residence in the towns) pending agreement among white 
parliamentarians upon uniform terms by which segregation could be introduced 
for both land and politics in light of the distinctive position of Africans in the 
Cape Province. 345 
In 1922 the Stallard Commission346 recommended that Urban Africans should 
be regarded as temporary sojourners in urban areas and that separate 
administrative bodies should be set up for them. In line with these 
recommendations the authorities passed the Natives (Urban Areas) Act 21 of 
1923 to deal with urban African local governmenL 347 
According to its preamble the Native (Urban Areas) Act was passed to provide 
for improved conditions of residence for natives in or near urban areas and the 
better administration of Native affairs in such areas; of the registration and 
better control of contracts of service with Natives in certain areas and the 
regulation of the influx of natives into and their residence in such areas. 
345 See Karls and Carter From Protest to Challenge 64. 
346 See TPl - 1922 § 42. 
347 See MP Olivier "Enkele Regsaspekte van die verblyfposisie van swartes in stedelike 
gebiede" paper presented on 16 August 1984 at the Conference organised by the Unisa Legal 
Aid Centre. 
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The Native Urban Areas Act of 1923 enacted the recommendation of the 
Stallard Commission that blacks were temporary sojourners in urban areas. 
Thus blacks had to be confined to rural reserves and only be admitted to urban 
areas on the basis of a migratory labour system. However, the urban locations 
and reserves remained part of and were administered by the white 
municipalities. Thus some of the wealth of the white municipalities were spent 
on the poor black townships. In their administration of black townships the 
municipalities were advised by advisory committees which had no executive 
powers.348 
Notwithstanding the influx control regulations the number of blacks in the 
urban areas increased rapidly during the thirties. This could be attributed to 
land hunger and the economic inviability of rural reserves. This influx forced 
the Young-Barrett Committee (1937) to acknowledge the permanency of blacks 
in urban areas. To deal with this situation the Government tightened its influx 
control regulations under the Native (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 
1945.349 
The Native (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act authorised the Governor-General 
to confer or exercise by proclamation certain powers of control, whereby the 
black population would be limited to the number legitimately required for the 
needs of the white community: Further, the Governor-General was authorised 
to declare by proclamation in the Government Gazette that from a specified date 
all blacks within the limits of any urban area or specified portion thereof were 
to reside in a location, native village or native hostel. Employers of blacks were 
also restricted in regard to the number of biacks who may reside on the 
property where they were employed. 
The Native (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act provided for the establishment by 
348 See HJ May The South African Constitution-2nd ed. (1949) 319. 
349 See§§ 17 and 49 of the departmental Young-Barrett Committee of 1937 and§§ 28 and 
30 of UG 28 of 1948. 
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an urban local authority of a native advisory board for every location or native 
village under the control of that urban local authority or for any portion of an 
urban area in which blacks reside. The board consisted of not less than three 
blacks resident in the areas as well as of a chairperson who may be a white 
person and who usually was a member of the urban local authority or the 
superintendent of the location or village. The boards usually consisted of three 
members elected yearly by the registered occupiers of property in the location 
or village, and three members appointed by the urban local authority. These 
boards, like their predecessors under the Native Urban Areas Act of 1923, were 
merely advisory bodies without executive powers. 350 
Following the accession to government by the National Party in 1948 
Parliament passed the Native Laws Amendment Act 54 of 1952 and tightened 
the restrictions on the right of blacks to remain in urban or proclaimed areas. 
It provided that no Native could remain for more than 72 hours in an urban or 
proclaimed area under a local authority unless he was born and permanently 
resided in such area, or has worked there continuously for one employer for not 
less than ten years, or has lawfully remained continuously in such area for a 
period of not less than fifteen years without having been sentenced to 
imprisonment for more than seven days or to a fine with an option for more that 
imprisonment for a month attached to it, or lawful permission has been granted 
to him to remain in the area. The Act also provided that where a black person 
had been granted a permit to remain in any area the purpose of seeking work, 
the validity of such permit would be limited to 14 days. 
The Act also contained provisions in regard to idle and undesirable blacks in 
urban or proclaimed areas. It declared that whenever an authorised officer had 
reason to believe that any Native in such area was an idle or undesirable 
person in that he was habitually unemployed and had no sufficient honest 
means of livelihood, or because of his own misconduct (such as by gambling, 
350 For a general discussion of the Act see HJ May The South African Constitution 20-21. 
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drinking or addition to drugs] he failed to provide for his own or his dependants' 
support, 351 such authorised officer could without warrant arrest such a black 
person and have him brought before a m~gistrate or Native commissioner. 
Such a person was then required to give a good and satisfactory account of 
himself and if he failed to do so, the magistrate or Native commissioner would 
declare him to be an idle or an undesirable person and have him removed to his 
home or to a work colony, farm colony, refuge, rescue home or similar 
institution, 352 or if he agreed to enter a contract of employment with an 
approved employer, ordered him to enter such employment. 
Following the proclamation of the Republic of South Africa in 1961 the 
Government introduced Urban Councils under the Black Urban Councils Act 79 
of 1961. These councils, like their predecessors, remained essentially advisory 
and consultative, with the result only a limited number were in fact 
established. 353 The failure of these Councils forced the government to transfer 
the control and administration of urban Africans to the central government. 
This system of direct rule was achieved through the Administration of Black 
Affairs Act 45 of 1971. 
The Administration of Black Affairs Act of 1971 sought to solve the problems 
regarding urban African local government by establishing administration boards 
and transferring the administration of black communities to them. The central 
government exercised overall control over these communities through the 
Department of Co-operation and Development. The administration boards 
implemented the policy of this department. 354 
During the seventies pressures for decolonisation and the meaningful 
351 See Section 23 of Act 25 of 1945, as amended by Acts 42 of 1946, 54 of 1952, and 67 
of 1952. 
352 Such orders were subject to appeal to or review by the Supreme Court. 
353 See DJ Hitge "Political Development on Local Government" paper presented on 10 
August 1984 at the conference organised by the Unisa Legal Aid Centre . 
354 Ibid. 
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involvement of blacks in government forced the South African government to 
begin a process of "internal decolonisation" of local government. The process 
began with the devolution of power of local government to black councils under 
the Community Councils Act 125 of 1977. Under this Act a total of 232 
Community Councils were established but they generally lacked executive 
powers and could at most be regarded as semi - local authorities. Although 
these community councils were subject to the control of administration boards 
they were considered, by the authorities, to form the basis for community and 
political responsibility at grassroots level. 355 
The introduction of the Community Councils in 1977 unleashed vehement 
opposition from black communities which resulted in the formation of 
alternative administrative and judicial structures. The first alternative 
structures were the Soweto Civic Association and the Port Elizabeth Black Civic 
Organisation. These mass formations were followed by the launch of the United 
Democratic Front (UDF) which was formed to co-ordinate the activities of these 
organisations and to address the central question of state power.356 
To deal with the situation the government introduced a number of reform 
initiatives. One of this initiatives was based on the report of the Riekert 
Commission, which was appointed to investigate urban policy. Riekert 
proposed the relaxation of restrictions on the mobility of urban black labour 
whilst at the same time advocating for the intensification of control over non-
urban labour. He proposed dividing the African population into urban insiders 
with permanent rights to live in urban areas, and "rural outsiders" with even 
less access to the urban areas than before. 
355 See Richard Humphries "Intermediate State Responses to the Black Local Authority 
Legitimacy Crisis" in Heymans and Totemeyer (eds.) Government by the People (1988) 105 et 
seq. 
356 See Hoarse Campbell "Challenging the Apartheid Regime from below" in Peter Anyang 
Nyongo (ed.) Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa (1987) 142-143. Also see Howard Barell 
"The United Democratic Front and National Forum, their Emergence, Composition and Trends" 
in 1981 South African Review II 6 et seq. 
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The Riekert reform proposals dovetailed with the concessions offered to the 
workers and trade unions by the Wiehahn Commission in that the right in the 
urban areas was complemented by trade union, property, and local government 
rights to live permanently in the urban areas that traditional apartheid had 
hitherto denied "temporary sojourners". 357 
Riekert did not question the cornerstone of the apartheid policy- namely, the 
Bantustan system. Urban Africans were to exercise their political rights in 
Urban African Councils whilst national political rights were still to be 
expressed through the TBVC and National States. 358 
The Riekert proposals were given substantive content by three "Koornhof" Bills 
introduced into Parliament in 1980. Owing to wide-spread resistance these bills 
were withdrawn and reintroduced in 1982 as the Black Communities 
Development bill, the Black Local Authorities Bill, and the Orderly Movement 
and Settlement of Black Persons Bill. 359 
The "Koornhof" Bills related to the establishment of new local government 
structures. The Black Local Authorities Act 102 of 1982, in particular, provided 
the mechanism for replacing the discredited Community councils with a system 
of local government similar to that of whites, without giving these bodies the 
financial resources to deliver urban services at a rate people could afford. 
The Black Local Authorities Act of 1982 contains provisions which are of legal 
and constitutional importance. Section 23 sets out the rights, powers, 
functions, duties and obligations of local authorities. It automatically endows 
town councils with certain powers enlisted in the schedule of the Act. It also 
authorises village councils to acquire similar power by virtue of a notice 
published by the Minister in the Gazette. 
357 See M Swilling The Politics of Statement (1988) 3. 
358 See D Hindson and M Lacey Iriflwc Control and Labour Allocation : Policy and Practice 
since the Riekert Commission (1983) 97-113. 
359 Ibid. 
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In 1984 the powers of administration were transferred from administration 
Boards (now known as Development boards) to the Black local authorities. The 
development boards were then expected to confine their role to the 
establishment of housing schemes and the training of local government 
personnel. 360 
The underlying philosophy of Black local authorities was to enable each person 
to participate on a democratic basis and within group context in local 
government decision-making affecting his or her interests. This system of local 
government came to be called local self-government as it was designed to afford 
local black communities the greatest possible degree of self-determination at 
local level. 
This local government approach derived from the racial policies which required 
local government administrative structures to contribute towards: 
(a) the realisation of individual and group on local levels; 
(b) the elimination of group domination as far as possible; 
(c) the promotion of order and stability and 
(d) co-operation with other local authorities. 
Elections for the new Black Authorities were scheduled for the latter part of 
1983 to coincide with the introduction of the tricameral parliament. 361 
A further devolution of powers to the Black Local Authorities was effected by 
Section 29 of the Black Communities Act 104of1984 which supplemented and 
substituted Section 11 of the Black (Urban Areas) Consolation Act 25 of 1945. 
Section 29 of the Black Communities Development Act specifically provided 
that Development Boards (which replaced Administration Boards) should as far 
360 See JC Bekker "Law and Local Government" paper delivered on 10 August 1984 at the 
Conference organised by the Unisa Legal Aid Centre, 67. 
361 See Hitge Political Development on Local Government Level 4-6. 
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as is practicable act in consultation with Black Local Authorities. It also 
required Development boards to apply the provision of the Black Local 
Authorities Act of 1982. 362 
The Black Communities Development Act of 1984 devolved fiscal powers to 
Development Boards. Henceforth, these boards were expected to raise their 
own money. In the meantime the Provincial authorities had taken away levies 
on employers and sold local sources of income such as beerhalls and bottle 
stores. Consequently, it became extremely difficult for the Black Local 
Authorities to generate any income. To contend with the situation they 
increased rentals and service charges and imposed levies, taxes and surcharges 
on their respective communities.363Consequently, rentals increased rapidly 
during the first half of the eighties. This rapid increase sparked off rent boycotts 
which threw black local government in South Africa into an unprecedented 
crisis. The rent boycott still persists in many black townships. 
To remedy the situation the government introduced the Regional Services 
Council Act 109 of 1985. 364 A Regional Services Council (RSC) consists of 
nominees of Blacks, Coloured, Indian and White local authorities. In other 
words the RSCs bring together local authorities representing different racial 
groups into a single body. These RSCs were established as "general affairs" 
bodies designed to allocate funds in the form of grants rather than loans. Thus 
they act as a kind of mechanism for the partial redistribution of wealth in the 
region where they exist. 
The chairpersons of the RSCs were appointed by provincial administrators in 
their respective provinces. These administrators, in turn, were appointed by the 
State President. The establishment of the RSCs introduced a regional 
362 See Bekker Law and Local Government 67. 
363 See Black Sash You and Your Local Authority (1988). 
364 For a general discussion see Alison Todes, Vanessa Watson and Peter Wilkinson "Local 
Government Restructuring in South Africa" in Regional Restructuring under Apartheid (1987) 
115 et seq. 
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subsection within the provincial government. Thus the RSCs indirectly linked 
the BLAs with the central government. The functions of the RSCs include: 
(a) the delivery of bulk services on a regional basis; 
(b) to facilitate greater racial interaction for different group; 
(c) to develop urban infrastructure in areas of greatest need through the collection 
and distribution of new sources of revenue; 
(d) to act as financial agencies that raise money through a double tax levied on 
employers (turnover and wage taxes), and then allocate money in the form of 
grants to various townships for capital development projects, particularly the 
provision of bulk infrastructure. 
The voting power in the RSCs is based on the economic strength of each 
constituent local authority. As the white local authorities have more economic 
power they decide how much of the money collect from levies (paid by business 
on turnover and wages) will be spent in the black areas. The RSC system, 
therefore, not only preserved racially-based local authorities but also white 
minority rule based on economic power. 365 If the white-dominated RSCs 
refused to spend money in a particular way the black councils had no power to 
force it to do so. This meant that black councils were wholly dependent on the 
goodwill of white councils. The inadequacy of the support received by BLAs 
from the RSCs is evidenced by the ongoing rent boycotts and the failure of the 
RSCs to intervene decisively. Notwithstanding the illegitimacy and inviability 
of the RSCs and BLAs the Government sought to use these structures as 
building blocks for a new South African Constitution. On 26 October 1988 some 
South Africans went to the polls to vote separately for Black, Indian, Coloured 
or White councillors in racially separated local authorities. The BLAs elected 
on the that day were expected to choose a group of people (called an electoral 
college) which would in tum elect nine black representatives to sit on the 
365 See Planact Workshop on Local Government For Ga-Rankuwa Civic Association, paper 
presented on 26 October 1990, Medunsa, Workshop III: Local Government in the Homeland 
Context" organised by the Community Law Centre, Institute for Public Interest Law and 
Research, Pretoria. 
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proposed National Council which was supposed to make proposals for a new 
constitutional system in South Africa. This meant that any black person who 
wanted to have a say in who should represent black people in the National 
Council would have to participate in the local authority elections.366 The 
National Council was rejected by all major black leaders who found that it was 
not a legitimate and appropriate body for drawing up a new constitution for a 
post-apartheid South Africa. 
4.5.3.2 Conclusion 
In summary, Africans were admitted to urban areas as temporary sojourners on 
the basis of a migratory labour system. Their affairs were initially administered 
by white municipalities acting on the advice of Councils modelled on the Glen 
Grey Council System. Africans were subjected to a system of influx control 
which reduced them to objects. During the seventies the government began a 
process of "internal decolonisation" of the dormitory townships (i.e. urban 
locations). Hardly a decade thereafter it became abundantly clear that these 
dormitory towns were not economically viable. The creation of these "towns", 
contrary to the will of the people and due to their economic inviability resulted 
in a vehement popular opposition beginning from the second half of the 
seventies. 
The government attempted to deal with this crisis by granting Africans the right 
of permanent residence in urban areas and by creating community councils 
through which the Africans could be consulted. It was then maintained that 
Africans would exercise their powers in the homelands. Continued resistance 
against these separate administrative structures forced the government to 
upgrade the community councils and rename them Black Local Authorities. 
These new structures, modelled on the white local authorities, were to serve as 
"own affairs" bodies in line with the consociational theory underlying the 
constitutional reforms initiated during the second half of the seventies. 
366 See Black Sash You and Your Local Authority 9 et seq. 
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Popular resistance against the Black Local Authorities and the tricameral 
parliament resulted in country-wide rent boycotts which plunged black local 
government into an unprecedented crisis. The government attempted to deal 
with economic crisis of the BLAs by creating Regional Services Councils (RSCs). 
The RSCs failed to resolve the crisis of the BLAs but at least served as a 
mechanism whereby the rich white municipalities partially distributed their 
financial resources to the poor black townships. 
The legitimacy crisis and economic inviability of the BLAs and RSCs 
notwithstanding, the government sought to use them as building blocks of. a 
new constitution substituting the discredited tricameral parliament. 
During the second half of the eighties the government introduced the concept 
of a National Council designed to serve as a negotiation forum for a new 
constitution accommodating the African majority. The National Council was 
expected to be an interim mechanism towards the realisation of a confederal 
state of Southern African States based on the consociational theory. Such a 
State would bring together the TBVC states, the tricameral parliament and 
regions composed of BLAs in an overarching system which would operate, at 
the national level, more or less like the RSCs. In other words, this would be 
a "South African" Regional Services Council which would not only preserve 
apartheid and white domination but also permanently deprive the black 
majority in South Africa of their right to self-determination (as defined in this 
thesis). 
4.5.4 General Conclusions 
Great Britain acquired sovereignty over the whole territory of South Africa 
through conquest. The British colonial power recognised only the right of the 
white minority to self-determination. Thus in 1908 they ·allowed the four 
colonies to call a National Convention (excluding the black majority) empowered 
to draw up a constitution for the Union of South Africa. The Convention (with 
the approval of the imperial authorities) postponed the African franchise 
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question indefinitely. After Union the British began to lead South Africa to 
legislative independence under white minority rule. To accommodate the 
disenfranchised blacks the Union Government introduced a system of black 
local government which culminated in the discredited black local authorities 
and the National States. The other black communities (Indian and Coloureds) 
were included in the central political process through the tricameral parliament. 
In short the South African constitutional system denied the black majority 
genuine civil and political rights and established separate constitutional 
structures to accommodate their political aspirations. This constitutional 
dispensation failed to meet the requirements of the traditional (or Diceyan) 
concept of the rule of law in its substantive sense in that it deprived Africans of 
civil liberties and granted Indian and Coloureds qualified rights which subjected 
them to the overriding authority of white minority governments. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN DEFENCE OF 
THE DYNAMIC CONCEPT OT THE RULE OF LAW: 
LESSONS FROM ZIMBABWE AND NAMIBIA 
5.1 Zimbabwe 
5.1.1 General 
The Post World War II linkage of the rule of law, the right of peoples (and 
nations) to self-determination and human rights (or in short the evolution of the 
dynamic concept of the rule of law) and their elevation to mandatory rules of 
contemporary international law established additional international legal norms 
for the creation of constitutional states in colonial territories and territories 
under racist regimes. 
During the sixties the dynamic concept of the rule of law became, by and large, 
the organising principle for newly independent African countries. This chapter 
examines, compares and contrasts the implementation of the dynamic concept 
of the rule of law in the creation of constitutional states in Zimbabwe, Namibia 
and South Africa. In each case, a brief historical background of the settlement 
proposals and their underlying international legal norms will be outlined, and 
a critical analysis is made of the interim measures of the Independence 
Constitutions and the impact of the International legal norms on the resulting 
constitutions. 
5.1.2 The United Nations Involvement in the Southern Rhodesian 
Constitutional Crisis 
Originally Southern Rhodesia was not included in the United Nations (UN) list 
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of non-self governing territories. 1 However, the promulgation of the Rhodesian 
Constitution of 1961 kindled international interest in the Rhodesian problem of 
self-determination. 2 By and large, this interest was sparked by petitions made 
by African political leaders to the UN General Assembly. These petitions, inter 
alia, forced the General Assembly to intervene. 3 
The UN General Assembly passed resolution 174 7 (XVI) declaring, amongst 
others, that the territory of Southern Rhodesia was a non-self-governing 
territory within the meaning of chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations. 4 
Following the adoption of this resolution, a debate continued in the General 
Assembly in which many speakers argued that this resolution had effectively 
established the juridical status of Rhodesia and that Britain therefore had power 
to intervene to impose a constitutional settlement in the same way as she had 
previously intervened in other places. 5 Britain rejected this argument 
maintaining that neither she nor the United Nations had power to intervene in 
Rhodesia. Britain based the non-existence of the UN power to intervene on the 
principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states which is 
embodied in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. This argument notwithstanding, the 
General Assembly passed further resolutions confirming its declaration in 
Resolution 174 7 (XVI) and requesting Britain to take urgent measures to resolve 
the Rhodesian problem. 6 As the Rhodesian problem was one of the right of self-
determination of peoples7 the majority of UN member states argued that the 
principle of domestic jurisdiction in Article 2(7) did not preclude the UN from 
discussing and passing resolutions on Rhodesia. Thus the General Assembly 
used the right of peoples to self-determination as an effective basis to found 
international jurisdiction on the Rhodesian Independence Crisis. 
1 See 1962 YBUN 559. 
2 See Nkala The United Nations, International Law and the Rhodesian Independence 
Crisis [1985) 31. 
3 See 1962 YBUN 428. 
4 of 28 June 1962. 
5 See 1962 YBUN 428. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Articles 1(2) and 55 of the UN Charter. 
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In 1963 the Special Committee on Colonialism drew the attention of the 
Security Council to the explosive situation in Southern Rhodesia. Taking 
account of this, the General Assembly also expressed deep concern at the 
explosive situation existing in Rhodesia owing to the denial of political rights to 
the vast majority of the African population and the entrenchment of the 
minority regime in power. 8 
On May 6, 1965 the Security Council adopted Resolution 202 which recalled 
earlier General Assembly resolutions and the resolutions of the Special 
Committee regarding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.9 
Furthermore, the Security Council endorsed the requests which the General 
Assembly and the Special Committee had repeatedly addressed to the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to obtain: 
(a) the release of all political prisoners, detainees and restrictees; 
(b) the repeal of all repressive and discriminatory legislation, and in particular the 
Law and Order (Maintenance) Act and the Land Apportionment Act; 
(c) the removal of all restrictions on political activity and the establishment of full 
democratic freedom and equality of political rights. 
The Security Council noted that the Special Committee had drawn its attention 
to the grave situation in Southern Rhodesia and, in particular, the serious 
implications of the election which was due to take place on 7 May, 1965 under 
the 1961 Constitution which had been rejected by the majority of the people of 
Southern Rhodesia and the abrogation of which had repeatedly been called for 
by the General Assembly and the Special Committee since 1962. 
Deeply disturbed by the looming UDI, the Security Council requested the United 
8 See Nkala The United Nations, International Law and the Rhodesian Independence 
Crisis (1985) 37. 
9 SI 1965 No. 1952. 
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Kingdom government and all States members of the United Nations not to 
accept a Unilateral Declaration of Independence for Southern Rhodesia by the 
white minority government. Further, the Security Council requested the United 
Kingdom government (a) to take all necessary action to prevent a Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence; (b) not to transfer under any circumstances to its 
colony of Southern Rhodesia, as then governed, any of the powers or attributes 
of sovereignty, but to promote the country's attainment of independence by a 
democratic system of government in accordance with the aspirations of the 
majority of the population. Finally, the Security Council requested the United 
Kingdom to enter into consultations with all concerned with a view to 
convening a conference of all parties in order to adopt new constitutional 
provisions acceptable to the majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia, so that 
the earliest possible date might be set for independence. The Security Council 
decided to keep the question of Southern Rhodesia on its agenda. 
Initially, Great Britain rejected all attempts to involve her in the Rhodesian 
Independence Crisis, arguing that neither she nor the UN had power to 
intervene in the affairs of Rhodesia. She sought to preclude the UN involvement 
on the basis of the principle of domestic jurisdiction embodied in Article 2(7) of 
the UN Charter. 10 
Following the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on 11 November 
1965, Britain abandoned its worn-out argument that the Rhodesian Crisis was 
a matter of domestic jurisdiction in which United Nations intervention was 
precluded. Thus Britain took the Rhodesian problem to the United Nations 
Security Council. In his address to the Security Council, Mr. Stewart, the British 
Foreign Secretary, stated two main reasons for referring the Rhodesian problem 
to the United Nations. First, that an attempt to establish in Africa an illegal 
regime based on minority rule is a matter of world concern, and second, that 
the measures taken by the United Kingdom against the Smith regime required 
io Ibid. 
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United Nations support to be effective. In his statement to the Security Council 
Mr. Stewart stated that since the UDI the only lawful Government of Southern 
Rhodesia was the Government of the United Kingdom. 11 
On 16 November the British Parliament passed the Southern Rhodesia Act, 
1965 declaring that Rhodesia continued to be part of Her majesty's dominions, 
and conferring executive and legislative authority to be exercised on behalf of 
the British Government by a Secretary of State. The Act further empowered the 
British Government to make orders in Council with reference to Rhodesia as 
appeared necessary and expedient. In pursuance of this power the British 
government made the Southern Rhodesia (Constitution) Order, 1965.12 
Following the proclamation of the UDI the Security Council passed resolution 
216 (1965) without making any prior determination that the Rhodesian 
situation constituted a threat to international peace under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter. In Resolution 216 (1965) the Security Council decided to condemn the 
UDI made by the racist minority and to call upon all States not to recognise the 
illegal racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia and to refrain from 
rendering any assistance to it. This was followed by Resolution 21 7 of 1965 in 
which the Security Council recorded its deep concern with the situation in 
Southern Rhodesia where the illegal authorities had proclaimed a UDI which the 
administering power (the government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland) regarded as a rebellion. The Security Council noted that 
the administering power had taken certain measures13 to deal with the situation 
and made a determination that the situation constituted a threat to 
international peace and security. Further, it reaffirmed Resolutions 216 and 
1514 (XV) and condemned the UDI as devoid oflegal validity. Thus the Security 
Council called on the United Kingdom government (a) to quell the rebellion and 
(b) to take other appropriate measures to end the rebellion. As the working of 
11 Ibid 39. 
12 See Marshall From Independence to Statehood in Commonwealth Africa vol II (1982) 
143-144. 
13 See note 11 supra. 
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the 1961 Constitution had broken down, the Security Council further called on 
the United Kingdom government to take immediate measures in order to allow 
the people of Southern Rhodesia to determine their own future in accordance 
with Resolution 1514 (XV) of 1960. Finally, the Security Council imposed 
sanctions on the illegal regime in Salisbury. 
In 196614 and 196815 the Security Council adopted resolutions imposing 
mandatory economic sanctions on Rhodesia under chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, describing the Smith regime as illegal but omitted calls to States to 
withhold recognition. This omission was cured by Resolution 277 (1970) 
adopted after the proclamation of Rhodesia as a republic. 16 The Resolution of 
1968 was particularly significant as it also recognised the legitimacy of the 
struggle of the people of Southern Rhodesia to secure the enjoyment of their 
rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in conformity with 
the objectives of General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960. 
Further, and perhaps more significantly, the Security Council called on the 
United Kingdom as the administering power in the discharge of its 
responsibility to take urgently all effective measures to bring to an end the 
rebellion in Southern Rhodesia, and enable the people to secure the enjoyment 
of their rights as set forth in the Charter of the UN and in conformity with the 
objectives of the General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV). 
In 1970 the Security Council adopted two other resolutions on Southern 
Rhodesia. The first Resolution 17 noted with grave concern that the measures 
thus far taken had not succeeded to bring the rebellion to an end and that some 
states had failed to prevent trade with the Smith regime contrary to resolutions 
of the Security Council and to their obligations under Article 25 of the Charter 
of the United Nations. Furthermore the resolution noted the continued 
repression of the black majority and reaffirmed its recognition of their 
14 See Resolution 232 adopted on the 16 December 1966. 
15 See Resolution 253 adopted on 29 May 1968 
16 This was effected by the Constitution of Rhodesia Act 54 of 1969. 
17 See Resolution 277 adopted on 18 March 1970. 
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legitimacy of their struggle and the duty of the United Kingdom to discharge her 
responsibility in respect of the people of Southern Rhodesia. The Security 
Council reaffirmed these positions in Resolution 288 of 1970. 18 This Resolution 
urged all states "not to grant any form of recognition" to the Smith regime and 
reminded states of their obligations under Article 25 of the UN Charter to act 
in accordance with decisions of the Security Council. Subsequent resolutions19 
did not expressly refer to the non-recognition of Rhodesia but instead called on 
states to carry out their obligations under the Charter, which by necessary 
implication included non-recognition. 
The Security Council used the terms "regime" or "authority" in Southern 
Rhodesia as it viewed this territory as a British colony subject to the authority 
of the United Kingdom, the administering power.20 In short, therefore, the 
resolutions of the Security Council were a denial of the statehood of an 
independent Southern Rhodesia and the non-recognition of the authority 
purporting to act as government of that territory. Resolution 277 (1970) 
declared that the decision directing states not to recognise the "illegal regime" 
was adopted under chapter VII of the Charter. Moreover, Resolution 288 (1970) 
emphasised that it was incumbent on states to comply with this obligation 
under article 25 of the Charter. It is therefore clear that by 1970, if not earlier, 
UN member states were legally obliged not to recognise either the state of 
Rhodesia or its government. 21 
5.1.3 The Impact of Contemporary International Law on the 
Constitutional Status of Southern Rhodesia 
It emerges quite clearly from the foregoing analyses of Security Council 
18 Adopted on 1 7 November 1970. 
19 Resolutions 218 (1972), 320 (1972), 388 (1976), 409 (1977), 423 (1978), 437 (1978). In 
Resolution 448 (1979) the Security Council labelled the 1979 elections, which resulted in Bishop 
Muzorewa becoming Prime Minister, as "null and void" and called upon states not to recognise 
his "government". 
20 See Resolution 217 of 1965. 
21 See Dugard Recognition and the United Nations (1987) 95. 
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resolutions that new international legal norms have emerged which deny 
statehood to any entity which suppresses the right of self-determination and 
systematically violates human rights. Hence, the territory of Rhodesia which, 
like South Africa, met all the requirements for statehood as contained in the 
Montevideo Convention of 193322 was denied the right to statehood. 
The normative basis for the UN sanctions campaign and its non-recognition of 
Rhodesia is to be found in Resolution 1514 (XV) (The Declaration on the 
Granting oflndependence to Colonial Countries and Peoples) of 1960. Thus after 
the UDI, resolutions of the General Assembly reaffirmed "the inalienable right 
of the people of Zimbabwe to freedom and independence in conformity with the 
provisions of General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 1960,23 condemned 
Rhodesian independence under minority rule as contrary to Resolution 1514 
(IV),24 stressed that Resolution 1514 (XV) envisaged independence under 
majority rule, 25 and denounced Rhodesia's policies of racial discrimination and 
segregation. 26 Security Council resolutions on the other hand condemned the 
minority regime in Southern Rhodesia as illegal, 27 reaffirmed the applicability 
of Resolution 1514 (XV) to Southern Rhodesia,28 and castigated the Smith 
regime's violation of human rights.29 
The most definite and emphatic exposition of the new international-law norm 
for the recognition of states found expression in Fawcett30 who argues that: 
"to the traditional (international law) criteria for the recognition of a regime as 
a new State must now be added the requirement that it shall not be based upon 
22 Ibid. 
23 2151 (XXI), 2383 (XXIII), 2508 (XXIV), 2652 (XXV). 
24 2662 (XXII), 2383 (XXIII), 2652 (XXV). 
25 2138 (XXI), 2262 (XXII), 2383 (XXIIII), 2508 (XXIV). 
26 2262 (XXII). 
27 216 (1965), 217 (1965). 
28 217 (1965), 232 (1966), 277 (1970), 288 (1970), 318 (1972), 328 (1973). 
29 277 (1970). 
30 See "Security Council Resolutions on Rhodesia" 1965-66BYIL112-113, and JES Fawcett 
The Law of Nations (1968) 38-39. Fawcett's views have been criticised by Devine "The 
Requirements of Statehood re-examined" 1971 34 Modern Law Review 410. 
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a systematic denial in its territory of certain civil and political rights, including 
in particular the right of every citizen to participate in the government of his 
country, directly or through representatives elected by regular equal and secret 
suffrage." 
Fawcett argues, further, that this new international-law norm was responsible 
for the non-recognition of Rhodesia. 
In similar vein Crawford31 argues that: 
"where a particular territory is a self-determination unit as defined, no 
government will be recognised which comes into existence and seeks to control 
the territory as a State in violation of self-determination. This principle does not -
at this stage of the development of international law and relations - constitute 
a principle of law with respect to existing states. But the evidence in favour of 
this principle as it applies to self-determination units, and in particular to non-
self governing territories, though it may be restricted to the one case of 
Rhodesia, is consistent and uniform. It appears then that a new rule has come 
into existence, prohibiting entities from claiming statehood if their creation is in 
violation of an applicable right to self-determination." 
It follows from the resolutions cited above and the arguments of legal scholars 
that Rhodesia established a clear precedent for the non-recognition as a State 
of an entity brought into being in violation of the norms contained in Resolution 
1514 (XV). 
5.1.4 The Commonwealth Intervention in the Rhodesian Crisis 
5.1.4.1 General 
The non-recognition of Rhodesia, a substantial increase in guerrilla pressures 
31 See James Crawford The Creation of States in International Law (1979) 105. 
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and mandatory sanctions forced the Smith regime (and South Africa) to support 
efforts to find an internationally acceptable solution to the Rhodesian problem. 
The first initiative was taken by Dr. Henry Kissinger, the then United States 
Secretary of State, in the middle of 1976. Dr. Kissinger met Mr. Smith in South 
Africa on 19 September 1976 and presented him with the following peace 
proposals: 
( 1) Rhodesia agrees to majority rule within two years. 
(2) Representatives of the Rhodesian government will meet immediately at a 
mutually agreed place with African leaders to organise an interim government 
to function until majority rule is implemented. 
(3) The interim government should consist of a Council of State, half of whose 
members will be black and half white with a white chairman without a special 
vote. The White and African sides would nominate their representatives. Its 
functions will include: legislation, general supervisory responsibilities and 
supervising the process of drafting the constitution. 
The interim government should also have a Council of Ministers with a majority 
of Africans and an African first Minister. For the period of the interim 
government, the Ministers of Defence and of Law and Order would be white. 
Decisions of the Council of Ministers should be taken by two-thirds majority. Its 
functions should include delegated legislative authority, and executive 
responsibility. 
(4) The United Kingdom will enact enabling legislation for the process to majority 
rule. Upon enactment of that legislation, Rhodesia will also enact such legislation 
as may be necessary to the process. 
(5) Upon the establishment of the interim government, sanctions will be lifted and 
all acts of war, including guerrilla warfare, will cease. 
(6) Substantial economic support will be made available by the international 
community to provide assurance to Rhodesians about the economic future of the 
country. A trust fund will be established outside Rhodesia which will organise 
and finance a major international effort to respond to the economic opportunities 
of the country and to the effects of the changes taking place. 
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The Smith regime accepted these peace proposals subject to their being 
accepted by the other parties involved and subject to the lifting of sanctions and 
the cessation of the armed struggle. 
On 26 September 1976 the Frontline States put forward proposals at 
considerable variance with the Kissinger proposals. On 28 October 1976 the 
United Kingdom government convened an All-Party Conference (including 
representatives of the Frontline States) in Geneva. A day thereafter (29 October 
1976) the two main liberation movements (Zanu and Zapu) in Rhodesia formed 
a Patriotic Front against the Smith regime. 32 
On 10 March 1977 the United Kingdom and the Unites States of America agreed 
to work together on a joint peace initiative to achieve a negotiated settlement 
in Rhodesia, the objective being independence with majority rule in 1978. In 
April 1977 Dr. Owen, the new Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary in the 
United Kingdom Labour government, toured Southern Africa and met all the 
parties to the problem as well as the Presidents of the Frontline States, the 
Prime Minister of South Africa and the Commissioner for External Affairs of 
Nigeria. Dr. Owen set out the elements which, taken together, could in the view 
of the two governments comprise a negotiated settlement, as follows: 
( 1) A constitution for an independent Zimbabwe which would provide for -
(a) a democratically elected government, with the widest possible franchise; 
(b) a Bill of Rights to protect individual human rights on the basis of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Bill would be made subject 
to special legislative procedures and it would give the right to an 
individual who believed his rights were being infringed to seek redress 
through the Courts; 
(c) an independent judiciary. 
(2) A transition period covering the surrender of power by the then present regime, 
the installation of a neutral caretaker administration whose primary role, in 
32 Ibid. 
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addition to administering the country, would be the organisation and conduct 
of elections in conditions of peace and security and the preparation of the 
country for the transition to independence. This period, it was envisaged, would 
be as short as possible, and in any case not more than six months. 
(3) The establishment of an internationally constituted and managed development 
fund (the Zimbabwe Development Fund). 
Following the tour, Dr. Owen and Mr. Cyrus Vance, the United States Secretary 
of State, met in London on the 6 May 1977 and agreed to carry forward their 
consultations with the parties on the basis of these proposals. To this end they 
established a joint consultative group. The group met all parties on a number 
of occasions in London and in Africa and carried out detailed technical 
discussions with them. In parallel, the governments of interested countries were 
informed generally of the progress of the consultations. 
On the basis of these consultations, the United Kingdom and United States 
governments decided to put forward firm proposals based on the following 
elements: 
( 1) The surrender of power by the illegal regime and a return to legality. 
(2) An orderly and peaceful transition to independence in the course of 1978. 
(3) Free and impartial elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage. 
(4) The establishment by the British government of a transitional administration, 
with the task of conducting the elections for an independent government. 
(5) A United Nations presence, including a United Nations force, during the 
transition period. 
(6) An independence constitution providing for a democratically elected 
government, the abolition of discrimination, the protection of individual human 
rights and the independence of the judiciary. 
(7) A Development Fund to revive the economy of the country which the United 
Kingdom and the United States view as predicated upon the implementation of 
the settlement as a whole. 
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The proposed transitional agreements included the establishment of the office 
of Resident Commissioner who would be the representative of the Crown in 
Southern Rhodesia and in whom would be vested responsibility for all executive 
and legislative functions of the government of the country. However, the 
Resident Commissioner would exercise his powers subject to any instructions 
that he might be given by the United Kingdom government except so far as the 
constitution otherwise expressly provided. On 1 September 1977 Field Marshal 
Lord Carver was named as the Resident Commissioner designate. 
These proposals were rejected by the Smith regime which embarked on efforts 
to find an internal settlement which, as shown above, failed to produce an 
internationally acceptable settlement. 33 
5.1.4.2 The Lancaster Agreements 
Following her election as British Prime Minister, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher 
concerned herself with the Rhodesian problem. Despite her election promises 
that her government would recognise the Muzorewa regime, Mrs. Thatcher 
succumbed to international opinion against any British recognition of the 
Muzorewa regime. Consequently, in her opening address to the Commonwealth 
Conference held in Lusaka from 1 to 7 August 1979, Mrs. Thatcher committed 
her government to "genuine black rule in Zimbabwe" and "legal independence" 
(for Zimbabwe) on the basis which the Commonwealth and the international 
community as a whole would find acceptable. Following this address, President 
Nyerere of Tanzania put a new proposal for the settlement of the Rhodesian 
crisis. The essentials of Nyerere's proposals were for the British government to 
draw up "a genuine majority rule constitution". This constitution was then to 
be laid before all the parties to the dispute and after agreement on the 
constitution had been reached, the British government, as the relevant colonial 
authority, would call an election under international supervision.34 Following a 
33 Ibid 155-157. 
34 See Seamus Cleary Zimbabwe is born (1980) 7-8. 
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due consideration of the proposal the Commonwealth heads of government 
passed, inter alia, the following resolutions: (a) a recognition that the internal 
settlement constitution was defective in certain important respects; (b) the 
acceptance that it was the constitutional responsibility of the British 
government to grant legal independence to Zimbabwe on the basis of majority 
rule; (c) a recognition that the search for a lasting settlement must involve all 
parties to the conflict and (d) a welcome to the British government's indication 
that an appropriate procedure for advancing towards all the objectives stated 
would be for them to call a constitutional conference to which all the parties 
would be invited. 35 
The Lusaka Accord36 which was embodied in paragraph 15 of the Heads of 
Government Communique issued at the end of the August meeting provided a 
framework for the Lancaster House Constitutional Conference which was 
convened by the British government in pursuit of the resolutions of the 
Commonwealth heads of governments. The Lancaster House Conference 
brought together the Muzorewa regime and the Patriotic Front comprising Zapu 
and Zanu, the two national liberation movements. 
Pursuant to the Lusaka Accord the British government convened the Lancaster 
House Conference which commenced on 1 O September 1979. The purpose of 
the Conference was to discuss and reach agreement on the terms of an 
independence constitution, and that elections should be supervised under 
British authority to enable Rhodesia to proceed to legal independence and the 
parties to settle their differences by political means. 37 
At the opening of the Conference the British government put forward 
constitutional proposals in accordance with the principles which were agreed 
35 See Marshall From Independence to Statehood in Commonwealth Africa 164. 
36 See (1979) 5 C.I.B. 1333. 
37 See Zimbabwe Rhodesia Report of the Constitutional Conference Lancaster House 
(1979) l. 
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at Lusaka and which formed the basis for other independence constitutions in 
Africa and elsewhere. 38 
In his opening address to the Lancaster House Conference the chairperson, Lord 
Carrington, recognised that the conference was taking place within the 
framework set out in the Lusaka Accord. The essential elements of this Accord 
were summarised as follows: the attainment for the people of Zimbabwe of 
genuine black majority rule through the adoption of a democratic constitution 
including appropriate safeguards for minorities; the transition to independence 
under such a constitution being the responsibility of the British government 
which would also supervise, prior to independence, the holding of free and fair 
elections with the presence of Commonwealth observers. 39 This framework, 
therefore, made Great Britain accountable to her Commonwealth partners as to 
the performance of her final major act of decolonisation. 40 
In terms of the proposals Britain, as the constitutional authority for Southern 
Rhodesia, took direct responsibility for the independence constitution. Their 
constitutional proposals took into account points made during consultations 
with all interested parties. However, the proposals were intended to give effect 
to the six principles which successive British governments had accepted as the 
proper basis for independence. 41 The British proposals provided (a) for an 
independent constitution modelled on the internal constitution42 but with 
changes designed to remove the defects in the latter which were regarded as 
inconsistent with the principle of genuine majority rule; (b) for interim 
arrangements for the pre-independence period during which Rhodesia would 
return to legality under a British governor who would be responsible for the 
supervision of free elections; and (c) for a cease-fire which was to take effect 
38 Ibid 9. 
39 See Peter Slinn "Zimbabwe Achieves Independence" (School of Oriental Studies. 
University of London, April 1989). 
40 Ibid. 
41 See Zimbabwe Rhodesia Report of the Constitutional Conference 10. 
42 le the constitution of Zimbabwe Rhodesia Act No 12 of 1979. 
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between the Rhodesian security forces and the forces of the Patriotic Front soon 
after the governor had been installed in Salisbury and which would be 
monitored by a military force under British command. 43 
In the course of the proceedings the Conference reached agreement on (a) a 
summary of the Independence Constitution, (b) arrangements for the pre-
independence period and (c) a cease-fire agreement. In concluding the 
agreement the parties undertook (a) to accept the authority of the Governor; (b) 
to abide by the Independence Constitution; (c) to comply with the pre-
independence arrangements; (d) to abide by the cease-fire agreement; (e) to 
campaign peacefully and without intimidation; (f) to renounce the use of force 
for political ends; (g) to accept the outcome of the elections and to instruct any 
forces under their authority to do the same. 44 
Soon after the conclusion of the agreement the British Parliament passed the 
Southern Rhodesia Act 1979. 45 This was an enabling Act giving power to Her 
Majesty in Council (inter alia) (a) to provide a constitution for Zimbabwe on the 
day on which Southern Rhodesia became independent as a republic-under the 
name of Zimbabwe; (b) to revoke the constitution order in Council of 1961 and 
to make transitional arrangements in connection with the coming into effect of 
the new constitution, and (c) to make provision for the government of Southern 
Rhodesia in the period up to independence. 
5.1.4.3 The Transitional Arrangements 
The parties agreed to the Independence Constitution subject to agreements on 
the arrangements for implementing it. The constitution gave effect to the 
principle of genuine majority rule and gave the government of Zimbabwe the 
powers to carry out the policies on the basis of which it was elected. Having 
43 See Zimbabwe Rhodesia Report on Constitutional Coriference 1-2. 
44 Ibid. 
45 See Statutory Instrument 1979 No 1571. 
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resolved the question of majority rule the British government left it to the 
people of Zimbabwe as a whole to decide through free and fair elections the 
issue of who was to form the future independent government. On its part the 
British government undertook (a) to transfer power to whatever leaders were 
elected by the people of Zimbabwe in elections held under these conditions and 
supervised under the British government authority and (b) to afford all parties 
an opportunity to take part on equal terms in elections held on the basis of the 
Independence Constitution which all parties had agreed to abide by. 
The British government rejected the transitional arrangements of the Patriotic 
Front which proposed, inter alia, complex power-sharing arrangements in the 
interim and restructuring of the police and security forces in advance of the 
election. First, the British government maintained that the purpose of the pre-
independence arrangements was to allow the parties to put their case to the 
people under fair conditions. They took the view that the pre-independence 
period should not be concerned with the remodelling of the institutions of 
government, but merely to level the playing field in order to allow all the parties 
to put their policies to the people. They maintained further that the remodelling 
of institutions of government would be a matter for the independence 
government elected by the people of Rhodesia. Secondly, the British 
government proposed that the administration of Rhodesia during the elections 
should be entrusted to the authority of the British government, while the 
leaders of all parties explain their case to the people. Thirdly, that the interim 
period be as short as possible and fourthly and finally, that both sides accept 
the authority of ·the British government and its determination to ensure the 
impartiality of the election process. 
In line with the Lusaka Accord the British government would appoint a 
Governor under an Order in Council which would confer on him legislative and 
executive authority. In short, the Governor would be empowered to rule by 
decree. Thus, he would have powers to make laws by ordinance for the peace, 
order and good governance of Rhodesia. No other body (including the Rhodesian 
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Parliament) would exercise any legislative authority. These transitional 
arrangements also vested executive authority in the Governor and subjected all 
public officers and authorities in Rhodesia, including the civil service, the police, 
and the defence forces, to his directions. The Patriotic Front forces too, were 
placed under his command. Thus, the Rhodesian government had to surrender 
its "sovereignty" to the British government acting through the Governor. The 
appointment of the Governor, the making of the Independence Constitution and 
the holding of elections under it and the granting of independence to Rhodesia 
required British legislation. 46 Thus on 3 December 1979 the British government 
passed the Southern Rhodesia Constitution (Interim Provisions) Order 197947 
making temporary provisions for the government of Southern Rhodesia and in 
particular providing for a Governor for Southern Rhodesia in whom full 
legislative and executive powers together with the exercise of the prerogative of 
mercy were vested. 48 This means that during the interim period Rhodesia would 
resume the status of a British colony and would be ruled directly by a British 
Governor, unaided by any representative institutions.49 
A day before the Governor arrived the Rhodesian Parliament hurriedly passed 
an Act to amend the 1979 Constitution. This Amendment Act, the Constitution 
of Zimbabwe Rhodesia Amendment (No 4)50 declared that "Zimbabwe Rhodesia 
shall cease to be an independent state and shall become part of Her Majesty's 
dominions". Thus, this Act reversed the Unilateral Declaration oflndependence 
of 1965, withdrew certain parts of the 1979 Constitution and provided for a 
Governor to assume all legislative and executive powers. The agreed new 
constitution was annexed in a schedule and Parliament dissolved. 51 
On its part Britain had already dealt with the status of this colony under the 
46 Ibid 628-631. 
47 See Statutory Instrument 1979 No 1571. 
48 Also see Marshall From Independence to Statehood in Commonwealth Africa 166. 
49 See Blaustein A, Gisbert P & Franz H Constitutions of the Countries of the World (1987) 
17-18. 
50 See Act 44 of 1979. 
51 See Blaustein, Gisbert and Franz Constitutions of the Countries of the World 17. 
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Southern Rhodesia Act of 1965. Thus on 6 December 1979 the British 
Government issued the Zimbabwe Constitution Order 1979,52 embodying the 
Independence Constitution whose operation was suspended until independence 
day had been fixed by Parliament. 
5.1.4.4 The Electoral Process 
The Lusaka Accord and the Lancaster House agreement vested the 
constitutional responsibility to establish just conditions for independence in the 
British government. In terms of these agreements the British government was 
obliged to organise and conduct free and fair elections and to supervise such 
elections with Commonwealth observers. 53 Thus the British government deemed 
it unnecessary to accept complex power-sharing arrangements which were 
proposed by the Patriotic Front. 54 
In preparation for the elections certain parts of the Independence Constitution 
were progressively brought into force under the terms of the Southern Rhodesia 
(Constitution of Zimbabwe) Elections and Appointment Order 1979. 55 This 
measure empowered the Governor to make arrangements for the holding of a 
general election of the members of the House of Assembly provided for under 
the new Constitution and for the election and appointment of members of the 
Senate. The general election itself was conducted under the Electoral Act 1979 
as amended by a number of ordinances enacted by the Governor. These 
Ordinances, in accordance with the Lancaster House agreements, vested 
responsibility, under the supervision of the Governor, for "ensuring the free and 
fair conduct of the elections" in the British Election Commissioner. 56 The 
Election Commission and Election Council Ordinance, 57 as its name indicates, 
provided for an election commissioner and his staff and functions and elections 
52 Statutory Instrument 1979 No 1600. 
53 See Report of the Constitutional Coriference Lancaster House (1979) 11. 
54 See Marshall From Dependence to Statehood in Commonwealth Africa 628. 
55 See Slinn Zimbabwe Achieves Independence 1051. 
56 See The Election Commissioner and Election Council Ordinance No. 2 of 1979. 
51 Ibid. 
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council and its functions as well as modifications to the Electoral Act of 1979. 
These provisions were designed to regulate the elections to be held before 
independence. 
The various Ordinances promulgated by the Governor (a) regulated, inter alia, 
the conduct of elections in terms of the Lancaster House agreement, 58 (b) 
provided for certain aspects of the conduct of the Commonwealth monitoring 
forces, 59 [c) provided for the use of party names registered under the Act,60 and 
[d) contained measures for the prevention of disruptive activities and the 
penalties therefore. Polling took place in February 1980 with an estimated 94 
percent of the electorate voting. The Zanu (PF) party under Robert Mugabe won 
an overall majority obtaining 57 of the 80 seats allocated to Africans in the 100 
member House of Assembly. The remaining Nationalist parties obtained 20 
[Zapu, PF) and 3 [UANC) seats. The reserved 20 white seats were won by Ian 
Smith. 
Following the elections victory of the Zanu (PF) party the Governor appointed 
Robert Mugabe the Prime Minister of the newly independent state of Zimbabwe. 
Mr. Mugabe formed a broadly-based government including 16 members of his 
party, 4 members of the Zapu [PF) party and two white Rhodesians. On 17 April 
1980, Zimbabwe obtained its legal independence when the Governor transferred 
power to the government of Robert Mugabe under the Independence 
Constitution. 61 
5.1.4.5 Main Features of the Independence Constitution 
5.1.4.5.1 General 
One of the major questions in the decolonisation of Zimbabwe was what would 
happen to the white minority in the event of black majority rule. This question 
58 See The Elections (Procedure) Ordinances 1979, 1980, No. 2, 1980. 
59 See the Commonwealth Ordinance 1980 No. 3 of 1980. 
60 See The Elections (Party Names) Ordinance No. 4 of 1980. • 
61 See Marshall From Dependence to Statehood in Commonwealth Africa 169-70. 
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was incorporated among the six principles set by Britain for granting 
independence to Zimbabwe under a majority rule constitution. The desired 
protection of the white minority was stated as a requirement that there should 
be no oppression of the majority by the minority or of the minority by the 
majority. To that end the Independence Constitution incorporated structures of 
government and a Declaration of Rights which guaranteed white minority 
rights. Some aspects of these structures and the Declaration are analysed in this 
section to assess their impact on the dynamic concept of the Rule of Law. 
5.1.4.5.2 Structures of Government 
The Independence Constitution is based on the doctrine of separation of powers. 
It provided for the Executive, 62 independent judiciary63 and a Parliament. 64 For 
the purpose of this thesis the focus falls on the composition and operation of 
Parliament as it embodied the constitutional guarantees which were adopted to 
protect white minority rights. 
The Zimbabwean Parliament consists of the Senate65 and House of Assembly.66 
In order to guarantee the representation of the white minority in Parliament, the 
Independence Constitution provided for a Delimitation Commission which 
divided Zimbabwe into eighty common roll constituencies and twenty white roll 
constituencies.67 In line with this racial quota representation the constitution 
provided for separate voters' rolls for blacks and white; a bi-cameral legislature 
consisting of a 100-member House of Assembly68 and a 40-member Senate. 69 
Twenty of the seats in the House of Assembly were to be filled by whites while 
62 See section 64. 
63 See sections 79-8 7. 
64 See section 32. 
65 See section 33. 
66 See section 38. 
67 Section 60(1) and (2). 
68 Section 38(1). 
69 Section 33(1). 
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80 are filled by blacks.70 In the Senate 10 of the seats were reserved forwhites71 
' 
and 10 for chiefs·. 72 
These arrangements could not be altered in the first seven years of 
independence save on the affirmative votes of all members of the House of 
Assemb!y and two-thirds of the Senate. 73 In effect therefore, whites were assured 
of reserved quotas of seats in both Houses of Parliament for the first seven years 
of Zimbabwe's independence. After the expiry of this period, the quotas could 
be abolished by the affirmative votes of 70 members of the House of Assembly 
and two-thirds of the Senate members. 
Through their special representation in Parliament the white minority were 
empowered to block changes implied in the new democratic order or to slow 
down the pace of changes which they found unacceptable to them. In other 
words, the white minority was enabled to limit the impact of black majority rule 
and to delay the realisation of certain aspirations of the black majority. 
Upon the expiry of the seven years the Zimbabwe Parliament passed an 
Amendment Act74 which ended the special representation of whites in 
Parliament by abolishing the twenty reserved House of Assembly seats and the 
ten reserved Senate seats. The twenty House of Assembly seats were to be filled 
on a non-constituency basis, with the 80 elected members of the House sitting 
as an electoral college to vote for candidates to occupy the twenty seats. The 
plenary House of Assembly would further sit as a college to elect candidates to 
fill the ten Senate posts previously reserved for whites, but in the event the 
House of Assembly did not have to conduct such an election as the amending 
Act deemed the ten sitting white senators to have been elected under the new 
constitutional provisions. 
10 See section 38(l)(a). 
71 See section 33(l)(b). 
72 See section 33(l)(c). 
73 See section 52. 
74 See Zimbabwe Constitution Amendment Act No. 6of1987. 
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The opposition to having special representation for whites was that such an 
arrangement might encourage them to have an insular attitude towards any 
future constitutional changes. It was also feared that whites could well have 
regarded their entrenched representation as capable of being extended and 
thereby restricting the representativity and democratic nature of the 
Zimbabwean Parliament.75 On the contrary, the passage of the Constitutional 
amendment abolishing the reserved white seats did not, on the whole, lead to 
a racial conflict between black and white. Instead, of the seventy eight members 
of Parliament who voted for the bill, eight were whites. 76 
It would appear, therefore, that the reservation of seats for the white minority 
in Zimbabwe served as a confidence-building measure which assisted the white 
minority to accept the transfer of power to the people of Zimbabwe as a whole. 
However, the power of the majority remained subject to limitations embodied 
in the Declaration of Rights, especially the property-rights clause. 
5.2 Namibia 
5.2.1 Introduction 
5.2.1.1 Background 
When the United Nations was being established in San Francisco, a preparatory 
Commission was set up with the purpose of arranging and preparing for the 
convocation of the first session of the General Assembly. 77 One of the tasks of 
this Commission was to prepare for the transfer of "certain functions from the 
League of Nations to the United Nations. "78 The Commission passed a resolution 
in which the mandatory powers were called upon to submit trusteeship 
75 See Luke Mhlaba "The Transitional Period in Retrospect, with Particular Reference to the 
Constitution and Minority Rights." Paper read at Conference on Zimbabwe's First Decade of 
Political Independence: Lessons for South Africa and Namibia, Harare 1990, 18. 
76 Ibid 20. 
77 See Ian Brownlie Basic Documents in International Law (1972) 63. 
78 Ibid. 
252 
agreements in the course of the first session of the General Assembly. 79 South 
Africa abstained at each stage of the deliberations in order to preserve its 
freedom of action in respect of Namibia. 80 
In the final session of the League the future of the mandate' system came under 
discussion again. The representatives of the other powers administering 
mandates stated their intention of bringing the territories under the United 
Nations Trusteeship system. On the other hand South Africa revealed its 
intention to annex Namibia. In this regard the South African representative 
stated that:81 
"It is the intention of the Union government, at the forthcoming session of the 
United Nations General Assembly ... to formulate its case for according South 
West Africa a status which it would be internationally recognised as an integral 
part of the Union ... In the meantime, the Union will continue to administer the 
territory scrupulously in accordance with the obligations of the Mandate, for the 
advancement and promotion of the inhabitants, as she has done in the past six 
years when meeting of the Mandates Commission could not be held." 
However, it is significant to note that South Africa did not regard the dissolution 
of the League as terminating its obligations under the mandate system. In the 
words of the South African representative:82 
"The Union government will nevertheless regard the dissolution of the League 
as in no way diminishing its obligations under the mandate, which it will 
continue to discharge with the full and proper appreciation of its responsibilities 
until such time as other arrangements are agreed upon concerning the future of 
the territory." 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid 68. 
82 Ibid. 
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In essence, these two statements clearly expressed the desire of South Africa to 
annex Namibia, while explicitly stating its recognition that whether the League 
existed or not it had obligations both to the inhabitants and the international 
community and that any change in the status of the territory would have to be 
agreed upon with the international community. 83 
When World War II began, the League of Nations and the Mandate Commission 
became ineffectual and the Union of South Africa stopped sending even the 
annual reports. During the Second World War, the.League became completely 
useless and died thereafter. 
In the final League session held on 18 April 1946 a final resolution was adopted 
which embodied the notion of a "sacred Trust" contained in Article 22 of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations. The resolution read:84 
"The Assembly: ..... 
3. Recognises that, on the termination of the League's existence, its 
functions with respect to the mandated territories will come to an end, 
but notes that Chapters XI, XII and XII of the Charter of the United 
Nations embody principles corresponding to those declared in Article 22 
of the Covenant of the League; 
4. Takes note of the expressed intentions of the members of the League now 
administering territories under mandate to continue to administer them 
for the well-being and development of the peoples concerned in the 
respective mandates, until other arrangements have been agreed between 
the United Nations and the respective mandatory powers." 
Meanwhile the United Nations was established under a Charter which was 
signed at San Francisco on 26 June 1945. The UN Charter contained a number 
of distinctive features. First, the Charter reveals the differences in conception 
with regard to the international accountability of dependent and trust 
83 See TD Gill South West Africa and the Sacred Trust 1919-1972 (1984) 19. 
84 Brownlie Basic Documents in International Law 70. 
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territories. While Article 22 of the Covenant of the League made no provision 
for the independence of the mandated territories, Article 16 of the UN Charter 
expressly committed the trust authority 
"to promote the political, economic, social and educational development of the 
inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards 
self-government and independence." 
However, the UN Charter did not provide for the continuance of the mandates. 
Instead, chapter XII initiated an International Trusteeship system. Article 75 of 
the Charter provides for the administration and supervision of such territory (to 
be known as Trust Territory) as may be placed under the International 
Trusteeship System by subsequent agreement. The object of the Trusteeship 
System is the same as the object of the Mandate System, and Article 77(1) 
provides that: 
"The Trusteeship system shall apply to such territories in the following 
categories as may be placed thereunder by means of trusteeship agreements: (a) 
territories now held under mandates; (b) territories which may be detached from 
enemy States as a result of the Second World War; and (c) territories voluntarily 
placed under the System by States responsible for their administration." 
However, Article 77(2) provided that: 
"It will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories in the 
foregoing categories will be brought under the trusteeship system and upon 
what terms." 
Furthermore, Article 79 provided that: 
"The terms of trusteeship for each territory to be placed under the trusteeship 
system, including any alteration or amendment, shall be agreed upon by the 
States directly concerned, including the mandatory power in the case of 
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territories held under mandate by a member of the United Nations, and shall be 
approved as provided for in Articles 83 and 85." 
These sections notwithstanding the rights of the affected peoples were protected 
by Article 80(1) which provided that: 
"Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agreements, made 
under Articles 77, 79 and 81, placing each territory under the trusteeship 
system, and until such agreements have been concluded, nothing in this chapter 
shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever of 
any states or any peoples or the terms of existing international instruments to 
which members of the United Nations may respectively be parties." 
To give effect to the Trusteeship system chapter XIII of the UN Charter 
established a Trusteeship Council which substituted the Mandate Commission 
of the League of Nations. 
The Trusteeship Council under the authority of the UN General Assembly, (a) 
considers the reports of the administering authorities; (b) accepts petitions, and 
examines them in consultation with the administering authorities; (c) provides 
for periodical visits to the respective trust territories at times agreed upon with 
the administering authorities, and (d) takes these and other actions in 
conformity with the terms of the trusteeship agreements. 
Last but not least, the voting procedure of both the Trusteeship Council and the 
General Assembly was one in which majority decisions had force, in contrast 
to the necessity of unanimity in the League Council and Permanent Mandate 
Commission. 85 
The UN Charter included as an annexure the Statute of a new court called the 
International Court of Justice. By chapter XIV this Court was established as the 
85 See S Slonim South West Africa and the United Nations; an International Mandate in 
Dispute (1973) 60. Also see Articles 18 and 89 of the Charter. 
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judicial organ of the UN to function in accordance with the Statute annexed to 
the Charter and forming part of it. All member countries (of which South 
African was one) were deemed to have subscribed to the Statute when they 
subscribed to the Charter. Each member undertook to comply with the 
decisions of the International Court of Justice, in any case to which it is a party 
and, on failure, the Security Council is to decide what action to take. The ICJ 
has two major functions: (a) to give advisory opinions on any legal question if 
invited by the General Assembly or the Security Council; and (b) to decide any 
contentious matter between two Member States. South Africa is an original 
signatory of the UN Charter and is bound by all the conditions of the Charter 
and the annexures thereto (thus also by the decisions of the International Court 
of Justice). 
5.2.3 South West Africa and the International Court of Justice 
5.2.3.1 The United Nations and the Mand~te System 
In Chapter 3 (paragraph 3.4.1) above it was shown that South Africa assumed 
obligations of a mandatory power over Namibia under Article 22 of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations. In Chapter 2 (paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2.1) it 
was shown that after World War II the UN was formed which de facto, not de 
jure, became a successor of the League. Consequently, no arrangements were 
made for a formal transfer of the powers and functions of the League to the UN -
especially the mandate system. 
The UN Charter, unlike the Covenant of the League, was designed to promote 
the decolonisation of countries and the realisation of the right of self-
determination of colonial peoples. 86 Furthermore, under the Covenant, the 
86 See Du Pisani SW A/Namibia, The Politics of Continuity and Change (1986) 110. Also 
see Articles 1 (2) and 55 of the UN Charter. 
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administration of colonial territories fell under the domestic jurisdiction of 
member countries while under the UN Charter it fell under the system of 
international accountability. Chapter XI of the Charter dealt with the non-self-
goveming territories under which the mandated territory of South West Africa 
fell. Although the international accountability for these territories was limited 
the mandatory powers were obliged to discharge their obligations towards the 
peoples of these territories in terms of the provisions of the UN Charter. 
Moreover, Articles 73 and 74 of the Charter provided that the interests of these 
peoples should enjoy preference to any others. As a member of the UN South 
Africa was bound by these provisions. 
Shortly after the formation of the United Nations, the General Assembly, on 
several occasions during its meetings, passed several resolutions87 
recommending that South West Africa should be placed under the International 
Trusteeship system and that the United States of America should propose the 
terms of agreement. South Africa did not take note of these recommendations. 
Although South Africa had accepted the validity of her obligations under the 
Covenant even after its demise88 she changed her attitude after the dissolution 
of the League. 
The attitude of South Africa was informed by the apparent vacuum which 
developed between the dissolution of the League and the coming into effect of 
the International Trusteeship agreements under chapter XII of the UN Charter. 
South Africa argued that, although the principles in chapters XI, XII and XIII 
of the UN Charter corresponded to those embodied in Article 22 of the Covenant 
of the League there was no legal obligations on her to place South West Africa 
under a trusteeship system as the UN was not a legal successor of the League. 
This attitude was surprising as South Africa had signed a final Resolution of the 
League recognising the continued existence of her obligations under Article 
22.89 
87 See Resolution 65(1) of 14 December 1946, 141(11) of 1 November 1947, 227(III) of 26 
November 1948 and 337(1V) of 6 December 1949. 
88 See note 83 supra. 
89 Ibid. 
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For South Africa the said Final Resolution, the Covenant and the UN Charter 
did not create any legal obligation to conclude a trust agreement with the UN 
regarding South West Africa, even though the mandatory powers (including 
South Africa] had agreed to respect the mandates clause until corresponding 
trusteeship agreements were concluded. 90 
5.2.3.2 History of the Dispute 
During the General Assembly's first session in 1946, South Africa proposed the 
incorporation of Namibia into the Union of South Africa claiming that the 
majority of Namibians desired the change. 91 In fact the annexation of Namibia 
was unanimously endorsed by the white-only territorial legislative assembly 
while consultations with the black majority were conducted through chiefs who 
were neither educated nor conversant with constitutional or international 
affairs. 92 South Africa sought to base the annexation of Namibia on the outcome 
of this controversial "referendum" arguing (in the person of General Smuts] that 
the referendum had offered the people of Namibia an opportunity to exercise 
their right of self-determination. 93 
Even without questioning the validity of consultations with the black majority 
the General Assembly rejected the South African argument outright. The 
General Assembly came to the conclusion that the black majority in Namibia 
had not yet secured political autonomy or reached a stage of political 
development enabling them to express a considered opinion which the 
Assembly could recognise on such an important question as incorporation of 
their territory. Thus the Assembly found itself unable to accede to the 
90 Ibid. 
91 See General Assembly O.ffkial Records 1st session (2nd part) Fourth Committee pt 1 
231-5 (Doc. A/123). Also see John Dugard (ed) The South West Africa/Namibia Dispute; 
Documents and Scholarly Writings on the Controversy Between South Africa and the United 
Nations (1973) 104-9. 
92 See Michael Scott Shadow over Africa (1950) 10-14. 
93 See Union of South Africa Debates of the House of Assembly (21 February - 5 June 
1947) Vol 60 Cols 1319-1354. 
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incorporation of Namibia into the Union of South Africa. Instead, it 
recommended that this territory be placed under the international trusteeship 
system and suggested that South Africa submit a proposal on the trusteeship 
agreement for its consideration. 94 
Six months after the adoption of this resolution South Africa informed the UN 
that it had decided not to proceed with the annexation of Namibia but to 
maintain the status quo and to continue to administer the territory in the spirit 
of the mandate. Also, South Africa undertook to submit reports on its 
administration of the territory for the information of the United Nations. 95 In 
response, the General Assembly of the UN again urged that Namibia be placed 
under the trusteeship system. Furthermore, the General Assembly authorised 
the Trusteeship Council to examine the report submitted by South Africa and 
to submit its observations to the Assembly. 96 
In 1947 South Africa submitted its first report on its administration of Namibia. 
The Trusteeship Council examined the document, requested supplementary 
information and adopted observations on the report for the third session of the 
General Assembly.97 The observations of the Trusteeship Council, inter alia, 
noted: 
[ 1) that the indigenous inhabitants of the territory had no political rights; neither 
franchise nor representation in the administration and legislature, nor eligibility 
to public office. 
(2) that whites, who constituted some 1 O percent of the population, owned over half 
the occupied land; 
(3) that the Namibian budget allocated only about 10 percent of public funds for 
blacks although they constituted nearly 90 percent of the population. 
94 See General Assembly Resolution 65(1) (1946). 
95 See General Assembly Official Records, 2nd session 4th Committee (Doc N334) 134-5. 
96 See General Assembly Resolution 141 (II) 194 7. 
97 See 3rd session supp no 4 43-5. 
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Consequently, the Trusteeship Council recommended the abolition of both 
urban segregation and the system of native reserves in the rural areas, and 
urged immediate provision of the education of African children. 
The General Assembly noted the Council's observations and requested the 
Secretary- General to forward them to the South African government. In the 
same resolution the Assembly recommended that Namibia be placed under the 
trusteeship system and that Pretoria should continue to submit annual reports 
on its administration of the territory.98 
In 1948 the National Party came to power on the platform of apartheid. A 
representative of this government informed the General Assembly during its 
1948 session that South Africa intended to form a closer bond with Namibia by 
granting it representation in the South African Parliament. 99 The following year 
(1949) South Africa made provision for six white members to be elected to the 
House of Assembly from South West Africa and for two (white) Senators to be 
elected and another two to be nominated. 100 In the same year South Africa 
informed the Secretary-General of the UN that she would no longer send any 
reports to the UN on her administration of Namibia. Nevertheless, South Africa 
denied that these moves were intended to unilaterally change the legal status 
of Namibia in violation of the mandate. 101 
In its letter of July 11 1949, addressed to the General Assembly, South Africa 
rejected the supervisory jurisdiction of the UN in Namibia. She stated that: 102 
"The Union Government have at no time recognised any legal obligations ... to 
98 See General Assembly Resolution 227(III) 1948. 
99 See General Assembly Official Records (4th session, 4th committee, annex to summary 
records of 1949 meeting) Doc A/929 7-8. 
100 See South West Africa Affairs Amendment Act 23 of 1949. 
101 See United Nations Institute for Namibia Namibia: A Direct United Nations 
Responsibility (1987) 170-1. 
102 See General Assembly Official Records 4th session fourth committee, Annex to 
Summary records (1949 Doc A/929) 7-8. 
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supply information on South West Africa to the United Nations, but in a spirit 
of goodwill, co-operation and helpfulness offered to provide ... reports ... with the 
clear stipulation that this would be done on a voluntary basis ... and on the 
distinct understanding that the United Nations has no supervisory jurisdiction 
in South West Africa." 
Furthe~ore, the letter criticised the Trusteeship Council for unjustified 
criticism and censure of South Africa's administration in both Namibia and 
South Africa itself. Also, the letter challenged the competency of the Truteeship 
Council to make recommendations on matters of internal administration of 
Namibia. 
However, South Africa reaffirmed its assurances that South Africa intended to 
administer the territory in the spirit of the mandate and that the new 
arrangement for closer association of South West Africa with South Africa did 
not mean incorporation or absorption of the former by the latter. 
Upon receipt of the letter the Trusteeship Council announced that it could no 
longer exercise its functions - due to the South African challenge of its 
competency to make recommendations on the administration ofNamibia. 103 In 
turn, the General Assembly expressed its regret at this decision and then 
reiterated all its previous resolutions and invited South Africa to resume its 
reports and to comply with the relevant General Assembly resolutions. 104 
5.2.4 Namibia in the International Court of Justice 
5.2.4.1 General 
The dispute between South Africa and the UN over Namibia forced the UN to 
approach the International Court of Justice, its judicial organ, for advisory 
103 See Trusteeship Council Resolution III (V) (22 July 1949) (Official Records of the General 
Assembly). 
104 See General Assembly Resolution 337 (VI) 1949. 
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opinions which were pronounced in 1950, 1955 and 1956. In 1962, 1966 and 
1971 the International Court of Justice also handed down judgements on 
Namibia. 
It is not intended in this chapter to make any critical study of these advisory 
opinions and judgements. Too much has been written on the opinions and 
judgements to merit any such study. Here, it is proposed to provide a brief 
summary of the questions submitted to the Court and the holdings of the Court 
with a view to trace the evolution of the UN jurisdiction over Namibia. 
5.2.4.2 The 1950 Advisory Opinion 
In response to the defiant attitude of South Africa regarding the supervisory 
jurisdiction of the UN over Namibia, the General Assembly requested the 
International Court of Justice for legal advice on the international status of 
Namibia and the legal obligations of the Union of South Africa arising 
therefrom, in particular, (a) whether South Africa continued to have 
international obligations under the mandate for South West Africa and, if so, 
what were these obligations; (b) whether the provisions of chapter XII of the UN 
Charter were applicable and, if so, in what manner to the territory of South 
West Africa, and (c) whether South Africa had the competence to modify the 
international status of Namibia 
The International Court of Justice handed down its Advisory Opinion on 11 
July, 1950 in an eight to six decision. The Court held that South African was 
not obliged to place the mandate under the trusteeship system. 105 The basis of 
the Court's arguments rested on the premise that Articles 75 and 77 of the UN 
Charter were permissive in their wording ("as may be placed thereunder"). 106 
Further, the Court found that while the Charter had clearly predicted that the 
natural place for all mandated territories was within the trusteeship system, and 
105 See ICJ Reports (1950) 110. 
106 Ibid 139. 
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that this could only take place after successful negotiations between the 
mandatory power and the UN, the mandatory powers were under no legal 
obligation to place mandates under the trusteeship system. 107 However, these 
findings did not mean that South Africa had ceased to be subject to any legal 
obligations with regard to her international accountability. 
The Court distinguished two sorts of obligations resulting from the Mandate 
Agreement. The first obligation was directly related to the administration of the 
territory and corresponded to the sacred trust of civilisation referred to in Article 
22 of the Covenant. 108 The second obligation concerned the machinery of 
implementation of the sacred trust and corresponded to the securities for the 
implementation of the trust. 109 With regard to the first group of obligations the 
Court took the view that they were the material obligations of the mandatory: 110 
"to promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being, and the social 
progress of the inhabitants." 
These obligations had been worked out in the further articles of the mandate 
with specific reference to arms and alcohol traffic, slave trade, freedom of 
conscience and worship and more. Further, the Court stated categorically 
that: 111 
"These obligations represent the very es5ence of the sacred trust of civilisation. 
Their raison d'etre and original object remain in force. Since their fulfilment did 
not depend on the existence of the League of Nations, they could not be brought 
to an end merely because these supervisory organs had ceased to exist. This 
view is confirmed by Article 80(1) of the UN Charter which maintains the rights 
of states and peoples and the terms of international agreements until the 
territories in question are placed under the Trusteeship System." 
101 Ibid 140. 
108 Ibid 133. 
109 Ibid. 
110 See Slonim South West Africa and the United Nations 369. 
111 See ICJ Reports (1950) 133. 
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In short, the Court found that South Africa had no right to unilaterally alter the 
status of Namibia. 
In other words, while South Africa was not bound to bring the mandate within 
the trusteeship system, she was still subject to the obligations that were part of 
the sacred trust of civilisation, as embodied in the Mandate Agreement. The 
Court put this in more definite and emphatic terms: 112 
"The authority which the Union Government exercises over the territory is based 
on the Mandate. If the Mandate lapsed, as the Union contends, the latter's 
authority would equally have lapsed. To retain the rights derived from the 
mandate and to deny the obligations thereunder could not be justified." 
Then the Court turned to the question of the degree of supervision that the 
General Assembly was authorised to exercise over the administration of the 
Mandate. 
Regarding this question, the Court found that since Namibia was still subject 
to the Mandate Agreement: 113 
"The degree of supervision should not therefore exceed that which applied under 
the Mandate System, and should conform as far as possible to the procedure 
followed in this respect by the Council of the League. These observations are 
particularly applicable to annual reports and petitions." 
The Court also found that South Africa was still subject to the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the International Court in any dispute between itself and another 
member of the League of Nations. 114 
In the light of these considerations the Court concluded that South Africa was 
u2 Ibid. 
113 Ibid 138. 
114 Ibid. 
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only competent to modify the international status of Namibia with the consent 
of the UN. 115 
The 1950 Advisory Opinion was a turning point in the UN efforts to bring 
Namibia under the trusteeship system. Basing its considerations on Article 80( 1) 
of the UN Charter the Court found that the UN had succeeded the League as a 
supervising body with regard to the mandate. The essential point in this regard 
was that South Africa held the territory solely in trust for the international 
community, and was therefore not able to alter the status of the territory 
without the concurrence of the international community. In the view of the 
court the fact that the League which acted for the international community in 
1919 did not exist in 1950, did not change this basic premise. In the opinion of 
the Court South Africa was not in Namibia as mandatory power on the basis of 
a contractual relationship with the League, but as the exerciser of the Sacred 
Trust embodied in the Covenant of the League and the Mandate agreement. 116 
As the Court put it: 117 
"It cannot be admitted that the obligation to submit to supervision has 
disappeared merely because the supervisory organ has ceased to exist, when the 
United Nations has another international organ performing similar though not 
identical supervisory functions." 
Five judges dissented in part while various commentators offered a number of 
interpretations to explain the succession of the UN to the League of Nations. 118 
For the purpose of this thesis it is not necessary to explore these dissenting 
opinions and commentaries. 
Suffice it to say that the Courts Finding on the question of succession was based 
on the principle of effectiveness of the original treaties which set up the 
115 Slonim 118. 
116 See JCJ Reports 135-137. 
111 Ibid. 
118 See Slonim South West Africa an International Mandate in Dispute 120. 
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mandate system. The Court recognised that the abolition of international 
supervision would effectively terminate the whole mandate status. Thus the 
Court was compelled to read into the original documents a principle of 
succession in international organisation in order to give effect to the original 
obligations assumed under the mandate. Consequently the Court concurred 
with the General Assembly in providing a legal basis for the UN supervision of 
the Mandate of Namibia, making it more difficult for South Africa to annex this 
territory. 
Meanwhile two factors reinforced demands for the implementation of the 
Advisory Opinion of 1950. These factors were (a) the growing opposition to the 
apartheid system by the disenfranchised black majority in South Africa, and (b) 
international pressure from anti- colonialist states that the Advisory Opinion 
should be given immediate and direct effect. These states found that the 
Opinion spoke for itself, and saw no need to enter into tortuous negotiations 
with the South African government to find the best means of effecting United 
Nations supervision. 119 Thus states relied on the holding of the ICJ that the 
United Nations was entitled to exercise supervision in the execution of the 
mandate, but that this supervision must resemble as far as possible that which 
was exercised by the League Council and the Permanent Mandate 
Commission. 120 On the other hand Western powers preferred negotiations with 
South Africa as the best way of working out a form of UN supervision, as far as 
that could be achieved, in accordance with League practice. 121 Following a 
deadlock between the anti-colonialist states and Western colonial powers (as 
well as the United States), the General Assembly passed a compromise 
resolution accepting the Advisory Opinion ( 1950) and urging South Africa to 
take the necessary steps to give effect to the opinion, including the transmission 
of reports and petitions, established an Ad hoc Committee of five states122 to 
119 Ibid 126. 
120 See Gill South West Africa and the Sacred Trust 31. 
121 Slonim South West Africa an International Mandate In Dispute 126. 
122 Amongst others Denmark, Thailand and Uruguay. See Gill South West Africa and the 
Sacred Trust chapter 7 note 6. 
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confer with South Africa concerning the procedural measures necessary for 
implementing the Advisory Opinion and as far as possible, in accordance with 
the procedure of the former Mandate System, to examine reports and petitions 
that may be submitted to the Secretary-General.2123 
South Africa rejected this opinion arguing that the United Nations had no right 
to exercise supervision over the administration of the territory, and repeating 
that the Mandate had lapsed. Protracted negotiations which followed resulted 
in the suspension of negotiations. When negotiations were resumed in the years 
1952 and 1953 neither party was willing to compromise. Hence, the talks 
deadlocked again making it impossible for the Ad hoc Committee to reach an 
acceptable agreement with guarantees for international supervision by the UN 
of the Mandatory power. The resulting anger and frustration led to a hardening 
resolve by the General Assembly to implement the 1950 Opinion with or 
without South African co-operation. 
Thus on 28 November 1953 the General Assembly established a Committee on 
South West Africa. 124 This Committee consisted of representatives of 8 
countries. 125 The new Committee differed from the Ad hoc Committee in that 
the latter had placed the emphasis upon negotiations with South Africa while 
the former was primarily of a supervisory nature. 126 The task of the new 
Committee was to imitate the Permanent Mandate Commission by examining 
information in the scope of the former questionnaire regarding the 
administration of the territory, by examining reports and petitions concerning 
South West Africa, and relaying this information to the General Assembly in 
periodic reports. 127 
123 Ibid 127. 
124 Ibid 148. 
125 Including Brazil, Mexico, Norway, Pakistan, Syria, Thailand and Uruguay. See Gill 
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The Committee began by requesting South Africa to resume negotiations with 
a view to implementing the Advisory Opinion and to submit a report concerning 
conditions in the mandate. 128 From the outset South Africa refused to co-
operate with the Committee and, in particular, refused to recognise the 
obligation to submit reports and petitions to the Committee. 129 In the light of 
this attitude the Committee decided to independently assess the conditions in 
the territory. 130 Using South African documentation and statistics as well as 
independent sources of information, the Committee released a report with 
detailed information concerning the political, social and economic conditions 
prevailing in the territory. 131 The scathing attack of the report on South African 
administration of the territory led the General Assembly to conclude that the 
Administration of South West Africa is in several aspects not in conformity with 
the obligations under the mandate. 132 
5.2.4.3 The 195 5 Advisory Opinion 
The Committee of South West Africa was also tasked to draw up procedural 
rules for the General Assembly to examine and review petitions and reports 
submitted by the Committee. 133 According to the 1950 Advisory Opinion these 
rules had to conform as far as possible to the procedure followed by the Council 
of the League of Nations. These observations were particularly applicable to 
annual reports and petitions. 
A major controversy ensued with regard to the interpretation of the committee's 
special rule F which dealt with the voting procedure to be applied in the review 
of reports and petitions. South Africa took the view that the Court had meant 
that any voting procedure would have to embody the League practice of 
128 Ibid 144. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid. 
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unanimity, implying automatically that South Africa would exercise a veto over 
any resolutions pertaining to such reports. Other delegations held the view that 
the reservation "as far as possible" concerning the procedure to be followed by 
the General Assembly left the way open to apply the normal voting rules 
envisaged in Article 18 of the Charter of the UN. 134 
The South West Africa Committee offered a compromise in the form of a voting 
procedure providing for a two-thirds majority regarding reports and petitions, 
subject to concurrence by South Africa. 135 The non-aligned group opposed any 
form of veto by South Africa while Western powers called for another Advisory 
Opinion by the Court on the matter. A deadlock on the issue was averted when 
the General Assembly decided to refer the question of the voting procedure to 
the Court. 136 
The Court adapted the textual interpretation of its 1950 Opinion and handed 
down a unanimous opinion confirming the right of the General Assembly to 
take decisions relating to reports and petitions by a two-thirds majority vote. 137 
The essence of the 1950 and 1955 Advisory Opinions was that South Africa was 
still subject to international accountability with regard to the mandate. Quite 
naturally, this could not continue under the UN as it did under the League. The 
ICJ had given the General Assembly the latitude to find a new form in which 
to clothe the basic principle with the reservation that the supervision should 
comply "as far as possible" with that exercised by the League. 138 
The Tenth session of the General Assembly held in 1956 addressed three major 
issues. First, the 1955 Advisory Opinion, secondly the report of the South West 
Africa Committee on General Conditions in the Mandate, and thirdly, the 
question of admissibility of oral hearings of petitions by the South West Africa 
134 For a text see The Europa World Yearbook 1993 vol 1 (1993) 9-16. 
135 Slonim South West Africa an International Mandate in Dispute 144-145. 
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Committee. With regard to the 1955 Opinion South Africa, which had not 
participated in the 1955 ICJ proceedings, refused to accord the opinion any 
acceptance. In the South African view, the Opinion had done no more than 
interpret an already incorrect 1950 opinion. 139 
The report of the South West Africa Committee was presented in the wake of 
South African obstruction and lack of co-operation. 140 The report was highly 
critical of South African administration of Namibia, accusing the Union 
government of favouring only the European inhabitants of the territory and of 
neglecting the welfare of the other communities. 141 
With regard to the third question, regarding the reservation clause, the practice 
had been that petitions in the time of the League Council could only be 
submitted in writing by the mandatory to the Permanent Mandate 
Commission. 142 Given the lack of consensus between South Africa and the UN 
and the UN members inter se the General Assembly was once again compelled 
to submit the matter to the International Court of Justice which decided 
narrowly in an eight to five opinion that oral hearings of petitions were not 
contrary to the 1950 opinion. 143 
On this occasion the court abandoned its textual interpretation of the 1950 
Opinion, replacing it with an approach which took the entire 1950 Opinion into 
account, and analysed its general meaning. 144 The Court found, in particular, 
that the general meaning of the 1950 Opinion had been "to safeguard the sacred 
trust of civilisation through the maintenance of effective international 
supervision of the administration of the mandated territory". 145 
139 Ibid. 
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5.2.4.4 The Contentious Proceedings on Namibia 
5.2.4.4.1 Background 
Attempts by the South West Africa Committee to induce South Africa to 
negotiate or submit reports concerning the mandate failed in 1956 as it did in 
previous years. 146 In the light of the intransigence of the South African 
Government the Committee submitted another report based on publicly 
available information released by the South African Government, and other 
independent sources. The report, like its predecessors, criticised the South 
African Government for failing to meet the obligations of the Mandate. 147 
The new and most significant part of this report was the reference made to 
South Africa's introduction of its apartheid policies to Namibia. 148 Though not 
explicit, the introduction of apartheid to Namibia had already become clear after 
the introduction of the Native Affairs Administration Act of 1954. The passage 
of this Act meant that henceforth the administration of black affairs in both 
South Africa and Namibia would fall under the same apartheid administrative 
bodies. This uniform application of apartheid policies in both South Africa and 
Namibia confronted the South West Africa Committee, for the first time, with 
the issue of apartheid in the South West Africa dispute. Between 1945 and 1955 
the conflict had centred on the issues of the maintenance of South West Africa's 
legal status as a territory subject to international supervision distinct from the 
Union of South Africa. 149 According to the Committee the application of 
apartheid policies in Namibia was150 
"neither in conformity with the principles of the mandate system nor with the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, nor with the Advisory Opinions of the 
International Court of Justice, nor with the resolutions of the General 
Assembly." 
146 See Slonim South West Africa an International Mandate in Disput~ 167. 
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This finding of a violation of international law, in particular the Universal 
Declaration, led the General Assembly to pass another resolution (1956) on the 
dispute. 
In its 1956 resolution the General Assembly requested the Committee to 
investigate ways in which South Africa could be induced to co-operate, if need 
be, by contentious proceedings in the Court. 151 In August 1957 the Committee 
submitted in addition to its regular report on Conditions, its findings concerning 
the possibilities oflegal action against South Africa to the General Assembly. 152 
To avert a looming deadlock on the issue, the General Assembly adopted a 
compromise resolution calling for a delay in the detailed consideration of legal 
action until the next session of the General Assembly. In addition, a Good 
Offices Committee was set up with wide powers of negotiation to attempt to find 
a "just and reasonable" solution to the problem. 153 The Committee tried in vain 
to find a solution. 154 
Following the failure of all other efforts to resolve the conflict, the room was 
then open to contentious proceedings. Thus on 1 7 November 1959 the General 
Assembly adopted a resolution drawing155 
"The attention to the conclusions of the special report of the Committee on 
South West Africa covering the legal action open to member states to refer any 
dispute with the Union of South Africa concerning the interpretation or 
application of the Mandate for South West Africa to the International Court of 
Justice for adjudication in accordance with Article 7 of the mandate read in 
conjunction with Article 37 of the Statute of the Court." 
The door to a compromise solution which would have maintained the status 
quo closed on 4 November 1960 when Ethiopia and Liberia instituted 
151 Ibid. 
152 Ibid 171-2. 
153 Ibid 1 72. 
154 See Gill South West Africa and the Sacred Trust 42. 
155 Ibid 43. 
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contentious proceedings against the Union of South Africa before the 
International Court of Justice. The papers before the Court contained nine basic 
submissions upon which they wished the Court to give its ruling. 156 These 
submissions were: 
(I) South West Africa is a territory under Mandate. 
(2) The Union continues to have international obligations stated in Article 22 of the 
Covenant and in the Mandate agreement, with supervisory functions to be 
exercised by the United Nations to which annual reports and petitions are to be 
submitted. 
(3) The Union has practised apartheid, in violation of Article 2 of the Mandate and 
Article 22 of the Covenant, and it has the duty forthwith to cease such practice. 
(4) The Union has violated Article 2 of the Mandate and Article 22 of the Covenant 
by failing to promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and social 
progress of the inhabitants of the territory and has a duty forthwith to proceed 
to carry out these obligations. 
(5) The Union has, by word and action, treated the territory in a manner 
inconsistent with its international status and has impeded opportunities for (the 
development and exercise oO self-determination and has a duty to desist from 
such acts. 
(6) 
(7) The Union has failed to submit annual reports to the General Assembly, in 
violation of Article 6 of the Mandate. 
(8) The Union has failed to transmit petitions to the General Assembly, in violation 
of its obligations as mandatory, and has the duty to submit same to the General 
Assembly. 
(9) The Union has attempted to modify substantially the terms of the mandate 
without Assembly consent, in violation of Article 7 of the Mandate. 
The three basic premises of these submissions were, first, that the mandate 
continued to exist under international law. Secondly, that the principle of the 
156 See ICJ Reports (1962) 324. 
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sacred trust and its corollary, international accountability, was applicable to the 
territory, and thirdly, that the Union had failed to promote the well-being of the 
territory's inhabitants. 
In effect, Ethiopia and Liberia were asking the Court to confirm and extend its 
1950 Advisory Opinion by ruling that the Mandate continued to be in force, and 
by defining the Mandatory's obligations with regard to international 
accountability and the promotion of the welfare of the inhabitants of the 
territory. Thus, the applicants brought the fundamental issue of apartheid 
policies for the first time to the consideration of the ICJ. 157 
South Africa responded to the application by raising four preliminary 
objections: 158 
(I) that since the dissolution of the League the Mandate was not a treaty in force 
(under Article 37 of its Statute, the Court had no jurisdiction to hear an issue 
arising under such a treaty) and, in any case, Article 7 of the Mandate, which 
gave jurisdiction to the Court to hear contentious cases under treaties, no longer 
existed; 
(2) that neither Liberia nor Ethiopia was "another member of the League of Nations" 
and Article 7 authorised only such members to bring proceedings before the 
Court; 
(3) that the conflict between the two African states and the Union was not the kind 
of dispute to which Article 7 of the Mandate applied because no material interest 
of the applicant governments or of their citizens was involved; and 
(4) that the conflict did not meet the requirement of Article 7 that it cannot be 
settled by negotiations. 
The Court overruled these objections by a vote of eight to seven.159 
157 See Gill South West Africa and the Sacred Trust 45. 
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In overruling the first objection the Court stood by its holding in the 1950 
Advisory Opinion in which it was held unanimously that Article 7 of the 
Mandate was still in force. The Court also rejected South Africa's contention 
that it continued to have rights over the territory without any corresponding 
legal obligations. 160 All in all, the Court found, first, with an eight to seven 
majority, that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the merits of the dispute 
and secondly, that Article 7 of the Mandate was still in force and that according 
to Article 37 of the Statute of the Court, the Court had a right to hear the case. 
The Court reached this decision by reasoning that there was a dispute between 
parties which could not reasonably be expected to be resolved by means of 
negotiations. Furthermore, the Court emphasised the role of "the sacred trust 
of civilisation" laid down upon the League and its member states, as a 
manifestation of organised international community. After examining the 
features of the Mandate, the Court proceeded to examine and reject in turn the 
four basic objections that had been submitted by South Africa. 161 
Following the rejection of its basic objections, South Africa replied to the 
original submissions of applicants. She maintained that the apartheid issue was 
not justiciable, basing her argument on the claim that she was applying in good 
faith its theory of development to the territory. Further, South Africa stressed 
the relatively good conditions in Namibia compared with many other countries. 
Applicants' arguments on the other hand, boiled down to two theses. First, that 
the allocation of rights, status, duties and so on,. on the basis of race or caste 
rather than individual merit was contrary to an international norm of conduct 
that had developed over the years and had become a part of the law of nations, 
and secondly, that the effects of apartheid resulted factually in treatment which 
did not meet the well-being and social progress standard of Article 2 of the 
Mandate. 
160 Ibid 330-35. 
161 Ibid 335-42. 
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Thus Counsel for the applicants requested the Court to find (a) that the 
respondent (South Africa) by laws and regulations, and official methods and 
measures had practised apartheid, i.e. had distinguished as to race, colour, 
national or tribal origin in establishing the rights and duties of the inhabitants 
of the territory, and (b) that the respondent, by virtue of economic, political, 
social and educational policies applied within the territory, by means of laws 
and regulations, and official methods and measures has, in the light of 
applicable international standards or international legal norm, or both, failed to 
promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and social progress of 
the inhabitants of the territory. 162 The respondent's invitation to the Court to 
see conditions in Namibia and to compare them with those in Ethiopia and 
Liberia and possibly other African countries, was rejected by eight to six 
votes. 163 
The Court reached its judgement on the South West Africa case on 18 July 
1966 after litigation lasting five years. A divided Court found, with the 
President's casting vote, that applicants had not established any legal right or 
interest appertaining to them in the subject matter of the present claims and 
that, accordingly, the Court must decline to give effect to them. 164 This 
judgement was criticised by various commentators on the ground that it 
reversed the 1962 judgement contrary to the principle of res judicata, which 
assures the parties to a dispute that a judicial decision is final. 165 
5.2.5 Revocation of the Mandate 
When the ICJ finally decided in 1966 not to rule on the merits of the South 
West Africa cases, 166 the General Assembly decided to revoke the Mandate of 
South Africa over Namibia. On 27 October 1966, it adopted Resolution 2145 
162 See ICJ Reports (1962) 9. 
163 ICJ Reports (1962) 9. 
164 See Cornell LQ Vol 52 (1967) 652-3. 
165 Ibid 657-66. 
166 See ICJ Reports (1966) 6. 
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[XXI), revoking the Mandate, and took over the administration of Namibia. 
Through this action the UN conclusively accepted its direct and unique 
responsibility for the territory. In justifying this action the preamble of the 
Resolution recited, inter alia, the deteriorating and explosive situation in 
Namibia; the failure of South Africa to administer the territory in accordance 
with the Mandate, the United Nations Charter, and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights; the application of apartheid and racial discrimination (a cri..TJle 
against humanity) to the territory; the efforts of the UN to bring about changes 
in the administration of the territory; the obligations of the UN to the people of 
Namibia; the jurisdiction of the General Assembly over Namibia; and its right 
to take appropriate action. 
In its operative paragraphs Resolution 2145 [XXI) reaffirmed the applicability 
to Namibia of the United Nations Declaration on Decolonisation 167 as well as the 
right of the Namibian people to self-determination, freedom and independence; 
reaffirmed the international status of Namibia; declared that South Africa had 
not fulfilled its obligations under the Mandate, thereby disavowing it; revoked 
the South African Mandate over Namibia; stated that South Africa had no other 
right to administer the territory; placed Namibia under the direct responsibility 
of the United Nations and resolved that the United Nations must discharge these 
responsibilities with respect to South West Africa; and established an Ad hoc 
committee to recommend practical means by which South West Africa should 
be administered, so as to enable the people of the territory to exercise their right 
of self-determination and to achieve independence and to report back to a 
special session of the Assembly not later than April 1967. 
The Ad Hoc Committee met in 1967 and made three proposals168 which were 
considered by the General Assembly in 1967. Following the recommendations 
of the Committee, the Assembly adopted Resolution 2248 (S-V) on 19 May 1967. 
167 See General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) 1960. 
168 See United Nations Institute for Namibia Namibia: A Direct United Nations 
Responsibility 152. 
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The resolution established a United Nations Council for South West Africa and 
charged it with the following powers: 169 
(1) To administer South West Africa until independence, with the maximum 
possible participation of the people of the territory; 
(2) To promulgate such laws, decrees and administrative regulations as are 
necessary for the administration of the territory until a legislative assembly is 
established following elections conducted on the basis of universal adult 
suffrage; 
(3) To take as an immediate task all the necessary measures, in consultation with 
the people of the territory, for the establishment of a constituent assembly to 
draw up a constitution on the basis of which elections will be held for the 
establishment of a legislative assembly and a responsible government; 
(4) To take all the necessary measures for the maintenance of law and order in the 
territory; 
(5) To transfer all powers to the people of the territory upon the declaration of 
independence. 
The Resolution stipulated that the Council for Namibia would be responsible to 
the General Assembly and that the Council would entrust administrative tasks 
to a Commissioner for South West Africa. The Commissioner would be 
appointed by the General Assembly, but would be responsible to the Council. 
The Resolution requested (a) the Council, which would be based in Namibia, to 
contact South African authorities to lay down procedures for the transfer of the 
territory to the UN and (b) to proceed to the territory at once to ensure, inter 
alia, the withdrawal of South African police and other civil and military 
personnel and to replace them by personnel operating under the authority of the 
Council, with preference being given to indigenous persons. Furthermore, the 
Resolution called on South Africa to comply without delay with Resolution 2145 
169 See General Assembly Resolution 2248 (S-V) 1967. 
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and facilitate the transfer of the territory to the Council and requested the 
Security Council to enable the Council to discharge its functions and asked 
member states for their co-operation. Finally, the General Assembly declared 
that Namibia should become independent in accordance with the wishes of the 
people and that the Council shall do all in its power to enable independence to 
be obtained by June 1968.170 
Since the adoption of Resolution 2145 (XVI) South Africa_'s legal status in 
Namibia changed from that of a mandatory into that of an illegal occupying 
power, like that of Nazi occupiers of Western Europe during World War II. 171 
This Resolution gave the Council powers to administer Namibia in the place of 
South Africa. Thus a mission was dispatched to Namibia to take over the 
administration, but was not allowed to enter the territory by the South African 
authorities. 172 
Meanwhile, South Africa introduced its draconian security laws to Namibia, 
notably, the Terrorism Act of 1967, as a reaction to the increasing opposition 
to its racial policies in Namibia. The detention and prosecution of Namibians 
under this Act provoked the International Community forcing the Security 
Council to adopt a resolution noting the revocation of the Mandate by the 
General Assembly, and calling for the release and repatriation of incarcerated 
Namibians who were being held illegally under South African laws. 173 
South Africa ignored this resolution as it had done with so many others in the 
past174 and proceeded with the trial. Thirty defenders were found guilty and 
received either life imprisonment or long prison terms. 
When the Security Council reconvened in February 1968, it adopted a 
i10 Ibid. 
171 See Namibia: A Direct UN Responsibility 155. 
i12 Ibid. 
173 See Gill South West Africa and the Sacred Trust 75. 
174 See S v Tuhadeleni 1967 (4) SA 511 (TPD). 
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resolution condemning the trial as an illegal act and a flagrant violation of the 
rights of the South West Africans concerned, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the international status of the territory now under direct 
United Nations responsibility. 175 This resolution was significant in that the 
Security Council found that South Africa's conduct in Namibia was illegal. In 
the same year ( 1968) South Africa exacerbated the situation by introducing the 
Bantustan system which was followed by the adoption of the South West Africa 
Affairs Act of 1969 which tied Namibia legislatively, administratively and 
financially closer to South Africa than ever before. 
Consequently, the Security Council adopted Resolution 246 of 20 March 1969 
that specifically recognised that the General Assembly had revoked South 
Africa's Namibian Mandate, that the continued presence of South Africa in 
Namibia was unlawful and urged South Africa to withdraw immediately and 
declared that her actions designed to destroy the national unity and territorial 
integrity of Namibia through the establishment ofBantustans were contrary to 
the provisions of the UN Charter. Furthermore, the resolution declared that if 
South Africa failed to comply, the Security Council would meet immediately to 
determine upon necessary steps or measures in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the Charter. When South Africa failed to comply, the Security 
Council adopted Resolution 269 of August 1969 which declared that the 
continued occupation of Namibia by South Africa constituted an aggressive 
encroachment on the authority of the United Nations, a violation of the 
territorial integrity and a denial of the political sovereignty of the people of 
Namibia, and requested all states to increase their moral and material 
assistance to the people of Namibia in their struggle against foreign occupation. 
Again, the Resolution threatened that in the event of failure of South Africa to 
comply with the Resolution, the Security Council would meet immediately to 
determine upon effective measures. 
175 See Security Council Resolution 246 of 14 March 1968. 
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South Africa responded to this resolution by issuing a "Reply to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations (Security Council Resolution 169 of 1969)" 
explaining why she would not comply with this resolution. Thus the Security 
Council adopted Resolution 276 of 30 January 1970. Paragraph 2 of this 
Resolution declared that all acts taken by South Africa on behalf of or 
concerning Namibia after the termination of the Mandate were illegal and 
invalid, while paragraph 5 called on all states; particularly those which had 
economic and other interests in Namibia, to refrain from any dealings with the 
government of South Africa which were inconsistent with paragraph 2 of this 
Resolution. In addition, paragraph 6 of the Resolution established an Ad Hoc 
Sub-Committee of the Security Council to study ways and means by which the 
relevant resolutions could be effectively implemented and to submit its 
recommendations in three months. 
Upon receipt of the Report of the Sub-Committee, the Security Council adopted 
two resolutions incorporating most of the proposals made in the report. The 
first, Resolution 283 of 1970, in summary, requested states to refrain from 
diplomatic, consular, or other relations with South Africa implying recognition 
of its authority over Namibia; to issue a formal declaration that they did not 
recognise any authority of South Africa over Namibia and that they considered 
Pretoria's continued presence in the territory illegal; to terminate diplomatic 
and consular representation relating to Namibia and withdraw any mission or 
representative from the territory; to end all dealings with respect to Namibia by 
companies under their control; to withhold government loans, credit guarantees 
and other financial support from their nationals if such support would facilitate 
trade or commerce in Namibia; to ensure that companies under their control 
cease all further investments, including concessions, in Namibia; to withhold 
from their nationals protection of investments or concessions in Namibia against 
claims of a future lawful government; to start a review of all bilateral treaties 
between themselves and South Africa insofar as they applied to Namibia; to 
discourage tourism and emigration to Namibia, and so on. Further, the 
Resolution re-established the Sub-Committee to explore further ways and means 
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to implement United Nations Resolutions. The second, Resolution 284 of 1970, 
called on the Security Council to submit to the International Court of Justice a 
request for an Advisory Opinion to determine the legal consequences for states 
of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia, notwithstanding Security 
Council Resolution 276 of 1970. 
On 21June1971 the ICJ handed down its Advisory Opinion with a majority of 
13 to 2 votes, finding that South Africa's presence in Namibia was illegal, and 
that consequently South Africa had a legal duty to withdraw its administration 
forthwith. The Court also found by a smaller 11 to 4 majority that all other 
states including non-members of the United Nations, should recognise the 
aforementioned illegality and had a legal duty to refrain from any action which 
would imply recognition of South Africa's presence in Namibia. 176 
After rejecting South Africa's objections on various matters177 the Court said 
that the object of the opinion was to guide the Security Council on a legal issue 
and help in the forming of its own opinion, and not to rule on ajudicial dispute. 
For this reason the Court rejected South Africa's objections regarding both its 
jurisdiction and judicial property. Then, the Court went on to review the history 
and legal purpose of the Mandate and reaffirmed its 1950 stance that the 
Mandate continued after the dissolution of the League in 1946. It went on to 
state that the United Nations had succeeded the League with regard to the 
supervision of Mandates on the basis of Article 80(1) of the Charter, the final 
session of the League, and its own earlier Advisory Opinions. 178 Further, and 
perhaps most significantly, the Court stated that there could be no doubt that 
the ultimate objective of the Mandate system had been to provide for the 
independence of the peoples concerned. 179 
In October 1971 the Security Council, acting on the recommendations made by 
176 See the Namibia Opinion (1971) 58. 
177 See the Namibia Opinion (1971) 23-24. 
178 Ibid 22. 
110 Ibid. 
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the re-established Sub-committee, noted with appreciation the Advisory Opinion 
of 1971 and declared its agreement with it. In addition, Resolution 301 of 1971 
reaffirmed that Namibia was the direct responsibility of the United Nations and 
that General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) on the decolonisation applied; 
reaffirmed the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia; condemned all 
moves to destroy that unity and integrity, such as the establishment of 
Bantustans; declared that South Africa's continued occupation of Namibia 
constituted an internationally wrongful act and a breach of international 
obligations; called on South Africa to withdraw; and declared that refusal to 
withdraw could create conditions detrimental to the maintenance of peace and 
security in Southern Africa. Furthermore, the Resolution reaffirmed Resolution 
283, reiterating some of its provisions and declared that franchises, rights, titles 
or contracts relating to Namibia granted by South Africa after the adoption of 
General Assembly Resolution 2145 (XXI) were not subject to protection or 
espousal by their states against claims of a future lawful government of 
Namibia. 
5.2.6 The Evolution of the Namibian Settlement Plan 
5.2.6.1 General 
The 1971 Advisory Opinion did not only settle important legal issues but also 
gave impetus to the General Assembly and the Council for Namibia to consider 
ways of strengthening the United Nations' own machinery relating to 
Namibia. 180 In 1972 the General Assembly invited SW APO to participate in an 
observer capacity in discussions on Namibia. 181 The following year (1973) the 
General Assembly recognised SW APO as the authentic representative of the 
Namibian people. 182 
180 See Namibia: A Direct United Nations Responsibility 188. 
181 See General Assembly Resolution 3031 (XXVII) 1972 6 preamble para. 6. 
182 See General Assembly Resolution 3111 (XXVIII) (1973) I, paras 2, 18. 
284 
The increasing repression by South African authorities in their attempt to 
contain the growing demand for Namibian independence forced the Security 
Council to adopt Resolution 366 of 1974183 which laid the foundation for the 
Namibian Settlement plan. This Resolution condemned (a) South Africa's illegal 
occupation of Namibia, (b) the illegal and arbitrary application by South Africa 
of racially discriminatory and repressive laws and practices in Namibia and 
demanded first, that South Africa make a solemn declaration that it will comply 
with the resolutions and decisions of the United Nations and the Advisory 
Opinion of 21 June 1971 in regard to Namibia and that it recognises the 
territorial integrity and unity of Namibia as a nation, such declaration to be 
addressed to the Security Council; secondly, the Resolution demanded that 
South Africa take the necessary steps to effect the withdrawal of its illegal 
administration maintained in Namibia and to transfer power to the people of 
Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations. 184 
Furthermore, the Resolution required South Africa to remove obstacles for the 
transfer of power to the Namibian people by: 
(a) complying fully, in spirit and in practice, with the provisions of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights; 
(b) releasing all Namibian political prisoners, including those imprisoned or detained 
in connection with offences under so-called internal security laws, whether such 
Namibians have been charged or tried or are still held without charge and 
whether held in Namibia or South Africa; 
(c) abolishing the application in Namibia of all racially discriminatory and politically 
repressive laws and practices, particularly Bantustans and homelands; 
(d) according unconditionally to all Namibians currently in exile for political reasons 
full facilities for return to their. country without risk of arrest, detention, 
intimidation or imprisonment. 
Finally, the Security Council decided to remain seized of the matter and to meet 
183 of 1 7 December 197 4. 
184 This demand is based on Resolution 264 and 269 of 1969. 
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again on or before 30 May 1975 to review the situation and consider appropriate 
measures under the UN Charter. 
Meanwhile South Africa invaded Angola forcing the General Assembly to adopt 
a Resolution urging the Security Council to take effective action under its 
Resolution 366 of 197 4 and, in particular, calling for an arms embargo against 
South Africa to compel her to comply with this Resolution and withdraw its 
administration from Namibia. 185 The following year (1976) the General 
Assembly completed its process of recognition of SW APO by designating it as 
the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people and invited it to 
participate as an observer in the work of the General Assembly and of all 
international conferences convened under the auspices of the Assembly. 186 
As the South African invasion of Angola faltered and the Turnhalle 
Constitutional Conference stalled the Security Council met and adopted 
Resolution 385 of 1976. 187 This was a key Security Council Resolution in 
Namibian history which sets out the basic legal framework for the transfer of 
power from South Africa to the Namibian people. The Resolution reaffirmed the 
legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia and condemned (a) the 
continued illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa; (b) the illegal and 
arbitrary application by South Africa of racially discriminatory and repressive 
laws and practices in Namibia; (c) the South African military build-up in 
Namibia and any utilisation of the territory as a base for attacks on 
neighbouring countries; (d) South Africa's failure to comply with the terms of 
Security Council Resolution 355 (1974); and (e) all attempts by South Africa 
calculated to evade the clear demands of the United Nations for the holding of 
free elections under United Nations supervision and control in Namibia. 
Furthermore, the Resolution set out the appropriate procedure for the transfer 
185 See General Assembly Resolution 3399 (XXX) 1975. 
186 See General Assembly Special Resolution 31/146 (1976) para 2; and 31/152 of 1976. 
187 of 30 January 1976. 
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of power in accordance with international law. It declared that the people of 
Namibia must be enabled freely to determine their own future, that it is 
imperative that free elections under the supervision and control of the United 
Nations be held for the whole of Namibia as one political entity, that in 
determining the date, timetable and modalities for the election there shall be 
adequate time, to be decided upon by the Security Council, for the purpose of 
enabling the United Nations to establish the necessary machinery within 
Namibia to supervise and control the elections, as well as to enable the people 
of Namibia to organise politically for the purpose of such electio_ns. To this end 
the Security Council demanded that South Africa urgently make a solemn 
declaration accepting the procedure for holding free elections and recognising 
the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia as a nation. Finally, the Security 
Council reiterated its demand that South Africa remove the obstacles 
enumerated in Resolution 366 of 197 4. 
Whilst resolutions calling for an arms embargo against South Africa were being 
vetoed in the Security Council and Henry Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy failed 
to yield positive results, a negotiating team (known as the Contact Group) was 
formed. 188 The Contact Group consisted of representatives of Canada, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Britain, France and the United States of America. 
This Contact Group, consisting of Security Council members as it were, started 
a new drive for the settlement of the Namibian conflict in April 1977. 189 
The Contact Group consulted the various parties involved in the Namibian 
situation with a view to encouraging agreement on the transfer of authority in 
Namibia to an independent government in accordance with Resolution 385 
(1976), adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 30 January 1976. 
Following these consultations the Contact Group drew up a proposal for the 
settlement of the Namibian question designed to bring about a transition to 
independence during 1978 within a framework acceptable to the people of 
Namibia and thus to the International Community. 
188 See Namibia: A Direct United Nations Responsibility 209-210. 
189 Ibid 212. 
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On 10 April 1978 the Contact Group placed their proposal for a settlement 
before the Security Council. 190 The proposal dealt with, inter alia, (a) the 
electoral process; (b) removal of obstacles to free and fair elections; (c) cessation 
of hostilities, and (d) transitional arrangements. 191 
Following the acceptance of the proposal by South Africa and SW APO the 
Security Council adopted Resolution 431 of 1978192 requesting the Secretary-
General to submit a report with recommendations on the implementation of the 
settlement proposal. By this resolution, the Security Council also requested the 
Secretary-General to appoint a special representative for Namibia to ensure the 
early independence of the territory. 
The Secretary-General appointed Mr. Martii Ahtisaari as the UN Special 
Representative for Namibia and instructed him to lead a survey mission to 
Namibia. The Secretary- General used the mission's findings to prepare a report 
to the Security Council of 29 August 1978. 193 SW APO accepted the report while 
South Africa raised several objections regarding the role of the UN in the 
implementation of the settlement proposal. South Africa's objections 
notwithstanding, the Security Council adopted Resolution 435 of 1978.194 This 
resolution reaffirmed the legal responsibility of the UN over Namibia, and 
approved the report of the Secretary-General for the implementation of the 
proposal for the settlement of the Namibian situation. 
The Security Council reiterated that its objective was the withdrawal of South 
Africa's illegal administration of Namibia and the transfer of power to the people 
of Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations in accordance with 
Resolution 385 of 1976. To that end the Security Council decided to establish 
190 See UN Doc S/2636 (10 April 1978). 
191 For a full-text of the proposal see Namibia: A Direct United Nations Responsibility 
appendix 1. 
192 of 27 July 1978. 
193 See UN Doc S/12827 (29 August 1978). 
194 of 29 September 1978. 
288 
under its authority a United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) to 
assist the UN Special Representative to carry out his mandate to ensure the 
early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the 
supervision and control of the United Nations. The Security Council welcomed 
Swapo's co-operation and readiness to sign and observe a cease-fire and called 
on South Africa to co-operate in the implementation of this resolution. Finally, 
the Security Council declared that all unilateral measures taken by the illegal 
administration in Namibia in relation to the electoral process, including the 
unilateral registration of voters, or transfer of power, were null and void. In 
December 1978, South Africa too, accepted the United Nations plan for the 
independence of Namibia. 
However, there were several obstacles to the implementation of the settlement 
plan. These included the Walvis Bay question and the internal elections 
organised by South Africa. South Africa claimed that Walvis Bay was part of the 
Cape Province and two months after accepting the settlement proposal, South 
Africa began to register voters to elect a constituent assembly as part of its plan 
for an internal settlement outside the framework of the United Nations. With 
regard to Walvis Bay the Security Council adopted Resolution 432 of 1978195 
declaring that the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia must be assured 
through the reintegration of Walvis Bay within its territory and that South 
Africa must not use Walvis Bay in any manner prejudicial to the independence 
of Namibia or the viability of its economy. On the other hand, the proposed 
internal elections challenged the authority of Resolution 435 (1978) which 
provided that all unilateral measures taken by the illegal administration in 
Namibia in relation to the electoral process, including unilateral registration of 
voters, or transfer of power would be null and void. Following the failure of the 
Contact Group to find a compromise solution, the Security Council adopted 
Resolution 439 of 1978 condemning South Africa's decision to hold elections in 
contravention of the UN resolutions and declaring such elections null and void. 
195 of 27 July 1978. 
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Nevertheless, South Africa went ahead with the elections. But thereafter, South 
Africa announced that she was willing to accept the UN plan for the 
independence of Namibia. 
The principal objective of the UN plan for the independence of Namibia was 
embodied in paragraph 2 of Resolution 435 (1978) which stated clearly that the 
principal objective of the UN with regard to Namibia was to secure the 
withdrawal of South Africa's illegal administration and the transfer of power to 
the Namibian people. 
The implementation of the UN plan would involve the following stages: 
( 1) Cease-fire agreement between SW APO and South Africa, followed by a restriction 
of their forces to base. 
(2) Withdrawal from Namibia of all but 1 500 South African troops within twelve 
weeks. The rest would be withdrawn after the certification of the election. 
(3) Demobilisation of the citizen and ethnic forces and the dismantling of their 
command structures. 
(4) Return of Namibian refugees and release of all political prisoners and detainees. 
(5) Free and fair elections for a Constituent Assembly, and 
(6) Formulation and adoption of a constitution for Namibia by the Constituent 
Assembly. 
During the transitional period Namibia would be administered by an 
Administrator-General appointed by South Africa. However, the powers and 
functions of the Administrator would be limited in three major respects. First, 
all his acts with a bearing on the political process would be under UN 
supervision and control, secondly, he would exercise his responsibility to 
maintain law and order under the control and supervision of the UN and thirdly, 
the Special Representative could at any time instruct the UN personnel to 
accompany members of the police force in the discharge of their duties. 196 
196 See Namibia: A Direct United Nations Responsibility 212. 
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On 22 December 1978 South Africa formally communicated to the Secretary-
General its decision to co-operate in the implementation of Resolution 435 
(1978). 197 Following this discussion the UN Special Representative visited South 
Africa and Namibia to begin consultations on the requirements for the 
deployment ofUNTAG. During these consultations the major questions raised 
by both sides related to the impartiality of the UN and the interpretation of the 
clause "restriction to base" which appeared both in the Contact Group 
settlement proposal and in the report of the Secretary-General of August 1978. 
In November 1980, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that 
one of the main obstacles in the negotiating process was the acute distrust and 
lack of confidence among the parties. To overcome this, the Secretary-General 
proposed the holding of a pre-implementation meeting in which all the parties 
concerned in the envisaged election to the Constituent Assembly could be 
included. 198 The pre-implementation meeting was held in Geneva from 7 to 14 
January 1981. The delegates participating in the meeting included the South 
African Administrator-General, Danie Hough, and the President of SW APO, Sam 
Nujoma. Observers included representatives of the Frontline States, the Contact 
Group, OAU and Nigeria. The aim of the meeting was to secure firm agreement 
on a date for a cease-fire to begin implementing Resolution 435 (1978) and to 
achieve Namibia's independence before the end of 1981. The South African 
delegation at the meeting reopened the question of impartiality, claiming that 
the UN had disqualified itself from supervising free and fair elections in Namibia 
because of its recognition of SW APO. 199 For its part SW APO reiterated its 
willingness to sign a cease-fire and agree to a date for implementing Resolution 
435 (1978).200 Thus, the pre-implementation meeting failed to achieve its main 
objective. The failure of this meeting drew a sharp reaction from the General 
Assembly which adopted a strongly worded resolution holding South Africa 
responsible for the failure and calling upon the Security Council to immediately 
197 See UN Doc S/12983, annex 1 (23 December 1978). 
198 See UN Doc S/14266 (24 November 1980). 
199 See notes 182 and 186 irifra. 
200 See UN Doc S/14333 (19 January 1981). 
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impose mandatory sanctions to secure compliance with UN resolutions relating 
to Namibia. 
In April 1981 the Security Council considered the Namibian question but failed 
to take a decision because of the triple veto of France, the United Kingdom and 
the United States of America. At that time, the new Reagan administration in 
the United States of America was formulating its new policy of constructive 
engagement in Southern Africa. With the explicit encouragement of ·the United 
States, South Africa began to link the independence of Namibia with the 
presence of Cuban troops in Angola. The Security Council met again from 21 
to 30 April 1981 to consider the Namibian question. But it failed to take any 
decision due to the western vetoes. 
In May 1981 the Contact Group issued a communique stating that in order to 
strengthen the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia, it was 
necessary to establish an understanding among all the parties about the shape 
of the future independent Namibia.201 Accordingly, the Contact Group 
announced that their governments were preparing proposals for constitutional 
arrangements which could, in their view, enhance the prospects of achieving a 
negotiated settlement. By September 1981 the Contact Group had come under 
the influence of the American policy of constructive engagement which placed 
a high value on South Africa's alliance with the West and sought to diminish, 
at any cost, what it perceived as the growing Soviet influence in Southern 
Africa. The Contact Group, under the conspicuous leadership of the United 
States, announced a new initiative which included a set of constitutional 
principles for the constituent assembly and a timetable to resolve the remaining 
issues. 
The Contact Group proposal comprised three phases. During phase I the parties 
would agree to a set of constitutional principles for the constituent assembly. 
201 See UN Doc S/14474 (6 May 1981). 
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This phase would be completed by 31 December 1981. The second phase would 
be completed by March 1982. This phase would include negotiations on specific 
arrangements for a cease-fire and the status and composition of UNTAG. The 
third phase would commence with a public commitment by all parties to the 
beginning of the implementation of Resolution 435 (1978) and would last until 
independence. It was envisaged that the implementation would start sometime 
in 1982. 
SW APO and the Frontline States rejected the idea that the constituent assembly 
should be bound in advance by rules elaborated in the course of the 
negotiations. They saw this as not only a negation of the sovereign powers to 
be vested in the constituent assembly, but also as inconsistent with the United 
Nations plan for the independence of Namibia and as an attempt to amend 
Resolution 435 of 1978. As some of the ideas were acceptable to SWAPO, and 
the Frontline States, they accepted the constitutional proposals as guidelines. 202 
In July 1982 the Contact Group communicated to the Secretary-General the 
text of the constitutional principles accepted by all the parties to the 
negotiations. The proposals entitled "Principles concerning the Constituent 
Assembly and the Constitution for an independent Namibia "203 consisted of part 
A (Constituent Assembly) and part B (Principles for a constitution for an 
independent Namibia). Part A provided for elections for the election of a 
Constituent Assembly which would adopt a constitution for an independept 
Namibia in accordance with Resolution 435of1978. Such a constitution would 
then determine the organisation and powers of all levels of government. 
Furthermore, part A. l provided for an electoral process based on the following 
principles: 
202 See Namibia: A Direct United Nations Responsibility 221. 
203 See"Principles concerning the Constituent Assembly and the Constitution for an 
independent Namibia" in Bureau for Information Namibian Independence and Cuban Troop 
Withdrawal (Pretoria 1989) 45. . 
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(1) Every adult Namibian will be eligible, without discrimination or fear of 
intimidation from any source, to vote, campaign and stand for election to the 
Constituent Assembly. 
(2) Voting will be by secret ballot, with provisions made for those who cannot read 
or write. 
(3) The date for the beginning of the electoral campaign, the date of elections, the 
electoral system, the preparation of voters rolls and other aspects of electoral 
procedures will be promptly decided upon so as to give all political parties and 
interested persons, without regard to their political views, a full and fair 
opportunity to organise and participate in the electoral process. 
(4) Full freedom of speech, assembly, movement and press shall be guaranteed. 
(5) The electoral system will seek to ensure fair representation in the Constituent 
Assembly to different political parties which gain substantial support in the 
election. 
Part A.2 of the proposals required the Constituent Assembly to formulate the 
constitution for an independent Namibia in accordance with the principles in 
part B below and to adopt the constitution as a whole by a two-thirds majority 
of its total membership. 
Part B contained the following principles for a constitution for an independent 
Namibia: 
(1) Namibia will be a unitary, sovereign and democratic state. 
(2) The constitution will be the supreme law of the state. It may be amended only 
by a designated process involving the legislature and/or votes cast in a popular 
referendum. 
(3) The constitution will determine the organisation and powers of all levels of 
government. It will provide for a system of government with three branches: an 
elected executive branch which will be responsible to the legislative branch; a 
legislative branch to be elected by universal and equal suffrage which will be 
responsible for the passage of all laws; and an independent judicial branch which 
will be responsible for the interpretation of the constitution and for ensuring its 
supremacy and the authority of the law. The executive and legislative branches 
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will be constituted by periodic and genuine elections which will be held by secret 
vote. 
(4) The electoral system will be consistent with the principles in A. l above. 
(5) There will be a declaration of fundamental rights, which will include the rights 
to life, personal liberty and freedom of movement; to freedom of conscience; to 
freedom of expression, including freedom of speech and a free press; to freedom 
of assembly and association, including political parties and trade unions; to due 
process and equality before the law; to protection from arbitrary deprivation of 
private property or deprivation of private property without just compensation; 
and to freedom from racial, ethnic, religious or sexual discrimination. The 
declaration of rights will be consistent with the provisions of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. Aggrieved individuals will be entitled to have the 
courts adjudicate and enforce these rights. 
(6) It will be forbidden to create criminal offences with retrospective effect or to 
provide for increased penalties with retrospective effect. 
(7) Provision will be made for the balanced structuring of the public service, the 
police service and the defence services and for equal access by all to recruitment 
of these services. The fair administration of personnel policy in relation to these 
services will be assured by appropriate independent bodies. 
(8) Provision will be made for the establishment of elected councils for local and/or 
regional administration. 
The Contact Group had also proposed an electoral system for electing members 
of the Constituent Assembly. 
They proposed a mixed electoral system, with half the members of the 
Constituent Assembly to be elected by proportional representation on a national 
basis and half on the basis of single-member constituencies. SW APO rejected 
this electoral procedure on the ground that it was not only complicated but also 
designed to have the white vote counted as a bloc via proportional 
representation, while at the same time giving black candidates opposed to 
SW APO a chance to appeal for votes on tribal or ethnic basis. Instead of this 
system, SW APO proposed either proportional representation or single-member 
constituencies, not a combination of the two. As the counter-proposal from 
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SW APO was not acceptable to South Africa, the Contact Group gave up in June 
1982, and suggested that the question of the electoral system be settled in 
accordance with Resolution 435 of 1978. 
Meanwhile the Reagan administration had launched a major diplomatic 
offensive in an attempt to win African support for the linkage of Namibian 
independence and Cuban troop withdrawal. In a joint declaration Angola and 
Cuba listed the following four conditions under which Cuban troops would 
withdraw from Angola:204 
(1) Unilateral withdrawal of South African troops from Angolan territory. 
(2) Strict implementation of Resolution 435 of 1978. 
(3) An end to the acts of aggression against Angola by South Africa, the United 
States and their allies. 
(4) Cessation of South African aid to UNITA and all other counter-revolutionary 
armed bands. 
At a summit meeting in Lusaka on 4 September 1982 the OAU rejected the 
"linkage" proposal as unacceptable and inconsistent with the UN plan for the 
independence of Namibia. In its Tripoli Declaration later in September the OAU 
rejected the attempts to link Namibia's independence to external and irrelevant 
issues.205 
The Security Council met again in May 1983 to consider the question of 
Namibia. The Secretary-General submitted a report to the Council in which he 
confirmed that substantial progress had been made on nearly all aspects 
concerning the implementation of the UN plan but also pointed out that, during 
the same period, the "linkage" proposal had created an impasse in the 
negotiations. The Secretary-General stated that this issue had not been 
envisaged in previous stages of the negotiations as it was clearly outside the 
scope of Resolution 435 of 1978. In conclusion the Secretary-General's report 
204 See IDAF Briefing paper (November 1982) no 6. 
20s Ibid. 
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stated that, as far as the UN was concerned, the only outstanding issues were 
the choice of the electoral system and the settlement of some final problems 
relating to the status and composition of UNTAG. 
On 31 May 1983, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 532 
calling upon South Africa to make a firm commitment as to its readiness to 
comply with Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978, and requesting the 
Secretary-General to undertake consultations with the parties to the proposed 
cease-fire with a view to securing the speedy implementation of the UN plan. 
The Secretary-General's consultations and visit to South Africa resulted in the 
settlement of all major outstanding issues relating to UNTAG. In his report to 
the Security Council the Secretary-General stated that the choice of the electoral 
system was still the only outstanding issue. However, he also reported that the 
"linkage" proposal still constituted an obstacle to the implementation of 
Resolution 435 of 1978.206 
Finally, the Security Council rejected the notion of "linkage" and called for the 
immediate implementation of Resolution 435 of 1978.207 In Resolution 539 of 
1983208 the Security Council rejected the linkage of Namibian independence to 
the Cuban troop withdrawal and warned that if South Africa continued 
obstructing the negotiating process, the Security Council would meet to 
consider appropriate measures under the Charter of the United Nations. South 
Africa rejected this Resolution declaring that it was determined to act against 
terrorists even if this brought it into conflict with the whole world, and further 
stated that South Africa would not succt.µnb to the Security Council threat. 
In December 1983, the Secretary-General of the UN informed the S~curity 
Council that South Africa was still not prepared to comply with Resolution 539 
of 1983 and therefore the negotiations had once again stalled. Thus the 
206 See UN Doc S/15943 (29 August 1983). 
207 See UN Doc S/16106 (31 October 1983). 
208 See UN Doc S/16237 (29 December 1983). 
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rejection of the linkage proposal by the International Community failed to 
persuade South Africa to abandon its stance. Following a major armed attack 
on SW APO bases in Southern Angola, the government of Angola approached the 
Security Council on 14 December 1983 requesting that an urgent meeting of the 
Security Council be convened to deal with the situation in Southern Angola. 
The Security Council met between 16 and 20 December 1983 to consider the 
situation in Southern Angola. At the end of these meetings the Security Council 
adopted Resolution 545 of 1983 which strongly condemned South Africa's 
military occupation of Angola, describing it as a flagrant violation of 
international law. 
South Africa ignored this Resolution and continued its military offensive against 
Angola until early 1984. In response the Security Council adopted Resolution 
546 of 1984 which strongly condemned South Africa for its occupation of the 
Angolan territory and for using the international territory of Namibia as a 
springboard for perpetrating armed attacks against Angola. On 31 January 
1984 South Africa announced that it would immediately begin the withdrawal 
of its forces from Angola. Following this announcement South Africa and 
Angola met in Lusaka on 16 February 1984. At those meetings, attended by 
a mediator in the person of US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs 
Chester Crocker, the two countries signed the Lusaka Agreement relating to 
practical measures to supervise the withdrawal of South African troops. Under 
this agreement a joint monitoring commission was established to supervise the 
disengagement process, and South Africa agreed to implement Resolution 435 
of 1978. 
Under the Lusaka Agreement South Africa was obliged to complete the 
withdrawal of her troops from Angola by 31 March 1984. Despite its public 
pronouncements to the contrary South Africa did not honour this agreement. 
Throughout 1984 South Africa and the United States continued to insist on the 
withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a pre-condition to the 
implementation of Resolution 435 of 1978. 
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Rejecting the linkage proposal of Angola in his letter of 26 November 1984 
addressed to the Secretary-General of the UN, President dos Santos outlined the 
steps taken by his government to secure the full implementation of Resolution 
435 of 1978. 
Furthermore, President dos Santos reiterated his government's rejection of the 
linkage proposal stating that Angola and Cuba, in the exercise of their 
Sovereignty, would begin withdrawing Cuban troops as soon as South Africa 
withdraws from Angola, ceases its acts of aggression against Angola, stops 
providing logistical support forUNITA bands and lastly implements Resolution 
435 of 1978 leading to the independence of Namibia. South Africa rejected 
these proposals demanding instead that all Cuban troops should be withdrawn 
from Angola within 12 weeks of the start of implementation of Resolution 435 
of 1978. 
Meanwhile, South Africa proceeded with its internal settlement plans which 
resulted in the installation of an interim government of national unity in 
Namibia which the Security Council declared null and void on 3 May 1985.209 
On 19 June 1985 the Security Council adopted Resolution 566of1985 which 
commended SW APO for its preparedness to co-operate fully with the United 
Nationals Secretary-General and his special representative, including its 
expressed readiness to sign and observe a cease-fire agreement with South 
Africa.21° Furthermore and perhaps more significantly, the Security Council 
recalled Resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and 2145 (XXI) of 27 
October 1966 as well as other related resolutions.211 Last but not least, the 
Security Council Resolution recalled the statement of the President of the 
Security Council of 3 May 1985, on behalf of the Council, which, inter alia, 
declared the establishment of the so-called interim government in Namibia to 
be null and void. 
209 See statement of the President of the Security Council S/l 7151 of 3 May 1985. 
210 See Reports of the Secretary-General S/16237 and S/l 7242. 
211 These resolutions are: 268(1969), 276(1970), 301(1971), 385(1976), 431(1978), 
432(1978), 435(1978), 532(1983) and 539(1983). 
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The Security Council expressed first, its concern at the tension and instability 
created by the hostile policies of the apartheid regime throughout Southern 
Africa and the mounting threat to the Security of the region and its wider 
implications for international peace and security resulting from that regime's 
continued utilisation of Namibia as a springboard for military attacks against 
and destabilisation of African states in the region and secondly, the Security 
Council reaffirmed the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia 
and the primary responsibility of the Security Council for ensuring the 
implementation of its resolutions, in particular resolutions 385 of 1976 and 435 
of 1978 which contained the United Nations Plan for Namibian independence. 
The Security Council noted that 1985 marked the fortieth anniversary of the 
founding of the United Nations as well as the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 
adoption of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and peoples and expressed graye concern that the question of 
Namibia had been with the Organisation since its inception. Thus the Council 
welcomed the then emerging and intensified world-wide campaign of people 
from all spheres of life against South Africa in a concerted effort to bring about 
an end to the illegal occupation of Namibia and of apartheid. Against this 
background, the Security Council condemned South Africa for its continued 
illegal occupation of Namibia in flagrant defiance of resolutions of the General 
Assembly and decisions of the Security Council of the United Nations, and 
reaffirmed the legitimacy of the struggle of the Namibian people against the 
illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa and called upon all states to 
increase their moral and material assistance to them. 
Further and more significantly, the Security Council condemned South Africa 
for its installation of a so-called interim government in Windhoek and declared 
this action constituted a direct affront to it and a clear defiance of its 
resolutions, particularly resolutions 435 of 1978 and 439 of 1978. Then the 
Security Council declared the installation of the interim government to be illegal 
and null and void and stated that neither the UN nor its member States or 
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representative or organ would recognise that government. Hence, the Council 
demanded that South Africa immediately rescind her illegal and unilateral 
establishment of a so-called interim government of National Unity in Namibia 
and condemned her obstruction of the implementation of Security Council 
resolution 435 of 1978 by insisting on conditions contrary to the provisions of 
the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia. Furthermore, the 
Security Council rejected South Africa's linkage proposal as incompatible with 
resolution 435 197 8, other decisions of the Security Council and the resolutions 
of the General Assembly on Namibia, including General Assembly Resolution 
1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and declared that the independence of Namibia 
could not be held hostage to the resolution of issues that are alien to Security 
Council Resolution 435 of 1978. 
Finally, the Security Council reiterated that its resolution 435 of 1978, 
embodying the UN plan for the Independence of Namibia was the only 
internationally accepted basis for a peaceful settlement of the Namibian problem 
and demanded its immediate and unconditional implementation, and affirming 
that all outstanding issues relevant to Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978 
had been resolved, except for the choice of the electoral system. Thus the 
Security Council decided to mandate the Secretary-General to resume 
immediate contact with South Africa with a view to obtaining its choice of the 
electoral system to be used for the election, under United Nations supervision 
and control, for the Constituent Assembly, in terms of Resolution 435 of 1978, 
in order to pave the way for the adoption by the Security Council of the 
enabling resolution forthe implementation of the United Nations' Independence 
plan for Namibia. 
Then the Security Council demanded that South Africa co-operate fully with the 
Security Council and the Secretary-General in the implementation of the present 
resolution and strongly warned South Africa that failure to do so would compel 
the Security Council to meet forthwith to consider the adoption of appropriate 
measures under the United Nations Charter, including chapter VII as additional 
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pressure to ensure South Africans compliance with the abovementioned 
resolution~. 
In response to this Resolution (566 of 1985) South Africa advised the Secretary-
General in a letter dated 12 November 1985 that after Consulting the 
"Government of National Unity in Windhoek," it had decided to select "a system 
of proportional representation as a framework for elections" and added the 
explanation that the aforesaid consultation took place, in accordance with 
"South Africa's practice of consulting the leaders of South West Africa on 
matters affecting the future of the territory and has been guided by their 
wishes. "212 Brian O'Linn213 observed quite correctly that South Africa did not 
consult with SW APO, the CDA under the leadership of Mr. Peter Kalangula of 
Ovambo or the Damara Raad under the leadership of Mr. Justus Garoeb, which 
parties were not represented in the so-called Government of National Unity and 
together probably represented the majority of Namibians. Nevertheless, SW APO 
promptly accepted South Africa's decision.214 In a letter dated 26 November 
1985 from the Secretary-General of the UN to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
South Africa, it was confirmed that the issue of the electoral system had been 
settled and that all outstanding issues pertaining to Resolution 435 of 1975 had 
been resolved. In the same letter the Secretary-General also proposed that "we 
now proceed to establish the earliest possible date for a cease-fire and the 
implementation of the Security Council Resolution". 
In a further response to this proposal, South Africa, in a letter dated 3 March 
1986 conveyed to the Secretary-General the following text of a statement in 
Parliament by the South African State President: 
"Just about eight years ago, the United Nations Security Council adopted 
Resolution 435 which was intended to provide a definite programme for the 
212 See Security Council Document S/17627 dated 11 December, 1985. 
213 See Bryan O'Linn What is Resolution 435 of 1978 and why has it not been 
implemented? (1986) 66. 
214 Ibid. 
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independence of South West Africa/Namibia. Those who know the history of 
this matter know that the fact that the territory has not yet attained 
independence cannot be laid at South Africa's door. The last remaining obstacle 
to the implementation of the International Settlement Plan is the continuing 
threat posed to South West Africa/Namibia and to our region by the presence of 
the Cubans in Angola. Despite the progress which has been made in bilateral 
discussions since October 1984, when Angola agreed in principle to the 
withdrawal of the Cubans in conjunction with the implementation of the 
Settlement Plan, the Angolan Government has yet to agree to a satisfactory 
timetable for Cuban withdrawal. The people of South West Africa/Namibia have 
waited long enough for independence. In a serious attempt to facilitate a 
resolution of this difficult problem, I propose that 1 August 1986 be set as the 
date for commencement of implementation of the Settlement Plan based on 
United Nations Security Council resolution 435 (1978), provided a firm and 
satisfactory agreement can be reached before that date on the withdrawal of the 
Cubans." 
In a letter dated 13 March 1986 addressed to the Secretary-General by President 
dos Santos of the Peoples Republic of Angola, the Angolan Government again 
formally rejected the linking of Cuban withdrawal from Angola with 
implementation of Resolution 435 of 1978. At the same time, however, the 
Angolan Government offered its co-operation in the negotiation process aimed 
at implementing Resolution 435of1978 and creating a climate for lasting peace 
in Southern Africa. It reiterated its conditions for a gradual withdrawal of 
Cuban troops from Angola and for a global peace agreement for South Western 
Africa (Angola and Namibia) as contained in the text of the document submitted 
in November 1974 to the Secretary-General and enumerated the subsequent 
negotiation between Angola, the USA Government and even with South Africa 
demonstrating the Angolan Government's will to settle. 
On 5 March 1986 the Secretary-General of the United Nations issued an official 
press state~ent indicating its readiness to begin implementation of Resolution 
435 of 1978 on 1August1986, but without preconditions. The 1st of August 
came and passed without progress. 
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Following the study of the reports of the Secretary-General of 31 March 1987 
(S/18767) and 27 October 1987 (S/19234) the Security Council adopted 
Resolution 601 of 1987 which, inter alia, strongly condemned South Africa for 
it's continued illegal occupation of Namibia and its stubborn refusal to comply 
with the resolutions and decisions of the Security Council (in particular 
resolutions 385 of 1976 and 435 of 1978 and affirmed that all outstanding 
issues relevant to the implementation of its resolutions 435 of 1978 had been 
resolved as stated in the abovementioned reports of the Secretary-General. The 
Security Council welcomed the express readiness of SW APO to sign and observe 
a cease-fire agreement with South Africa, (in order to pave the way for the 
implementation of Security Council resolution 435 of 1978); and decided to 
authorise the Secretary-General to proceed to arrange a cease-fire between 
South Africa and SW APO in order to undertake the administrative and other 
practical steps necessary for the emplacement of the United Nations Transition 
Assistance Group. This resolution laid down a firm foundation for the 
implementation of the UN Independence Plan for Namibia. 
5.2.7 
5.2.7.1 
The Implementation of the United Nations Settlement Plan 
for Namibia 
General 
The Security Council resumed its consideration of the Namibian question in 
October 1987. It adopted Resolution 601 of 1987 which recalled and reaffirmed 
its earlier resolution on this question. In particular this resolution reaffirmed 
the legal and direct responsibility of the UN over Namibia, affirmed that all 
outstanding issues relevant to the implementation of its Resolution 435 of 1978 
had been resolved and furthermore, the Security Council welcomed the 
expressed readiness of SW APO to sign and observe a cease-fire agreement with 
South Africa, in order to pave the way for the implementation of its Settlement 
Plan for Namibia. Then the Council authorised the Secretary-General to 
proceed to arrange a cease-fire between South Africa and SW APO in order to 
undertake the administrative and other practical steps necessary for the 
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emplacement of the UN Transition Assistance Group. Finally the Security 
Council urged States Members of the UN to render all the necessary practical 
assistance to the Secretary-General in the implementation of Resolution 
601(1987) and requested him to report on the progress. 
In November 1987 the President of SW APO assured the Secretary-General of his 
fullest co-operation in respect of the Mandate entrusted to him by Resolution 
601 of 1987. The President of SWAPO, Mr. Sam Nujoma, reiterated the 
readiness of his organisation to proceed immediately to sign and observe a 
cease-fire agreement with South Africa in accordance with the Namibian 
Settlement Plan. 
On 18 February 1988 the Secretary-General of the UN and the President of 
Angola, Mr. Jose Eduardo dos Santos, met in Luanda to review developments 
in Angola and Namibia. At this meeting President Dos Santos expressed 
support for the efforts of the Secretary-General to facilitate a peaceful settlement 
and committed his Government to support the action of the UN to bring about 
peace in the South Western region. Also, President Dos Santos informed the 
Secretary-General that Angola was prepared to take new practical steps towards 
the initiation of peace talks with the Government of South Africa. 
A further meeting between the Secretary-General of the UN and the President 
of SWAPO took place on 18 February 1988. At this meeting the President of 
SWAPO informed the UN Secretary-General that, while all constructive efforts 
to break the impasse were welcome, no solution to the Namibian problem was 
acceptable outside the framework of Resolution 435 of 1978. In subsequent 
discussions the South African permanent representative to the UN informed the 
Secretary-General of the UN that prior to the implementation of the Namibian 
settlement plan (embodied in Resolution 435 of 1978) all Cuban: troops had to 
be withdrawn from Angola. 
The reaffirmation of the linkage between the Namibian Independence Plan and 
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Cuban troop withdrawal was discussed at tripartite meetings of Angola, Cuba 
and South Africa held in London, Cairo, New York and Geneva between 3 May 
and 5 August 1988. The three delegations reached agreement, subject to 
ratification by their respective Governments, on a basic document entitled 
"Principles for a peaceful settlement in South Western Africa." This document 
was approved by the Governments concerned and released publicly by mutual 
agreement on 20 July 1988. 
Hardly a month thereafter the parties to this accord agreed on a sequence of 
steps necessary to prepare the way for the independence of Namibia in 
accordance with Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978 and to achieve peace 
in South-Western Africa. They agreed to recommend to the Secretary-General 
the date of November 1988 for the implementation of Security Council 
Resolution 435 of 1978. Also, the parties approved, subject to ratification by 
their respective Governments, the text of the tripartite agreement concluded in 
New York and published on 20 July 1988. 
On the other hand, Angola and Cuba reiterated their decision to subscribe to a 
bilateral accord which would include a timetable acceptable to all parties for the 
phased and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. The parties 
approved a comprehensive series of practical steps that would enhance mutual 
confidence, reduce the risk of military confrontation and create the conditions 
in the region necessary to conclude the negotiations. The approval of these 
measures gave effect to a de facto cessation of hostilities. These agreements 
were embodied in the Geneva Protocol of 5 August 1988, which was approved 
by the Governments of Angola, Cuba and South Africa. On 8 August 1988, 
these three Governments and the Government of the United States of America 
issued a joint statement on the outcome of their negotiations.215 On the same 
day South Africa confirmed to the Secretary-General of the UN, in terms of the 
provisions of paragraph 5 of the Geneva Protocol, its commitment to adopt the 
215 See S/20109. 
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necessary measures of restraint in order to maintain the existing de facto 
cessation of hostilities. On 12 August 1988, the President of SWAPO also 
informed the Secretary-General of the UN216 that his organisation had agreed to 
comply with the commencement of the cessation of all hostile acts, in 
accordance with the Geneva agreement. He also stated that SW APO would be 
ready to continue to abide by that agreement until the formal cease-fire under 
Resolution 435 of 1978. However, he stated that SWAPO's combat actions 
against the South African forces in Namibia would only hold provided that 
South Africa also showed the necessary political will to do the same. Finally, 
all parties to the talks confirmed their recommendation of the date of 1 
November 1988 for the beginning of the implementation of Security Council 
Resolution 435 of 1978, in accordance with the Geneva Protocol. 
Meanwhile a meeting of the Heads of State of the front-line States held at 
Luanda on 8 August 1988 requested the Secretary-General of the UN to take 
measures aimed at the implementation of the Namibian Settlement Plan. 
Following several consultations with the South African Government the 
Secretary- General dispatched a technical mission to Namibia from 2 to 23 
October 1988. The parties agreed to finalise for signature the draft agreement 
on the status ofUNTAG, in order to establish the legal status ofUNTAG and its 
personnel in Namibia. In his discussions with South Africa the Secretary-
General confirmed to the State President that agreement had been reached on 
the system of proportional representation for the envisaged elections. Also, the 
Secretary-General confirmed that the text of the principles concerning the 
Constituent Assembly and the Constitution of an independent Namibia 217 
constituted an integral part of the UN settlement plan. 
With regard to the question of impartiality raised by South Africa the Secretary-
General gave assurances to all concerned of the complete impartiality of the UN 
216 See S/20129. 
217 See S/15287. 
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in the implementation of the Namibian Independence Plan. The Secretary-
General emphasised that he expected the same from all South African officials 
in the discharge of their responsibilities in Namibia during the transitional 
period. So far as the UN was concerned he stressed that all the parties in 
Namibia would be treated equally on the commencement of implementation of 
the UN Plan. More specifically, he confirmed to the State President that the 
United Nations would place all the political parties of Namibia on an equal 
footing during the transitional period leading to independence. The members 
of the Security Council supported the actions of the Secretary-General and 
urged the parties to co-operate with him in the immediate, full and definitive 
implementation of the UN Plan. 
Following the signing of the Geneva Protocol on 5 August 1988, delegations of 
Angola, Cuba and South Africa, through the mediation of the Government of the 
United States, held five meetings at Brazzaville from 24 August to 
13 December 1988 to continue negotiations towards the implementation of the 
UN Plan. 
On 13 December 1988, the Governments of Angola, Cuba and South Africa 
signed the Brazzaville Protocol by which the parties agreed to recommend to the 
Secretary-General that 1 April 1989 be established as the date for the 
implementation of UN Plan. As agreed in Brazzaville the parties met on 22 
December 1988 in New York at the UN Headquarters for the signing of the 
tripartite agreement prepared in Geneva in August and for signature by Angola 
and Cuba of a bilateral agreement relating to the withdrawal of Cuban troops 
from Angola. 218 Meanwhile the Security Council had adopted Resolution 626 of 
1988219 establishing under its authority the United Nations Angola Verification 
Mission (UNA VEM) to verify implementation of the bilateral agreement. In its 
Resolution 628 of 1989 the Security Council welcomed the signature of the 
tripartite and bilateral agreements and expressed its full support for them. 
218 See S/20345. 
219 of 20 December 1988. 
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Following the signing of these agreements South Africa agreed to recommend 
to the Secretary-General that 1 April 1989 be the date for the implementation 
of the UN Plan. 
On 16 January 1989 the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 629 
of 1989 regarding the levelling of the playfield for free and fair elections. The 
Security Council expressed concern at the increase in the police and 
paramilitary forces and the establishment of the South West Africa territory 
force since 1978, and stressed the need to ensure conditions under which the 
Namibian people will be able to participate in free and fair elections under the 
supervision and control of the United Nations. Also, the Security Council noted 
that these developments needed a re-examination of the requirements for 
UNTAG effectively to fulfil its. mandate which included, inter alia, keeping 
borders under surveillance, preventing infiltration, preventing intimidation and 
ensuring the safe return of refugees and their free participation in the electoral 
process. 
Furthermore, the Security Council emphasised its determination to ensure the 
early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the 
supervision and control of the United Nations, reaffirmed its legal responsibility 
over Namibia and then decided that 1 April 1989 shall be the date on which 
implementation of the UN Plan would begin. To that end the Security Council 
requested the Secretary-General to proceed to arrange a formal cease-fire 
between SW APO and South Africa and called upon the latter to reduce 
immediately and substantially the existing police forces in Namibia with a view 
to achieving a reasonable balance between these forces and UNTAG so as to 
ensure effective monitoring by the latter. 
5.2.7.2 The Role of the Administrator-General 
The settlement proposal vested the responsibility for the administration of 
Namibia during the transition in the Administrator-General as the 
309 
representative of South Africa in the territory. The Administrator-General was 
required to work closely with the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-
General in order to ensure the orderly transition to independence. In general, 
the tasks of the Administrator-General related to administration and removal 
of obstacles for the implementation of the UN plan. 
These tasks included the following: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
to administer the day-to-day running of the territory during the transitional 
period; 
to prepare regulations in regard to the procedures to be followed during the 
election; 
to repeal all remaining discriminatory or restrictive laws, regulations, or 
administrative measures which might abridge or inhibit the objective of free and 
fair elections; 
to make arrangements for the release, prior to the beginning of the electoral 
campaign, of all alleged Namibian political prisoners or detainees held by the 
South African authorities so that they can participate fully and freely in the 
electoral campaign without risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or 
imprisonment; 
to prepare for the reception of Namibian refugees or Namibians detained or 
otherwise outside the territory who return to Namibia; 
to ensure the good conduct of the police forces, who are primarily responsible for 
maintaining law and order in Namibia during the transition period and take the 
necessary action to ensure their suitability for continued employme.nt during the 
transition period. 
With regard to the administration of Namibia during the transition period it is 
noteworthy that all political office bearers in the territory (both South African 
and Namibian) were required to vacate their positions before the date of 
implementation of the settlement agreement. In other words, the authority of 
the South African Government and its bantustans was scaled down (or reduced) 
to administrative powers which were vested in the Administrator-General. 
However, the position of tribal authorities such as traditional chiefs and 
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headmen remained unaltered and they were not effected by the requirements 
regarding political parties as such. 
5.2.7.3 Levelling the Playing Field 
The Administrator-General and the UN Special Representative were required to 
co-operate in the levelling of the playing field for free and fair elections. In other 
words, they were required to ensure impartial and equal treatment of all parties. 
Thus the following impartiality and equal treatment provisions were agreed to: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
The UN Special Representative had to satisfy himself at each stage of the process 
as to the fairness and appropriateness of all measures affecting the political 
process at all levels of administration before such measures take effect; 
that freedom of speech, assembly, movement and press are guaranteed; 
that all discriminating or restrictive laws, regulations or administrative measures 
which might abridge or inhibit free and fair elections must be respected; 
that the Administrator-General must make arrangements, prior to the start of 
the election campaign, for the release of all- alleged Namibian prisoners or 
detainees. Similarly, all detainees held in SW APO camps be released. 
that all Namibians in exile shall have the right to peaceful return to Namibia in 
order that they may participate freely in the election without risk of arrest, 
detention, intimidation or imprisonment; 
The impartiality and equality of treatment clauses did not only apply to the 
South African government and its Black authorities but also to SW APO, 
especially with regard to its international status as the sole and authentic 
representative of the Namibian people. 
With regard to SW APO the Secretary-General was required 
(a) to initiate a review of all programmes of organs of the UN with respect to 
Namibia to ensure that they were administered on an impartial basis and 
(b) to seek the co-operation of the executive heads of the specialised agencies and 
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other organs and bodies within the UN System to ensure that their activities 
with respect to Namibia were conducted impartially. In particular the status of 
SW APO was de-escalated in that, first, consideration of the question of Namibia 
at the regular general assembly were suspended during the transition period, 
secondly, the UN or any of its agencies would not provide funds for SW APO or 
any other party during the transition period, thirdly, the UN Council for Namibia 
has to refrain from engaging in all public activities once the Security Council 
meets to authorise implementation, fourthly, the Commissioner for Namibia and 
his office would suspend all political activities during the transition period and 
fifthly, SW APO would voluntarily forego the exercise of the special privilege 
granted to it by the general assembly (viz, that of the sole and authentic 
representative of the people of Namibia) including participation as an official 
observer in the General Assembly and in other bodies within the United Nations 
System. 
5.2.7.4 Requirements of Free and Fair Elections 
As said above, the electoral campaign was scheduled to start on 1 July 1989. 
Prior to the commencement of this campaign certain measures were to be taken 
in order to meet the objective of free and fair elections. These measures 
included:-
• 
• 
the repeal of all remaining discriminatory or restrictive laws, regulations or 
administrative measures, 
the release of all alleged Namibian political prisoners or detainees; 
Other measures which were to be taken within six weeks of the Commencement 
of the UN plan to meet the objective of free and fair elections included:-
• arrangements for the peaceful return of all Namibian refugees or Namibians 
detained or otherwise outside the territory without the risk of arrest, detention, 
intimidation or imprisonment and for the attestation of the voluntary nature of 
the decision of those Namibians who decide not to return to the territory. 
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5.2.8 The Role of the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group 
The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General was assisted in the 
discharge of his functions by the United Nations Transition Assistance Group 
(UNTAG) which consisted of a military and a civilian component. The tasks of 
each of the components are summarised below. 
5.2.8.1 The Military Component 
The tasks of the Military Component ofUNTAG derived from paragraph 8 of the 
settlement proposal and were set out in more detail in the annex to this 
proposal. 220 These tasks were further elaborated in the UN Secretary-General's 
report of 1978. 221 These tasks can be summarised as follows: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
to monitor the cessation of hostile acts by all parties; 
to monitor the restriction of South African Defence Force (SADF) troops to base 
and their subsequent reduction to the agreed strength of 1 500 men, who would 
be restricted to certain agreed locations; 
to monitor such SADF military personnel as continue to perform civilian 
functions during the transitional period; 
to monitor the dismantling of the command structures of citizen forces, 
commando units and ethnic forces (including the South West Territory Force 
(SW AFT), the withdrawal of all SADF personnel attached to those forces, and the 
confinement of all the arms and ammunition of such forces to agreed locations; 
to monitor the restriction of SW APO troops to base in Angola and Zambia; 
to keep the borders under surveillance and prevent infiltration; and 
to ensure that all military installations along the Northern borders were 
deactivated or placed under United Nations supervision and to provide security 
for vital installations in the Northern border area. 
220 See S/12636. 
221 See S/12827. 
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In addition, the task of the military component was to assist and support the 
civilian component of UNTAG in the discharge of their tasks. 
5.2.8.2 The Role of the Civilian Component 
The Civilian Component of UNTAG consisted of two elements, viz, a civilian 
police and an administrative element. The concept of civilian police derived 
from paragraph 9 of the settlement proposal222 which provided that: 
"primary responsibility for maintaining law and order in Namibia during the 
transition period shall rest with the existing police forces. The Administrator-
General to the satisfaction of the United Nations Special Representative, shall 
ensure the good conduct of the police forces and shall take the necessary action 
to ensure their suitability for continued employment during the transition 
period. The Special Representative shall make necessary arrangements when 
appropriate for United Nations personnel to accompany the police forces in the 
discharge of their duties. The police forces would be limited to the carrying of 
small arms in the normal performance of their duties." 
Paragraph 10 of the settlement proposal also provided that the 
"Special Representative will take steps to guarantee against the possibility of 
intimidation or interference with the electoral process from whatever quarter." 
The specific tasks of the civilian police monitors were described in paragraph 
29 and 30 of the Secretary-General's report of 29 August 1978. 223 These tasks 
can be summarised as follows:-
• To satisfy himself that the Administrator-General ensured the good conduct of 
the police force; 
222 See S/12636. 
223 See S/12869. 
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* 
* 
To satisfy himself that the Administrator-General takes the necessary action to 
ensure the suitability of the police for continued employment during the 
transition period; 
To make arrangements when appropriate for United Nations personnel to 
accompany the police forces in the discharge of their duties. 
The administrative element of the Civilian Component of UNTAG was 
particularly important to the electoral process. It has the task of assisting the 
Special Representative of the UN in regard to the following: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Supervision of all aspects of the electoral process, considering the fairness and 
appropriateness of the electoral procedures, monitoring the balloting and 
counting of votes and investigating complaints in this connection; 
Advising as to the repeal of discriminatory laws and measures which may inhibit 
free and fair elections; 
Ensuring the absence of and investigating complaints relating to intimidation or 
restrictions on freedom of speech, movement or political assembly which may 
impede the objective of free and fair elections; 
Assisting in arrangements for the release of alleged Namibian political prisoners 
or detainees and for the peaceful and voluntary return of Namibian refugees or 
Namibians detained or otherwise outside the territory. 
Assisting in arrangements proposed to and implemented by the Administrator-
General to inform and instruct the electorate as to the significance of the election 
and the procedures for voting. 
These transitional arrangements brought about the successful implementation 
of UN Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978, leading to the elections, the 
drafting of a constitution and finally to the independence of Namibia on 21 
March 1990. 
However, Namibian independence was not achieved without a hitch. First, even 
before implementation there was a dispute about the size of UNTAG. The 
Western powers demanded a cut in the size of UNTAG from 7 500 to 4 650, 
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fuelling anxieties especially among African States about the capacity ofUNTAG 
to restrain the activities of South African controlled police.224 Secondly, the first 
day of implementation did not produce a cease-fire, but rather a bloody fire-fight 
between returning SW APO guerrillas and para-military police; and thirdly, 
throughout the elections there were allegations of violence and intimidation on 
the part of Koevoet, a counter-insurgency unit incorporated into the police. 225 
There are several factors which made these hitches understandable as the 
elections were run by South Africa (through its Administrator-General) which 
a few months previously had been actively at war with SW APO, the largest 
party contesting them. 226 The restoration of direct colonial rule through the 
South African appointed Administrator-General illustrated the complexity of the 
situation in Namibia. 
However, the independence of Namibia on 21March1990, a few days ahead of 
schedule was a remarkable example of international co-operation in conflict 
resolution between formerly deeply hostile forces, and the capacity of the UN 
to play an effective role in organising, supervising and controlling an election 
process. 
This election took place in November 1989. Ninety seven (97) percent of the 
electorate cast their votes for the 72-seat Constituent Assembly. SW APO won 
41 seats while the DTA won 21 seats. Thus SWAPO failed to achieve the two-
thirds majority required under Resolution 435 of 1978 to adopt the 
independence Constitution. The UN Special Representative, Martii Ahtisaari 
pronounced the election as free and fair. 227 
On 16 February 1990 the Constituent Assembly adopted a Constitution by 
224 See Security Council Resolutions 628, 629, and 632 of 1989. 
225 See Hatchard and Slinn Namibia: The Constitutional Path to Freedom 142. 
226 These incidents are documented in The Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group 
on Namibia Commonwealth Secretariat, 1989. 
227 See Hatchard and Slinn 143-144. 
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consensus. Then Sam Nujoma, President of SW APO was elected unanimously 
as the first President of Namibia. On 21 March 1990, Mr. Nujoma was sworn 
in by the UN Secretary-General, Peres de Cuellar, as a symbol of the role of the 
UN in the independence process. 228 
5.2.9 The Drafting Process 
The Constituent Assembly met for the first time on 21 November, 1989 in the 
Tintenpalast and adopted a Constitution on 21 March 1990. The actual drafting 
was done in a multi-party standing Committee assisted by three South African 
legal experts229 and by the Commonwealth Secretariat. 230 
At the first sitting of the Constituent Assembly SW APO proposed that the 
independence constitution should be based on the 1982 Constitutional 
principles. 231 This proposal was unanimously adopted. During subsequent 
investigations the status of these principles was enhanced to such an extent 
that they were invoked in the formulation of each provision of the 
Constitution. 232 
Some additional factors that enhanced the status of and respect for the 1982 
Constitutional principles were the conditions and atmosphere under which the 
deliberations of the Constituent Assembly took place. These factors include: the 
international media coverage of the proceedings, the high expectations of the 
Namibian people as well as the supervision of the Special Representative of the 
UN. Supervision and control over observation of the principles was an integral 
part of the task of the UN Special Representative. More specifically, the 
228 Ibid. 
229 They were Arthur Chaskalson, SC, of the Legal Resources Centre, Professor Gerhard 
Erasmus (University of Stellenbosch) and Professor Marinus Wiechers (University of South 
Africa). 
230 See Hatchard and Slinn 144. 
231 See Gerhard Erasmus "The Namibian Constitution and the application of International 
Law" SAYIL vol. 15 (1989/90) 92. 
232 See Gerhard Erasmus "Die grondwet van Namibie, Internasionale Proses en Inhoud" 
1990 3 Stellenbosch Law Review 12. 
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principles were to be applied as part of the settlement of the Namibian Situation 
in accordance with Security Council Resolution 435. 233 The principles were to 
be applied as part of the Resolution 435 machinery which stated that the task 
of the Special Representative was 
" ... to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections 
under the supervision and control of the United Nations." 
It followed from this that the Special Representative was entitled to monitor the 
whole electoral process including the implementation of the 1982 Constitutional 
principles. Thus Erasmus correctly observed that (a) control over compliance 
with the 1982 principles was part of the UN responsibility (through its Special 
Representative) over Namibia and (b) that this interpretation was in line with 
the UN's own attitude since 1966 that the final authority and responsibility for 
the Namibian independence rested with it. Consequently, the UN wrote the 
rules for Namibian independence and assumed the responsibility to ensure 
compliance with them. 234 
The Standing Committee agreed to use the SW APO draft Constitution as a 
working document. However, as SW APO had failed to achieve the required two-
thirds majority required for adopting the Constitution it needed and sought the 
co-operation of other parties for the adoption of each and every clause with or 
without modifications or amendments. 235 
The 1982 principles attached important significance to the protection of human 
rights. It required the incorporation of a justifiable bill of rights in the 
Independence Constitution. Furthermore, and perhaps more significantly, it 
required the bill to conform, at least in broad terms, with the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and related documents. Thus they also 
233 Ibid 13. 
234 Ibid. 
235 See Hatchard and Slinn 145. 
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spelled out a list of fundamental rights such as the right to life, personal liberty 
and freedom of movement; freedom of conscience, freedom of expression 
including the freedom of assembly and association including the right to form 
political parties and trade unions, due process of law and equality before the 
law, protection of private property against arbitrary expropriation or 
expropriation without adequate compensation and a prohibition against 
discrimination based on race, ethnicity, religion or sex. They also prohibited 
retrospective penal legislation. 
It is quite evident that the 1982 principles envisaged a Constitutional State 
based on far more than the Diceyan concept of the rule of law. Hence, the 
emphasis falls on classical, civil and political rights. There is no mention of 
social and economic rights. It was stated that the Constitution should provide 
for a balanced re-structuring of the public service, the police and for equal 
competition by all in the employment by these sectors. Provision is made for 
the supervision of the human resources, policies and practices of these sectors. 
These provisions were designed to address the imbalances of the past rather 
than protect social and economic rights. 
Within these guidelines vigorous debate took place within the Standing 
Committee on such key issues as the powers and mode of election of the chief 
executive, whether the legislature should be unicameral or bicameral, provision 
for detention without trial and the timing of regional elections. In general 
terms, SW APO favoured a strong executive presidency and a single chamber 
legislature elected on a Constituency basis, while other parties were anxious to 
limit the powers of the executive and favoured a National Assembly elected on 
the basis of proportional representation and a regionally-based second chamber 
with strong powers of legislative review.236 However, the failure of SWAPO or 
any other party to win a two-thirds majority led to compromises which appear 
below in the analysis of the Namibian Constitution. 
236 See SW APO Election Manifesto, The Namibian, 22 January 1990, Times of Namibia, 
26 January, 1990. 
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There are some significant distinctive features between the Namibian and 
Zimbabwean Constitution drafting processes. First, the Namibian Constitution 
is said to fairly represent at least the wishes and aspirations of the elected 
representatives of the people of Namibia and should therefore enjoy, subject to 
limitations imposed by the 1982 principles, an autochthonous legitimacy denied 
to the Zimbabwean Independence Constitution. In the case of Zimbabwe the 
drafting process remained in the hands of Britain, the departing colonial power, 
and the working document used was generated by the illegitimate and illegal 
Muzorewa/Smith regime, rather than by democratically elected representatives 
of the majority. The Zimbabwe/Rhodesia Constitution which served as the 
working document was designed to concede majority rule with the maximum 
degree of minority control. This would be tantamount to conducting the 
deliberations in the Tintenpalast in Windhoek on the basis of the draft 
Constitution prepared under the auspices of the National Assembly of South 
West Africa/Namibia in 1987. 
The inherently undemocratic nature of the Zimbabwean drafting process led the 
first freely-elected government to perceive the Lancaster-House (or 
independence) Constitution as interim, imposed arrangements with 
fundamentally objectionable features to be removed at the earliest opportunity. 
Thus, for the first ten years of Zimbabwean independence, a series of changes 
have been made directed towards the still incomplete process of the 
achievement of an autochthonous Constitution involving, inter alia, the creation 
of an executive presidency, the removal of reserved seats for the white minority 
and the abolition of the Senate. The objectionable character of some aspects of 
the Zimbabwean independence Constitution also led to confrontation between 
the Government and a judiciary which was determined to uphold the 
Supremacy of the Constitution. 
One main distinctive shortcoming in both the Zimbabwean and Namibian 
drafting processes was the participation of civil society. For instance, during 
the Tintenpalast deliberations, the press observed that Namibians were aware 
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of the lessons to be learned from the Zimbabwean experience and expressed the 
hope that their manner of drafting and adoption of the Constitution would 
produce a truly consensual framework for the evolution of democratic political 
structures and the economic and social consolidation of free society. However, 
in the Namibian drafting process civil society was conspicuous by its absence. 
No wonder that the National Union of Namibian Workers, the country's trade 
Union Federation, concerned about the protection of workers' rights, called for 
the promotion of public debate on the draft Constitution. 237 
The failure (or neglect) to involve civil society in the drafting process led to 
accusations that the Standing Committee of the Namibian Constituent 
Assembly was not accessible to the people at large and that there was no 
genuine attempt on the part of the Constituent Assembly to involve the public 
in the finalisation of the Constitution. 238 
5.2.10 Main Features of the Constitution 
5.2.10.1 General 
It is not proposed to make a critical analysis of all provisions of the Namibian 
Constitution. The focus falls on the main features of the Constitution with a 
view to identifying the key principles on which the Constitution is built. In 
particular, it is proposed to determine the extent to which the contemporary 
doctrines of democracy, rule of law and international human rights and, in 
particular, the 1982 Constitutional principles found expression in the 
Constitution. The analysis of the Constitution will be based on themes rather 
than sections. These themes will include; the form of state, national territory, 
language, citizenship, human rights, state of emergency and national defence, 
organs of state, principles of state policy, amendment of the Constitution, 
transitional provisions and the incorporation of international law. Each of these 
themes is dealt with separately below. 
237 See Hatchard and Slinn 146. 
238 See The Namibian, 11 and 19 January, 1990. 
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5.2.10.2 The Form and Character of State 
The underlying values of the Namibian Constitution derive directly from the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights239 and the African Charter on Human 
and People's Rights related international human rights instruments. For 
instance, the preamble of Namibian Constitution,240 like that of the Universal 
Declaration, begins by acknowledging that the recognition of the inherent 
dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family 
is the foundation (or prerequisite) for freedom, justice and peace. Both 
documents derive these rights from the worth and dignity of the human 
personality.241 This emerges more clearly in Article 7 of the Universal 
Declaration which states that: "All human beings are born free and equal in 
dignity and rights. They are endowed of with reason and conscience and should 
act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood." 
Two other regional human-rights instruments that derive human rights from 
the worth and dignity of the human personality are the American Convention 
on Human Rights242 and the African Charter on Human and People's Rights. 243 
These Regional Instruments, like the Universal Declaration and the Namibian 
Constitution not only derive human rights from the worth and dignity of the 
human personality but also recognises and acknowledges their universal 
239 See Centre for the Study of Human Rights Twenty-Four Human Rights Documents 
Columbia University 1992 6. 
240 For a text see SAYIL vol.15 (1989/90) 301 ff. 
241 Ibid.. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights states this 
in the followib.g definite and emphatic terms: 
" ... recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world. And .... that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person." 
See para. I and 2 of the preamble. 
242 Paragraph 2 reads that " ... the essential rights of man are not derived from one being a 
national of a certain state, but are based upon the attributes of the human personality, and that 
they therefore justify international protection in the form of a convention reinforcing or 
complementing the protection provided by the domestic law of the American states." 
243 Paragraph 6 of the Preamble reads:" ... that fundamental human rights stern from the 
attributes of the human beings, which justifies their national and international protection ... " 
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character. On the contrary the European Convention on Human Rights tends 
to regard human rights as a European (or Western) heritage.244 More 
specifically, the rights that the Namibian Constitution (and the human-rights 
instruments mentioned above) derive from the worth and dignity of the human 
personality include:- the right to life, the right to liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness. 245 The Namibian Constitution extends these rights to all persons 
without discrimination based on race, colour, ethnic origin, sex, religion, creed 
or social or economic status.246 
This provision is quite clearly informed by Article 2 of the Universal Declaration 
which human rights universal, but also their respect obligatory. This Article 
reads:247 "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the 
political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to 
which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or 
under any other limitation of sovereignty." The American Convention on 
Human Rights248 and the African Charter on Human and People's Rights249 
244 This appears in the sixth paragraph of the preamble which urges: 
"The governments of European Countries which are like-minded and have a common 
heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law, to take the first steps 
for the collective enforcement of certain rights stated in the Universal Declaration." 
245 Cf the preamble of the American Declaration of Independence. 
246 See paragraph 2 of the preamble. 
247 See article 2 of the Universal Declaration. 
248 Article 7(1) reads: 
"The State Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms 
recognised herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and 
full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination by reason of race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, 
fortune, birth or other status." 
249 Article 2 reads: 
"Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms 
recognised and guaranteed in the present charter without distinction of any kind such 
as race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, 
national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status." 
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contain similar provisions. The former emphasises the universality of the 
obligation to respect human rights by defining "person" as every human being 
rather than citizen. 250 
Paragraph 3 of the Preamble links these universally recognised rights with the 
principles of democracy, the rule of law and human rights. It states that these 
rights are most effectively maintained and protected in a democratic society, 
where the government is responsible to freely elected representatives of the 
people, operating under a sovereign constitution and a free and independent 
judiciary. In other words, the preamble of the Namibian Constitution envisages 
a constitutional state. 
Furthermore, the preamble of the Namibian Constitution, like the African 
Charter on Human and People's Rights251 links the rule of law and the struggle 
for the right of self-determination and independence. Thus the preamble 
attributes the achievement of human rights by the people of Namibia to their 
victory over colonialism, racism and apartheid and expresses their commitment 
to constitutionalise these rights. No wonder that the people of Namibia 
committed themselves to promote the principles of self-determination, national 
unity and territorial integrity252 embodied in the Declaration on the granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. In their efforts to rid their 
country of the racism, racial segregation and divided loyalties created by 
apartheid the people of Namibia committed themselves to strive for national 
250 Article I (2) of the American Convention reads: 
"For the purposes of this Convention, 'person' means every human being." 
251 See the last but two paragraphs of the preamble. 
252 In line with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples, Article I (4) of the Constitution asserts the territorial integrity of Namibia in the 
following terms: 
" The National territory of Namibia shall consist of the whole of the territory recognised 
by the international community through the organs of the United Nations as Namibia 
including the enclave, harbour and port of Walvis Bay, as well as the off-shore islands 
of Namibia, and its Southern Boundary shall extend to the middle of the Orange River." 
See in general Erasmus "Die Grondwet van Namibie" 3 1990 Stellenbosch Law Review 289-
290. Walvis Bay and the islands have been incorporated into the National territory under an 
agreement signed by South Africa and Namibia. 
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reconciliation, peace, unity and a common loyalty to a single state. Finally, 
Namibians resolved to constitute the Republic of Namibia as a sovereign, 
secular, democratic and unitary state securing to all its citizens justice, liberty, 
equality and fraternity and then accepted and adopted the constitution as the 
fundamental law of the sovereign and independent Republic of Namibia. 253 
Article 1 of the Constitution incorporates the constitutional state envisaged in 
the preamble in more definite and emphatic terms. It reads: 
"l The Republic of Namibia is hereby established as sovereign, secular, democratic 
and unitary state founded upon the principles of democracy, the rule of law and 
justice for all. 
2. All power shall vest in the people of Namibia who shall exercise their sovereignty 
through the democratic institutions of the state. 
3. The main organs of the state shall be the Executive, the legislature and the 
judiciary. 
4. 
5. 
6. This constitution shall be the supreme law of Namibia." 
The linkage of the doctrines of human rights, democracy and the rule of law in 
the Namibian Constitution as the foundation of the Namibian Constitutional 
State and in particular, the inclusion of the rule of law in the preamble of the 
Constitution is:254 
"An acknowledgement of the Status which the doctrine has acquired, 
particularly since World War II, the embodiment of universally accepted 
standards of human rights protection, in consequence of its inclusion in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Constitution thus remains, in 
Kelsens terms, the Namibian Grundnorm, while the principles stated in sub-
article ( 1) point to the ideals in which the Constitution is rooted." .../ 
253 See Erasmus "Die Grondwet van Namibie" 3 1990 Stellenbosch Law Review 290-292. 
254 See Carpenter "The Namibian Constitution- ex Africa Aliquid Novi after all?" 1989/90 
SAYIL29. 
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It is evident from the foregoing analysis of the preamble and Article 1 of the 
Namibian Constitution that Namibia is the first African State to establish a 
constitution based on the modern concept of the rule of law that emerged after 
World War II. In other words, the Namibian Constitution has incorporated the 
fundamental values of modern constitutionalism embodied in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and Regional Human Rights Instruments. 255 
5.2.10.3 Language 
The language question in Namibia is a curious one. Article 3(1) states that the 
sole official language of Namibia shall be English. This, even though it is not the 
spoken language of the majority ofNamibians.256 Provision is however made for 
the use of "any other language" as a medium of instruction in both private and 
state subsidised schools. 257 The passing of legislation by the Parliament 
authorising the use of other languages for legislative, judicial and administrative 
purposes in regions where the language is spoken by a substantial component 
of the population is permitted by Article 3(3).258 
5.2.10.4 Citizenship 
The Namibian Constitution contains detailed provisions for the acquisition and 
loss of citizenship. 259 Provision is made for the acquisition of citizenship by 
birth, whether before or after independence. However, children of diplomats, 
career representatives of other countries, police, military or security unit of 
other countries or illegal immigrants are not allow to acquire citizenship by 
birth. Persons that qualify for citizenship by descent are required to register 
their birth either in Namibia or an embassy, consulate or the like. Persons who 
do not qualify for citizenship by descent or birth may nevertheless acquire it by 
registration if they had been ordinarily resident in Namibia for five years before 
255 See paragraph 7 of the preamble. 
256 The majority of the whites speak either Afrikaans or German, while the black population 
speak a variety of indigenous languages. 
257 See article 3(2). 
258 See Erasmus "Die Grondwet van Namibie" 292. 
259 Ibid 292-294. 
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independence, provided that they applied for citizenship within a year after 
independence and renounced the citizenship of any other country of which they 
were citizens.260 
The five year residence qualification up to and including independence also 
applies to persons enabled to claim citizenship by registration by application 
within twelve months after independence. Thus an expatriate South African 
who had worked in Namibia for the requisite period could claim citizenship 
under this provision provided, however, that he/she renounced his/her existing 
citizenship. The impact of the restrictions on dual citizenship is limited by the 
fact that they apply only where a person voluntarily acquires the citizenship of 
another country or takes up permanent residence abroad after independence. 
Moreover, persons who are citizens by birth or descent are not affected by 
these.261 
The dual citizenship provisions of the Namibian Constitution reflect both the 
need to confer citizenship on persons with a genuine connection with the 
country and also SW APO anxiety about the position of peoples whose loyalty 
might lie elsewhere. 262 The Zimbabwean government too, was so anxious about 
dual citizenship that within three years after independence they amended the 
Constitution to prohibit dual citizenship. 263 
Prospective citizens by marriage are treated differently. Although such persons 
must apply for citizenship like any other person for naturalisation the resident 
requirement in their case is only two years instead of five. It is also particularly 
interesting that this provision do not only apply to married women but all non-
citizens who many citizens. 
260 See Carpenter 31. 
261 See Hatchard and Slinn 151. 
262 Ibid. 
263 See Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (no 3) Act 1983, Citizenship of Zimbabwe 
Act 1984. 
327 
Any person may acquire Namibian citizenship by naturalisation after a period 
of continuous residence of at least five years. Such person may be required to 
meet requirements pertaining to health, morality, security or legality of 
residence. The possibility exists for persons to acquire citizenship on the 
strength of special skill, experience or service rendered to the Namibian nation. 
This power, vested in the legislature, could be used to exclude would be 
immigrants who are indigent, illiterate or untrained in any skilled occupation. 
Such a prohibition could affect black people from neighbouring countries which 
supported Namibia during its struggle for independence. Namibian citizenship 
is lost when a citizen voluntarily renounces his or her citizenship. The 
legislature is also empowered to enact legislation to the effect that Namibian 
citizenship may be lost on acquisition of the citizenship of another country, 
service in the armed forces of another state without the leave of the government 
or permanent residence in another country. However, such legislation may not 
deprive a Namibian by birth or descent of his or her citizenship. In other words, 
a Namibian citizen by birth or descent who acquires the citizenship of another 
country may hold dual citizenship. The Constitution does not provide for 
deprivation of citizenship by reason of conviction of a serious crime. This such 
legislation would be unconstitutional or more specifically in conflict with the 
Declaration of Rights. The acquisition and loss of citizenship provisions in 
Namibia and Zimbabwe further demonstrates the incorporation of non-racialism 
and non- discrimination and their translation into constitutional reality in 
modern African constitutionalism. 
5.2.10.5 Human Rights 
The fundamental human rights and freedoms, their protection and enforcement 
and derogations thereof in exceptional circumstances are contained in articles 
5-25. 264 The Constitution protects mostly first generation rights, second and 
third generation rights appearing as principles of state policy (in Chapter 11), 
thus not being judicially enforceable. 
264 See Erasmus "Die Grondwet van Namibie" 294-299. 
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Article 5 states that the fundamental rights and freedoms contained in the 
Constitution shall be binding on the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. 
Further, all organs and agencies of the government are bound by these, as well 
as private individuals and legal persons. Thus the organs of government in 
whose care the government of Namibia is entrusted are all bound in their 
actions by the constraints laid upon them in the Constitution. 
Article 6 states that the right to life is respected and shall be protected. The 
death sentence is expressly forbidden, this prohibition seemingly being 
extended to such sentences passed down by (military) court marshals. The 
Universal Declaration states in article 3 that everyone has the right to life. The 
broad phrasing of this article leaves it open to judicial interpretation as to 
whether or not it would include the death sentence's prohibition. By contrast, 
the European Convention expressly made provision for the imposition of a 
sentence of death by a court. Further provision is made for the deprivation of 
life in cases of self-defence, lawful arrest or in riot situations. This position was 
changed in 1983 with the adoption of Protocol VI which states in article 1 that 
the death penalty shall be abolished and that no one shall be condemned to 
such penalty or executed. However, according to article 2, a state may make 
provision in its law for the death penalty in respect of acts committed in time 
of war or imminent threat of war, provided that such penalty is applied in 
instances laid down in the law and in accordance with its provisions. 
Personal liberty is protected by article 7, with the only derogations thereof 
allowed being those according to procedures established by law.265 The 
European Convention states that deprivations of one's personal liberty may only 
be done in accordance with procedures prescribed by law, and then only in 
exceptional circumstances. 266 
265 See article 9 of the UDHR. 
266 Inter alia after a conviction by a competent court, for contempt of court, upon 
reasonable suspicion of the person having committed an offence. See article 5(1)(a)-(fl. 
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Respect for human dignity is guaranteed by article 8, including during judicial 
proceedings or other proceedings before any organ of state, and during the 
enforcement of penalties.267 Further, article 8(2) specifically outlaws torture, 
cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment. 268269 
Article 9 proscribes slavery and forced labour. The article goes on to describe 
what shall not be included under forced labour: labour required in consequence 
of a sentence or order of a court; labour required in the interest of hygiene; 
labour required of persons in lawful detention; labour required by members of 
the security force in pursuance of their duties, or of conscientious objectors in 
lieu of military service; labour required during a period of public emergency; 
and labour required as part of communal or other civic obligations. Article 4 of 
the European Declaration also prohibits slavery, servitude and forced labour, 
the latter also being extensively defined. 270 
Article 10 contains an equality clause, 271 stating that all persons are equal 
before the law and may not be discriminated against on grounds of sex, race, 
colour, ethnic origin, religion, creed or social or economic status. 272 Article 23(2) 
contains a proviso to this article empowering the legislature to enact measures 
aimed directly or indirectly at the advancement of persons who have been 
disadvantaged by past discriminatory laws or practices and to correct social, 
economic and educational imbalances and imbalances in the structure of the 
public service, defence force, police force and prison service. Thus policies of 
affirmative action are allowed notwithstanding the provisions of article 10. 273 
267 See article 8(1). 
268 The same is stated almost verbatim in article 5 of the UDHR and article 3 of the 
European Declaration. 
269 See in this regard Ex Parte Attorney General, Namibia: In re Corporal Punishment by 
Organs ojthe State 1991 (3) SA 76 (NMSC), where it was found that corporal punishment is a 
form of cruel and inhuman punishment. See also TCOEIB 1993 (1) SACR 274 (NM). 
270 See article 4(3)(a)-(d). See also article 4 of the UDHR. 
271 In this regard see article 14 of the European Convention which contains materially the 
same provisions. 
272 Carpenter states that this is the closest that the Namibian Constitution gets to 
recognising minority or group rights. The protection is however accorded to individuals and no 
recognition is granted to the groups separate identity. See Carpenter 33. 
273 See article 14 of the European Convention, which does not contain any provisions 
concerning affirmative action. See also article 2 of the UDHR. The latter may conceivably allow 
for policies of affirmative action under article 29(2) which allows for "such limitations as are 
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Arbitrary arrest and detention are proscribed by article 11. 274 It would seem, 
given article 7, that the inclusion of this article would be "an instance of 
legislation ex abud.anti causa".215 However, taking into account the history in 
South Africa of detentions without trial according to procedures established by 
law, it would appear to be necessary to highlight the fact that not only are 
arbitrary arrests and detention proscribed, but that any arrest and detention 
will be subject to the due process provisions contained in the article: these being 
that the person concerned be informed in a language they understand of the 
reason for the action;276 that he or she be brought before a judicial officer within 
a reasonable time and that any further detention must be authorised by judicial 
officer and not an organ of the executive. 
Article 12 guarantees due process before the law. The Constitution statutorily 
enshrines certain basic principles of common law, such as that a person 
accused of an offence is entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, 
impartial and independent court or tribunal established by law, and within a 
reasonable time (failing which the accused shall be released); that every accused 
is presumed innocent until proven guilty; that an accused is entitled to call 
witnesses, to cross-examine state witnesses and to a fair opportunity to prepare 
his or her defence and to be represented by legal council of his or her choice; 
that no-one can be compelled to give testimony against himself or his spouse; 
that no-one should be liable to be tried for an offence of which he has already 
been convicted or acquitted; and that the rule nulla poena sine Lege will be 
observed.277 It is in this article (amongst others) that one clearly sees the 
influence of the European Convention, which in article 6 contains materially the 
same provisions as does the Namibian Constitution in article 12.278 
determined by law ... and of meeting the just requirements ... and the general welfare in a 
democratic society." 
274 See Djama v Government of the Republic of Namibia and others 1993 (1) SA 387 (Nm). 
275 Carpenter 33. . 
276 See article 6(3)(a) of the European Convention. 
277 See sections l O and 11 of the UD for similar provisions. 
278 The European Convention goes further than the Namibian Constitution in regards to the 
protection of due process in that it guarantees the right, upon conviction, to appeal to a higher 
tribunal. See article 2(1) of Protocol VII (1984). 
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Article 13 protects the individual's right to privacy specifically against such 
intrusion by organs or agencies of the state, save as in 
( 1) accordance with the law; 
(2) as is necessary in a democratic society; 
(3) in the interest of national security, 
(4) public safety, or 
(5) the economic well-being of the country,. 
(6) for the protection of health or morals, 
(7) for the prevention of disorder or crime, or 
(8) for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
Criticism can be given against the wide ambit of the derogation clause. 
Carpenter79 shows that the presence of the criterion of necessity in a 
democratic society could, by a court oflaw, be interpreted legalisticly, and gives 
as an example the decision in Government of Bophuthatswana v Segale, 280 
where the Appellate Division was prepared to accept that action was necessary 
in a democratic society if the executive said it was. A literalist approach such 
as this leads to doubts as to the efficiency of the protection afforded individuals 
by a bill of rights. 281 This has however not been the case as the court stated in 
Government of the Republic of Namibia and Another v Cultura 2000 and 
Another282 that the Constitution is not to be given a narrow, mechanistic, rigid 
and artificial interpretation. It should rather be interpreted so as to enable it to 
play a creative and dynamic role in the expression and achievement of the 
ideals and aspirations of the nation. It would thus appear as though the 
derogations afforded in article 13 are of an internationally acceptable standard 
as this article is almost identical in content to that of article 8 of the European 
Convention. 283 
279 Carpenter 36. 
280 1990 1 SA 434 (BA). 
281 See AM Dhlarnini "Growth by Stifling" 1990 THRHR 121, and Carpenter "Constitutional 
Interpretation in Bophututswana - What price a Bill of Rights" 15 SAYIL (1989-90) 169-175. 
282 1994 (1) SA 407 (Nms). 
283 See also article 12 of the UD. It is interesting to note that the African Charter does not 
protect the right to privacy of an individual. 
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The rights of the family are protected in article 14. This article (which 
corresponds verbatim with article 16 of the UD) guarantees that spouses are 
equal in every aspect of marriage. This raises questions as to, for example, the 
position of the husband as head of the family, the domicile of the wife and the 
position of the father as legal guardian of minor children284 in respect to the 
common law will change.285 Further, the article states that spouses shall enter 
into marriage voluntarily. This means that arranged marriages in accordance 
with indigenous legal systems would not be allowed. 
Article 14(3) recognises the family as the natural and the fundamental group of 
society, which is entitled to protection by the state. This provision should 
however not be construed so as to give every such family a claim against the 
state for housing or monetary support. The result of such an interpretation 
would be an intolerable burden on the economic resources of the state. It would 
appear that the article is geared towards the protection of the family as a 
singular unit, with the prevention of its dissolution as its main aim. 
Jaichand286 states with reference to article 16 of the UD that this article would 
include protection for children as they are members of the society of the future 
and therefore need the protection of both laws and society. Article 15 of the 
Namibian Constitution deals specifically with the rights of children. Children 
have the right to a name, nationality, and the right to know and be cared for by 
their parents. Further protection is confined largely to protection against 
economic exploitation and legislation providing for preventative detention 
(presumably except in a place of safety or a reformatory) of children under 
sixteen years of age. These provisions are to be found in the Declaration of the 
Rights of the Child287 under principle 3 (the right to a name and nationality) and 
284 In this regard see article 5(1) of protocol VII (1984) of the European Convention which 
gives spouses equal rights and responsibilities in their relations with their children. 
285 With regard to the husbands position as head of the family and the determination of the 
wife's domicile in accordance with the common law in South Africa, the position has been 
statutorialy changed through article 30 of the Fourth General Amendment Act 132 of 1993. 
286 See Robertson (ed.) Human Rightsjor South Africans (1990) 111. 
287 GA Resolution 1386(XIV) of 20 November, 1959. 
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principle 9 (protection against economic exploitation). The right of a child to 
know its parents would seem to indicate that adopted children will be entitled 
to know the identity of their biological parents. This right would not seem to be 
extended to children born out of incest or rape due to the proviso "subject to 
legislation enacted in the best interests of children". 
Article 16 protects the right of individuals288 to own property. This right is 
subject to the restriction that the state may expropriate property in the public 
interest subject to the payment of just compensation. 289 Although Carpenter 
argues that it would have been preferable to permit expropriation "for public 
purposes" rather than "in the public interest" since the latter term is much 
wider and can be construed to encompass virtually all forms of dispossession; 
it is submitted that the latter seems to be generally accepted as it appears in the 
European Convention290 and in essence in the African Charter. 291 
The freedom to participate in peaceful political activity is protected in article 1 7. 
This includes the right to join and form political parties and to participate in the 
conduct of public affairs, either directly or through freely chosen 
representatives. The Franchise is extended to every citizen over the age of 
eighteen years and the right to stand for public office to every citizen over the 
age of twenty-one years. These rights may only be abrogated, suspended or 
impinged upon by Parliament on grounds of infirmity or "on such grounds of 
public interest or morality as are necessary in a democratic society." It is 
interesting to note that the UD in article 21(3) goes further than article 17 of the 
288 Carpenter states that the concept of communal rather than private ownership of fixed 
property has therefore not found its way into the Namibian Constitution. 
289 See Government of the Republic of Namibia and Another v Cultura 2000 and Another 
1994 (1) SA 407 (Nms). 
290 See article 1 of Protocol 1 (1952) of the European Convention on Human Rights, which 
reads: 
"No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to 
the conditions provided for by law ... ". 
291 See article 14 which reads that property " may only be encroached upon in the interest 
of public need or in the general interest of the community ... ". 
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Namibian Constitution by stating that elections shall be periodic and genuine, 
and shall be held by secret ballot or by equivalent voting procedures. 292 
Article 18 guarantees administrative justice. The basic tenets of the 
Administrative Law (ie that administrative bodies and officials must act fairly 
and reasonably and must comply with the requirements as laid down by law, 
and that persons aggrieved by the exercise of such acts and decisions shall have 
recourse to the .courts) are constitutionally guaranteed. This is explained by the 
fact that in the absence of such guarantees it is possible for the legislature to: 
(1) exclude rules aimed at fair and reasonable administrative action, and (2) to 
exclude the court's jurisdiction to review administrative action. Read in 
conjunction with article 25(4) the aggrieved party could be awarded monetary 
compensation for a transgression of this article, thus making financial 
recompense for unlawful administrative action reasonably easily obtainable. 
Article 19 protects the right of every person to enjoy or practice any culture, 
language, tradition or religion.293 This right is placed subject to the condition 
that such rights do not impinge upon the rights of others or the national 
interest. Thus any tradition or practice in conflict with these provisions are not 
permitted. Article 27(1) of the UD states that everyone has the right to freely 
participate in the cultural life of the community. Staniland294 states that the 
primary meaning of this provision is that any individual has the right to 
cultural freedom regardless of race, gender, religion or any other such 
distinction. Article 19 of the Namibian Constitution seems to be in accordance 
with this. 
Article 20 states that all persons have the right to education. 295 Primary 
292 The European Convention states in this regard that free elections must be held at 
reasonable intervals by secret ballot. See article 3 of Protocol 1 (1952). 
293 See Government of the Republic of Namibia and Another v Cultura 2000 and Another 
1994 (1) SA 407 (Nms). 
294 Robertson (ed.) Human Rights for South Africans (1990) 200. 
295 See article 26 of the UD. 
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education (which is not defined) is compulsory and free of charge. The 
minimum education a child may receive is primary education, or failing that, 
the child must be educated until he or she attains the age of sixteen years. 
Private educational facilities may be established, provided that: 
a) they register with the appropriate government department; 
b) their standard of education is not inferior to that in government schools; 
c) they have no restrictions with respect to admission of pupils or the recruitment 
of staff based on race or colour. 
The European Convention guarantees for everyone the right to education.296 
However, it does not prescribe a minimum educational qualification that is 
compulsory. Further, the European Convention makes it obligatory for states, 
in respect to the provision of education, to respect the right of parents to ensure 
such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and 
philosophical convictions. No such obligation is placed on the Namibian 
Government, although a similar provision is to be found in the UD under article 
26(3) which states that parents "have a prior rigbt to choose the kind of 
education that shall be given their children." 
Article 21 contains provisions for the protection of certain fundamental 
freedoms. The article states that all persons shall have the right to: 
"a) freedom of speech and expression, which shall include freedom of the press and 
other media·297 , 
b) freedom of thought, conscience and belief, which shall include academic 
freedom;298 
c) freedom to practise any religion and to manifest such practice;299 
d) assemble peaceably and without arms;300 
296 See article 2 of Protocol 1 (1952). 
297 See article 10(1) of the European Declaration, see also article 19 of the UD. 
298 Ibid article 9(1), see also article 18 of the UD. 
200 Ibid. 
300 See article 20 of the UD. 
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e) freedom of association, which shall include freedom to form and join associations 
or unions, including trade unions and political parties;301 
t1 withhold their labour without being exposed to criminal penalties; 
g) move freely through Namibia;302 
h) reside and settle in any part of Namibia;303 
i) leave and return to Namibia;304 
j) practice any profession, or carry on any occupation, trade or business." 
With reference to article 2l(b), Carpenter states that freedom of conscience 
should not be interpreted in such a way as to render conscription 
unconstitutional. 
The freedoms enumerated in article 21 are not unlimited as they are rendered 
subject to article 21(2) which provides that they are subject to the law of 
Namibia which may impose such reasonable restrictions as are necessary in a 
democratic society and are in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of 
Namibia, national security, public order, decency and morality, or relate to 
contempt of court, defamation or incitement to commit an offence. 
Article 22 prescribes the conditions which legislation has to meet if its object is 
the curtailment of the rights and freedoms protected in Chapter 3. The article 
states that any law providing for such limitations: 
1) must be of general application; 
2) may not negate the essential content of the right or freedom concerned; 
3) may not be aimed at a particular individual; 
4) must specify the ascertainable extent of such limitation; and 
5) must identify the provision on which authority to enact the limitation is based. 
The limitation that the legislation must be general and not of individual 
application ensures that no victimisation takes place. The requirement relating 
301 Ibid article 11 (1). 
302 See article 2 of Protocol IV (1963), see also article 13 of the UD. 
303 Ibid. 
304 Ibid article 2(2), see also article 13 of the UD. 
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to the essential content of the right derives from the concept of Wesengehalt 
which is to be found in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
These restrictions ensure that an important factor in the achievement of both 
procedural and substantive justice, namely legal certainty, is achieved. 
Article 23 concerns apartheid and affirmative action. Sub-article (1) states that 
the practice of racial discrimination and apartheid may be rendered a 
punishable offence by the Namibian Parliament and a penalty imposed which 
"Parliament deems necessary for the purposes of expressing the revulsion of the 
Namibian people of such practices." Sub-article (2) makes provision for 
affirmative action stating that nothing in article 10 shall prohibit such 
legislation being enacted. 
The Namibian Constitution contains in article 24 a derogation clause. This 
article must be read in conjunction with article 26 which makes provision for 
extraordinary measures which may be adopted in times of public emergency, 
a state of nationaJ defence or martial law. In terms of article 24 nothing done in 
terms of article 26 will be deemed to be in conflict with the Constitution if the 
measures are taken whilst the country is in a state of national defence or when 
a declaration of national emergency is in force. Article 26(1) provides that the 
President may by proclamation in the Gazette declare a state of emergency "at 
a time of national disaster or during a state of national defence or public 
emergency threatening the life of the nation or the constitutional order." 
The President may, in terms of article 26(5)(a) and during such extraordinary 
times as mentioned above, make such regulations as he or she deems 
necessary. This may include the detention of individuals. Such detentions are 
however subject to the conditions as laid down in article 24(2) which require 
that: within the time period of five days at the most the detainee must be 
furnished, in a language he or she understands, with a statement specifying in 
detail the grounds upon which they are detained and, at their request, this 
statement must be read to them; notification of any such detention must be 
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published in the Gazette within fourteen days; the Advisory Board, established 
in terms of article 26(5)(c), must review the detention not more than one month 
after the commencement of the detention and every three months thereafter, 
this board being competent to order the release of a detainee if it is not satisfied 
that the detention is reasonably necessary; and that the detainee shall be offered 
the opportunity for the making of representations as may be desirable 
(presumably this refers to the President or the Advisory Board.) 
Article 26(5)(b) confers wide ranging powers on the President who may suspend 
the operation of any rule of common or statutory law or any fundamental right 
or freedom protected by the Constitution, for such a time and subject to such 
conditions as are reasonably justifiable for the purpose of dealing with the 
situation at hand; subject to the proviso that the President may not act contrary 
to the provisions of article 24(3). 
Article 24(3) entrenches certain fundamental rights and freedoms, these being: 
article 5 (which states that all the rights and freedoms contained in the 
declaration of rights must be respected by the government in all its three 
branches); article 6 (life); article 8 (liberty); article 9 (slavery and forced labour); 
article 10 (equality and freedom from discrimination); article 12 (fair trial); 
article 14 (family rights); article 15 (children's rights); article 18 (administrative 
justice); article 19 (cultural rights); article 2l(a) (freedom of speech and 
expression), (b) (freedom of thought, conscience and belief), (c) (freedom of 
religion) and (e) (freedom of association). This article thus provides wide ranging 
protection for the individual under the Constitution. This protection should 
remain unchallenged save for the total collapse of the constitution of Namibia. 
Article 25 provides for the justiciability of the Constitution. Namibia, like 
Zimbabwe, has opted for enforcement of the Constitution by the ordinary courts 
rather than by a special constitutional court. The courts have not only the 
power to declare a statute or executive matter invalid as being contrary to the 
provisions of the Constitution, but may, in terms of article 25(l)(a) also refer 
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such statute or executive matter back to either the parliament or the executive 
(as the case may be) to correct any defect in the said statute or action as may 
be required by the court. Pertaining to laws in force prior to the date of 
Independence, article 25(l)(b) states that such laws shall remain in effect until 
amended, repealed or declared unconstitutional. Here again the court has the 
option of either invalidating the law or allowing parliament to correct the defect. 
An issue worth noting is the question which arises as to the status of common 
law rules or laws which, while clearly in conflict with the Constitution, have not 
yet been repealed or declared unconstitutional by the court. Carpenter3°5 
suggests that the answer lies in a literal interpretation of article 25(l)(b) and 
article 140(1), the latter reading: 
"Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, all laws which were in force 
immediately before the date of Independence shall remain in force until repealed 
or amended by Act of Parliament or until they are declared unconstitutional by 
a competent court." 
Thus the law would remain in force until the legislature or judiciary removed 
it. 306 By removing the power to decide the issue from the hands of the 
administration who could then decide the issue on a day to day basis, one is 
promoting legal certainty. This also ensures that the doctrine of the separation 
of powers as provided for in article 1 (3) is maintained. 
Access to the courts is provided for in article 25(2) to persons whose rights and 
freedoms have been infringed, or who fear they may be infringed. Further 
provision is made for access to the Omdudsman (created in terms of Chapter 
305 Carpenter 41. 
306 Carpenter finds the solution to this issue in the distinction between formal and material 
law validity: the Constitution enjoying formal validity from the date of its commencement, yet 
achieving material law validity only at such a time as the courts lay their seal on it. Ibid. The 
opposite could however also be said, namely that the Constitution is materially valid, with laws 
enjoying formal validity. Laws would attain material validity once they withstood the test of 
Constitutionality. (The author subscribes to the latter). 
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10), for either legal assistance or advice. This provision reinforces article 24(3), 
thus making it clear that derogations from or suspensions of fundamental rights 
and freedoms may not have the effect of denying individuals access to legal help 
or a court of law. 
One may ask the question as to what extent interpretations of the Universal 
Declaration and the European Convention will influence inteq)retations of the 
Namibian Constitution?. Due to the fact that the provisions of the European 
Convention formed an integral part in the framing of the Namibian Constitution, 
it is submitted that the judgements of the European Court should play a very 
persuasive role in the interpretation of the Namibian Constitution. 
5.2.10.6 State of Emergency. 
The powers of the Executive in this regard are not absolute. 307 In terms of article 
27(3) the President, in consultation with the Cabinet, may declare a state of 
emergency by proclamation in the Gazette at a time of national disaster or 
during a state of national defence or public emergency. This declaration will 
cease to have effect unless it is ratified by a two-thirds majority of all members 
of the National Assembly within seven days if the Assembly is in sitting or 
within thirty days if it is not. The resolution of the Assembly itself is valid for 
six months, after which the state of emergency must again be renewed by a 
two-thirds majority. Further, it must be remembered that the role of the courts 
in this regard will be decisive, this being due to the fact that article 24(3) and 
article 25(2) prohibit ouster clauses seeking to exclude the court's jurisdiction 
when the infringement of any fundamental right or freedom is at issue, further, 
article 22 serves to ensure that no fundamental right or freedom's essence is 
encroached upon. 308 
307 See Erasmus "Die Grondwet van Namibie" 299-300. 
308 See also in this regard the discussion of article 5[c) supra. 
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5.2.10. 7 Organs of the State 
a) The President. 
The President309 is both head of state and head of the government, and the 
executive power vests in him or her and the cabinet. The President's term of 
office is five years [barring death, resignation or removal). The supremacy of the 
Constitution is emphasised in the constitutional requirement for the removal of 
a President from his or her office. Article 29(2) states that a President may only 
be removed from office by a resolution passed with a two-thirds majority of all 
the members of the National Assembly, confirmed by a two-thirds majority of 
all the members of the National Council, impeaching the President on the 
grounds of 
a) violation of the Constitution; or 
b) a serious violation of the law of the land; or 
c) such gross misconduct or ineptitude as to render the President unfit to hold 
office with honour and dignity. 
Article 32 sets out the functions and powers of the President. 
Further, in terms of article 32[4)[a) the President is empowered to appoint 
judges, the Ombudsman and the Prosecutor-General, on recommendation of the 
Judicial Service Commission. Such Commission shall consist of the Chief-
Justice, a judge appointed by the President, the Attorney-General and two 
members of the legal profession nominated in accordance with an Act of 
Parliament by the professional organisation representing the interests of the 
legal profession. 310 
309 On the Executive in general see Erasmus "Die Grondwet van Namibie" 300-302. 
310 See article 32(4)[a). 
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b) The Cabinet 
Article 35 provides that the Cabinet is comprised of the President, the Prime 
Minister311 and the Ministers appointed by the President from the ranks of the 
National Assembly. Article 40 lays out the duties and functions of the Cabinet. 
Most of these duties and functions may be described as standard functions of 
the executive312 (such as directing the activities of of the ministries, initiating 
legislation, being responsible to the legislature for state expenditure and 
government policy, advising the President an:d so on). 
Mentioned in this article is also the individual and collective responsibility of the 
Cabinet to Parliament, as well as the prohibition on members of the Cabinet 
enjoying paid employment or participating in any other activity which could 
lead to a conflict of member's official and private interests. Ministers are further 
prohibited from using their positions or any information gained as members of 
the Cabinet to enrich themselves. 
c) The National Assembly. 
In terms of article 44 the legislative authority in Namibia is vested in the 
National Assembly, this being empowered to make laws with the assent of the 
President and in certain circumstances subject to the powers of the National 
Council. Certain principles of democracy are enshrined in article 45 which 
states that the National Assembly shall be representative of all the people of 
Namibia and is to be guided in the execution of its duties by the objectives of 
the Constitution (and by its obligatory provisions as well),313 by the public 
interest and by their own conscience. 314 
All Namibians who qualify in terms of article 1 7 for the franchise elect, by direct 
311 On the office of the Prime Minister see article 36. 
312 Carpenter 48. 
313 See article 25. 
314 See paragraph 3 of the Preamble 
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and secret ballot, seventy-two members of the National Assembly. The President 
can then appoint not more than six additional members by virtue of their 
special expertise, status, skill or experience. In line with the above mentioned 
democratic principles, these members, who are thus not elected by the people 
of Namibia, have no vote and are not taken into account for the purposes of 
determining specific majorities which are required by law. 
Members vacate their seats on becoming disqualified, on resignation, on 
removal by the Assembly in terms of its rules and standing orders, if the 
member is absent without leave for ten consecutive sitting days, and if the 
political party which nominated the member informs the Speaker that he or she 
is no longer a member of that party. Thus the free mandate system falls away. 
This is due to the fact that territorial representation has been replaced with a 
system of proportional representation. The parliamentary representative 
represents the party that nominated him or her and not the constituents of a 
particular geographical area.315 Thus when a member of Parliament crosses the 
floor to an opposing political party, the chances are that his or her constituents 
will no longer feel as though he or she is their representative. 316 
As with the President, the powers of the National Assembly are also limited by 
the Constitution. The President must in terms of article 56(1) assent to all Bills 
passed by the Namibian Parliament. As Carpenter states,317 "this assent is by 
no means a mere formality." A Bill approved by a two-thirds majority of all the 
members of the Assembly and confirmed by the National Council, the President 
has no option but to assent to. 318 Where it is approved by less than a two-thirds 
majority, and confirmed, the President may decline his assent and inform the 
315 In a system of territorial representation the parliamentary representative represents his 
or her constituents in principle but his or her party in practice. 
316 There were instances in pre-independence Namibia where constituents sought to force 
their elected parliamentarian who had thrown his lot in with that of an opposing party to resign. 
See Du Plessis NO v Skrywer NO 1980 2 SA 52 (SWA), (1980 3 SA 863 (A)). 
317 See Carpenter 50. 
318 See article 56(2). 
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Speaker accordingly.319 The Bill is then returned to the National Assembly for 
reconsideration, or approval in its original form, or the National Assembly may 
decline to pass it. If the National Assembly approves the Bill, no further 
confirmation by the National Council is required, but if the Bill is passed by less 
than a two-thirds majority the President retains the discretion to refuse his or 
her assent. In this case the Bill will lapse.320 
The Constitution further limits the powers of the National Assembly by vesting 
the President with the right to judge the constitutionality of a Bill. Article 64 
gives the President the right to withhold assent ifhe or she is of the opinion that 
the bill is in conflict with the Constitution. Upon such refusal the President 
must inform the Speaker, who in turn informs the National Assembly and the 
Attorney-General. The Attorney-General may take appropriate steps to have the 
matter settled judicially. If the Court finds that the Bill is in conflict with the 
Constitution, it lapses and the President may not assent to it. On a finding that 
it is not unconstitutional, the President is obliged to give his or her assent if it 
has been passed with a two-thirds majority in the Assembly, if this has not 
occurred he may withhold his or her assent upon which occurrence articles 
56(3) and (4) then apply. 
For the purpose of this thesis no in-depth analysis of the National Council is 
necessary, save what has already been dealt with; yet it should be noted further 
that the National Council has no original legislative jurisdiction. 
d) The Judiciary 
Article 78 states that the judicial power vests in the Courts of Namibia, 
consisting of a Supreme Court, a Higher Court and Lower Courts. 321 Sub-article 
(2) states that the courts "shall be independent and subject only to the 
319 See article 56(3). 
320 See article 56(4). 
321 On the Judiciary in general see Erasmus "Die Grondwet van Namibie" 306-309. 
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Constitution and the law." The independence of the judiciary is highlighted in 
sub-article (3) which prohibits members of the Cabinet, the Legislature or any 
other person from interfering with the Judges or judicial officers in the 
execution of their duties. As stated before, the ordinary courts of Namibia are 
vested with the power of constitutional judicial review.322 
5.2.10.8 Principles of State Policy. 
Chapter 11 deals with the Principles of State Policy. 323 This Chapter can best be 
described as a "statement of intention which has been accorded special validity 
and permanence by its inclusion in the Constitution itself. "324 In short, it is a 
blueprint for future state action. It is submitted that the promotion of the 
welfare of its people is of paramount importance to the state, the government 
and the constitution. The Namibian Constitution has however spelt out the 
policies which the state is to follow in this regard, and also constitutionally 
enshrined them in article 95. Among the issues dealt with in this provision are: 
the achievement of sexual equality; the improvement of health standards; the 
encouragement of trade unions; membership of the International Labour 
Organisation; the plight of senior citizens, the unemployed, the disabled, the 
indigent and the disadvantaged; legal aid; a decent living wage; educational 
standards; and the protection of the environment and the ecosystem. 
As can be seen, these interests concern second and third generation human 
rights (ie socio-economic and environmental rights.) These are not included 
under the Namibian Constitution's bill of rights and are thus not judicially 
enforceable. The reason for this is that their enforcement is often too difficult 
a task to achieve, and also as it would place an unbearable strain on the 
Namibian economy. 
322 See Federal Convention of Namibia v Speaker, National Assembly of Namibia, and 
Others 1994 (1) SA 177 (Nm). 
323 In general see Erasmus "Die Grondwet van Namibie" 309-313. 
324 See Carpenter 56. 
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Article 96, which deals with foreign relations states that Namibia shall follow 
a policy of non-alignment; promote international co-operation, peace and 
security; create and maintain just and mutually beneficial relations amongst 
nations; foster respect for international law and treaty obligations; and 
encourage the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. 325 
Article 97 deals with the question of asylum, article 98 with the principles of 
economic order and article 99 with foreign investment. 
Article 101 makes provision for the application of the principles contained in 
Chapter 11. This article makes it clear that the provisions in Chapter 11 are not 
judicially enforceable, but are intended to act as guidelines. Due to the fact that 
the Courts will be able to have regard to the said principles in interpreting any 
law based on them, the principles will in effect have the force of presumptions 
of statutory interpretation and should thus, in time, gain the force of law 
through judicial precedent. 326 
5.2.10.9 Amendment of the Constitution. 
Amendments of the Constitution are provided for in Chapter 19.327 Article 131 
is of such cardinal importance in the Constitution that it deserves to be quoted 
in full: 
"No repeal or amendment of any of the provisions of Chapter 3 hereof, in so far 
as such repeal or amendment diminishes or detracts from the fundamental 
rights and freedoms contained and defined in that Chapter, shall be permissible 
under this Constitution, and no such purported repeal or amendment shall be 
valid or have any force or effect." 
325 This article corresponds materially to the Charter of the United Nations, especially those 
provisions stating the aims and objectives of the UN. 
326 Carpenter states that this will prove to be of immense importance in the field of judicial 
review of administrative action in particular. See Carpenter 57. 
327 In general see Erasmus "Die Grondwet van Namibie" 315. 
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Thus enhancement or extension of the protection given under Chapter 3 is 
allowed, but any diminuation thereof is prohibited. Thus the protection granted 
under Chapter 3 is irrevocably and firmly entrenched in the Constitution. 
The Constitution, under article 132, does allow for the amendment of other 
provisions, but subject to considerable restraints. 328 A Bill purporting to amend 
the Constitution must be specific and may not deal with any matter other than 
the proposed repealment or amendment. It must be approved by a two-thirds 
majority of the total number of members of the National Assembly and a two-
thirds majority of the total number of members of the National Council. In the 
event that the required majority is not secured in the National Council, the 
President may call a referendum over the Bill in question. If approved by a two-
thirds majority of the votes cast, the Bill is deemed to have been duly passed 
and is given to the President for his assent. Sub-article (4) prohibits absolutely 
any amendment of the provisions concerning the required majorities (in sub-
articles (2) and (3)) above. Further protection of Chapter 3 is given by subarticle 
(5)(a) which states that the entrenched position of article 131 cannot be altered. 
The above mentioned provisions clearly entrench the idea of a Constitutional 
State in the Namibian Constitution. 
5.2.10.10 Transitional Provisions. 
Chapter 20, entitled "The Law in Force and Transitional Provisions", makes 
provision for the conversion of the Constituent Assembly to the first National 
Assembly, for the election of the first President by the Constituent Assembly 
and for the implementation of the Constitution. 329 
Until such time as the first National Council has been elected, the National 
Assembly would exercise all legislative authority. Article 137 provides for the 
328 Carpenter 59. 
329 In general see Erasmus "Die Grondwet van Namibie" 314-315. 
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election of the first Regional Councils and the first National Council. 
Judicial continuity is provided for by article 138; the judges holding office at the 
date of independence continued in office and all laws governing jurisdiction, 
procedure and so on remained in force. Criminal prosecution started before 
independence continued as if they had been started after independence. All 
criminal offences committed before the date of independence would remain 
thus, provided they would have been crimes according to the law of Namibia, 
had it been in existence at that time. Article 140 (read with article 60) made 
provision for the continued applicability of laws in force prior to independence, 
subject to the Constitution, until such time as they are repealed, amended or 
declared unconstitutional. Thus the status quo was maintained for transitional 
purposes. Article 142 provides for the appointment of the first Chief of the 
Defence Force, Inspector-General of Police, and Commissioner of Prisons; these 
being appointed by the President in consultation with the leaders of all political 
parties represented in the National Assembly. 
In terms of article 143 existing international agreements binding on Namibia 
remain in force, unless and until the National Assembly, acting under article 
63(2)(d)330 decides otherwise. 
5.2.10.11 Incorporation of International Law. 
Article 144 states that the general rules of international law and international 
agreements binding on Namibia under the Constitution shall form part of the 
law of Namibia, unless the Constitution or an act of parliament provide 
otherwise. 331 
330 The National Assembly shall have the power ... " (d) to consider and decide whether or 
not to succeed to such international agreements as may have been entered into prior to 
Independence by administrations within Namibia ... ". 
331 See in this regard Erasmus "Die Grondwet van Namibie" 315 - 317. 
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5.2.10.12 General Clauses 
Article 145 contains two saving clauses. The first of these clauses indemnifies 
the government against any obligations to any other states or persons (arising 
out of acts or contracts of prior administrations) which would not have been 
regarded as binding in terms of international law. The second clause states that 
nothing in the Constitution shall be construed as giving recognition of the 
government of South Africa's administration of Namibia. It is true that the 
Constitution makes provision for the transition from the South African 
administration to the Namibian administration,332 and that this would amount 
to de facto recognition of the former's administration, thus one must interpret 
article 145(2) as a rejection of the de jure administration by South Africa of 
Namibia. 
The definition of "parliament" in article l 46(2)(a) gives further evidence of the 
limitations placed on the legislature when it states that the National Assembly 
(after the election of the first National Council) shall act "subject to the review 
of the National Council." 
5.3 Conclusions 
As shown, the Namibian Constitution contains a remarkable number arid 
variety of checks and balances. These include a justiciable declaration of 
fundamental rights and freedoms based largely on the successful European 
Convention on Human Rights (1950) and the Universal Declaration .. Like the 
European model, no provision is made for second and third generation rights 
in this bill. These rights (being mainly socio-economic and environmental of 
nature) do however find recognition under Chapter 11 as principles of state 
policy. 
332 See article 140(2)-(5). 
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The checks and balances include an executive President who can do little of his 
own volition, having to act in consultation with various other organs of the 
state. The legislative powers of the National Assembly are limited by the power 
of review of the National Council and the possible Presidential review, and 
further, by the constitutional review of all relevant legislation by the judiciary. 
The Ombudsman is there as a source of assistance for individuals who feel 
aggrieved and who do not wish to take recourse in the courts. These 
constitutional protection mechanisms (amongst others) would seem to give the 
individual a large degree of protection, while the principles of democracy and 
the rule of law have further been entrenched. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE DYNAMIC CONCEPT OF THE RULE OF LAW IN SOUTH AFRICAN 
CONTEXT 
6.1 General 
The dynamic concept of the rule of law links human rights, democracy and the 
right of peoples to self-determination and independence. In this chapter we 
examine how that linkage evolved and finally informed the creation of a 
Constitutional State in South Africa. First the Chapter will trace the UN and the 
OAU decolonisation strategies and their impact on Apartheid colonialism; 
secondly the Chapter will trace the reception of the international bill of rights 
and its impact on municipal concepts of a bill of human rights; thirdly the 
convergence of those municipal concepts; fourthly the liberalisation of South 
African politics which resulted in negotiations between the South African 
government and th.e National Liberation Movements; fifthly the dynamic 
concept of the rule of law in the South African context, and in particular, the 
dynamic concept of the rule of law and the final constitution-making process: 
its limitations, opportunities and implications for the Reconstruction and 
Development programme. 
6.1.1 South Africa and the United Nations Decolonisation Strategy 
The influence of the post-World War II politico-legal order spread to South Africa 
soon after the establishment of the United Nations. The UN concerned itself 
with the racial situation in the South in the three resolutions on the South 
African racial conflict. 1 It stated, firstly, that it is the higher interest of humanity 
to put an immediate end to religious and so-called racial persecution and 
discrimination.2 Secondly, peace could not be secured solely by collective 
1 See chapter 3 supra. 
2 See Resolution 103 (I) of 19 November 1946. 
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security arrangements against breach of international peace and acts of 
aggression, but also by the observance of all principles and purposes established 
in the Charter of the United Nations,3 and thirdly, that in multi-racial society 
harmony and respect for human rights and freedoms and the peaceful 
development and unified community are best assured when patterns of 
legislation and practice are directed towards ensuring the equality before the 
law of all persons regardless of race, creed or colour, and with economic, social, 
cultural and political participation of all racial groups on the basis of equality.4 
In 1953 the UN General Assembly reaffirmed all three resolutions after realising 
that the policies of apartheid and their consequences were not only contrary to 
the UN charter and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, but also that 
these policies were unlikely to be acceptable to the black majority. Thus the 
General Assembly resolved to request the Union Government to reconsider the 
components of its policy towards various ethnic groups in South Africa. 5 The 
UN Commission6 for South Africa reinforced the position of the General 
Assembly in its second report which concluded that the principles incorporated 
in the provisions of the charter concerning human rights and fundamental 
freedoms have become, even outside the United Nations Charter, the general 
principles of law recognised by civilised nations. This conclusion made the UN 
Charter and the Universal Declaration directly applicable to the resolution of the 
South African constitutional conflict. Thus the commission suggested three 
steps for addressing the conflict within the UN politico-legal framework. First, 
the holding of an interracial conference with the assistance of the UN, secondly, 
an economic integration designed to alleviate the serious suffering caused to the 
black people by the dispersal and inadequacy of the reserves, their over-
population in relation to their natural resources, the quality of their soil and 
their economic and technical development and also by the discriminatory 
measures against black workers employed in industry in the white areas, and 
3 See Resolution 377 A (V) section E .of 3 November 1950. 
4 See Resolution 616 B (VII) of 5 December 1952. 
5 See Resolution 616 B (VIII) of 8 December 1953. 
6 See Sohn and Buergenthal International Protection of Human Rights (1973) 665. 
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thirdly, that the need to ensure equal economic opportunities for all, regardless 
of differences of race, colour or belief should not delay steps to achieve political 
equality. 
During the consideration of the commission's report on the racial situation in 
South Africa, the Union government claimed that the inclusion of an item on 
apartheid on the agenda infringed the provisions of Article 2(7) of the UN 
Charter which provides for the principle of non-interference in the internal 
affairs of members states. Apparently the General Assembly rejected this 
argument. The General Assembly discussed the commission's report and finally 
adopted a resolution which, firstly, endorsed the commission's finding that the 
new law and regulations which were being adopted by the Union government7 
were incompatible with the obligations of that government under the UN 
Charter and that the policy of apartheid constituted a grave threat to the 
peaceful relations between ethnic groups in the world;8 and secondly, the 
General Assembly accepted the idea of an interracial conference proposed by 
the commission and accordingly invited the Union Government to reconsider 
its position in the light of the principles expressed in the United Nations 
Charter, taking into account the pledge of all member states to respect human-
rights and fundamental freedoms without distinction as to race.9 Finally, the 
General Assembly requested the Commission to keep under review the problem 
of race conflict in South Africa. 
In terms of this Mandate the Commission made a thorough study and analysed 
a series of new legislative measures adopted by the Union Government which 
it (the Commission) considered to be inconsistent with the obligations of that 
government under the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration. In its third 
report resulting from this study the Commission affirmed that the continuation 
of the policy of apartheid constituted a serious threat to the national life within 
7 See chapter 3 on a host of apartheid legislation adopted during the first half of the fifties. 
8 See Resolution 820 (IX) 9 GA OR Suppl. no. 21 (N2890) 1954. 
9 Ibid 
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the Union of South Africa and recommended that the General Assembly 
consider the matter under Article 14 of the Charter. 10 After considering this 
report the General Assembly expressed concern about the failure or neglect of 
the Union Government to observe its obligations under the UN Charter11 and 
further called on the Union Government to take joint and separate action in co-
operation with the UN 12 for the realisation of the principle of equal rights and 
self determination in South Africa13 and, in addition, to promote: 
(a) higher standards of living, full employment and conditions of economic and 
social progress and development, 
(b) solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems and 
(c) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all without discrimination as to race, sex, language or religion. 
In this resolution, therefore, the General Assembly, linked the principle of self-
determination and human rights embodied in the UN Charter and Universal 
Declaration and made them directly applicable to South Africa. Here, for the 
first time the General Assembly reduced the post World War II politico-legal 
order to a fundamental basis for the creation of a new constitutional order in 
South Africa. 
In 1957 the General Assembly deplored the continued failure and neglect of the 
Union Government to observe her obligations under the UN Charter and 
appealed to her to observe those obligations. 14 The appeal was followed by a 
1958 general call upon all members to bring their policies into conformity with 
their obligations under the UN Charter and to promote the observance of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. 15 In addition, the General Assembly 
10 See Sohn and Buergenthal International Protection of Human Rights 665. 
11 See suppl. No. 19 (C/3116) at 1955. 
12 This call was made under Articles 56 of UN Charter. 
13 These obligations are embodied in Article 55 of the UN Charter. 
14 See Resolution 1016 (XI); II GAOR, suppl. No. l 7(A/13572)5-6 (1957).n 
15 See Sohn and Buergenthal op cit. 
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expressed its regret and concern that South Africa had not yet responded to its 
appeals to observe its obligations under the UN Charter. 
Following the racial disturbances of 196016 the UN Security Council17 
recognised, first, that the large scale killings of unarmed and peaceful 
demonstrators against racial discrimination and segregation had been brought 
about by the racial policies of the government; and secondly that the situation 
in South Africa was a threat to international peace and security. Hence, the 
Security council directly linked the creation of a new constitutional order to 
peace and stability in South Africa and called on the Union Government to 
initiate measures aimed at bringing about racial harmony based on equality in 
order to ensure that the racial conflict did not continue or recur and, in 
particular, to abandon its policies of apartheid and racial discrimination. 
Instead, the Union Government embarked on : 
(a) the persecution and repression of opponents of the policies of apartheid; 
(b) the vigorous implementation of those polices; and 
(c) an alarming and unprecedented build-up of military and police forces. These 
developments increased the intensity of UN action against apartheid in South 
Africa. 
For instance, in 1963 the Security Council noted with great concern the arms 
build-up by South Africa, which arms were being used to defend the policies of 
apartheid, 18 and reiterated its call on the Union Government to abandon its 
apartheid policies and free all persons imprisoned, interned or subjected to other 
restrictions for having opposed the policy of apartheid. 19 In addition, the 
Security Council imposed an arms embargo against South Africa. 20 
At the end of 1963 the Security Council21 reaffirmed its earlier resolutions22 and 
16 See John Dugard Human Rights and the South African Legal Order (1978) 1. 
17 See Resolution 134 (1960) of 1 April 1960. 
18 See Resolution 181 (1963) of 7 August 1963. 
19 See par. 2 Ibid. 
20 See par. 3 Ibid. 
• 
21 See Resolution 182 (1963) of 4 December 1963 {S/5471). 
22 In particular Resolution 181 (1963) of 7 August 1963. 
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recognised the need to eliminate discrimination in regard to basic human rights 
and fundamental freedoms for all individuals within the territory of the religion 
and stated that the policies of apartheid and racial discrimination practised by 
South Africa was abhorrent to the conscience of humanity and that therefore 
a positive alternative to these policies had to be found through peaceful means. 
To that end the Security Council urgently requested the South African 
government to cease forthwith its continued imposition of discriminatory and 
repressive measures which were contrary to the UN Charter and Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. Here the Security Council, for the first time, 
endorsed the applicability of the post World War II politico-legal order to South 
Africa in clear terms. Further, the Security Council reiterated its call for the 
release of political prisoners and detainees, mandated the Secretary General to 
establish a group of experts and charge them with the task of examining 
methods of resolving the South African racial conflict through full, peaceful and 
orderly application of human rights and fundamental freedoms to all 
inhabitants of South Africa as a whole, regardless of race, colour or creed, and 
to consider the role of the UN in the process. Finally the Security Council 
invited the South African government to assist the group of experts in order to 
bring about a peaceful and orderly transformation and requested the Secretary-
General to monitor efforts towards the implementation of this resolution and to 
report to the Security Council not later than 1 June 1964. 
In a June 1964 Resolution23 the Security Council noted with great concern the 
Rivonia trial24 instituted against the leadership of the African National Congress 
(ANC) on the basis of arbitrary state security laws and urged the South African 
government: 
(a) to renounce the execution of persons sentenced to death for acts resulting from 
their opposition to the policy of apartheid; 
(b) to terminate the trial instituted within the framework of those arbitrary laws; 
23 See Resolution 190 (1964) of 9 June 1964(5/5761). 
24 Ibid par. 3. 
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and 
(c) to grant an amnesty to all persons already imprisoned, interned or subjected to 
other restrictions for having opposed the policy of apartheid, particularly to the 
accused in the Rivonia trial. 
On the 18 June 1964 the Security Council adopted another resolution25on the 
race conflict in South Africa. The resolution reaffirmed that the policies of 
apartheid were contrary to the principles and purposes of UN Charter and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and condemned those policies and 
legislation supporting them and urgently reiterated its appeal to the South 
African government for the release of political prisoners and detainees. 
Furthermore, and perhaps more significantly, the resolution endorsed the 
recommendation of the group of experts that: 
"All the people of South Africa should be brought into consultation and should 
thus be enabled to decide the future of their country at the national level." 
In this regard the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to consider 
the role that the UN might play and gave the South African government and 
ultimatum to respond to the call for national consultation on the future of South 
Africa. 
The Security Council's call for a national consultation on the future of South 
African indicated repeated demands of the ANC for a non-racial convention26 
which had culminated in the 1961 All-Africa Conference held in 
Pietermaritzburg.27 In particular, the Resolution signalled a common 
understanding between the ANC and the Security Council that the authority of 
government must be based on the will of the people of a particular country as 
a whole regardless of their race, colour or creed. The policy of apartheid suffered 
25 See Resolution 191 (1964) of 18 June (S/5773). 
26 In this regard see Chapter 4 par. 2.2 note 293. 
27 Ibid. 
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a further setback when colonial issues, including the issue of apartheid and 
racism in South Africa, were removed from the restrictions of the domestic 
jurisdiction clause of Article 2(7) of the Charter. Furthermore, sovereignty was 
vested in the people of the territory and not in the colonial power while national 
liberation movements were given interim personality as representatives of the 
peoples of the territories in question. The impetus for this development came 
from the struggles of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau in 
the sixties. Both the Security Council and the General Assembly extended that 
formula to other situations. 28 
For instance, at its twentieth session in 1965 the General Assembly for the first 
time recognised the 
"legitimacy of the struggles by the peoples under colonial rule to exercise their 
right to self-determination and independence." 
and at the same time invited 
"all states to provide material and moral assistance to the national liberation 
movements in colonial territories." 
The following year ( 1966), the General Assembly went a step further and stated 
that the preservation of colonialism and its manifestation, including racism and 
apartheid, were incompatible with the United Nations Charter and the 
Declaration on Decolonisation. 29 It was further declared that colonialism 
threatened international peace and security and that the practice of apartheid 
constituted a crime against humanity; a characterisation which was to have 
important legal repercussions later.30 
28 See Kader Asmal "The Legal Status of National Liberation Movements" in Law and 
Politics in South Africa, JSAS Conference held in London, 6-8 April 1984, 2 et seq. Also see GA 
Resolution 2105 (XX). 
29 See Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of 
16 December 1960. · 
30 Ibid. 
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The struggle for self-determination and independence by peoples under colonial 
and racist rule received a further impetus from the International Covenant on 
Civil and Polit_ical Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights of 1966 which made the right of self-determination a 
mandatory (or peremptory) rule i.e. ius cogens31 of customary international 
law.32 The Human Rights Committee33 observed the linkage between the right 
of self-determination and individual rights in both Covenants and stressed that 
"the right of self-determination is of particular importance because its realisation 
is an essential condition for the effective guarantee and observance of individual 
human rights and for the promotion and strengthening of those rights." 
South Africa could not escape the impact of this mandatory norm of customary 
international law as the Covenants did not limit the right of self-determination34 
to colonial peoples, but extended it to peoples under racist regimes. 35 
No wonder that during the seventies the Security Council endorsed the 
legitimacy of the struggle of the oppressed people of South African for self-
determination and independence. In its 1970 Resolution36 the Security Council 
not only recognised the legitimacy of the South African national liberation 
struggle, but also affirmed that the struggle was waged in pursuance of the 
human and political rights set forth in the UN Charter and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. Hence, the Security Council reaffirmed its earlier 
calls for a national consultation on the future of South Africa. In other words, 
it specifically supported the ANC call for a non-racial national convention 
including all the people of South Africa. 
31 See Kader Asmal "The Illegitimacy of the South African Apartheid Regime: International 
Law Perspectives" (paper read at a conference entitled "Consultation on the Legitimacy of the 
South African Government" Harare 4-8 September 1989) 5. 
32 See Robert McCorquodale "South Africa and the Right of Self-Determination" in l 0 1994 
SAJHR 5 note 5. 
33 Cited in Robert McCorquondale "South Africa and the Right of Self-Determination" in l 0 
1994 SAJHR 5 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid 6. 
36 See Resolution 282 (1970) of 23 July 1970. 
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In the same year, 1970, South Africa's policy of apartheid received a deadly 
blow from the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations and the definition of aggression. 37 The Declaration 
reaffirmed the principles of the territorial integrity of colonial territories and the 
right of self-determination of peoples under colonial rule. Like the two 
international Covenants, the Declaration applied the right of self-determination 
to "all peoples" without any restrictions as to their colonial status. This made 
the Declaration directly applicable to South Africa thus depriving it of any 
claims of protection under article 2(7) of the UN Charter. 
More specifically, the Declaration dealt a deadly blow to the policy of separate 
development by proclaiming that every state had 
"a duty to promote the realisation of the principles of equal rights and self-
determination of people and states and that no action shall be taken to disrupt 
the territorial integrity or national unity of a government representing the whole 
people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour." 
The General Assembly's definition of aggression provided that nothing in the 
definition could prejudice the right of self-determination, freedom and 
independence of the peoples under colonial and racist regimes or other forms 
of alien domination. The test for suppression of self-determination, within the 
meaning of international law was primarily whether the government was 
indigenous and not restricted to one race or minority of the population to the 
exclusion of the majority of the people. The South African policy of apartheid 
failed this test as it excluded the black majority from the central political 
process within a united South Africa. 
Hence, from the seventies the UN began to consider the South African 
government as illegitimate while recognising the South African national 
37 See GA Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970. 
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liberation movements (the ANC and PAC) as the authentic representatives of the 
oppressed people of South Africa. 38 For instance, the General Assembly adopted 
a resolution proclaiming its full support for the national liberation movements 
of South Africa, as the authentic representatives of the South African people in 
their just struggle for freedom. 39 Henceforth, the UN recognised national 
liberation movements as instruments for the realisation of the right of self-
determination of peoples under colonial and racist rule. Thus, in a series of 
annual resolutions on the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples, the General Assembly reaffirmed its support for 
national liberation movements in Africa. 40 
South African national liberation movements gained a political high ground in 
1973 when Article 1(1) of the International Convention on the Suppression and 
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid declared that apartheid was a crime 
against humanity and that inhuman acts resulting from the policies and 
practices of racial segregation and discrimination were crimes violating 
principles of international law, in particular the purposes and principles of the 
UN Charter.41 Consequently the UN General Assembly rejected South Africa's 
credentials in 197 4 42 and then suspended her voting rights. 43 The large-scale 
killing and wounding of Africans in Soweto following the callous shooting of 
African people including school children and students demonstrating against 
racial discrimination on the 16 June 1976 intensified international efforts 
38 See Kader Asmal "The Illegitimacy of the South African Apartheid Regime: International 
Law Perspectives" 5. 
39 See Kader Asmal "Apartheid South Africa: The illegitimate Regime" in Centre Against 
Apartheid, notes and documents from the World Conference for Action Against Apartheid (UN 
Publ. Conf. 6, November 1977). 
40 See Travers "The Legal Effect of United Nations Action in Support of the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation and the National Liberation Movements of Africa" in 17 Harvard 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 462. 
41 See Robert McCorquondale "South Africa and the right of self-determination" in 10 1994 
SAJHR 12. 
42 See GA Resolution 3206 (XXIX) of 30 September 197 4. For a discussion of this resolution 
see Erasmus "The Rejection of Credentials - a Proper Exercise of General Assembly Powers and 
Suspension by Stealth?" 7 1981 SAYIL 40. Also see Suttner "Has South Africa been illegally 
excluded from the United National General Assembly" 1984 CILSA 279. 
· 
43 See Neville Botha "The Coming of Age of Public International Law in South Africa" 18 
1992/93 SA YIL 36. 
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towards the elimination of apartheid and the creation of a democratic state in 
South Africa. Hardly three days after the Soweto uprising44 the Security Council 
adopted a resolution45 which condemned mass suppression brought about by 
the continued imposition by the South African government of apartheid and 
racial discrimination in defiance of the resolution of the Security Council and 
the General Assembly, re-affirmed that the policy of apartheid was a crime 
against conscience and dignity of mankind and seriously disturbed international 
peace and security. Further, it recognised the legitimacy of the struggle of the 
South African people for the elimination of apartheid and racial discrimination. 
Finally, the resolution called upon the South African government urgently to 
end violence against the African people and to take urgent steps to eliminate 
apartheid and racial discrimination. 
Despite international condemnation the South African government intensified 
repression against any form of resistance against its apartheid programme. This 
repression resulted in the banning of 19 organisations in 1977. 46 The massive 
repression of opponents of apartheid and arms build-up by South African 
prompted the Security Council to adopt another resolution. 47 This resolution 
reaffirmed the UN framework for the settlement of the South African 
constitutional conflict in more emphatic and definite terms. First, it reaffirmed 
the Security Council's recognition of the legitimacy of the struggle of the South 
African people for the elimination of apartheid and the establishment of a 
democratic society in accordance with their inalienable human and political 
rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. Secondly, it reaffirmed that the policy of 
apartheid was a crime against the conscience and dignity of mankind and was 
incompatible with the right and dignity of man, the Charter of the United 
Nations and the Universal Declaration of the Human Rights, and seriously 
disturbed international peace and security. Thirdly, it recognised the legitimacy 
44 Ibid 150 et seq. 
45 See Resolution 392(1976) of June 1976. 
46 See Johan Dugard Human rights and the South African Legal Order 102. 
47 See Resolution 417 (1977) of 31 October 1977. 
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of the struggle of the South African people for the elimination of apartheid and 
for the establishment of the desired non-racial and democratic state in South 
Africa. More specifically, the resolution demanded that South Africa should take 
measures immediately to eliminate the policy of apartheid and grant to all 
South African citizens equal rights, including political rights, and a full and free 
voice in the determination of their destiny. 
These measures included: 
(a) granting of an unconditional amnesty to all persons imprisoned, restricted or 
exiled for their opposition to apartheid; 
(b) cessation forthwith of its indiscriminate violence against peaceful demonstrators 
against apartheid, murders in detention and torture of political prisoners; 
(c) abrogation of the bans on political parties and organisation and the new media 
opposed to apartheid; 
(d) termination of all political trials; 
(e) provision of equal education opportunities to all South Africans. 
This time it became absolutely clear the Security Council needed genuine 
negotiations between the South African government and leaders of the national 
liberation movements. In this regard it urgently called upon South Africa to 
release all political prisoners, including Nelson Mandela and all other black 
leaders with whom it had to deal in any meaningful discussion of the future of 
the country. 
Instead of taking the necessary steps to abolish apartheid and enter into 
genuine negotiations with the leaders of the national liberation movements, the 
South African government began to speed up the implementation of its policy 
of separate development, believing that it would be in line with international 
expectations in the field of self-determination and human rights. 48 To that end 
48 The implementation of this policy in terms of the Promotion of Black Self-Government 
Act (1959) began with the passage of the Transkei Constitution Act of 1963. This process was 
extended by the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act 21 of 1971, and culminated in the various 
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South Africa began to grant its Bantustans independence hoping that they 
would be recognised as independent states.49 On the contrary, the UN adopted 
a series of resolutions calling for the non-recognition of the Bantustans 
concerned. 
For instance, two days after the granting of independence to Transkei, the 
General Assembly adopted a resolution50 condemning "the establishment of 
Bantustans as designed to consolidate the inhuman policies of apartheid, to 
destroy the territorial integrity of the country, to perpetuate white minority 
domination and to dispossess the African people of South Africa of their 
inalienable rights", rejecting Transkei's "independence" as "invalid", and called 
upon all governments 'to deny any form of recognition to the so-called 
independent Transkei". 51 The following year, in response to the granting of 
independence to Bophuthatswana, the General Assembly again denounced 
Bantustans and called upon states to deny any form of recognition to the so-
called "independent" Bantustans. 52 When Venda became independent in 1979 
the President of the Security Council issued a statement reaffirming the 
inalienable rights of the African majority. 53 A similar statement was issued on 
the occasion of Ciskei's independence. This statement added to the reasons for 
the denunciation of "independent homelands" the fact that the homeland policy 
"seeks to create a class of foreign people in their own country". 54 
Subsequent resolutions of the General Assembly condemned homeland 
independence and called for their non-recognition. In one resolution the policy 
of "bantustanisation" and denationalisation of Africans was characterised as "an 
"Status Acts" in terms of which Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei became 
independent" states. 
49 See John Dugard Recognition and the United Nations (1987) 99. 
50 See Resolution 3 l/6A. · 
51 The call for non-recognition of Transkei was subsequently endorsed by the Security 
Council in Resolution 402 (1976). 
52 See Resolution 32/105N of 14 December 1977. 
53 The President of the Security Council issued a statement denouncing the "independence" 
of both Venda (S/13549 of 21 September 1979) and Ciskei (S/14794 of 15 December 1981). 
54 S 14 794. This statement was made at the 23 l 5th meeting of the Security Council that 
the existence of such "states" threatens international peace under Article 39 of the Charter. 
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international crime", 55 while another resolution on decolonisation declared that 
"bantustanisation is incompatible with the genuine independence, national 
unity and sovereignty". 56 None of these resolutions are mandatory under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter.57 However, it is obvious, first that they acquire 
binding force under article 25 of the Charter, in terms of the test enunciated by 
the International Court of Justice in its 1971 Opinion on Namibia58- and 
secondly, that arguably, the creation of homeland-states violates norms in 
international law dealing with self-determination and human rights, which have 
their basis in the Charter or custom, and that states are under general legal 
obligation to withhold recognition of such an illegality.59 In summary, the 
resolutions of both the Security Council and the General Assembly indicate 
clearly that the creation of the homeland states is contrary to several norms in 
the field of self-determination and human rights. 60 
Although South Africa is not a colonial power within the orthodox meaning of 
the term, it is evident from the foregoing resolutions and legal literature that it 
is a colonial state of a special type within the context of Resolution 1514(IX). 
South Africa became a self-determination unit under this resolution because in 
the African-Law context the subject of self-determination was delimited 
according to territorial criteria, namely, the existing colonial boundaries.61 So 
it was colonies (including South Africa), not traditional political units, that 
became independent. 62 
55 Resolution 37 /69A of 9 December 1982. 
56 Resolution 37/4f3 of 3 December 1982. 
57 As they are not preceded by any finding in the Security Council that the existence of 
such "states" threatens international peace under Article 39 of the Charter. 
58 See "Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)" ICJ Reports 16, 
62053. Also see Rosalyn Higgins "The Advisory on Namibia: Which United Nationals resolutions 
are binding under Article 22 of the charter?" 1972 21 ICLQ 270. 
59 See Henry J Richardson "Self-determination, International Law and the South African 
Bantustan Policy" 1978 1 7 Columbia Journal ofTransnational Law 185, 202-204. Also Konrad 
Ginther "DasAnerkennungsverbot derHomelands" 1980 23 German Yearbook of International 
Law323. 
60 See Dugard Recognition and the United Nations 103. 
61 See AJGM Sanders "The Swaziland Deal" and "The International Law Principle of the 
Self-determination of Peoples" October 1971 Codicillus 35. 
62 Ibid. 
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The resolutions calling for the non-recognition of homelands-states are also 
premised on the fact that South Africa is a self-determination unit. 63 The 
principal reasons for the non-recognition of these homeland-states are:64 
[ 1) That the granting of independence to the homeland-states violates the 
prohibition on the territorial fragmentation of self-determination units contained 
in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence of Colonial Countries of 
196065 and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations of 1970.66 The prescription that the right of self-
determination should be exercised without "disruption of the national unity and 
territorial integrity" of a self-determination unit67 has served as a guideline to the 
UN in its approach to the non-recognition of homeland-states. This is evident in 
the General Assembly resolution which condemn "the establishment of 
Bantustan as designed ... to destroy the territorial integrity of the country".68 
(2) That in the establishment of homeland-states the people of South Africa have 
been permitted to "freely determine their political status, as required by 
Resolution 1514 [XV) of 1960. More specifically, it is argued that the South 
African government violated the basic precept of self-determination enunciated 
by Judge Dillard in the Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara. The learned 
judge69 stated that "it is not for the people to determine the destiny of the 
people." This aspect of the denial of self-determination, though not mentioned 
in General Assembly or Security Council resolutions, is implied in the 
condemnation of Bantustan on the ground that they serve "to dispossess the 
African people of South Africa of their alienable rights. "70 This is reaffirmed by 
63 See Dugard Recognition and the United Nations 103. 
64 For a full discussion see Dugard Recognition and the United Nations 104-108. 
65 GA Res. 1514 (IX) of December 16 1960. 
66 GA Res. 2625 (XXV). 
67 See GA Res. 1514 (XV). 
68 See GA Res. 31/6A (1976) and 32/105N (1977). Also resolutions of the General Assembly 
adopted by the General Assembly before the independence of Transkei likewise appose the 
territorial fragmentation of South Africa: Resolution 2775E (XXVI) and 34/lD (XXX). 
69 See 1975 JCJ Reports 12, 122. 
70 See GA Res. 31/31/6A (1976 and 32/105N(l977}}. 
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the Declaration of Lagos 71 which denies that the 
homeland policy represents a genuine exercise self-determination. 
[3) That the establishment of the homeland-states furthers the goals of apartheid, 
a policy which has been characterised as unlawful or contrary to the Charter and 
basic norms of international court of justice,72 the political organs of the UN,73 
international conventions74 and thewritingsofjurists.75 Afurther ground, closely 
related to the above, advanced for non-recognition is that the creation of 
homeland-states violates a number of fundamental human rights. 76 
During the early eighties the UN intensified its efforts to counter the 
constitutional reforms of the South African government and to find an 
alternative constitutional settlement for South Africa. In 1980 the Security 
Council adopted a resolution 77 which located the desired constitutional 
settlement within the UN politico-level framework .. The Resolution reaffirmed 
the Security Council recognition of the legitimacy of the struggle of the South 
African people for the elimination of apartheid and the establishment of a 
democratic society in accordance with their inalienable human and political 
rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal 
71 It states: 
"The people concerned have not determined their political status or done so freely. the 
delineation of the territories, the allocation of the population to these territories and the 
political status of the Bantustan been solely determined by the white minority and its 
Parliament." 
See "Declaration of the Seminar on the Legal Status of the Apartheid Regime and Other Aspects 
of the Struggle against Apartheid" held at Lagos, Nigeria, from 13 to 16 August 1984 N39 423-
S/16709, at 7. 
72 See "Legal Consequences for States of Continue Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)" 1971 /CJ Report 
1971 57. 
73 For instance in 1970 the General Assembly affirmed that apartheid "is a crime against 
the conscience and dignity of mankind and, like Nazism, is contrary to the principles of the 
Charter"; GA Resolution 2627 (XXV). Today resolutions label apartheid as a crime against 
humanity and deny the "legitimacy" of the South African government. See GA Res. 
39.72A(l984). 
74 The International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 
Apartheid (1973) declares that "apartheid is a crime against humanity" and that inhuman acts 
resulting from the policies and practices of apartheid ... are crimes violating the principles of 
international law" (Art 1). The International Conventions on the Elimination of all forms of 
Racial Discrimination (1966) also condemns the policy of apartheid (Art 3). 
75 See Dugard Recognition and the United Nations 106. 
76 Ibid. 
77 See Resolution 473 (1980) of 13 June 1980. 
368 
Declaration of Human Rights.78 Furthermore, the Resolution reaffirmed that the 
policy of apartheid was a crime against the conscience and dignity of humanity 
and was incompatible with the rights and dignity of human personality, the 
Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
Under those circumstances, the Resolution recognised the legitimacy of the 
struggle of the South African people to eliminate the illegal Constitutional order 
based on the policy of apartheid and for the establishment of a democratic 
society in which all the people of South Africa as a whole, irrespective of race, 
colour or creed, will enjoy equal and full political and other rights and 
participate freely in the determination of their destiny. 
The Security Council observed that the violence and repression by the South 
African government and its continuing denial of equal human and political 
rights to the black majority aggravated the situation and thus called upon the 
South African government to create the necessary climate for a peaceful 
resolution of the conflict. More specifically, the Security Council called upon 
South Africa, first to take immediate measures to eliminate the policy of 
apartheid and grant to all South African citizens equal rights, including equal 
political rights, and a full and free voice in the determination of their destiny. 
Security Council's call upon the South African government to release all 
political prisoners, including Nelson Mandela and all other black leaders was a 
clear signal that the Security Council would not accept any constitutional 
settlement between the government and the Bantustan leaders. 
The cumulative effect of these resolutions totally delegitimized the South 
African constitutional order and legitimised the struggle of the majority of the 
people of South Africa led by their natural liberation movements. 
In other words, the South African government was reduced to a de facto 
government while the national liberation movements were given the right to 
overthrow it by any means possible, including armed struggle. 
78 See Resolution 38/11 of 15 November 1983. 
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Meanwhile popular resistance against apartheid and the international "de-
recognition" of the South African constitutional order threw South African into 
an unprecedented Constitutional crisis which shifted the balance of forces 
towards a democratisation transformation. 
In response to the constitutional proposals of 198379 which resulted in the 
tricameral parliamentary80 system the General Assembly adopted a resolution 
which solemnly declared that: 
" ... only the total eradication of apartheid and the establishment of a non-racial 
democratic society, based on majority rule, through the full and free exercise of 
adult suffrage by all the people in a united and non-fragmented South Africa lead 
to a just and lasting solution of the explosive situation in South Africa." 
Thus the General Assembly requested the Security Council to consider (as a 
matter of urgency) the serious implications of the so-called constitutional 
proposals and to take measures (in accordance with the UN Charter) to avert the 
further aggravation of tension and conflict in South Africa and in Southern 
Africa as a whole. 
The Security Council81 recalled earlier resolutions calling upon the South 
African government to abandon apartheid and seek a lasting solution within the 
UN constitutional framework and observed that the so-called new Constitution, 
approved on 2 November 1983 in a referendum by the white voters, excluded 
the indigenous African majority, depriving it of all fundamental rights, and 
further entrenched apartheid, transforming South Africa into a country for 
whites only. Thus the Security Council declared first, that the so-called new 
Constitution was contrary to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, 
secondly, that the results of the referendum of 2 November 1983 were of no 
79 See Resolution 473 (1980) of 13 June 1980. 
80 See Resolution 38/11 of 15 November 1983. 
81 See Security Council Resolution 554 (1984). 
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validity whatsoever and that the enforcement of the Constitution would further 
aggravate the situation. Thus the Security Council rejected and declared null 
and void the so-called "New Constitution" and the elections which were to be 
organised for the Coloured and Indian communities. 
Furthermore, the Security Council rejected any so-called negotiated settlement 
based on Bantustan structures or on the so-called "New Constitution" and 
affirmed the call of General Assembly82 for the total eradication of apartheid and 
the establishment of a non-racial democratic society based on majority rule, 
through the full and free exercise of universal adult suffrage by all the people 
in a united and unfragmented South Africa, could lead to a just and lasting 
solution of explosive situation in South Africa. Finally, the Security Council 
urged all governments and organisations not to recognise the results of the so-
called "elections" and to take appropriate action, in co-operation with the UN 
and OAU to assist the oppressed people of South Africa in their legitimate 
struggle for a non-racial and democratic society. Also, this resolution called for 
a settlement within an internationally acceptable constitutional framework. 
The African block in the UN opposed the 1983 South African Constitutional 
reforms which sought to entrench and perpetuate the apartheid system. This 
constitution, which had been endorsed by a white minority electorate declared 
the 24 million black South African aliens in their own country. It provided for 
the establishment of a so-called tricameral (i.e. three-house) Parliament- one for 
whites, one for coloureds and one for those of Asian origin. But blacks, 
according to the regime, did not deserve to have any kind of representation. 
Under the tricameral Constitution, each house would discuss its own matters. 
However, the house for whites had de facto and dejure control over general 
affairs (i.e. matters of mutual concern to all three houses) which control could 
not be challenged by the coloureds and the people of Asian origins since the 
82 See note 79 supra. 
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seats in the Parliament had been distributed in such a way that the whites were 
always able to retain a parliamentary majority. Thus, the so-called New 
Constitution effectively created a tri-racial based constitution that excluded the 
African majority in violation of the principles of equality and self-determination 
of all the people of South African both black and white. 83 In other words, the 
1983 Constitution violated the UN Charter and Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights as well as the internationally acceptable Lusaka Manifesto of 1969. 84 
Thus the UN correctly declared the 1983 Constitution null and void and of no 
consequence. 85 This declaration therefore reduced the South African 
government to a de facto government. 
Nevertheless, the regime continued to defend its constitutional reforms on 
grounds that a substantial percentage of the African population (referring to the 
TBVC States) had themselves opted for political independence. The regime 
regarded this as the clearest possible manifestation of the right of African people 
to self-determination and argued that the time had come to include in the 
overall pattern of multi-national development and co-operative co-existence of 
the coloured and the Indian people in the decision-making process in a 
meaningful way. In line with this confederal Constitutional principle, the regime 
stated that this Constitutional architecture has been given a horizontal and 
vertical aspect which spread political power across the country's communities 
through the autonomous institutions in their national states, to the African 
people and through the new tricameral Parliament to Coloured and Indian 
communities. That the Constitutional dispensation delegated political power 
downwards from the first to the third tier/level of government. To that end, 
legislation had been passed granting black local government power ostensibly 
the same as those of white local authorities. 86 
83 See UN Chronicle vol. XXI number 6/1984 at 12. 
84 For a discussion on the Lusaka Manifesto see par. 5.3 infra. 
85 However, one German writer took the view that the UN did not have the authority to 
nullify the South African Constitution. See Klaus Stern "The South African Constitution -
external appraisal" in 1985 TSAR 260 et seq. 
86 See the Black Local Authorities Act 102 of 1982. 
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The General Assembly saw through those constitutional manoeuvres and not 
only confirmed its 1983 Resolution, 87 but also requested the Security Council 
to consider the serious situation that resulted from the imposition of the so-
called New Constitution and to take all necessary measures to avert the further 
aggravation of tension and conflict in South Africa. Responding to that request, 
the Security Council88 confirmed its 1983 Resolution in more definite and 
emphatic terms. First, the resolution declared the so-called New Constitution 
contrary to the principles of the UN Charter and re-affirmed the provisions of 
the Universal Declaration of Human rights, particularly article 21, paragraph 1 
and 3, which recognised: 
# the right of every person to take part in the government of his or her country, 
directly or through freely chosen representatives; and 
# that the will of the people was the basis of the authority of the government. 
Hence, the Security Council commended the massive united resistance of the 
oppressed people of South Africa and, in particular, the Indian and Coloured 
communities for their full-scale boycott of the elections held under the so-called 
New Constitution. Then the resolution re-affirmed the legitimacy of the struggle 
of the people of South Africa for the full exercise of their right to self-
determination and the establishment of non-racial democratic society in an 
unfragmented South Africa. 
Finally, the Security council re-affirmed that the eradication of apartheid and 
the establishment of a non-racial, democratised society based on majority rule, 
through the full and free exercise of adult suffrage by all the people in a united 
and fragmented South Africa - could lead to a just, equitable and lasting 
solution of the South African conflict. Also, the Security Council reaffirmed its 
call upon all governments and organisations to take appropriate action within 
the international framework to assist the oppressed people of South Africa in 
87 See GA Res. 39/2 adopted on the 28th September 1984. 
88 See Security Council Resolution 556 (1984). 
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their legitimate struggle for the full exercise of the right to self-determination, 
for that purpose, the Security demanded the immediate eradication of apartheid 
and the necessary step towards the full exercise of the right of self-
determination in an unfragmented South Africa. 
To achieve these, the Security Council renewed its call for the removal of 
obstacles to a negotiated constitutional settlement in South Africa. More 
specifically it demanded: 
[a) The dismantling of the Bantustan structures as well as the cessation of 
uprooting, relocation and denationalisation of the indigenous African people; 
[b) The abrogation of bans and restrictions on political organisations, parties, 
individuals and news media oppressed to apartheid; and 
[c) The unimpeded return of all exiles. 
The cumulative effect of these resolutions totally delegitimized the South 
African Constitutional order and legitimised the struggle of the majority of the 
people of South Africa led by their National liberation movements. In other 
words, the South African government was reduced to a de facto government 
while the national liberation movements were given the right to overthrow it by 
any means possible, including armed struggle. 
6.1.1.1 South Africa and the Organisation of African Unity's 
Decolonisation Strategy 
The emergence of the United Nations system during the forties reinforced 
African struggle for their right of self-determination and equal rights. This 
resulted in the achievement of independence by a large number of African 
colonial territories and the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 
in 1963,89 when the OAU was formed the UN had already moved away from its 
89 See Zdenek Cervenka The Organisation of African Unity and its Charter (1969) 1 et seq. 
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colonialistic conception of international law embodied in Article 73 of the UN 
charter which speaks of the "progressive development of their free political 
institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its 
peoples and their varying stages of advancement. "90 This principle of 
"gradualism" was reversed after the Sharpeville massacre by the Declaration on 
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. 91 This 
declaration signified the radicalisation of the principle of self-determination in 
the context of decolonisation. This radicalisation which occurred largely as a 
response to the situation in South African meant a departure from the principle 
of gradualism. Henceforth, decolonisation would be speeded up, self-
detennination became an international legal right and the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of the people became normative basics for the 
establishment of African states within the framework of the UN and the OAU.92 
Within this framework, matters concerning the protection of human rights and 
the right of peoples to decide their destiny in a colonial or quasi-colonial (e.g. 
South Africa) context no longer belonged to the internal affairs of states. 93 
The charter of the OAU is couched in terms that licences it to interfere in the 
affairs of colonial and quasi-colonial countries. For instance, one of the major 
purposes of the OAU was to eradicated all forms of colonialism in Africa and 
each member state solemnly pledged their adherence to the principle of the total 
emancipation of the African territories which were still dependent. 94 
According to these objectives and principles the OAU confirmed from the very 
beginning South Africa was disqualified from becoming a member of the OAU, 
90 See Konrad Ginther "The question of legitimacy of the South African Government from 
the point of view of International Law" in Christine Lienemann-Perrin & Wolgang Lienemann 
(eds.) Political Legitimacy in South Africa (1988) 58-61. 
91 See note 65 supra. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. 
94 See Article III. 
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not because it was not an independent and sovereign state, but because it did 
not meet the criteria oflegitimacy based on the post World War II concept of the 
Rule of Law.95 
Instead the OAU, like the UN, recognised the national liberation movements 
(viz. the ANC and PAC) as the legitimate representatives of the African peoples 
struggling for their right of self-determination. This special nature of South 
African colonialism forced the OAU, like the UN, to adopt the interpretation of 
the right of self-determination embodied in the Freedom Charter which 
extended this rights to all the people of South Africa both black and white. 96 
This interpretation informed the OAU decolonisation strategy of South Africa. 
In 1969 independent East and Central African States adopted the Lusaka 
Manifesto setting out their policy towards colonialism and white minority rule 
in Southern Africa. The signatories of the manifesto embraced the right of self-
determination and equal rights contained in the UN Charter and Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. 97 Furthermore, the manifesto specifically stated, 
first, their belief that all men have equal rights to human dignity and respect, 
regardless of colour, race, religion or sex. 98 Secondly, that all men have the right 
and the duty to participate as equal members of the society, in their own 
government, and thirdly, that no individual or group has any right to govern 
any other group of adults, without their consent, and further affirmed that only 
the people of a society, acting together as equals, can determine what is, for 
them, a good society and a good social, economic, or political organisation. 
The signatories to the Lusaka Manifesto committed themselves to work for the 
right of self-determination of peoples under colonial and racist regimes in 
Southern Africa. 
95 See Chapter 3 supra. 
96 Ibid. 
97 See Louis B. Sohn (ed.) Basic Documents of African Regional Organisations vol. 7 (1971) 
141 et seq. 
98 See par 2. 
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In line with this stand, they also opposed any kind of racialist majority-
government which adopted a philosophy of deliberate and permanent 
discrimination between its citizens on the grounds of racial origin. 
To resolve the racial conflicts in Southern Africa the Lusaka Manifesto 
demanded an opportunity for all the people of South Africa, working together 
as equal individual citizens (not groups), to work out for themselves the 
institutions and systems of government under which they will, by general 
consent, live together and work together to build a harmonious society.99 
The Manifesto acknowledged white minority fears and the need to accommodate 
such fears in any interim arrangements towards a new Constitution. However, 
it was made abundantly clear that any constitutional arrangements within the 
countries concerned which wished to be accepted into the Community of 
Nations had to be based on an acceptance of the principles of human dignity 
and equality. In other words, these prerequisites for freedom and justice formed 
that basis of a regionally (African) acceptable constitutional order. 100 
Furthermore, the Lusaka Manifesto accepted the colonial territories of South 
Africa and Rhodesia as whole self-determination units. This position 
presupposed the total rejection of Bantustan programme in South Africa and 
Namibia. 
Although the OAU supported the national liberation movements in their 
struggle against colonial and racist regimes, the Manifesto urged the peoples of 
Southern Africa living under colonial and racist rule to use peaceful methods of 
struggle even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change. Like the 
UN and OAU, the East and Central African States did not consider the principle 
of non-interference in the internal affairs of members states as relevant. In their 
manifesto, therefore, they stated that in the case of South Africa, the 
99 This paragraph endorsed the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples 1514 (XV). 
100 In other words, the Lusaka Manifesto indigenised the Post World War II politico-legal 
values. 
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international community had a responsibility to assist the victims of apartheid 
in defence of humanity itself. 
Consequently the signatories to the Manifesto asserted that the validity of the 
principles of human equality and dignity extended to South Africajust as they 
did to other colonial territories of Southern Africa and embraced these principles 
as prerequisites for a peaceful development which every nation and state must 
make a deliberate attempt to implement. Finally, the signatories to the 
Manifesto reaffirmed their commitment to the principles of human dignity, self-
determination and non-racialism and their resolve to work for the extension of 
these principles within their own nations and throughout the continent. In the 
same year ( 1969) the Lusaka Manifesto was endorsed by the Heads of State and 
government of the OAU as well as the General Assembly of the United Nations 
which recommended it to the attention of all states. Subsequently, African 
states unanimously agreed that all the peoples of Southern Africa (including 
South Africa) have a right to self-determination and that a policy of racial 
discrimination was contrary to the adopted standards of international law. 101 
In 1975 the OAU adopted the Declaration of Dar-Es-Salaam on Southern Africa 
which reaffirmed the Lusaka Manifesto and their belief in a peaceful resolution 
of the conflicts in Southern Africa. In the Dar-Es-Salaam Declaration the OAU 
adopted a new strategy on apartheid. First it reaffirmed that the OAU, like the 
UN, was dedicated to the principle of full equality for the people of South Africa, 
irrespective of race or colour. Secondly, it refused to acquiesce the denial of 
human equality and human dignity which was represented by the system of 
apartheid and reiterated that, like the UN, it opposed the regime in South 
Africa, not because it was white, but because it rejected and fought against the 
principles of human equality and national self-determination. Finally the 
Declaration reaffirmed the OAU's total rejection of apartheid in all of its 
manifestations, including Bantustans. Henceforth, the OAU lent its support to 
South Africa's National liberation movements through its liberation committee. 
101 See AJGM Sanders "The Swaziland Land deal" and "The International Law Principle of 
Self-determination of Peoples" 35. 
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6.1.1.2 General Conclusions 
The post-World War II politico-legal order inextricably linked the rule of law, 
democracy and human rights and made them applicable to all member states 
whether or not they participated actively in the evolution of the rules of 
customary international law in question. Thus South Africa, whose credentials 
were only suspended in 197 4, had all the time been obliged to respect and 
adjust her legal order to the international human rights law. Hence, the 
sustained efforts of the UN to extend the right to political participation to all the 
people of South Africa regardless of race or colour did not fall within the 
domestic jurisdiction clause which outlawed interference in the internal affairs 
of member states. It is therefore submitted that the UN and OAU have always 
had the right to intervene in South African affairs on behalf of the black 
majority that lived under racist rule. 
The difference between South Africa and other colonies, such as Zimbabwe and 
Namibia, however, was that South Africa was already an independent state and 
member of the UN. Thus the UN defence of the right of self-determination and 
equal rights in South Africa was not strictly speaking an act of decolonisation 
as the British, the colonial power, had already granted independence to South 
Africa. The case of South Africa, therefore, was not about the transfer of power 
to the indigenous black majority, but the extension of the right to participate in 
government and equal rights for all the people of South Africa, black and white. 
In other words, South Africa was obliged to adjust her legal and constitutional 
order to meet international requirements for political legitimacy. 
6.1.2 
6.1.2.1 
The Impact of International Human Rights Law on the South 
African Legal System 
Background 
The relationship between domestic legitimacy and international law was 
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established by the United Nations Charter as a result of the horrors of World 
War II. 102 This development brought human rights and state legitimacy into 
direct focus. World War II gave conclusive evidence of the close relationship 
between the outrageous behaviour of a government towards its own citizens and 
the core concerns of international law, namely, the protection of human rights 
and the maintenance of international peace and security. For the first time, the 
international community not only recognised the nexus between the State's 
internal behaviour and broader interests of humanity, but also incorporated it 
in the preamble of the UN Charter which reaffirmed the faith of member states 
in fundamental human rights in the dignity and worth of the human person and 
in the equal rights of men and women. 103 
The notion of a crime against humanity which emerged from the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg affirmed the existence of certain fundamental 
human rights and principles superior to the law of the state and protected by 
international criminal sanctions, even if their violation was in pursuance of the 
law of the State. 104 One of the most important human rights that emerged after 
World War II was the right to participate in government. The institutionalisation 
of the policy of apartheid in 1948 violated this fundamental right. As we saw 
above, 105 the UN opposed the policy of apartheid from the outset. In response 
to the charge that apartheid unfairly discriminated against blacks, South Africa 
claimed that apartheid was a purely domestic matter which fell outside the 
competence of the UN, and that Article 2(7) of the UN Charter was an absolute, 
overriding provision which took precedence over the human rights provisions. 106 
That response was untenable as the UN Charter had established a clear and 
definite link between the State legitimacy and the policy of apartheid in South 
Africa as it did Nazism and state legitimacy in Germany. This link found a 
102 See Chapter 3 par. 3.3.2.2 supra. 
103 See Dugard International Law: a South African Perspective (1994) 200. 
104 Ibid. 
105 See Chapter 6 par. 5.2 supra. 
106 Ibid. Also see Dugard International Law 18. 
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definite and more emphatic expression in the Declaration on Decolonisation and 
the 1966 Covenants which established a direct link between the right to political 
participation and the right to self-determination. 107 Furthermore, both the 
Universal Declaration and the 1966 Covenants guaranteed the right to political 
participation which apartheid denied to the majority of South Africans. Article 
21 of the Universal Declaration provided that: 
"[t]he will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this 
will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by 
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent 
free voting procedures." 
Similarly, Article 25 of the ICCPR stated that: 
"every person shall have the right and opportunity without any distinction 
mentioned in Article 21 and without unreasonable restrictions: 
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs directly of indirectly or through 
freely chosen representatives; 
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by 
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot guaranteeing the 
free expression of the will of the electors ... ". 
South Africa claimed that, through her policy of separate development, she was 
striving for the peaceful realisation of self-determination and majority rule. 108 
Quite clearly, the South African interpretation of the right of self-determination 
differed from that of the international community. As we saw above, 109 a 
succession of resolutions by the General Assembly and the Security Council had 
107 See Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of 
16 December 1960. 
108 See Dugard International Law 77-78. 
109 Ibid and par. 5.2 supra. 
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stated that the South African government was breaching the right of self-
determination by its policy of apartheid, including the establishment of 
Bantustans. The international community applied the right of self-determination 
to South Africa as her policy of apartheid was a means whereby Africans, 
Coloureds and Indians were subject to subjugation, domination and exploitation 
by the white government. Moreover, this policy was declared a crime against 
humanity. Hence, the UN linked the right of self-determination and the policy 
of apartheid and took the view that the domestic jurisdiction clause 2(7) of the 
UN Charter did not apply to South Africa. Thus it could be argued that if South 
Africa had signed the ICCPR, it would have been obliged to adapt its legal order 
to establish institutions, laws and procedures in order to conform to 
international human rights norms, as article 2(2) of the ICCPR contains an 
incorporation clause which reads: 
"Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each 
state party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in 
accordance with its Constitutional processes and with the provisions of the 
present Covenant, to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be 
necessary to give effect to the rights recognised in the present Covenant." 
During the nineties, the UN General Assembly began to translate its concern for 
electoral politics into reality. In Resolution 45/150 of 18 December 1990, it 
requested the UN Secretary-General to seek the views of member states and 
other bodies concerning suitable approaches that would permit the UN to 
respond to the requests of members states for electoral assistance. Following the 
report of the Secretary-General, the UN General Assembly adopted a Resolution 
entitled Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine 
Elections. 110 This Resolution dealt another deadly blow to South Africa by re-
emphasising that under the UN Charter all states enjoy sovereignty and 
equality, and that each state, in accordance with the will of all its people, is 
110 See GA Resolution 46/137 1991. 
382 
entitled to freely choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural 
system. The Resolution did not only reaffirm the right of self-determination of 
all the peoples within a self-determination unit such as South Africa, but also 
reiterated and re-emphasised the conviction that periodic and genuine elections 
were a necessary and indispensable element of sustained efforts to protect the 
rights and interests of the governed. Finally, the General Assembly expressed 
the linkage between the right to participate in government and enjoyment of 
human rights in general in clear and definite terms: 111 
" ... the right of everyone to take part in the government of his or her country is 
a crucial factor in the effective enjoyment by all of a wide range of other human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, embracing political, economic, social and 
cultural rights." 
In practical terms, South Africa failed to pass this test in that her electoral 
process did not provide all the people (both black and white) an equal 
opportunity to become candidates and put forward their political views, either 
individually or in co-operation with others. In other words, the right of self-
determination in the South African context belonged to all the people, not to 
groups. 
From the point of international law, the right to political participation and 
periodic elections have become a basic feature of democratic governance. They 
have crystallised out as norms of customary international law. Hence, the UN 
has observed several elections since World War II. These observer missions took 
place in both dependent and independent countries, e.g. Zambia, Angola, 
Namibia. A number of principles and standards emerged from these observer 
missions. They include the requirements that elections must be: (a) free from 
discrimination towards or against voters and candidates; (b) held at reasonable 
times and intervals; (c) be by secret ballot and (d) be based on universal and 
u1 Ibid. 
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equal suffrage. These principles have become rooted in international law 
through repeated reaffirmation by the General Assembly, overwhelming support 
thereof by the majority of states, regional and international organisations. 112 
6.1.2.2 The Reception of the International Concept of a Bill of Rights 
in South Africa 
As shown above, 113 the reception of customary international law in South Africa 
was inhibited by the invocation of the domestic jurisdiction clause by the South 
African authorities. This standard defence met with UN resistance from the 
outset. In 1946 the Economic and Social Council 114 established the Commission 
on Human Rights to give substance to international human rights. The task115 
of the Commission was to make proposals and recommendations and to submit 
reports regarding the following matters: (a) an international bill rights; (b) 
international declarations or agreements regarding civil rights, the legal position 
of women, freedom of information etc.; (c) the protection of minorities; and (d) 
the prevention of discrimination on grounds of race, sex, language or religion. 
The activities of the Commission resulted in the adoption by the General 
Assembly of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on 10 December 1948. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UD) gave substance to the concept 
of human rights, in particular to the human rights provision of the UN 
Charter116 and formed part of what became known as the International Bill of 
Rights. This Bill consists of four major United Nations legal instruments, 
namely: (a) the Universal DeclBfation of Human Rights of 1948; (b) the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966; (c) the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 and (e) the First 
112 See Rwelamira and Ailola "International Monitoring of Free and Fair Elections" in 
Steytler et al Free and Fair Elections (1994) 270. 
113 See par. 5.2 supra. 
114 Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter. 
115 Article 62 of the UN Charter. 
116 In terms of article 68 of the UN Charter. 
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Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 
1966. These legal instruments define and guarantee the protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. 
South Africa is a co-author of the International Bill of Rights. The second clause 
of the preamble of the UN Charter, which contains the first explicit reference to 
human rights, was drafted by a former South African Prime Minister, Field 
Marshall Jan Smuts. At the 6th plenary session (1 May 1948) of the San 
Francisco Conference at which the UN Charter was drafted, Field Marshal 
Smuts117 reportedly suggested "that the Charter should contain at its very 
outset, and in the preamble, a declaration of human rights and of common faith 
which had sustained the Allied Peoples in their bitter and prolonged struggle for 
the vindication of these rights and that faith ... we have fought for justice and 
decency and for the fundamental freedoms and rights of man, which are basic 
to all human advancement and progress and peace." 
In 1946 when South Africa was challenged to treat its Indian citizens in 
conformity with the relevant provisions of the UN Charter, 118 Smuts took the 
view that the provisions concerned did not create any special obligations for UN 
members. Smuts based this view on the absence of a widely accepted definition 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 119 In 1948 the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights provided the necessary definition, making this 
Declaration the basic international statement of the inalienable and inviolable 
rights of all members of the human family. The Declaration clearly intended to 
serve as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and Nations in an 
effort to secure universal and effective recognition and observance of the rights 
and freedoms of all. Thus the Declaration provided the definition that Smuts 
sought as a prerequisite to the enforceability of human rights. South Africa 
however continued to ignore its obligations in this regard and instead 
117 Economic and Social Council Resolution 5 (1) of 5 February 1946. 
118 Articles 1 and 55. 
119 Titus The Applicability of the International Human Rights Norms to the South African 
legal System 153 note 5. 
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introduced its policy of apartheid which institutionalised racism, discrimination, 
sexism and the forcible denial of the right of self-determination to the majority 
of its people. 
For many decades South Africa refused to become a party to any of the 
recognised international human rights instruments. For instance, South Africa 
is not a party to both the Political and Economic Covenants which provide for 
the right of self-determination and the protection of specified rights and 
freedoms. 120 Both Covenants have provisions barring all forms of discrimination 
in the exercise of human rights and have the force of law for the countries 
which ratify them. 
As shown above, 121 the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) protects economic, social and cultural rights such as the right 
of every human person to work and to free choice of employment; to fair wages; 
to form and join labour unions; to social security; to an adequate standard of 
living; to freedom from hunger; to health and education. States that have 
, ratified this Covenant acknowledge their responsibility to promote better living 
conditions for all their people, regardless of race, colour or creed. The Covenant 
imposes a responsibility on governments to see to employment opportunities, 
a social security system, housing, education, health etc. Quite naturally South 
Africa could not have accepted such a responsibility without negating its racist 
policies. 
The first generation rights are couched in peremptory (mandatory) language 
while the second generation rights are couched in permissive language. 122 That 
12° For instance, article 55(c) whereby the members of the UN (including South Africa) 
committed themselves to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. 
121 See Chapter 3 par. 3.2.4 supra. See also Newell M Stulz "Evolution of the United Nations 
Anti-apartheid regime" in 13 Human Rights Quarterly (1991) 2-3. 
122 The first generation rights are formulated as "Everyone has the right to ... "; "All persons 
... "and "Anyone ... "etc., while the second generation are formulated as "Each State Party ... 
undertakes to ... " and "The State Parties ... recognise ... ". 
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is, the first generation rights impose duties on governments whilst the second 
generation rights are merely a common standard of achievement and are not 
directly applicable to the individual. However, this cannot be said without 
qualification. 
Article 2(3) of the ICECSR stipulates that the rights in the Covenant will be 
exercised without discrimination of any kind. It is therefore possible to submit 
discriminatory practices in terms of the rights under the Covenant in National 
(or municipal) courts. Thus article 2(3) provides a detour for the justiciability of 
the human rights provisions of the Covenant. This found support in Dutch case 
law. In the Broeks Case123 the issue was whether legislation providing for social 
security violated the prohibition against discrimination contained in article 26 
of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
guarantee given therein to all persons regarding equal and effective protection 
against discrimination. The Committee answered the questioned positively and 
ordered the Dutch Government to offer Mrs Broeks an appropriated remedy. In 
the Zwaan Case124 the Committee observed that the Covenant did not establish 
social security schemes, but that once these were established, only distinctions 
based on reasonable and objective criteria were allowed. In its General 
Comment 3 of 1990 the Committee of Experts125 expressed the justiciability of 
some human rights provisions of the ICESCR in more definite and emphatic 
terms. 126 
123 Broeks v The Netherlands Communication no 1 72/1984. 2 Selected Decisions of the 
Human Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol (October 1982 - April 1998), United 
Nations (New York - 1990) 196 -201. 
124 Zwaan de Vries v The Netherlands Communication 182/1984. Ibid 209-214. 
125 The Committee of Experts was elected by the Economic and Social Council to monitor 
compliance with states Parties obligations under the ICESCR. 
126 It stated: 
"Among the measures which might be considered appropriate, in addition to legislation, 
is the provision of judicial remedies with respect to rights which may, in accordance 
with the National legal system, be considered justiciable. The Committee notes, for 
example, that the enjoyment of the rights recognised without discrimination, will often 
be appropriately promoted, in part, through the provision of judicial or other effective 
remedies. Indeed, those State parties which are also parties to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are already obligated (by virtue of articles 2(1), 
2(3), 3 and 26) of that Covenant to ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms 
(including the right to equality and non-discrimination) recognised in that Covenant are 
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The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights deals with the so-called 
classical rights, generally known as the first generation rights which require 
governments not to interfere in the private life of the individual (i.e. it places a 
negative commitment on the government concerned). As shown above, 127 the 
rights involved are, inter alia, the right of every human person to life, liberty 
and security of person; to privacy; to freedom from cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment and from torture; to freedom from slavery; to immunity from 
retroactive sentences; to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; to freedom 
of opinion and expression; to liberty of movement, including the right to 
emigrate; to peaceful assembly and to freedom of association. 
The Covenant also has a First Optional Protocol 128 which provides for 
individuals tinder certain circumstances to file complaints of human rights 
violations by ratifying states. That is, individuals are entitled to file complaints 
against their governments in case of alleged violations. The complaints are then 
considered by the Human Rights Committee. As South Africa has not ratified 
the Covenant this right of recourse was not available to South African citizens 
under the apartheid regime. 
6.1.2.3 South African Concepts of a Bill of Rights and the 
International Bill of Rights 
As shown in Chapter III, the end of World War II heralded a new era in which 
racial discrimination and the denial of human rights were no longer accepted 
violated, shall have effective remedy." (Article 2(3)(a)). In addition, there are a number 
of other provisions, in the Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, including 
articles 3, 7(a)(l), 8, 10(3), 13(2)(a), 13(3), 13(4) and 15(3) which would seem to be 
capable of immediate application by judicial and other organs in many National legal 
systems. Any suggestion that the provisions indicated are inherently non-self-executing 
would seem to be difficult to sustain. See Phillips Alston "The International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" in Manual on Human Rights Reporting UN 
Centre for Human Rights, and UN Institute for Training and Research Geneva, UN (New 
York 1991) 39-77. 
127 See Chapter 3 par. 3.2.4 supra. 
128 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by GA Resolution 2200 A 
(XXI) of 16 December 1966. 
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as matters of exclusive domestic concern. 129 More specifically, the UN Charter 
(unlike the Covenant of the League of Nations) internationalised human rights130 
while the Universal Declaration of Human Rights spelled out these rights in 
more definite and emphatic terms. South Africa refused to endorse the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Nonetheless, the Declaration 
strengthened the hand of domestic and international anti-apartheid 
organisations. Thus as the policy of apartheid began to unfold opponents of 
apartheid placed human rights on their political agenda's. 131 For instance, in 
1955 the Congress Alliance convened and adopted a Freedom Charter which 
was amongst the most advanced documents of its time. This document spelled 
out in clear and coherent language, economic and social rights that were only 
to become internationally agreed upon in the sixties and people's rights that 
were only to be formulated in the seventies and eighties. 132 While domestic and 
international organisations advanced in terms of human rights South Africa 
retreated into the policy of apartheid which invoked the law and legal 
institutions to promote racial discrimination and political repression. This abuse 
of state authority resulted in the Constitutional Crisis of the fifties. 133 In the 
wake of the Constitutional Crisis and the suppression of the ANC-led Congress 
Alliance following the 1956 Treason Trial, interest in a bill of rights was revived 
by the Molteno Commission of Enquiry134 established by the newly formed 
Progressive Federal Party. The Molteno Commission found that a sovereign 
Parliament was inappropriate to South Africa and recommended a bill of rights, 
protected by judicial review in a federal South Africa. The approval of the 
Molteno recommendations by the Progressive Federal Party made a bill of rights 
and judicial review important part of the South African constitutional/political 
debate. 
129 Also see John Dugard "Changing Attitudes Towards a Bill of Rights in South Africa" 
Centre for Applied Legal Studies, University of Witwatersrand, 1994 5 et seq. 
130 See Articles 1 and 55 of the UN Charter. 
131 See John Dugard "A Bill of Rights for South Africa" in Cornell International Law 
Journal (Vol. 23) 446. 
132 Ibid. 
133 See John Dugard Human rights and the South African Legal Order (1978) chapter 2. 
134 See Molteno Commission Report on Franchise Proposals and Constitutional Safeguards 
(1960). 
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The Progressive Federal Party and the Natal Provincial Council made attempts 
to introduce a Bill of Rights into the Republican Constitution of 1961 which was 
rejected by the black majority as it excluded them from participation in the 
political process. The liberal forces failed dismally as the National Party 
government was not interested in the general protection of rights and liberties, 
except for those of the chosen few. During the sixties and seventies the NP 
government passed repressive security laws that authorised indefinite detention 
without trial. Thousands of persons were detained, others were tortured, and 
some fifty detainees died in suspicious circumstances. 135 During the seventies 
a new human rights movement towards the adoption of a universally accepted 
concept of a bill of human rights began to emerge. In 1970 the then Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Mr RF (Pik) Botha expressed his regret in his maiden speech in 
the House of Assembly that the South African government had failed to support 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and suggested that South 
Africa should identify itself to a greater extent with the Declaration. 136 
That shift towards universal accepted human rights was sparked off by the 
development of international human rights law which culminated in two land 
mark international judicial decisions. First, in the Barcelona Traction Case137 
the International Court of Justice held, inter alia, that the rule against racial 
discrimination entailed obligations erga omnes of all states in the world. In the 
Namibia Case138 of 1971 the International Court of Justice found that because 
South Africa had applied apartheid in South West Africa/Namibia the Security 
Council had lawfully terminated the Mandate under which South Africa had 
been administering the territory. The Court also held that all states (including 
those who are not members of the United Nations) were barred erga omnes 
from acting as though South Africa was in lawful control of South West 
135 e.g. Steve Biko who died while in police custody in 1977. 
136 See House of Assembly Debates vol. 29 Cols. 2164-6 (21August1970). 
137 See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Ltd (Belgium v Spain)(second 
phase) 1970 /CJ 3, 32 (pars. 33-34). 
138 See Advisory Opinion Legal Consequences for States of the continued Presence of 
South Africa in Namibia(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 
76(1970), 1971 ICJ 1.56 (par 126). 
390 
Africa/Namibia. The effect of these decisions was that apartheid and racial 
discrimination were regarded under international law as constituting a violation 
of the norms of ius cogens. 139 
The repression of the second half of the seventies intensified the human-rights 
debate within South Africa itself. The first national conference on human rights 
was held in Cape Town in 1979. At that Conference Mr Louis Henkin, 140 an 
international human rights expert, advocated the Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights as a framework over within which to begin, as opposed to the 
United States Constitution 141 which was revered by the liberal forces which 
advocated a bill of rights for South Africa. While echoing the call of South 
African liberals for the adoption of a bill of rights Mr Henkin 142 cautioned that 
a bill of rights was no better that what was in it. He thus commended that 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as being a better text on 
which to draw, better than the United States Constitution. 143 
The Cape Town conference brought human rights into the centre-stage of the 
Constitutional debate that preceded the adoption of the 1983 Constitution. In 
this debate the concept of a bill of human rights featured prominently and 
enjoyed support not only from the liberals, 144 but also from some Afrikaner 
jurists. 145 The heated human-rights debate notwithstanding, in 1982 the 
139 See J Dugard Recognition and the United Nations 156-58; J Crawford The Creation of 
States in International Law (1979} 226-27 and Johan van der Vyver "Statehood in International 
law" 5 1991 Emory International Law Review 84-88. 
140 See Louis Henkin "International Instruments for the Protection of Human Rights" in 
Forsyth and Schiller (eds.) Human Rights: the Cape Town Coriference (1979) 224-235. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Ibid. 
143 It is interesting to note that the US government only ratified the International Covenant 
on Civil and political Rights on 8 June 1992 and that it has not yet ratified the International 
Covenant on Economic, social and Cultural Rights which imposes a responsibility on 
governments to safeguard the rights of their Citizens to jobs, education, housing, and an 
adequate standards of living. See Jimmy Carter (US President 1977-1980) "US Finally ratifies 
human rights covenant" in Christian Science Monitor (CH) Monday June 29 (1992) 19. 
144 See Corbett "Human Rights : The Road ahead" 1979 South African Law Journal 
192,201. 
145 See SC Jacobs (ed.) 'n Nuwe Grondwetlike Bedeling in Suid Afrika (1981) 51. 
391 
Constitutional Committee of the President's Council published a report146 which 
showed quite clearly that the government did not accept the idea of a bill of 
rights protected by judicial review. They rejected it on the ground that it was 
based on a humanist philosophy which emphasised individual rights whereas 
the Afrikaner with his Calvinist background was more inclined to place the 
emphasis on the State and its maintenance. Thus the South Africa 
Constitutional Bill (passed on 9 September 1983) did not include a bill of 
rights. 147 In 1984 the then Minister of Justice, Kobie Coetsee justified the 
omission of a bill of rights from the 1983 Constitution on grounds similar to 
those of Field Marshall Smuts, namely the undefinable nature of human 
rights. 148 These grounds were unsound as the Universal Declaration and the two 
Covenants had subsequently defined and elaborated the on the concept of a bill 
of human rights. 
Meanwhile, according to widely held belief, popular and international pressures 
had begun to force the South African government to reconsider its position. 
Consequently on 23 April 1986 Mr Kobie Coetsee announced in Parliament that 
he had instructed the South African Law Commission to investigate and to 
make recommendations on the definition and protection of group rights in the 
South African Constitutional dispensation and the possible extension of existing 
protection of individual rights, as well as role courts of law could play in that 
regard. 149 
The announcement caused scepticism in legal circles150 as the government, and 
146 See Second Report of the Constitutional Committee of the President's Council PC 
4/1982, chapter 9, par 9.10. 
147 See 108 Hansard Cols. 11181-494 [August (1983) 15-17). 
148 See Titus The Applicability of the International Human Rights norms to the South 
African Legal system (1994) 157. Also see (the then Minister of Justice) Coetsee "Hoekom nie 
'n Verklaring van Menseregte nie ?"in 1984 Tydskrif vir Regswetenskap 5. 
149 See House of Assembly Debates (23 April 1986) Cols. 4014-15. The announcement 
caused scepticism in legal circles. See Dugard "A Bill of Rights for South Africa: can a Leopard 
change its spots?" 2 1986 South African Journal on Human Rights 275. 
150 See Johan van der Westhuizen "Constitutional Options for Post-Apartheid South Africa" 
in 40 1991 Emory Law Journal 3 755 and Dugard "A Bill of Rights for South Africa: Can the 
Leopard change its spots" in 1986 South African Journal on Human Rights 275. 
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Mr Coetsee in particular, were well known opponents of the idea of a bill of 
human rights. 151 The unexpected endorsement of the idea of a Bill of Rights and 
the emphasis on group rights indicated that the government had laboured 
under the misconception that White privileges and political domination could 
be guaranteed under the auspices of a bill of rights. 152 
The announcement of Mr Coetzee was followed by the Pretoria Human-Rights 
Conference153 which focused on the South African municipal legal order. The 
liberals and Afrikaner jurists attempted to use the Pretoria Conference to 
develop an internal concept of a bill of rights rather than incorporate the 
international bill of rights advocated by Henkin. Three main options emerged 
at the Conference. First, the incorporation of a bill of group and individual rights 
in the 1983 Constitution; secondly, a fully-fledged bill of rights which would 
effectively destroy the apartheid-based political order and gain acceptance and 
confidence as a tool with which apartheid was destroyed; and thirdly, the 
introduction of a limited bill of rights as a starting point and an interim strategy 
which would do away with objectionable laws and create a climate and legal 
framework for negotiations involving, inter alia, the ANC. The Anti-Bill of 
Rights Committee (composed of members of the now defunct Democratic 
Lawyers Congress and the Intervarsity Law Students Council) and black 
lawyers in general rejected the introduction of a bill of rights into a racist tri-
cameral constitution which vested ownership of 87% of the land and 90% of its 
productive capacity in the white minority and entrenched apartheid and the 
Bantustan system. 154 
In response to the human-rights debate and suggestion of a negotiated 
settlement, the ANC proclaimed155 that the liberation struggle would not end 
151 See note 20 supra. 
152 See Van der Westhuizen "Constitutional Options for a Post-Apartheid South Africa" 756. 
153 See Johan Van der Westhuizen and Henning Viljoen (eds.) A Bill of Rights for South 
Africa (Proceedings of Symposium held at the University of Pretoria on 1 and 2 May 1986) 
(1988). 
154 See DH van Wyk "Menseregtehandves en Politieke idioom" Ibid 87. 
155 See Dugard "Changing attitudes towards a bill of rights in South Africa" op cit. 
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until South Africa was transformed into a united, democratic and non-racial 
country, and that the transformation of South Africa into a non-racial, 
democratic community was the only solution that would enable all its people, 
both black and white to live as equals in conditions of peace and equality, and 
that the overwhelming majority of the South African population had accepted 
that the Freedom Charter provided a reasonable and viable framework for the 
construction of a new society. 
In 1988 both the government and the ANC embarked on major projects 
regarding human rights. In May 1988 an advisory body to the State President, 
called the President's Council, acting in terms of section 78(1) of the Republic 
of South Africa Constitution Act 110 of 1983, advised the State President that 
it would conduct an enquiry in the public interest into "viable constitutional 
models available for the further development of the Republic of South Africa. "156 
The Constitutional Committee of the Council seemingly preoccupied itself with 
the insoluble problem of retaining white domination, or at least white privileges, 
in a political system that would afford full citizenship and extend democracy to 
Blacks who made up close to 80% of the South African population. The Council 
never finished its business. It was overtaken by the report of the South African 
Law Commission which was released in March 1989. The Law Commission 
produced a working paper on Group and Human Rights (the Working Paper). 157 
The Working Paper158 examined the philosophy of human rights, international 
and foreign methods of protecting human rights, current South African 
attitudes towards human rights, and the nature of the rights to be protected. It 
concluded with a draft bill of rights159 and a discussion of various methods for 
implementing such an instrument. 
156 See General Notice 303 Government Gazette 11288 May 5 1988. 
157 See South African Law Commission, Working Paper 25, Project 58: Group and Human 
Rights (August 31, 1989). 
156 This working paper is also known as the Olivier Report (Mr Justice Olivier was the 
chairman of the Commission.) 
159 See chapter 15 of the Working Paper. 
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The draft bill of rights focused on individual rights and endorsed the first 
generation rights found in most international instruments and bills of human 
rights. It proclaimed the rights to life (but failed to outlaw capital punishment), 
liberty, privacy, and a fair trial. It guaranteed the freedoms of speech, assembly, 
association, and movement and condemned torture and cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment. Furthermore, the draft bill recognised equality before the 
law and outlawed discrimination based on race or gender and more 
significantly, the bill asserted: 160 
"the right of all citizens over the age of eighteen years to exercise the vote on a 
basis of equality in respect of all legislative institutions at regular and periodical 
elections and at referendums." 
While incorporating the first generation rights the Commission excluded the 
second generation rights on the ground that such rights were non-justiciable 
and therefore belonged to a political manifesto rather that a bill of rights. 161 
The overall findings of the South African Law Commission162 were based on the 
premise that South Africa, as then constituted, could not accommodate a 
genuine and credible bill of rights. The Commission argued that any meaningful 
protection of human rights presupposed adherence to the principle of non-
discrimination, and the free and full participation of all the citizens of a political 
community in the constitutional structures of the country. Hence, the 
Commission was in favour of human rights protection as part of the 
constitutional arrangement in post-apartheid South Africa. Also the Commission 
held the view that a bill of rights could be introduced only as the outcome of a 
negotiated settlement based on consensus between all political groupings in 
South Africa. 
160 Ibid art 20 at 4 7 4. 
161 See Dugard A Bill of Rights for South Africa 449. 
162 See Van der Westhuizen "Constitutional Options for Post-Apartheid South Africa" 756. 
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Many people, especially black lawyers, believed that the Law Commission would 
produce a report that exalted group rights, and by necessary implication 
Afrikaner group rights, over individual rights. Others harboured misgivings 
about the legitimacy of the Commission itself. It was for these reasons that 
many black lawyers declined to make representations to the Commission. 163 To 
the surprise of both government and its opponents the Commission rejected the 
idea of protecting racially defined group interests under the auspices of a bill of 
rights. 164 Furthermore, group interests founded on considerations other than 
race, such as freedom of religion and cultural rights, or the special rights of 
women or of workers, could be protected adequately by allocating the 
corresponding rights to individuals and by leaving it up to the persons 
concerned to exercise those rights, on the basis of freedom of association within 
the group of their own choice. Although the bill did not directly protect group 
rights, it gave limited protection through a provision recognising "the right of 
every person or group to disassociate himself or itself from other individuals or 
groups .... " .165 Where, however, such disassociation resulted in racial, religious, 
linguistic, or cultural discrimfr1ation no public funds would be allocated to such 
an enterprise. That provision had clearly anticipated racially exclusive private 
schools with no public financing. 166 Although the Olivier Commission accepted 
the concept of a bill of rights it was abundantly clear that the thrust of its 
approach was to contain the human rights movement within the South African 
municipal order, rather than incorporate the international bill of rights. 167 
No wonder that the Commission did not rule out segmentation of the South 
African population along racial lines for purposes of a constitutional system of 
power-sharing (Consociationalism), holding that questions as to the structures 
163 See Dugard A Bill of Rights for South Africa 449. 
164 The Commission stated that South African law was "oriented towards the individual" 
and "does not recognise the legal subjectivity of an amorphous group such as, for example, a 
racial group, an ethnic group[or] a Cultural group ... ". See Working Paper 383. 
165 Art 17 at 474. 
166 See Dugard A Bill of Rights for South Africa 450. 
167 See Titus The Applicability of the International Human Rights Norms to the South 
African legal system 159-161. 
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of government did not come within its mandate. 168 The Olivier Report also 
received equivocal reception from Government. While government accepted the 
need to protect individual rights, there were signs that they were dissatisfied 
with the Commission's refusal to accord equal status to the protection of group 
rights. This equivocation was evident in Mr de Klerk's opening address to 
Parliament on February 2, 1990. Mr de Klerk declared that 
"[t]he government accepts the principle of the recognition and protection of the 
fundamental individual rights which form the Constitutional basis of most 
Western democracies. We acknowledge, too, that the most practical way of 
protecting those rights is vested in a declaration of rights justiciable by an 
independent judiciary. However, it is clear that a system for the protection of the 
rights of individuals, minorities and National entities has to form a well-rounded 
and balanced whole. South Africa has its own National Composition, and our 
Constitutional dispensation has to take this into account. The formal recognition 
of individual rights does not mean that the problems of a heterogeneous 
population will simply disappear. Any new Constitution which disregards this 
reality will be inappropriate and even harmful. 
Naturally, the protection of co~ective, minority and natural rights may not bring 
about an imbalance in respect of individual rights. It is neither the government's 
policy nor its intention that any group in whichever way it may be defined shall 
be favoured over or in relation to any of the others."169 
Although the South African Law Commission and Government had finally 
accepted the concept of a bill of human rights it is abundantly clear that their 
concept was still largely informed by the idea of group rights especially with 
regard to future Constitutional options. We shall come back to this issue in the 
following paragraph. 
168 S~ Working Paper par. 13.15 
169 See South African Debates of Parliament vol. 1Cols.1-8 (2nd Session, 9th Parliament, 
90). 
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In January 1988 the ANC published Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa 
based on the 1987 Statement on Negotiations. 170 These Guidelines were issued 
to encourage National debate on the form that a post-apartheid society should 
take. 171 The Guidelines paid homage to the Freedom Charter (1955) and 
declared that the Charter had to be converted from a vision for the future into 
a Constitutional reality. 172 
The centrality of the Freedom Charter in the AN C's concept of a bill of human 
rights appeared quite clearly in the Guidelines173 which stated: 
"The Constitution shall include a Bill of Rights based on the Freedom Charter. 
Such a Bill of Rights shall guarantee the fundamental human rights of all 
citizens irrespective of race, colour, sex or creed and shall provide appropriate 
mechanisms for their enforcement." 
The Guidelines guaranteed the first generation rights such as freedom of 
association, expression, thought, worship, and the press. 174 These freedoms 
were, however, subject to the qualification that advocacy of the practice of 
racism, fascism, nazism or the incitement of ethnic or regional exclusiveness or 
hatred would be outlawed. 175 
Moreover, the Guidelines denounced the Constitutional protection of group 
rights as such protection would perpetuate the status quo. 176 However, in line 
170 
"Comments on the Constitutional Guidelines of the African National Congress" in 1989 
South African Journal of Human Rights 133 et seq. 
171 As they put it: "The ANC is of the opinion that the drafting of a Constitution for a 
democratic South Africa may only be the task of elected representatives of all the people of our 
country in a Constituent assembly. These guidelines are being tabled for discussion by all our 
people, irrespective of their political inclinations, ideological leanings or party affiliations. They 
are meant to set in motion a process of National debate. It hoped that finally a position will 
emerge out of these discussions which would reflect the broadcast National Consensus. It is in 
this spirit that these guidelines have been tabled for consideration by all South Africans." 
172 
"Comments on the Constitutional Guidelines of the African National Congress" in South 
African Journal on Human Rights 129. 
173 Ibid note 46 at 131. 
174 Ibid par 1. 
175 Ibid par k. 
176 Ibid at 130 (prefatory note). 
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with article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ( 1966) 
the Guidelines recognised the linguistic and cultural diversity of the all the 
people of South Africa and required facilities for free linguists and cultural 
development for all. 177 
As shown above, 178 the South African Law Commission distanced itself from 
international human rights norms179 while the liberals, in particular John 
Dugard, 180 argued for international norms of human rights through the doors 
of the USA and the UK and, like the Olivier Commission, steered away from the 
second generation rights. The shortcomings of the establishment and the 
liberals in this regard left the ANC as the only champion of the first, second and 
third generation rights contained in the International Bill of Rights. 
This was evident in the ANC Bill of Rights181 formally launched in 
Johannesburg on 28 January 1991. The Bill of Rights included the entire 
known range of first generation civil and political rights, as well as second 
generation economic, social and cultural rights, and even third generation 
rights. The ANC's Commitment to universally accepted human rights norms 
developed through its experience as a major non-racial representative organ of 
the people of South Africa in the international arena. As Prof. Asmal put it: 
" ... Its (ANC) participation in the debates and discussions around apartheid and 
racialism in the international arena over the past three decades has also enabled 
it to draw on internationally accepted concepts of human rights, combining the 
first, second, and third generation rights into an integrated if not indivisible 
basis for a dignified life for all our fellow citizens." 
177 Ibid par g at 131. 
178 See Titus The Applicability of the International Human Rights Norms to the South 
African legal System 159-162. 
179 Ibid 1 78. 
180 Ibid 179. 
181 See ANC Constitutional Committee, A Bill of Rights for a New South Africa (1990). 
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This found support in the introductory note to the ANC draft Bill of Rights. 182 
The note stated that in preparation of the document heavy reliance was placed 
upon the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR and the ICESCR. 
Furthermore, the note stated that they also drew upon the European 
Commission on Human Rights (ECHR) and the African Charter of Human and 
People's Rights, as well as provisions dealing with protection of hun1an rights, 
in many Constitutions, ranging from India to the then West Germany, from the 
USA to Namibia. 
Finally, Kader Asmal was appreciative of the fact that the changed politico-legal 
climate in South Africa was due partly to the impact of the international legal 
order of human rights. In particular, Prof. Asmal observed that the legal order 
of human rights enabled the political and legal organs of the UN to emphasise 
the criminality, illegality or illegitimacy of the South African regime with all 
that such characterisation implied. Enunciating the same appreciation as Prof. 
Asma! the ANC President, Nelson Mandela, 183 signalled South Africa's 
movement towards the incorporation of the International Bill of Rights and its 
return to the fold of the international community. In his address to the UN 
General Assembly in December 1991 President Mandela stated that South 
Africa had started its final lap towards the realisation of the goals enshrined in 
the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The President 
stated: 184 
"We are taking the final steps towards ending the apartheid system of white 
minority domination. Acting together, we have the possibility to bring into being 
a new country which you will be proud and happy to readmit into the ranks of 
the Assembly." 
182 See Dr Zola Skweyiya "Introductory note to a Bill of Rights for a New South Africa: A 
Working Document by the ANC Constitutional Committee (1990)" iii in 3 1991 African Journal 
of International and Comparative Law 602. 
183 See "Taking the final steps Towards Ending Apartheid; Objective Justice, A United 
Nations Review Dedicated" in David Phillips Nelson Mandela Speaks -forging a Democratic, 
non-racial South Africa (1994). 
184 Ibid. 
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Although the establishment and the liberals on one side and the ANC on the 
other side accepted the concept of a Bill of Human Rights, it is clear that they 
differed on the degree to which such a concept should incorporate the 
international bill of rights. We shall come back to this question below. 
6.1.2.4 The Status of Human Rights Instruments in South Africa 
As shown in Chapter III, South Africa was a co-founder of the United Nations 
and a signatory of its Charter. Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter obliged member 
states to promote universal respect for, and observance of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions as to race, sex, language or 
religion. South Africa, however, did not take any steps to incorporate these 
provisions into South African law. The National Party government that came 
into power on the platform of the policy of apartheid abstained from voting on 
the General Assembly's Universal Declaration in 1948. Subsequently, the 
National Party government refused to become a party to or did not support the 
major human rights treaties which comprise the corpus of International Human 
Rights Law (IHRL). These treaties include:-
a) The Charter of the United Nations;185 
b) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 186 
c) International Covenant on Civil and political Rights; 187 
d) The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; 188 
e) The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
185 In spite of the animosity between the UN and SA over the years, South Africa remained 
a member state. Her membership continued even after the rejection of her credentials. See in 
general Erasmus "The rejection of credentials: a proper exercise of General Assembly powers 
or exclusion by stealth?" 7 1981 SAYIL 40 and Suttner "Has South Africa been illegally 
excluded from the United Nations General Assembly?" 1984 CILSA 279. 
186 See GA Res. 217 A (iii) UN Doc A/810 (1948). As the Declaration is not a treaty to which-----~ 
a state may accede South Africa cannot now "join" the Universal Declaration. 
187 See GA Res. 2200 21 UN GAOR Suppl. 16 at 52; UN Doc A/6316 (1966). This Covenant 
should be read with the Optional Protocol GA Res. 2200 21 UN GAOR Suppl. 16 at 59, and the 
Second Optional Protocol UN Doc A/44/824 (1989). 
188 19 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3. 
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Freedoms· 189 ,
f) The American Convention on Human Rights; 190 
g) The African Charter on Human and People's Rights; 191 and 
h) Regional Charters. 192 
The failure (or neglect) on the part of South Africa to incorporate IHRL meant 
that there was little scope for human rights in South Africa especially as a result 
the apartheid policy. 
International Law played little part in the advancement of human rights due to 
both non-incorporation into South African law and South Africa's reliance on 
the domestic jurisdiction clause. 193 The non-incorporation by itself, as will be 
shown below, did not prevent South African Courts from invoking IHRL. The 
Domestic jurisdiction clause too did not prevent this occurring either as the 
days of regarding such rights as a purely "domestic concern" 194 are well and 
truly past. 195 It is true that in modern times human rights are invariably 
embodied in a constitution that is a piece of National legislation - and would, 
therefore, in strict terms constitute municipal law. However, these rights which 
started off as constitutional rights in a specific country have expanded to 
constitutional rights in a number of countries and eventually mutated into what 
Henkin196 described as " ... a universal conception and a staple of international 
189 1950 213 UNTS 221. 
190 22 November 1969, OA STS 36. 
191 27 June 1981 OAU Doc CAB /leg/67/3/ Rev. 5 (1981). 
192 For example, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act (the 
Helsinki Accords) 1 August 1975. See 73 Department of State Bulletin 323 (1975); Arab Charter 
of Human Rights. 
193 For discussion of this clause see par. 5.2 supra. 
194 This is the traditional argument based on article 2(7) of the Charter of the United 
Nations which, in the interests of state sovereignty, prohibits intervention "in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State ... ". As shown above it was raised by 
South Africa with monotonous regularity in rejecting UN intervention against its policy of 
apartheid. See Neville Botha "The Coming of Age of Public International Law in South Africa" 
18 1992/3 SAYIL 36, and Jacqueline Casette "United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa -
A significant event" 18 1992/3 SAYIL 1 et seq. 
195 See, for instance, Flilartiga v Pena lrala 1980 ILM 966 and Botha "Human Rights, 
torture, customary international law" 6 1980 SAYIL 150. 
196 See Louis Henkin The Age of Rights (1990) cited in Titus op cit 13-14 and Lillich 
"Sources of human rights law and the Hong Kong Bill of Rights" 10 1990-91 Chinese Year book 
of International Law and Affairs 27. 
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.. .law". In other words, IHRL is a separate branch of public law deriving from 
the Constitutional will of States aimed at the protection of the individual in the 
face of sovereign might. 
During the early seventies the South African government began to feel the 
impact of IHRL. The impact forced her to begin to move away from the 
domestic jurisdiction towards the recognition of IHRL. For instance, in his 
maiden speech in the House of Assembly, Mr RF Botha, expressed his regret 
that the South African government had failed to support the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and suggested that South Africa should 
identify itself to a greater extent with the Declaration. 197 
Instead South Africa argued that its policies did not offend the norm of non-
discrimination and that the government was moving away from discrimination 
on the grounds of race. 198 Thus the South African Government was not yet 
ready to recognise IHRL as universally (or generally) understood. 
The official interpretation of IHRL and its non-incorporation notwithstanding, 
South African courts were not powerless to invoke the principles of IHRL in 
other ways. Dugard199 observes "that for over a hundred years South African 
Courts have simply assumed that rules and principles of customary 
international law might be applied by municipal Courts as if they were in some 
way part of South African Law. Consequently they have _not required 
international law to be proved as a foreign legal system." 
Hence, in 1971 in South Atlantic Islands Development Corporation Ltd v 
Buchan200 the Court refused to admit an affidavit from an expert on 
international law was not foreign law and therefore could not be proved by 
affidavit. Dugard concluded, therefore, that South African courts have shown 
197 See House of Assembly Debates vol. 29 Cols. 2164-6 (21 August 1970). 
198 Unfortunately this referred to the decolonisation of South Africa based on the principle 
of separate development which resulted the creation of the TBVC states. See John Dugard 
International Law - A South African Perspective_ 77-78. 
199 Ibid 42. 
200 1971 (1) SA 234(c) at 238 P-F. For an early dictum that international law need not be 
proved see Maynard v The Field Cornet of Pretoria (1894) 1 SAR 232._ 
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strong support for the doctrine of incorporation (or the monist approach) in 
respect of customary international law. In most cases our courts have simply 
applied customary international law without questioning its place in our legal 
order.201 
From 1971 the courts have expressly asserted that international law forms part 
of our law and that it is the duty of a municipal court "to ascertain and 
administer the appropriate rule of international law". 202 This clear affirmation 
of the monist position has been diluted by a few judicial dicta couched in terms 
of the dualist (or adoption) theory. For instance, in the case of Parkin v 
Government of the Republique Democratic du Congo203 the Court stated that 
the answer to the problem before the court was to be found in international law 
to the extent that our common law recognises such international law.204 Also, 
and perhaps most unfortunately, the most authoritative Appellate Division 
dictum on the subject has been interpreted as lending support to both dualist 
and monist approaches. 205 
In the case of Nduli v Minister of Justice206 Rumpff CJ declared (without 
reference to earlier cases207) that: 
"[W]hile it is obvious that international law is to be regarded as part of our law, 
it has to be stressed that the Jons et origo of this proposition must be found in 
Roman-Dutch law." 
In the Trendtex Corporation (like the South Atlantic Islands) case the court 
affirmed the monist position in the following terms:208 
201 See Dugard International Law 42 note 38. 
202 See South Atlantic Islands Development Corporation Ltd v Buchan op cit. 
203 1971 (1) SA 259 (W). 
204 At 261 A. 
205 On these approaches see Titus The Applicability of the International Human Rights 
Norms to the South African Legal System 28 et seq. 
206 1978 (1) SA 893 (A). 
201 These cases are South Atlantic Islands Development Corporation Ltd v Buchan op cit 
and Trendtex Trading Corporation v Central Bank of Nigeria 1977 QB 529 (CA) at 553-554. 
208 At 553-554. 
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"A fundamental question arises for decision: what is the place of international 
law in our English law? One school of thought holds to the doctrine of 
incorporation. It says that the rules of international law are incorporated into 
English law automatically and considered to be part of English law unless they 
are in Conflict with an Act of Parliament. The other school of thought holds to 
the doctrine of transformation. It says that the rules of international law are not 
to be considered as part of English law except in so far as they have been already 
adopted and made part of our law by the decisions of judges, or by Act of 
Parliament or long established custom. The difference is vital when you are 
faced with a change in the rules of international law. Under the doctrine of 
incorporation, when the rules of international change, our English law changes 
with them. But, under the doctrine of transformation, the English law does not 
change. It is bound by precedent .... As between these schools of thought, I now 
believe that the doctrine of incorporation is correct. Otherwise I do not see that 
our courts could ever recognise a change in the rules of international law." 
The judicial dictum in Nduli's case does not affirm the monist approach as 
clearly stated in the Trendtex Trading Corporation case. 209 
Instead the judicial dictum in the Nduli case reaffirmed the monist approach on 
the one hand lend support to the dualist approach on the other.210 In short the 
monist approach states that customary international law forms part of our law 
without any act of incorporation whilst the dualist approach holds that some act 
of adoption is a pre-condition of the acceptance of international law as part of 
our law by its insistence that the Jons et origo of thus proposition must be found 
in Roman-Dutch law. The dualist approach received further support from the 
concession by Counsel for appellants that211 
209 Ibid. 
210 See Dugard International Law 43. 
211 At 906 D. This statement echoes those English decisions that had generally been 
invoked in support of the dualist adoption theory. See for instance, Chung chi Cheing v R (1939) 
AC 160 (AL) at 167-8 and Compania Naviera Vascongado [1938) AC 485 at 502. 
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"according to our law only such rules of customary international law are to be 
regarded as part of our law as re either universally recognised or have received 
the assent of this country." 
Consequently, two schools of thought developed regarding the status of 
customary international law in South African law. 
Although the majority of the nations of the world regarded customary public 
international law as binding an acrimonious debate still raged in South African 
academic circles. 212 The debate manifested itself in two schools of thought. 
Ironically, both schools relied on the same authority.213The first school of 
thought, advocated by Dugard,214 held that international law was part of our law 
whilst the second school, advocated by Booysen,215 held that international law 
was a source of law available to the courts in appropriate cases. While Basin216 
hailed the dictum of Rumpff CJ as support for the dualist position 
Dugard217took the view that a careful examination of the same suggested a 
totally different conclusion. According to Dugard218 Rumpff CJ did not say that 
the source (fons et origo) of international law was Roman-Dutch law (which 
would undoubtedly have lent support to the dualist approach), but that the 
source of the proposition that international law was to be regarded a part of our 
law derived from Roman-Dutch law, not English law. Hence, 
Dugard219concluded that (with the exception of Booysen) it was widely accepted 
that South Africa follows a monist approach in respect of customary 
212 See Neville Botha "The Coming of Age of Public International Law in South Africa" 41. 
213 Viz. Nduli's case Ibid. 
214 See Dugard "The Place of Public International law in South African Law" in Visser (ed.) 
Essays in Honour of Ellison Kahn (1989). 
215 See H Booysen "Is Gewoonteregtelike Volkereg Deel van ons Reg" 1975 THRHR 315. For 
recent views on this see DJ Devine "What Customary International law is part of South African 
Law?" 1987-88 SAYIL 119, Rosalie P Schaffer "The interrelationship between Public 
International Law and the Law of South Africa: An Overview" 1983 International Comparative 
Law Quarterly 277 and most recently Booysen "Jurisdiction to try Abducted Persons and the 
Application of International Law in South African Law" 17 1990/91 SAYIL 133. 
216 See H Booysen Volkereg en Sy Verhouding tot die Suid Afrikaanse Reg (1989) 69-70. 
217 See Dugard International Law 43. 
21s Ibid. 
219 Ibid 44. 
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international law and that Nduli's case provided authority for the proposition 
that international law formed part of our law without the need for any act of 
transformation. 220 
No wonder that judicial decisions since Nduli's case have cited this case as 
authority for the monist approach. 221 
The Approach of the South African judiciary to customary international law was 
finally spelled out in S v Petane.222 In casu the Court considered the question 
whether the 1977 Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 had become 
part of customary international law, by examining resolutions of the General 
Assembly, state practice, and the writings of jurists. In the course of this 
judgement Conradie stated:223 
"I am ... prepared to accept that customary international law may ... be created 
very quickly, but before it will be considered by our municipal law as being 
incorporated into South African law the Custom, whether created by usus and 
opinion juris or only by the latter, would at the very least have to be widely 
accepted." 
It is quite clear from the foregoing discussions that customary international law 
has always been part of South African law, and that the courts have been open 
to apply those norms of IHRL that had acquired the status of custom unless 
they were in conflict with legislation. However, as the apartheid legal order 
violated almost every right recognised in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, there was little scope for the application of customary norms. Also, 
220 Ibid. 
221 Ibid note 51. Also see Botha op cit. For an exception to this approach see the Prize 
Jurisdiction Act 3 of 1968. 
222 1988 (3) SA 51 (CJ. 
223 At 57H-I. Another case that affords a good illustration of the manner in which customary 
international law could be ascertained is Nkondo v Minister of Justice & another 1980 (2) SA 
895. 
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where legislation was silent our courts showed no inclination to invoke 
customary rules. 
For instance, in S v Petane224 the court rejected the argument that the rights 
contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights had acquired the status 
of customary law. In S v Rudman Cooper J, without even examining foreign 
case law, dismissed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the European and 
American Conventions as instruments inspired by laudable ideals which do not 
from part of customary international law.225 
Although South Africa had signed and ratified the UN Charter26 it had not 
incorporated it into municipal law by statute. The relationship between IHRL 
and municipal law under South African law found a definite and emphatic 
expression in Pan American World Airways incorporated v SA Fire and 
Accident Co-Ltd. 227 In this case Steyn CJ stated that it was trite law: 
" ... that in this country the conclusion of a treaty, convention or agreement by 
the South African government with any other government is an executive and 
not a legislative act. As a general rule, the provisions of an international 
instrument so concluded are not embodied in our law except by legislative 
process. 
In the absence of any enactment giving [its] relevant provisions the force of law, 
[it] cannot affect the rights of the subject." 
On the ground of this decision South African courts could not directly invoke 
the human rights clauses of the UN Charter. 
224 1988 (3) SA 51 (c) at 58 G-J. 
225 1989 (3) SA 368 at 376 A-B. 
226 See par 5.2 supra. 
227 1965 (3) SA 150 A. 
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However, the clauses which assert the principle of non-discrimination might be 
invoked to interpret an ambiguous statute in accordance with the presumption 
that the legislature does not intend to violate international law.228 The South 
African Supreme Court found an opportunity to apply this reasoning in the case 
of S v Werner.229 This case involved the interpretation of the Group Areas Act. 
It was argued in court that the Act did not expressly authorise discrimination, 
yet the proclamation of the Group area concerned was discriminatory. Thus the 
Act was considered to be ambiguous and requiring to be interpreted as closely 
as possible with South Africa's obligations under the human rights provision of 
the UN Charter and that this required the court to insist on an equality of 
treatment of all races in the implementation Act. The Court was thus invited to 
be guided by unincorporated treaty obligations in interpreting an ambiguous 
statutory provision. An additional argument was that the proclamation was 
invalid on the ground of unreasonableness. Such unreasonableness occurs 
where a subordinate law-making body acts without regard to the international 
obligations of the State in terms of the UN Charter. Both the trial court and the 
Appellate Division held the Act was not ambiguous and therefore that it did not 
allow recourse to a presumption of compliance with international obligations. 
The courts simply held that the Group Areas Act was not ambiguous and by 
implication allowed discrimination and manifest injustice. 
In the trial court Le Roux J stated that it was unnecessary to consider 
arguments advanced on the ground that230 
"[W]hen an Act of our own Parliament authorises something, then in my opinion 
228 See GE Devenish Interpretation of Statutes (1992) 212; HR Hahlo and Ellison Kahn The 
South African legal system and its background (1968) 114, 211; and Maynard v The Field 
Cornet of Pretoria (1894) 1 SAR 214. 
229 The Case is reported in S v Adams; S v Werner (1981) (1) SA 187 (A). Also see S v 
Werner 1980 (2) SA 313 (W) at 328 C. 
230 at 328 (own translation from Afrikaans text). 
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it cannot be influenced by controversial obligations in the Charter of the United 
Nations." 
On appeal Rumpff CJ231 declared that: 
"The argument that international relations, e.g. the Charter of the United 
Nations, must be used as norm is, in the circumstances, unacceptable. A 
proclamation in terms of the Group Areas Act must be tested against the 
provisions of the Act, an Act, which explicitly provides for the creation and 
development of group areas for different ethnic groups." 
The South African Law Commission232 summarised this law-is-law approach of 
South African courts to the protection of human rights as follows: 
"There is full recognition of a respect for the rights of the individual as 
recognised in our Common Law. The courts see it as their task to protect these 
rights, and it is said that the courts form the bulwark between the individual and 
the executive. However, where there is an Act of Parliament that apparently 
infringes one or more of the recognised human rights, the courts will carefully 
examine the Act in question and even interpret it strictly so as to curtail the 
infringements as far as possible. If however, it appears at the end of the 
examination that it was the intention of the legislature to infringe the rights in 
question, the court in powerless and must enforce the provisions of the Act 
however unjust the result may be." 
International human rights conventions and declarations which are not binding 
on South Africa either through custom or treaty might be invoked by courts as 
a guide to judicial policy in the formulation of a rule of law.233 For instance, in 
231 Ibid. 
232 See Working Paper 25 par 8.22 at 169. 
233 See Blathway T v Cawley {Baron) and others 1976 Ac 397 (HL) at 426. 
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s v Khanyile 234 Didcott J i n v o k e d 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European 
Convention on Human Rights to support a finding that an indigent person 
might not be sentences to a substantial term without legal representation. This 
reasoning was rejected by the Eastern Cape235 and Natal236 divisions of the 
Supreme Court as well as the Appellate Division. 237 In the case of Labour law238 
and prisoners rights239 South African courts have successfully invoked 
unincorporated conventions. 
The failure or neglect of the South African judiciary to incorporate the 
international human rights norms was untenable as South Africa was a 
signatory to the UN Charter that had been recognised as an important source 
of obligations for states, including those aspects that related to human rights. 
The provisions of the UN Charter that deal with human rights figure quite 
prominently in the statement of purpose of the UN.240 South Africa, as a 
member state was obliged to act in accordance with these obligations and it was 
her legal duty to respect and observe human rights. Moreover, under article 55 
of the UN Charter, South Africa was obliged to promote respect for and 
observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. This duty was further 
emphasised in article 56 in which all member states pledged to take joint and 
separate action in co-operation with the UN for the achievement of the purposes 
set out in article 55. These provision gave legal character to the argument that 
South Africa's disregard or violations of human rights were destructive to both 
234 1988 (3) SA 795 (N). 
235 See S v Rudman 1989 (3) SA 368 (ECP). 
236 S v Dadla 1989 SA 1 72. 
237 See S v Mthwana 1992 (1) SA 343 (A). 
238 See Metal and Allied Workers Union v Stobar Reiriforcing (Pty) Ltd 1983 4 IW 84 (IC), 
United African Motor and Allied Workers Union v Fodens SA (Pty) Ltd 1983 4 IW 212 (IC). 
Also see DJG Woolfrey "The Application if International Labour Norms to South African" 12 
1986/87 SAYIL 135. 
239 In S v Staggie 1991 (1) SACR 669 C Conradie J applied a provision of the SMR which 
declares that corporal punishment is completely prohibited as a punishment for disciplinary 
offences in prison to the interpretation of Section 54 (2)(d) of the Correctional Services Act of 
1959. 
240 See Articles 1 (3), 13, 62(2) and (3) and 68. 
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the moral and legal character of the human rights provisions of the UN Charter. 
It is therefore submitted that South Africa's reliance on the domestic 
jurisdiction clause had never been justified. 241 
6.1.2.5 Constitutional Options for a Post Apartheid South Africa 
Popular struggles and international pressures against apartheid during the first 
half of the eighties plunged South Africa into an unprecedented Constitutional 
Crisis. In particular, the crisis resulted from the "nullification" of the 1983 
Constitution, rejection of the Bantustan and racially based local authorities by 
the UN Security Council and mass actions which rendered the country 
ungovernable. 242 These factors shifted the balance of power in the country 
towards a democratic transformation. 243 
As a result of the crisis different quarters presented Constitutional models either 
to try to extricate the apartheid system from its impasse, or to design a 
Constitution for a post-apartheid South Africa.244 The Crisis also aroused the 
interested of the international organisations. For instance, in October 1985 the 
Commonwealth sent the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) to South Africa to seek 
a Commitment from the South African government for real change in its 
policies. 245 The EPG reached a deadlock with the government when they 
identified two non-negotiable positions - namely, (a) the concept of group rights 
on which apartheid and its bantustan system were based, and (b) that the 
racially-based tricameral parliamentary system (which had been rejected by 
both the UN security Council and the overwhelming majority of South Africans) 
would serve as the basis for further Constitutional reform. 
241 See Steytler "Free and fair polling" 221. 
242 See Mark Swilling "Living in the Interregnum: Crisis, Reform and the Socialist 
alternative in South Africa" in Third World Quarterly (1986) 408 et seq. 
243 See Zola Skweyiya "The ANC Constitutional Guidelines: a Vital Contribution to the 
Struggle against Apartheid" in Harare Conference on the Role of Law in a Society in Transition 
(1989) et seq. 
244 Ibid. 
245 See The Commonwealth Report Mission to South Africa (1986) 123. 
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These non-negotiable positions of the South African government led the EPG 
to the conclusion that while the government claimed to be ready to negotiate, 
it was in truth not yet prepared to negotiate fundamental change, nor to 
countenance the creation of genuine democratic structures, nor to face the 
prospect of the end of white power in the foreseeable future. It became 
abundantly clear to the EPG that the government reform programme did not 
seek to end apartheid, but rather to give it a less inhuman face and that its 
quest was power-sharing without surrendering overall white control. 
In 1986 the National Party government speeded up its reform programme. As 
mentioned above on 23 April 1985 Mr Coetzee announced in Parliament that 
he had instructed the South African Law Commission to investigate and to 
make recommendations on the definition and protection of group rights in the 
context of the South African Constitutional dispensation and the possible 
extension of the existing protection of individual rights, as well as the role the 
courts could play in that regard. Meanwhile the NP governments power-sharing 
constitutional option received a further impetus at the National Party Federal 
Congress held on 12 and 13 August 1986. 
The National Party Congress issued a Manifesto containing the main features 
of the NP vision of a future South African Constitutional dispensation and their 
programme of action. 246 Although their Constitutional option preserved the 
policy of apartheid they recognised the equality of all racial groups and sought 
to use them as building blocks for a Consociational democracy which would 
allow all four racial groups to share power. Thus at the Federal Congress the NP 
not only reaffirmed its policy of apartheid but also adopted three principles 
which would underpin its power-sharing Constitutional model. The principles 
were: 
(a) the sovereignty of the law as the basis for the protection of fundamental rights 
of both individuals and groups; 
(b) the equality of all population groups regardless of race, ethnic group, colour or 
246 See Manifesto of the National Party - Elections 6 May 1987. 
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creed; and 
(c) the rights of each population group to self-determination and participation in the 
government of the country, provided no group dominated others. 247 
The NP used its 1986 Manifesto for the 1987 general elections. 
Between the years 1986 and 1987 the NP and the ANC entered into dialogue 
which involved the jailed ANC leader Mr Nelson Mandela. No wonder that the 
ANC promptly responded to the government's statements on negotiations. In 
their own statement on negotiations (of 9 October 1987) the ANC, like the EPG, 
expressed serious doubts as to Pretoria's willingness to engage in meaningful 
negotiations for the termination of apartheid institutions and practices. 
Furthermore, the ANC observed that the government's perception of 
negotiations remained focused upon two objectives: (a) to defuse the struggle 
inside South Africa by holding out false hopes of a just political settlement 
which Pretoria had every intention to block, and (b) to defeat the continuing 
campaign for comprehensive and mandatory sanctions. The ANC statement 
reaffirmed its vision of the post-apartheid South Africa embodied in the 
Freedom Charter and emphasised that the ANC would not be willing to enter 
into secret negotiations with the South African authorities on the Constitutional 
future of the country. However, the ANC reaffirmed its willingness to participate 
in genuine (open and official) negotiations, provided their aim was to transform 
South Africa into a united, non-racial democracy. For that purpose the ANC 
insisted that the future Constitutional arrangements had to define and treat all 
South Africans as equal citizens, without regard to race, colour or ethnicity. 
Moreover, the ANC reaffirmed its commitment to the concept of a bill of human 
rights to safeguard the rights of the individual, and opposed any attempt to 
perpetuate the apartheid system through the concept of so-called group or 
minority rights. 
247 Ibid 6-7. 
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By the end of 1987 through the ANC externally and the Mass Democratic 
Movement inside South Africa had gained a moral and political high-ground 
over the National Party government and demonstrated that apartheid could not 
be reformed and that it had to be completely dismantled. Meanwhile an HSRC 
Report248 confirmed that the majority of both black and white communities 
rejected the tricameral parliamentary system. In response the government 
established a special department (in January 1988) within the Ministry of 
Constitutional Development and Planning and tasked it to study alternative 
Constitutional models. 249 The establishment of that department coincided with 
the publication of the ANC Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South 
Africa. In May 1988 an advisory body to the State President, called the 
President's Council, acting in terms of section 78(1) of the Republic of South 
Africa Constitution Act 110 of 1983, advised the State President that it would 
conduct an inquiry in the public interest into "viable Constitutional models 
available for the further development of the Republic of South Africa. "250 While 
the Constitutional Committee of the President's Council was preoccupied with 
the development of Constitutional arrangements which could protect the 
interests and privileged positions of whites, Parliament passed the Promotion 
of Constitutional Development Act of 1988. 251 
The Act provided for the establishment of a multi-racial National Council and 
tasked it inter alia, to draft a new Constitution that would allow all four racial 
groups to participate in process of government on the basis of the NP formula 
of Consociational democracy. 
The Promotion of Constitutional Development Act was fundamentally flawed 
because it did not provide for the unbanning of the National liberation 
movements and for participation in the Constitution making process by the 
248 See Skweyiya note 58 supra. 
249 See Nie J Rhoodie "Reform: The Way to a Democratic Socio-political order in South 
Africa" H C Marais (ed.) South Africa - Perspectives on the Future (1989)171. 
250 See General Notice 303 Government Gazette 11288 May 5 1988. 
251 Act 86 of 1988. 
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genuine and democratically elected leaders of the South African Community. 
The government sought to introduce a new Constitutional dispensation through 
the offices of black participants of its own choice. 252 Many of the black leaders 
singled out in the Act to participate in the design of a new Constitution had 
almost no credibility in the black community because they had allowed 
themselves to be co-opted into apartheid structures. Some of the leaders 
concerned, including Dr Mangosuthu Buthelezi, then chief Minister of KwaZulu 
and leader of the lnkatha Movement, made it publicly known that they would 
not serve on the Council. It is not suprising, in light of this, that President PW 
Botha's National Council never got off the ground.253 The efforts of PW Botha's 
administration to get negotiations off the ground on their own terms failed 
dismally. The failure once more afforded the ANC a moral and political high 
ground. 
The ANC, unlike the government, embarked on consultations with the Mass 
Democratic Movement inside the country254 as well as the international 
community.255 These consultations resulted in the Harare Declaration and the 
UN Consensus Resolution on South Africa which provided an international 
framework for a constitutional settlement in South Africa. When the Declaration 
was submitted to the UN for consideration it was pointedly observed that256 
"endorsement by the UN would establish an international benchmark on 
negotiations to be used as a standard by which to judge any proposal emanating 
252 See Van der Westhuizen "Constitutional Options for a Post-Apartheid South Africa" 759 
note 56. 
2
s.i Ibid. 
254 The ANC Convened a two-day meeting in Lusaka, Zambia on 6 June 1989 with Cosatu 
and the UDF to formulate a proposal on negotiations for submissions to the OAU summit to be 
held in Harare on 29-31/71 1989. The proposal was adopted and published as the Declarations 
of the OAU Ad-Hoc Committee on Southern Africa on the question of South Africa. See 
Discussion paper: The MDM meets the ANC SASPU National (August/September 1989) 26 et 
seq. For a text of the Declaration see Setshaba (October 1989) 2-5. 
255 See Alan Dunn "World sets deadlines" Pretoria News Wednesday 4 October 1989, and 
"Wooing the World" New Nation September (1989) 15-21. Also see "South Africa: De Klerk faces 
the big heat" Africa Conftdential 22 September 1989 vol. 30 no. 19. 
256 See Unisa Tutorial Letter 103/1994 (Department of Constitutional and Public 
International Law) 4. 
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from Pretoria, so if Pretoria wishes to negotiate on terms of its own choosing, it 
has weeks rather that months in which to derail the ANC plan and present one 
of it own". 
In December 1989, the UN General Assembly endorsed the Harare Declaration 
in its Resolution on Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences in South 
Africa. 
In its preamble the Resolution reaffirmed that in its efforts to find a negotiated 
peaceful settlement in South Africa (and elsewhere) the UN was guided by the 
fundamental and universal principles enshrined in the UN Charter and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and reiterated that the apartheid system 
was an obstacle to the achievement of the fundamental objectives of justice, 
human dignity and peace by the people of South Africa. Furthermore, the 
preamble reaffirmed: 
"the right of all peoples, including the people of South Africa, to determine their 
own destiny and to work out of for themselves the institution and the system of 
government under which they will, by general consent, live and work together 
to build a harmonious society." 
Also, the preamble reaffirmed the UN's commitment to do everything possible 
and necessary to assist the people of South Africa, in such a way as they 
decided, through their genuine representatives, determined to achieve their 
right of self-determination. 
The preamble noted that the International Community made those 
commitments because of its belief that all people were equal and had equal 
rights to human dignity and respect, regardless of colour, race, sex or creed and 
that all men and women had the right and duty to participate in their own 
government, as equal members of society, and that no individual or group of 
individuals had any right to govern others without their democratic consent, 
and reiterated that the apartheid system violated all these fundamental and 
417 
universal principles. Thus the General Assembly affirmed that apartheid was 
a crime against the conscience and dignity of humanity stating that it would 
continue to support the victims of apartheid as its duty carried out in the name 
of humanity. Then the General Assembly endorsed the Harare Declaration and 
the Lusaka Manifesto.257 In an apparent endorsement258 of the Dar-Es-Salaam 
Declaration, the Assembly acknowledge other changes towards peaceful change 
that had taken place in Southern Africa. 
In its operative paragraphs, the Resolution observed that there was a real 
possibility to end apartheid through negotiations if there was demonstrable 
readiness on the part of the South African regime to engage in negotiations 
genuinely and seriously, as the majority of South Africans had always preferred 
a peaceful political settlement. Thus the Resolution encouraged the people of 
South Africa, as part of their legitimate struggle, to join together to negotiate an 
end to the apartheid system and agree on all the measures necessary to 
transform their country into a non-racial democracy. The Resolution, like the 
1987 ANC statement on negotiations, held that the goal of any negotiations 
should not be the amendment or reform of the apartheid system but its 
elimination. 
Hence, the General Assembly supported the position of the people of South 
Africa who demanded a new Constitutional Order based on fundamental and 
universal principles embodied in the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. Hence, the General Assembly held the following fundamental 
principles to be of importance to the creation of a new constitutional order in 
South Africa: 
(a) South Africa shall become a united, non-racial and democratic state; 
(b) All its people shall enjoy common and equal citizenship and nationality, 
regardless of race, colour, sex or creed; 
257 See Willem de Klerk FW de Klerk: The Man in his time (1991) 55-60. 
258 August 1989. 
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(c) All its people shall have the right to participate in the government and 
administration of the country on the basis of universal and equal suffrage, under 
a non-racial voters' roll, and by secret ballot, in a united and non-fragmented 
South Africa; 
(d) All its people shall have the right to form and join any political party of their 
choice, provided that this is not in furtherance of racism; 
(e) All shall enjoy universally recognised human rights, freedoms and civil liberties, 
protected under an entrenched bill of rights; 
(0 South Africa shall have a legal system that will guarantee equality of all before 
the law; 
(g) South Africa shall have an independent and non-racial judiciary; 
(h) There shall be created an economic order that will promote and advance the 
well-being of all South Africans; 
(i) A democratic South Africa shall respects the rights, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of all countries and pursue a policy of peace, friendship and mutually 
beneficial co-operation with all people. 
The General Assembly adopted these principles as a possible basis for an 
internationally acceptable constitutional settlement for South Africa that is to 
say, a "holy law"259 for South Africa. 
Then, the General Assembly called upon South Africa to create a climate for 
negotiations by removing certain obstacles. They included: 
(a) Releasing all political prisoners and detainees unconditionally and refraining 
from imposing any restrictions on them; 
(b) Lifting all bans and restrictions on all proscribed organisations and persons; 
(c) Removing all troops from the townships; 
(d) Ending the state of emergency and repealing all legislation, such as the Internal 
Security Act, designed to circumscribe political activity; 
(e) Cease all political trials and executions for politically motivated crimes. 
259 See Willem de Klerk "The Process of Political Negotiation: 1990-1993" in Bertus de 
Villiers Birth of a Constitution (1994) 4. 
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The General Assembly believed that these measures were necessary for a 
climate for free political discussion which was an essential condition to ensure 
that the people themselves participated in the process of remaking South Africa. 
Furthermore, the General Assembly spelled out guidelines to the process of 
negotiations between the national liberation movements and the South African 
regime. The process required three agreements. First, an agreement on the 
mechanism for the drawing up of a new constitution, based on, amongst others, 
the principles enunciated above, and the basis of its adoption; secondly, an 
agreement of the role to be played by the international community in ensuring 
a successful transition to a democratic order; and thirdly, an agreement of the 
transitional arrangements and modalities for the process of drawing up and 
adoption of a new Constitution, and for the transition to a democratic order, 
including the holding of elections. Finally, the General Assembly adopted a 
programme of actions based on the implementation of the Declaration. 
6.2 The Birth of a New Constitution 
6.2.1 Background 
The Collapse of the PW Botha's attempts to negotiate on his own terms forced 
the government to realise that the National Liberation Movements (especially 
the ANC) held the key to the future of South Africa. Hence, exploratory talks 
took place between the ANC (through its jailed leader, Mr Nelson Mandela) and 
the government in May 1988 (other sources state July 1989 as the correct 
date).260 Upon his election as the leader of the National Party on 2 February 
1989 Mr FW de Klerk immediately made fresh efforts to get negotiations off the 
ground. In a speech given on his election day he emphasised a total change in 
South Africa's goals .261 The new goals would include: 
260 See David Phillips Nelson Mandela Speaks - forging a Democratic, non-racial South 
Africa 163-4. 
261 See Van der Westhuizen "Constitutional Options for a Post Apartheid South Africa" op 
cit. 
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(a) a country free of antagonisms of the past, domination and oppression and a 
country that would find expression in a true democracy; 
(b) a plan of action that would address the genuine grievances hampering 
negotiations; 
(c) · normalisation of international relations; and 
(d) elimination of domination in politics by either the majority or the minority. 
Hardly two weeks before the adoption of the Harare Declaration Mr PW Botha 
resigned as State President (on 14 August 1989) and Mr FW de Klerk was 
elected by the Parliamentary Electoral College as the seventh State President 
of the Republic of South Africa (this following the National Party victory in a 
"general election" on 6 September 1989). With the adoption of the Harare 
Declaration hardly a week262 before his election as State President Mr de Klerk 
and his administration saw the writing on the wall and responded positively to 
the prerequisites for negotiations spelled out in the document (especially 
obstacles to negotiations contained in the Declaration and earlier UN 
Resolutions), for instance, the release of political prisoners, the unbanning of 
organisations and persons, the removal of certain legislation and so forth. 263 
At his inauguration as State President on the 20 September 1989 de Klerk 
undertook to repeal discriminatory legislation, release security prisoners and to 
end the State of Emergency as soon as possible. Also, he undertook to work out 
Constitutional proposals which would protect all people, including minorities, 
by means of Constitutional checks and balances and a bill of rights. 264 In his 
first opening-of-Parliament speech265 following his election as leader of the ruling 
National Party, Mr de Klerk committed himself 
(a) to abolish apartheid; and 
(b) to create conditions that would be conducive to securing the climate for a 
262 Ibid. 
263 Ibid. 
264 Ibid. 
265 See South African Debates of Parliament vol. 1 Cols. 1-8 (2nd session, 9th Parliament, 
90) 
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negotiated settlement of the South African Constitutional problem on the basis 
of a non-discriminatory democracy. 
Willem de Klerk266 observed quite correctly, that the NP Government's radical 
change in policy towards negotiations was not only the result of pressure from 
the ANC, the international Community and the changes in Eastern Europe but 
also of the emerging cracks within the ruling party itself. 
During the 1990 Parliamentary session the de Klerk administration repealed 
several remaining laws that sanctioned racial discrimination. These laws 
included:-
(a) the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act, 267 
(b) the Group Areas Act of 1966,268 and 
(c) the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936. 269 
In a direct response to the Harare Declaration and the UN Consensus Resolution 
on Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences, and in particular, to create a 
favourable climate for settling the Constitutional problem through negotiations, 
the government released its political prisoners,270 most notably Mr Nelson 
Mandela. 271 
The De Klerk government also lifted all banning orders that had restricted the 
266 See De Klerk "The Process of Political Negotiation: 1990-1993" 4-5. 
267 See Discriminatory legislation regarding Public Amenities Repeal Act 121 of 1990. 
268 See Group Areas Act 36 of 1966. 
269 See Black Land Act 27 of 1913 and the Development Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936. 
The following year February 1, 1991 he announced that the population Registration Act would 
be replaced by regulations to facilitate the racial criteria of political rights under the 1983 
Constitution. 
270 See Human Rights Index (1 October 1989-28 February 1990) in 1990 South African 
Journal of Human Rights 121, 128 and Human Rights Index (1March1990-30 June 1990) in 
1990 South African Journal of Human Rights 325-326. 
271 Mr. Mandela was released on 11 February 1990. See Van der Westhuizen "Constitutional 
Options for a Post-Apartheid South Africa" 761 note 64. 
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political activities of individuals272 and organisations, 273 notably those that had 
outlawed the ANC, the PAC and the SACP,274 and made provision for the return 
of political refugees to South Africa with immunity.275 
It is abundantly clear from the preceding paragraphs that the de Klerk 
government, unlike that of his predecessor, demonstrated good faith and a 
determination to enter into negotiations with all political groups in the country 
to design an entirely new Constitutional dispensation for post-apartheid South 
Africa. This act of good faith and determination ushered in a negotiation process 
that can be divided into three phases: (1) the Talks about Talks phase, (2) the 
Constitutional Negotiations phase and (3) the Transitional phase. These phases 
(and the role of the international Community in them) will be discussed below. 
6.2.2 Landmarks in the Negotiations Process 
6.2.2.1 The Talks About Talks Phase 
In the 1990 opening-of-parliament speech Mr de Klerk removed obstacles to 
negotiations and opened the door for the Talks about Talks phase. This phase 
started with a meeting between the two main players - the government and the 
ANC - in May 1990 at Groote Schuur (in the Cape Province). The two sides held 
the first talks in 78 years in what was considered as the beginning of a process 
to clear all the obstacles to negotiations. Following the talks the two parties 
agreed on the Groote Schuur Minute which declared, inter alia, the parties276 
commitment towards the resolution of the existing climate of violence and 
intimidation, as well as their commitment to stability and to a peaceful process 
of negotiations. 
272 See Government notice R 231andR232 in Government Gazette 12287 of February 3 
1990. 
273 See Government Notice R 229 in Government Gazette 12287, February 3 1990. 
274 The SACP was banned by the Suppression of Communism Act 44 of 1950, and the ANC 
and PAC were banned in terms of the Unlawful Organisations Act 34 of 1960. 
275 See the Indemnity Act 35 of 1990. 
276 See De Klerk "The Process of Political Negotiation: 1990-1993" 6. 
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The Groote Schuur meeting also formed Working Groups and tasked them to 
identify further obstacles which were to be removed before Constitutional 
negotiations could begin. 
The reports of the Working Groups resulted in the Pretoria Minute which was 
signed on 6 August 1990. In terms of this agreement the ANC and government 
reaffirmed the Groote Schuur Minute and the ANC announced that it would 
suspend all armed actions with immediate effect. 
During the following few months after the signing of the Pretoria Minute the 
"talks about talks" deadlocked on various issues. The main bones of contention 
were (a) the meaning of "armed actions" and (b) the failure of the government 
to grant indemnity to returned exiles. These snags were addressed in the DF 
Malan Accord which was signed on 12 February 1991. In terms of the Accord 
the ANC agreed to cease all armed action and related activities, while the 
government agreed to deal with the return of exiles and the release of political 
prisoners more comprehensively. 277 
The DF Malan Accord notwithstanding, violence within the country continued 
to increase leading to a worsening of relations between the ANC and the 
government. To address the problem of violence the government unilaterally 
convened a Conference on Violence and Intimidation on 24-25 May 1991 at the 
CSIR in Pretoria. In protest against that unilateral action by the government the 
ANC and the churches boycotted the conference. Although the Conference 
failed, it provided a mechanism for consultation with the churches and business 
who were involved in another initiative. 
The church and business initiative led to a second conference which was held 
in Sandton in June 1991. At that Conference five sub-committees were 
appointed to address specific aspects of the peace process. The reports of those 
211 Ibid. 
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sub-committees culminated in the integrated Peace Accord which was signed 
on 14 September 1991. The Accord was signed by 36 parties and organisations 
(excluding the Conservative Party and other rights-wing parties and 
organisations, as well as the PAC) at the National Peace Convention which was 
held at the Carlton Hotel in Johannesburg. The aim of the peace accord was to 
set out the codes of conduct, procedures and mechanisms to achieve the 
common purpose of ending political violence. Thus at the Convention a National 
Peace Committee was established and tasked to monitor and make 
recommendations on the implementation of the Peace Accord and to ensure 
compliance with the Code of Conduct for political parties and organisations. It 
terms of the Accord Mr Justice Richard Goldstone was appointed as a one-man 
Commission of enquiry into the ongoing violence in the country. The peace 
Accord signified the end of the "talks about talks" phase and opened the door 
to Constitutional negotiations. 
6.2.2.2 The Constitutional Negotiations Phase 
The "talks about talks" phase affirmed the position of the Harare Declaration 
(and the UN Consensus Resolutions) that the main role-players in the 
negotiation process were the National Liberation Movements (led by the ANC) 
and the government. In line with its leadership role the ANC led the formation 
of the Patriotic Front in Durban from 25 to 27 October 1991. The Patriotic Front 
Conference brought together political, labour, women's, religious, youth, 
professional, sports, cultural and business formations as well as organisations 
of traditional leaders. The Conference reaffirmed: 
(a) the commitment of the majority of South Africans shared by the international 
Community278 to the establishment of a non-racial, non-sexist, democratic, 
unfragmented and unitary country; 
(b) the illegality and illegitimacy of the National Party government; 
278 See The Patriotic Front/United Front Conference Declaration adopted at the 
Patriotic/United Front Conference held in Durban on the 25-27 October 1991. 
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(c) noted that the governments' Constitutional proposals sought to entrench 
minority privilege and white domination; and 
(d) recognised the need for the transfer of power to all the people through a 
mechanism in which all the people (both black and white) would elect by 
proportional representation and through universal suffrage, a Constituent 
Assembly that would draft and adopt a democratic constitution which shall 
constitute the basis for unifying the country around a common patriotism. 
In order to ensure that elections for the Constituent Assembly would be free and 
fair and to prevent the incumbent government from presiding over or 
manipulating the transition through the misuse of its de facto control over state 
power and resources, the Patriotic Front Conference called for the establishment 
of a sovereign interim government/transitional authority that would at least 
assume control over security forces and related matters, the electoral process, 
state media and defined areas of budget and finance, as well as secure 
international participation. Finally and perhaps most significantly the 
Conference demanded a speedy holding of an All-Party Congress/Pre-
Constituent Assembly (APC/PCAM), a mechanism to set in motion the process 
leading to a democratically elected Constituent Assembly which would effect the 
desired transfer of power to the people. More specifically, the APC/PCAM would 
be tasked to work out modalities for transferring power to the people. Such 
modalities would centre around: the establishment of an elected Constitutional 
Assembly based on one person one vote with a single voters' roll; constitutional 
principles within the framework outlined in the Harare Declaration and the UN 
Consensus Resolutions on South Africa; an interim Government/Transitional 
Authority; the role of the international community; the re-incorporation of the 
Bantustans and a definite time-frame. The Patriotic Front Conference was 
particular significant as it not only brought together all the oppressed majority 
across the colour and political divide but also united them around a common 
perspective of majority rule based on universally accepted constitutional 
principles. 279 
219 Ibid. 
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The Patriotic Front Conference paved the way for preparatory talks (held on 29 
and 30 November 1991) which resulted in the establishment of the Convection 
for a Democratic South Africa. The Convention (later known as Codesa I) 
brought together nineteen (19) political parties/organisations/governments 
which became the founding members of Codesa. Political parties and 
organisations on both the extreme left (e.g. PAC) and the extreme right (e.g. the 
A WB) did not participate in the establishment of Codesa. 
At its first meeting held on 20-21 December 1991 Codesa I adopted a 
Declaration of Intent which was signed by all the participating parties, except 
the government of Bophuthatswana and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). With 
the adoption of the Declaration Codesa was effectively established as a 
negotiating forum which had to set the process in motion for the drawing up 
(and establishing) a democratic Constitution for South Africa. 
The Declaration of Intent280 incorporated (with some modifications) the 
Constitutional principles contained in the Harare Declaration and the UN 
Consensus Resolutions and various human-rights norms embodied in the 
international human rights law. The Declaration captured the ideas of a united 
South Africa with a single citizenship, freedom, equality and security for all 
regardless of race, colour, sex or creed, and above all, the need to abolish 
apartheid or any other form of discrimination. The latter appears to be a 
compromise between the white minority and black majority to ensure that 
white minority domination should not be replaced by black majority 
domination. How this was achieved will appear in the analysis of the 
Constitutional principles below. The Declaration did not only recognise the need 
to heal the divisions of the past, to secure the advancement of all, and to 
establish a free and open society based on democratic values but contrary to the 
apartheid jurisprudence recognised the dignity, worth and rights of the 
individual as the basis of freedom, justice and peace. Also, the Declaration 
280 For a text of the Declaration see ANC Negotiations Bulletin no. 10 (18 May 1992) 1. 
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committed its signatories to improve the quality of life of all the people through 
policies that will promote economic growth and human development and ensure 
equality of opportunities and social justice for all South Africans. These 
principles are clearly informed by the preamble of the UN Charter and further 
reflect the impact of international human-rights law on South Africa. In a clear 
and unequivocal response to the demands of the International Community 
(especially the Harare Declaration and numerous UN Resolutions) the 
Declaration recognised the need to create a climate conducive to peaceful 
constitutional change by eliminating violence, intimidation and destabilisation 
and by promoting free political participation, discussion and debate and the set 
in motion the process of drawing up and establishing a constitution that would 
incorporate the universally accepted Constitutional principles which would 
mark a clear break with apartheid constitutionalism. 
The Constitutional principles concerned were: 
[a) that South Africa will be a united, democratic, non-racial and non-sexist state in 
which sovereign authority is exercised over the whole of its territory; 
[b) that the constitution will be the supreme law and that it will be guarded over by 
an independent, non-racial and impartial judiciary; 
[c) that there will be a multi-party democracy with the right to form and join 
political parties and with regular elections on the basis of universal adult 
suffrage on a common voters roll: in general the basic electoral system shall be 
that of proportional representation; 
[d) that there shall be a separation of powers between the legislature, executive and 
judiciary with appropriate checks and balances; 
[e) that the diversity of languages, cultures and religions of the people of South 
Africa shall be acknowledged; 
(fl that all shall enjoy universally accepted human rights, freedoms and civil 
liberties including the freedoms of religion, speech and assembly, protected by 
an entrenched and justiciable Bill of Rights and a legal system that guarantees 
equality of all before the law. 
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In summary, these principles (a) endorsed the universally accepted vision of a 
post-apartheid South Africa, (b) outlawed the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty and substituted it with the sovereignty of the law, and (c) 
incorporated international human rights law with due regard to the rights of all 
sections of the population. Finally, the Declaration shifted the balance of power 
from the tricameral parliament to Codesa by empowering it to draft the text of 
all legislation required to give effect to the agreements reached in Codesa I and 
making those agreements binding on all parties. 
However, in Constitutional terms Codesa I did not have any original authority, 
nor statutory or executive powers. Thus it could not make and enforce any 
laws. This meant that the implementation of its agreements, depending on their 
nature, had to be vested in the apartheid institutions of authority. This was also 
the case in Namibia and Zimbabwe during their negotiations phase. This 
approach guaranteed Constitutional continuity and an orderly transition. 
The negotiations structures of Codesa I included a plenary (including all 19 
parties), a Management Committee and five Working Groups. Each Working 
Group was assigned specific terms of reference. The mandate of Working Group 
1 was to investigate the creation of a favourable climate for free political 
activity. In turn the Group established a number of sub-committees concerned 
with specific issues such as the completion of the reconciliation process, the role 
of security forces, the socio-economic process and the creation of opportunities 
for political organising. The Group reached agreement on a wide range of issues, 
like the way in which a state of emergency would be handled if the need arose. 
Also, the Group put forward proposals for the removal of remaining 
discriminatory legislation and framed a definition of political intimidation. 
Amongst others the Group proposed the establishment of a task group to invite 
a neutral, independent international body to monitor the electoral process. The 
Group also played a significant role in the promotion of gender equality through 
the Gender Advisory Committee. Thus the group clearly recognised and 
acknowledged the role of the international Community in settling domestic 
Constitutional disputes in both dependent and independent states. 
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Working Group 2 was tasked to investigate and make recommendations about 
a set of general Constitutional principles which should serve as the framework 
for a new Constitution, 281 and in the context of such principles to identify key 
problems and issues that required attention on the one hand and the areas of 
commonality and agreement on the other. The second task of Working Group 
2 was to investigate and to make recommendations regarding the appropriate 
body to draft a new constitution (and the process whereby that would take 
place). Here too, the Group was tasked to identify areas of communality and 
agreement and areas of disagreements. The commitment of all the participating 
parties to end apartheid in line with the demand of the overwhelming majority 
of South Africans and the international Community (especially the UN) was 
reflected by the remarkable measure of agreement which was reached at an 
early stage on the following Constitutional principles : 
(a) South Africa shall be a united, democratic, non-racial, non-sexist and sovereign 
state; 
(b) the Constitution shall be the Supreme Law of the Land and shall include a 
judicially enforceable bill of fundamental rights guaranteeing universally 
recognised human rights, freedoms and civil liberties, including freedom of 
religion, speech and assembly; 
(c) that the diversity of languages, cultures and religions within the country shall 
be recognised and afforded equal status; 
(d) that the doctrine of separation of powers, with appropriate checks and balances 
shall be adhered to; 
(e) that the legislature shall function on the basics of a multi-party democracy, 
regular elections, universal suffrage, a common voters' roll and a system of 
proportional representation; 
(0 that the judiciary shall be independent, non-racial and impartial and the legal 
system shall guarantee equality for all before the law; and finally 
(g) that all South African shall enjoy common citizenship. 
281 Cf. the role played by the so-called 1982 principles in the Namibian Constitution-making 
process. See Van Wyk "The Making of the Namibian Constitution: lessons for Africa" 1991 
CILSA 341 and Wiechers "Namibia: the 1982 Constitutional Principles and their legal 
Significance" 1989/90 SA YIL 1. 
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Although Working Group 1 reached agreement with ease on Constitutional 
principles it encountered serious problems on a number of issues. First, the 
relationship between the three tiers of government; the ANC favoured a unitary 
state, the NP and IFP favoured a federal state and Bophuthatswana government 
opted for a Confederation which was original advocated by the NP. This was not 
surprising as a Confederation would perpetuate Bantustans (especially the 
TBVC states including Ciskei, Venda, Transkei and Bophuthatswana) through 
the backdoor. However, Venda and Transkei rejected the Confederal from of 
state along side the ANC. 
The second bone of contention was the effective participation of minorities in 
the new constitutional dispensation. The Working Group agreed that there 
should be effective participation of political parties and that such participation 
should be consistent with democracy. This approach, however, did not 
adequately address the problem of representation of minorities as envisaged by 
the establishment parties and administrations. For instance, South African 
whites in general, and the NP and other white minority political parties in 
particular, were concerned about the possibility of being swamped by the 
numerically superior blacks as they still interpreted the South African political 
landscape in racial terms despite their advocacy of non-racism and opening-up 
of their parties to all races. 
The NP sought to limit the impact of majority rule by introducing a bicameral 
system in which both the interim legislature and the new Parliament would 
consist of a representative lower house/National Assembly plus a higher 
house/Senate with representation loaded in favour of minorities, and that the 
senate should possess a legislative veto. This proposal found opposition from the 
ANC-led patriotic front which remained implacably opposed to a bicameral 
Constitutional Assembly in any form. However, the ANC supported the idea of 
a bicameral legislature and the idea of a regionally elected second chamber 
without veto powers. A major deadlock in Working Group II emerged on the 
issue of the majority required to approved a new constitution. The government 
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and its allies demanded a 75 percent majority, and the ANC and its allies a two-
thirds majority. This deadlock nearly caused Codesa 2 (held on 15 May 1992) 
to flounder completely. It was saved by the personal intervention of both 
Messrs. FW de Klerk and NR Mandela. 282 
Other contentious issues facing Working Group II were the issue of self-
determination (propagated by the conservative parties which rejected "black" 
majority rule outright) for the Afrikaner people, the right of the Zulu King to 
participate in Codesa and the right of he Zulus to self-determination, affirmative 
action and economic policy. Although there was consensus in the desirability 
of a justiciable bill of right the parties disagreed on whether or not the so-called 
second generation or "red" rights (socio-economic rights) and third generation 
or "green" rights (environmental rights) should enjoy Constitutional protection. 
Furthermore, the IFP rejected the idea of a democratically elected Constitutional 
Assembly drawing up a Constitution. They felt that approach would defeat their 
object of curtailing the power of a popularly elected assembly. Also, the IFP felt 
that as they were committed to a federal state the form of state had to be settled 
at an early stage in the proceedings. 
The assignment of Working Group III was that of making transitional 
Constitutional arrangements pending the finalisation of the Constitution. This 
Working Group identified two preliminary stages for the transition to 
democracy. The first stage was the pre-interim stage which involved the 
preparations for holding free and fair elections. This exercise was also described 
as levelling the playing field for free and fair elections. The second stage was the 
interim period between the elections and the adoption of a new Constitution. 
The main proposal that emerged from Working Group III was that a 
Transitional Executive Council (TEC) should be established with a number of 
subcouncils to deal with matter such as regional and local government, finance, 
law and order, defence, foreign affairs, elections etc. The Group also proposed 
282 See Carpenter and Beukes "The Path to Constitutional Democracy" in 1992 Journal of 
African Law vol. 36 1 71. 
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the formation of an independent election commission to assisting in levelling the 
playing field. 
Working Group IV was tasked to deal with the future of the TBVC states. Its 
subcommittees dealt with matters such as the way in which the will of the 
citizens of the TBVC states could be tested, citizenship and the implications of 
possible reincorporation of the TBVC states~ Here, public international law 
impacted directly on the deliberations. For instance, the ANC-led Patriotic Front 
took the view that all negotiations had to be conducted on the basis of the 1910 
boundaries of the Union of South Africa. This was a clear affirmation of the 
principle of the territorial integrity of South Africa which manifested itself in the 
non-recognition of the Bantustans by the international community. 
Last but not least, Working Group V concerned itself with timeframes and the 
implementation of the new constitution. Working Group V could not make 
much progress as its work depend on agreements by the other four working 
groups. At Codesa II held on 15-16 May 1992 Working Groups I, II and III tabled 
their draft agreements. Working Group II on the Constitution-making body 
failed to table a draft agreement as it had deadlocked. As a result of the 
deadlock in Working Group II Codesa II did not enter into any agreements, each 
of the Working Groups formed part of single package and they had no mandate 
to enter into piecemeal agreements. The ANC saw the Constitution-making body 
and the Constitution-making process as the heart of the negotiation while all 
other agreements (e.g. climate creation, interim government) were merely 
designed to facilitate Constitution-making.283 Hence in its annual statement (8 
January 1992) the ANC stated that: 
"There cannot be any point in setting up an interim government if this principle 
(the principle of democratically elected Constitution-making body) has not been 
adopted." 
283 See ANC Negotiations Bulletin no. 1.0 (18 May 1992) 1. 
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The ANC negotiators were guided by this approach throughout the 
negotiations. 284 
At face value that impasse in Codesa II resulted from the disagreement between 
the ANC and government on the majority required to approve a new 
Constitution. As said above, the government and its allies demanded 75 percent 
majority, and the ANC and its allies a two-thirds (66. 7 percent) majority. The 
problem was however much more deeper that. As the ANC stated285 the core of 
the negotiations was the Constitution-making process. In other words the 
question of how political power was to be apportioned. 286 
The government had entered negotiations with the purpose not of transferring 
power to the majority, but of striking a unique power-sharing deal which would 
ensure a powerful role for the white minority in the future. 287 Hence the 
government rejected what it called simple majority rule and proposed its own 
constitutional principles288 different from those contained in the Harare 
Declaration and the UN Consensus Resolutions. The government model of 
majority rule was based on a constitution which would entrench the position of 
minority parties in government and restrain majority parties through a maize 
of checks and balances. Their proposals included: a transitional government of 
an enforced coalition for up to ten years, with a multi-party executive, a rotating 
presidency, and a strong emphasis on devolution of power to regional 
authorities; to this was added a bicameral parliament, the first house to be 
elected by proportional representation (which enhances the role of minorities), 
the second to be the seat of minorities, in which each party receiving a specified 
minimum support in elections would receive an equal number of seats; the 
second house would effectively have the power to veto legislation by the first 
house.289 
284 Ibid. 
285 Ibid. 
286 See Meredith South Africa's New Era (1994) 45. 
287 Ibid. 
288 Ibid 46. 
289 See Meredith South Africa's New Era 46. 
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The government apparently sought to give Codesa more or less the same status 
with the Turnhalle multi-party forum in South West Africa/Namibia. 290 Hence, 
they saw the purpose of Codesa as that of settling in a multi-party forum, as 
many of the abovementioned constitutional details as possible before 
negotiations moved to a democratically elected Constitution-making body where 
the influence of the National Party would be substantially reduced (a 
constitution-making process known as pouviour constitue1. Thus the NP 
wanted to secure its future before relinquishing sole power. In addition, they 
wanted the transition to take a long period. On the other hand the ANC had 
entered negotiations with the aim of moving the process on rapidly from Codesa 
to an interim government and to an elected assembly empowered to determine 
a new Constitution (a constitution-making process known as pouviour 
constituante). The ANC wanted a clean break with the past and saw Codesa's 
role as merely to decide on measures which were needed before a Constitution-
making body could be elected. 291 At the second sitting of Codesa held on 15 and 
16 May 1992 the radically opposed approaches to negotiations by the ANC and 
government resulted in an impasse. 
The ANC identified four major obstacles to a negotiated settlement and blamed 
the government for them. They included292 
(a) unacceptably high percentages to draft a Constitution, in essence a veto through 
the back door; 
(b) entrenched regional and local boundaries and powers to be determine in the 
interim and to be binding on the future democratic Constitution; 
(c) an undemocratic and unelected senate with veto powers; and 
(d) a determination that the u:iterim Constitution, a mechanism to ensure continuity 
during the transition, had wide veto powers and so became a permanent feature 
remaining in force indefinety. 
290 See chapter 4 par. 4.2 supra. 
291 See Meredith South Africa's New Era 46. 
292 See David Phillips Nelson Mandela Speaks -forging a Democratic, non-racial South 
Africa (1994) 163-4. 
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Commenting on these obstacles the ANC President, 293 Mr Nelson Mandela, 
reaffirmed the AN C's position that agreements reached at Codesa could only be 
treated as a whole package and that therefore the breakdown over the 
Constitution-making body affected the entire process. Also, the President 
reaffirmed the ANC view that the National Party was trying to hold on to power 
at all costs by introducing minority veto powers in a variety of ways that could 
only result in a paralysis of decision-making, strife, and great instability. Having 
reached an impasse Codesa II mandated its management Committee to resolve 
all outstanding matters of the Working Groups. Its immediate task was to 
examine and co-ordinate all the agreements reached in the Working Groups 
created by Codesa 1 and to set up a mechanism which would draft all the 
legislation required by agreements reached thus far. In order to fulfil its brief 
the Management Committee had a mandate to establish structures such as 
technical committees or sub-committees to assist it in its task. Also, the 
Management Committee was mandated to convene a third plenary session of 
Codesa in order to implement transitional measures leading to the drafting of 
a new Constitution. 
6.2.3 The Breakdown in Constitutional Negotiations and the 
Intervention of the International Community 
When CODESA 2 reached deadlock on 16 May, amid acrimonious exchanges, 
the ANC was already preparing alternative plans. The ANC plans involved a 
campaign of mass action, a series of rolling strikes, demonstrations and 
boycotts across the country. The campaign was intended to force the 
government to back down at the negotiating table. While some sections of the 
ANC alliance regarded mass action as a necessary component of the negotiating 
process others considered it as the Leipzig option, that is, a means to bring 
down the government, rather than just gaining compromises. When the 
Campaign was launched many townships were already in turmoil. The National 
293 Ibid 164. 
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Peace Accord (NPA) had proved fruitless, many of its Committees were close to 
collapse and the death toll, since its introduction, had risen to 1500. The 
violence on the reef continued unabated, resulting in at least 260 attacks on 
township residents by hostel dwellers between July 1990 - April 1992. The date 
chosen for the start of the mass action campaign was 16 June, the anniversary 
of the beginning of Soweto revolt in 1976. While the ANC proclaimed the mass 
stayaway it organised a success; the government claimed that the stayaway 
would have happened on that date anyway. On the 17 June 1992 an incident 
of grave brutality, like the Sharpeville (1960) and Soweto (1976) massacres, took 
place in Boipatong near Vanderbijlpark .. On the night of the 17 June 1992 a 
group of hostel dwellers attacked a nearby shack settlement, kicking in doors, 
smashing windows and then hacking, stabbing and shooting residents at 
random in a killing spree that lasted for more than four hours. That killing 
spree left 45 residents dead .. 
The police were accused of collusion in the killing of the residents who were 
mostly women and children .. Two days later three people died when police 
opened fire on a crowd which had gathered to protest at the massacre. 294 
On the 23rd June 1992 the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the ANC 
met to discuss the implications of the Boipatong massacre. 295 At the end of the 
meeting they reaffirmed the AN C's commitment to a negotiated resolution of the 
conflict, but resolved to break off all negotiations and make the following 
fourteen demands. 
( 1) the creation of a democratically elected and sovereign Constituent assembly to 
draft and adopt a new Constitution; 
(2) the establishment of an interim Government of National Unity; 
(3) the immediate termination of all covert operations including hit squad activity; 
(4) to disarm, disband and confine to barracks all special forces as well as 
294 Meredith South Africa's New Era 49-50. 
295 See ANC Negotiation Bulletin no. 12 14 July (1992) 1. 
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detachments made up of foreign nationals; 
(5) to suspend and prosecute all officers and security force personnel involved in 
violence; 
(6) to ensure that all repression in some of the self-governing states, and in the so-
called independent states, is ended forthwith; 
(7) the immediate implementation of the programme to phase out the hostels and 
convert them into family unit accommodation; 
(8) the installation of fences around these establishments; 
(9) guarding of these hostels by security forces on a permanent basis, monitored by 
multi-lateral peace structures, and the expulsion of those who occupy the hostels 
illegally; 
(1 O) regular searches of hostels with the participation of multi-lateral peace 
structures; 
(11) banning the carrying of all dangerous weapons in public on all occasions, 
including so-called cultural weapons; 
( 12) the establishment of an international commission of enquiry into the Boipatong 
Massacre and all acts of violence as well as the international monitoring of the 
violence; 
(13) release all political prisoners forthwith; 
(14) repeal all repressive legislation .. 
The decision of the ANC (NEC) and the foregoing demands were endorsed by the 
Tripartite Alliance and the Patriotic Front. 296 
The demands of the ANC were delivered to Mr de Klerk in the form of a 
memorandum dated 26 June 1992. On the 2 July 1992 Mr de Klerk replied to 
the ANC's memorandum, but failed (or neglected) to address the· demands. 
Instead, Mr de Klerk merely denied ANC charges of government complicity and 
involvement in the violence. He refused to commit his government and party 
to the democratic principle of majority rule and merely accused the ANC of 
stalling the process of negotiations. 297 
296 Ibid. 
297 See ANC Negotiations Bulletin no. 12 14 July (1992) 1. 
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In his letter dated 9 July, 1992 (being a reply to Mr de Klerk's letter of 2 July 
1992) Mr Mandela stated the ANC's negotiational position in definite and more 
emphatic terms and challenged Mr de Klerk claim that his government was 
committed to Constitutionality and a transitional government while the ANC 
insisted on an unstructured and immediate transfer of power before a proper 
transitional Constitution was negotiated.298 Mr Mandela accused Mr de Klerk of 
distorting the purpose of negotiations as set out in the Declaration on Intent 
adopted by Codesa 1. He noted that WG 2 was specifically charged with the task 
of determining the set of general Constitutional principles consistent with and 
including those in the Declaration of Intent, as well as the form and content of 
the Constitution-making body/processes, and further, that the question of a 
transitional government was the subject matter of one of those created by 
Codesa 1. Mr Mandela challenged Mr de Klerk for trying to elevate transitional 
arrangements above the question of the Constitution-making body which he (Mr 
Mandela) regarded as the primary focus of negotiation. With regard to the latter, 
Mr Mandela challenged Mr de Klerk to pronounce himself in keeping with basic 
democratic principles and (in particular and perhaps most significantly) 
declared that:299 
"A democratic Constitution will be fatally flawed if the body charged with 
drafting and adopting it is itself [un-democratic]- be it in its composition or the 
way in which it is to function .......... . 
It is the authority of the people, through their elected representatives that gives 
a Constitution its fundamental legitimacy. Our position is founded on basic 
features of any democratic structure charged with the task of Constitution 
making." 
Mr Mandela then listed the basic features300 in question and observed, first, that 
Mr de Klerk was opposed to a sovereign and democratically elected Constitution-
making body and; secondly, that he was trying to pre-empt the work of the 
298 See Phillips Nelson Mandela Speaks 180. 
299 Ibid 182-183. 
300 Ibid 183. 
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Constituent Assembly by the Codesa process; thirdly, that, besides subjecting 
the work of the Constituent Assembly to the veto of a regionally elected senate 
he (Mr de Klerk) sought to entrench federalism by subterfuge; fourthly, that the 
question of the form of government, be it federal or unitary of whatever, was a 
matter that should be left to a democratically elected Constitution-making body; 
and finally, Mr Mandela concluded that the manner in which Mr de Klerk 
elevated the transitional arrangements to the central focus of negotiations 
betrayed his preoccupation with obtaining guarantees of a constitutionally 
entrenched role for the National Party which would remain a minority party in 
the event of a democratic Constitution. 
With regard to Mr de Klerk's claim that the ANC was insisting on "an 
unstructured and an immediate transfer of power" Mr Mandela recalled that 
long before Codesa was established, the ANC proposed that there should be an 
interim Government of National Unity so as to ensure that no party occupied 
the position of player and referee. Furthermore, Mr Mandela traced the idea of 
a Government of National Unity to the Harare Declaration thereby underlying 
the role of the international community in the process. Mr Mandela stated that 
an interim Government of National Unity was put forward not as an end in 
itself, but as a means by which a democratically elected and sovereign 
Constituent Assembly could be brought into being for the purposes of drafting 
and adopting a democratic Constitution for a united, non-racial, and non-sexist 
South Africa. 
Finally Mr Mandela traced the ANC's linkage of the transitional arrangements 
with the question of a Constitution-making body to the paragraph 1.12 of the 
report of WG 3 which read: 
"The following agreements were reached with regard to the first stage of the 
transition. These agreements and their implementation are dependant upon 
agreement being reached by Codesa in respect of the second stage of the 
transition, including an interim Constitution, and general Constitutional 
principles." 
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The ANC interpreted this paragraph to mean that the implementation of 
transitional constitutional structures were dependent on an agreement on the 
Constitution-making body. This then was the crux of the matter through the 
eyes of the ANC and they would not return to the negotiating tables unless and 
until the deadlock was resolved and the violence ended. 
Meanwhile the ANC proposed an international monitoring force to the OAU 
meeting in Dakar where the latter agreed to raise the matter with the UN 
Security Council. 301 Subsequently, the ANC requested to address a special 
session of the UN Security Council. 302 The ANC used its address to the Council 
to invite the UN to play a role in the transition to democracy in South Africa 
contrary to the South African claim that the UN was precluded by article 2(7) 
of its Charter to interfere in the domestic matters of South Africa. 303 As the 
South African traditional defence in this regard has been dealt with elsewhere304 
we shall only focus on the ANC's motivation for the involvement of the 
International Community in the transition to democracy in South Africa. In its 
address to the Security Council the ANC recalled that the UN had been seized 
with the question of South Africa for more than four decades as the people of 
South Africa had been subjected to the policy of Apartheid which the UN had 
declared a crime against humanity. The ANC noted, first that the UN Security 
Council and General Assembly had assumed the responsibility to adopt 
measures directed at ending the apartheid crime against humanity and helping 
to transform South Africa into a non-racial democracy and, secondly, that 
objective had not yet been achieved. More specifically, it was noted 
(a) that South Africa continued to be governed by a white minority regime; 
(b) that the overwhelming majority of the people were still denied a vote and the 
right to determine their destiny; 
(c) that representatives of the South African government attending the Security 
301 See ANC Negotiations Bulletin no. 12 (of 14 July 1992) 3. 
302 See Phillips Nelson Mandela Speaks 188. 
303 Ibid. 
304 See chapter 4 par. 4.2 supra. 
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Council meeting represented the system of white minority rule to which the UN 
was opposed and; 
(d) that the white minority continued to govern the country under a Constitution 
which the Security Council had declared null and void. For these reasons the 
ANC requested the Security Council to continue looking for ways and means by 
which it could help to expedite the process leading to the democratic 
transformation of South Africa. 
Then the ANC turned to the crisis situation of the negotiations process. The 
ANC identified two major problems facing South Africa - namely, the deadlock 
in Codesa and the violence engulfing black townships. With regard to the 
deadlock the ANC told the Security Council that the ruling white minority 
government continued to look for ways and means by which it could guarantee 
itself the continued exercise of power, regardless of its electoral support. For 
that purpose the regime insisted that the political majority, no matter how 
large, should be subjected to veto by minority political parties. The ANC 
rejected this and demanded a firm commitment by government to full 
democracy based on internationally accepted principles, and an acceptance of 
a sovereign and democratic Constitution-making body. With regard to violence 
the ANC gave details about the deaths and injuries over a period of six years 
and pointed out that the control of state power by the National Party allowed 
them the space to deny and cover up the role of government and its surrogates, 
the security forces and the police, in fostering and fomenting the violence. Then 
the ANC recalled that UN Declaration on Apartheid and its Destructive 
Consequences in Southern Africa required both the regime and the national 
liberation movements to end the violence, remove obstacles to negotiations and 
ensure that a proper climate for negotiations existed. 
Finally, the ANC recalled earlier decisions of the Security Council to help the 
people of South Africa to transform their country into a non-racial democracy 
and then expressed the belief that that commitment placed an urgent obligation 
on the Council to intervene in the South African situation to end the violence. 
According to the ANC the UN interest in a peaceful settlement based on the UN 
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Consensus Resolution and various Security Councils resolutions justified a firm 
and speedy intervention by the Security Council. This was a direct challenge to 
the government which had protested the illegality of the General Assembly's 
actions in passing the 1989 Declaration which it rejected as ultra vires the 
United Nations Charter. Nevertheless, the ANC maintained that the violence, 
like the system of apartheid itself, was a direct challenge to the authority of the 
Security Council and a subversion of its global tasks of furthering peace and 
promoting the objectives contained in both the UN Charter and the Declaration 
on Human Rights. For these reasons the ANC urged the Security Council first 
to request the Secretary-General to appoint a Special representative on South 
Africa and task him (or her) to investigate the situation in South Africa with a 
view to helping the Council to decide on the measures it should take to help end 
the violence, and secondly, that the Council should then take the necessary 
decisions to implement such measures, including the continuous monitoring of 
the situation, to ensure the effectiveness of the measures concerned. Finally, the 
ANC reaffirmed its commitment to the UN Consensus Resolutions and, in 
particular, to the need for a climate conducive to negotiations and a genuinely 
democratic outcome of such negotiations. 
In response to the appeal by the ANC the Security Council passed a unanimous 
resolution on South Africa on the 16th August 1992. This Resolution recalled 
the Security Council resolutions 392 (1976), 473 (1980), 554 (1984) and 556 
(1984) and noted first the escalating violence in South Africa and its 
consequences for the peaceful negotiations aimed at creating a democratic, non-
racial and united South Africa, and secondly that its continuation would 
seriously jeopardise peace and security in Southern Africa. Then the Security 
Council recalled the 1989 Declaration305 which called for negotiations in South 
Africa to take place in a climate free of violence, expressed the concern that the 
break in negotiations and condemned the escalation of violence especially the 
Boipatong Massacre of 17 June 1992. Finally, the Security Council 
305 See UN Chronicle (December 1992) 14. 
443 
(a) urged the South African authorities to take immediate measures to bring an 
effective end to the ongoing violence and to bring those responsible to justice; 
(b) called upon all the parties to cooperate in combating violence and to ensure the 
effective implementation of the National Peace Accord; 
(c) invited the Secretary General to appoint a Special Representative who would 
recommend, after discussion (inter alia) with the parties, measures which would 
assist in bringing an effective end to the violence and in creating conditions for 
negotiations leading towards a peaceful transition to a democratic, non-racial 
and united South Africa. 
Further, the Security Council underlined the need to resume negotiations as 
speedily as possible, urged the international Community to maintain sanctions 
for the purpose of bringing an early end to apartheid and committed itself to 
remain seized of the matter until a democratic, non-racial and united South 
Africa was established. 
Immediately after the adoption of Resolution 765 (1992) the Secretary-General 
appointed Mr Cyrus Vance as his special representative under the terms of 
paragraph 4 of the said resolution and mandated him to visit South Africa. 
During his mission to South Africa (21 - 31 July) Mr Vance held meetings with 
the then South African President FW de Klerk and other senior government 
officials, as well as with representatives of political parties, church groups, 
business and trade union organisations; and leading individuals. The Vance 
mission submitted their report to the Secretary-General who then prepared a 
report for the Security Council. 306 
On 7 August 1992 the Secretary-General reported that the reasons for violence 
in South Africa were complex and deep and that the special desperation that 
resulted from apartheid could in the long run only be remedied by rapid 
progress towards the creation of a democratic, non-racial and united South 
300 Ibid. 
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Africa. Furthermore, the Secretary-General observed that this was the goal not 
only of the negotiations within Codesa but also of the international community 
as a whole. To that end the Secretary-General recommended the deployment of 
UN observers (reinforced by other appropriate international organisations) in 
various parts of the South Africa and urged the major parties to return as early 
as possible to the negotiating table stressing that the task of conducting those 
negotiations was "uniquely the responsibility of South Africans themselves." 
Also, the Secretary-General recommended the immediate release of all 
remaining political prisoners as that would contribute greatly to improve the 
political climate, creating trust and burying the unhappy past. 
The Secretary-General conceded that the Codesa process was fraught with 
shortcomings. However, he recommended that the process had to be pursued, 
improved, better co-ordinated and made much more transparent in order to 
encourage non-participants like the PAC and CP to join. Also, the Secretary-
General recommended the establishment of a deadlock-breaking mechanism at 
the highest political level and the appointment of an imminent and impartial 
person to draw the strings together and to provide the impetus and cohesion 
needed to be successful. Finally, the Secretary-General highly commended the 
Goldstone Commission of Enquiry into Public Violence and Intimidation and 
recommended, firstly that its recommendations (especially those relating to a 
total ban on the public display of dangerous weapons and the security of 
hostels) should be fully and speedily implemented by the South African 
Government and parties; secondly that the Commissions code of conduct for 
mass action demonstrations could also do much to control violence and that the 
leaders of major political parties had to take firm steps to stop their supporters 
from participating in acts of violence; and thirdly, an investigation into the 
activities of certain armed formations such as MK, AZAPLA, the KwaZulu police 
and certain private security firms. Finally, the Secretary-General recommended 
that UN missions should be undertaken quarterly in order to provide regular, 
impartial and objective in formation to the Security Council. 307 
301 Ibid. 
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In response to the Report of the Secretary-General the Security Council adopted 
Resolution 772 ( 1992) of 1 7 August 1992. This Resolution: 
(a) reaffirmed resolution 765 (1992), 
(b) reaffirmed the determination of the Security Council to help the people of South 
Africa in their legitimate struggle for a non-racial, democratic society, 
(c) recognised that the people of South Africa expected the United Nations to assist 
with regard to the removal of all obstacles to the resumption of the process of 
negotiations, 
(d) recognised the concerns of the people of South Africa about violence and, in 
particular, the issues of the hostels, dangerous weapons, the role of the security 
forces and other armed formations, the investigation and prosecution of criminal 
conduct, mass demonstrations and the conduct of political parties, 
(e) recognised the need to strengthen and reinforce the indigenous mechanisms set 
up under the National Peace Accord in order to enhance their capacity in the 
building of peace, and finally 
(fl the resolution underlined the need for co-operation of all the parties to ensure the 
resumption of the negotiation process as speedily as possible. 
In response to this the Security Counci1:308 
(a) authorised the Secretary-General to deploy UN observers in South Africa to help 
end the spiralling cycle of violence, 
(b) invited the Secretary-General to assist in strengthening the structures set up 
under the 14 September 1991 National Peace Accord (NPA) aimed at facilitating 
the socio-economic development and reconstruction in South Africa, 
(c) called upon the South African government, parties and organisations to extend 
their full co-operation to the UN observers to enable them to carry out their tasks 
effectively, and finally 
(d) also invited international organisations, such as the Organisation of African 
Unity (OAU), the Commonwealth and the European Community, to consider 
deploying their own observers in South Africa, in co-ordination with the UN and 
the structures set up under the NPA. 
308 Ibid. 
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Also, the Security Council decided to remain seized of the matter until a 
democratic, non-racial and united South Africa was established. In other words, 
the Security Council reaffirm the vision of the national liberation movements 
for a post-apartheid South Africa as also embodied its earlier resolutions. 309 
On 9 September 1992 the Secretary-General deeply deplored the killing of a 
least 28 people and the wounding of nearly 200 in Ciskei during a 
demonstration on 7 September organised by the African National Congress. On 
the same day it was announced that 50 UN observers were being sent to South 
Africa. On the 10 September 1992 the Security Council emphasised the 
responsibility of the South African authorities for the maintenance of law and 
order and called on them to "take all measures to end the violence and to 
protect the right of all South Africans to engage in peaceful political activity 
without fear of intimidation of violence. "310 
Allowing the deployment of a United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa 
was a significant victory for the people of South Africa, especially the ANC 
which had been calling for the UN intervention in South Africa. More 
specifically, allowing the deployment of UN observers was an belated 
acknowledgement by South Africa that the domestic jurisdiction clause (article 
2(7)) did not exempt her from the human rights provisions of the UN Charter 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In other words, South Africa 
finally accept the binding force of international human rights law. 
It has been argued by some311 that the then government's consent to the 
deployment of the United Nations Observer Mission to South Africa (UNOMSA) 
was a political decision motivated by expedience and did not reflect a belated 
acceptance of the view that the UN, as the body primarily responsible for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, had a responsibility to ensure 
309 Ibid. 
310 Ibid. 
311 See Jacqueline Casette "United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa - a Significant 
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peaceful transition to democracy in South Africa in accordance with the 
principles of the Charter. Although political expediency might have been a 
factor it has been shown that international human rights law acquired a binding 
force on South Africa and that the increase of international pressures from the 
seventies forced South Africa to accept the jurisdiction of the UN over its 
domestic matters. Hence, when the UN Security Council heeded the ANC call 
for the involvement of the international community to help curb the violence 
after the Boipatong massacre South Africa had no choice but to meet the 
demand. South Africa's willingness to involve the UN and other missions was 
evident in a proclamation issued by the State President on 12 May 1993. The 
proclamation officially accorded the international missions the privileges and 
immunities contained in the Convention on the Privileges and immunities of the 
United Nations.312 
6.3 Distinctive Features of the new Constitution 
6.3.1 General 
The deepening crisis and the intense international pressures forced the ANC and 
the government to consider the resumption of negotiations. Before they resumed 
negotiation they held numerous bilateral meetings which prepared 
compromises. 313 Following those bilateral meetings the ANC and the 
government met on 26 September 1992 and adopted a Record of 
Understanding314which contained the salient features of their settlement 
proposals. The two parties agreed, first, that there was a need for a democratic 
Constituent Assembly/Constitution-making body and that for such a body to be 
democratic it had: 
312 See Proclamation no. 41GG14809 of 12 May 1993. 
313 See De Klerk "The Process of Political Negotiation: 1990-1993" 8. 
314 See report of the meeting between the State President of the Republic of South Africa 
and the President of the African National Congress held at the World Trade Centre on the 26 
September 1992. 
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(a) to be democratically elected; 
(b) to draft and adopt the new Constitution, implying that it had to sit as a single 
chamber; 
(c) to be bound only by agreed Constitutional principles; 
(d) to have a fixed time frames; 
(e) to have adequate deadlock breaking mechanisms; 
[fl to function democratically (i.e. arrive at its decisions democratically with certain 
agreed to majorities); and 
(g) to be elected within an agreed predetermined period. 
Secondly, the two parties agreed that during the interim/transitional period 
there would be Constitutional continuity and no Constitutional hiatus. In 
consideration of this principle it was further agreed that: 
(a) the Constitution-making body/Constituent Assembly would also act as the 
interim/transitional Parliament; and 
(b) there would be an interim/transitional government of National Unity and the 
Constitution-making body/Constituent Assembly cum interim/transitional 
Parliament and the interim/transitional government of National Unity would 
function within a Constitutional framework/transitional Constitution which 
would provide for National and regional government during the period of 
transition and would incorporate guaranteed justiciable fundamental rights and 
freedoms. 
The issue of a unicameral or bi-cameral Parliament was left open. 
Thirdly, the two parties agreed on a phased release of political prisoners. 
Fourthly, government agreed to address the issue of problematic areas and to 
allow the United Nations observers to witness the progress in co-operation with 
the Goldstone Commission and the National Peace Secretariat. Fifthly and 
finally government agreed (a) to prohibit countrywide the carrying and display 
of dangerous weapons at all public occasions (subject to exemptions based on 
Goldstone Guidelines) and (b) to accept the right of all parties and organisations 
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to participate in peaceful mass action in accordance with the provisions of the 
National Peace Accord and the recommendations of the Goldstone Commission. 
On its part the ANC reaffirmed its commitment to the Code of Conduct for 
political parties arrived at under the National Peace Accord and the agreement 
reached on 16 July 1992 under the auspices of the Goldstone Commission as 
important instruments to ensure democratic political activity in a climate of free 
political participation. 
Meanwhile, Joe Slovo315 (chairman of the South African Communist Party) 
suggested that in order to break the deadlock in the negotiations it might be 
necessary for the ANC to offer the government a Sunset Clause in a new 
Constitution which would entrench power-sharing for a period. In other words, 
Slovo abandoned the idea of a seizure of power and accepted the NP idea of 
power-sharing. 316 In addition he suggested that the ANC might also have to give 
ground by offering guarantees on regional government and an amnesty for 
security officers, and by honouring the contracts of civil servants, either by 
retaining them or compensating them. Slovo argued that the ANC was not 
dealing with a defeated enemy and that the revolutionary seizure of power was 
not realistic and argued that the capacity of the white civil service, army and 
policy to destabilise a newly born democracy was so enormous that it was 
necessary to settle for less by inserting a sunset clause in the new Constitution 
to provide for compulsory power-sharing for a fixed number of years. 317 
Following thorough discussions within ANC structures the NEC of the ANC 
adopted Slovo's compromise solution in a document entitled "Negotiations: A 
strategic Perspective".318 In this document the ANC argued, in particular, in 
favour of a government of National Unity and suggested that the ANC and 
government address these matters in bilateral meetings before including other 
315 See Meredith South Africa's New Era 56. 
31a Ibid. 
317 Meredith South Africa's New Era 56-57. 
318 See African National Congress Negotiations; A strategic perspective (as adopted by the 
National Working Committee on 18 November 1992) 
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parties in a multi-party forum. Mr de Klerk added to the momentum of a 
negotiated settlement by committing himself to a clear time frame for the 
establishment of a Government of National Unity by the year 1994. His 
proposed time scale for change issued at the end of November 1992 included:319 
(a) a large number of bilateral talks and a multiparty negotiation Conference before 
the end of March 1993; 
(b) the institution of a transitional Executive Council and an Electoral Commission 
in June 1993; 
(c) the adoption in September 1993 of an Interim Constitution which made 
provision for a Constitution-writing body; 
(d) a general election to be held in March/April 1994; and 
(e) the institution of a government of National Unity by the middle of 1994. 
Through a large number of bilateral meetings the ANC and government320 
reached common ground on the outline of a new order which involved the 
following elements: (a) a Transitional Executive Council which would prepare 
the way for elections to a Constituent Assembly; (b) an Interim Government 
which would: 
(i) comprise all parties winning an agreed share of the vote; 
(ii) rule South Africa for five years while a final Constitution was drawn up; and 
(iii) allow a strong role for regional government providing enhanced security for 
minority and regional interests. 
Last but not least the parties also agreed that the final constitution would be 
based on a set of principles agreed to previously at the multi party negotiations 
which would launch the whole process. 
The use of bilateral talks to address the South African question reaffirmed the 
position of the Harare Declaration (and UN Consensus Resolutions) - namely, 
319 See De Klerk "The Process of Political Negotiation: 1990-1993" 8. 
320 See Meredith South Africa's New Era 58. 
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that the National Liberation Movement(s) and the South African government 
were the major role players. In fact Mr de Klerk had come to realise that an 
agreement with the ANC formed the whole basis of a negotiated settlement. In 
particular he realised that the ANC had massive internal and international 
support and that it was also the key to international recognition and the lifting 
of sanctions. 321 
As the resolution of the South African conflict was no longer a purely domestic 
matter the government needed the ANC, more than the IFP, to deliver and 
internationally acceptable settlement. To the NP government the IFP was only 
required for the purpose of forging an electoral alliance of regional black leaders 
for the purpose of advancing its original Consociational proposals. 322 Hence, in 
December 1992 when Chief-Minister Buthelezi unveiled proposals of his own for 
an autonomous region for KwaZulu/Natal and threatening a UDI, Mr de Klerk 
repudiated him publicly. When Mr Buthelezi realised that his former ally, the 
NP government, had thrown his lot in with the ANC he clubbed together with 
other TBVC states and the white right-wing parties to form the Concerned 
South African Group, also known as COSAG. The link between the COSAG 
members was their belief in the idea of ethnic self-determination which would 
reduce a new South Africa to an ethnic federation or confederation. 323 These 
parties supported their idea of ethnic self-determination so that they could later 
secede and form, for instance, a Volkstaat for right-wing Afrikaners and a 
Zulustate for KwaZulu/Natal,324 as the basis of a Confederal State. 
Following the adoption of the Record of Understanding the ANC began a process 
of selling its settlement deal to its own structures and the Patriotic Front. 325 The 
second Patriotic Front (PF) Conference endorsed the Record of Understanding 
and, more specifically; 
321 Ibid. 
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(a) the idea of a Constituent Assembly elected on a basis of one-person, one-vote in 
a common voters' roll; 
(b) that such an assembly be bound only by broad Constitutional principles; 
(c) the need for a Transitional Executive Council and substructures as well as an 
independent Electoral and media Commissions to ensure free and fair elections; 
(d) the idea of a government of National Unity; 
(e) the need to end the violence; and 
(0 to involve the international Community both in efforts to eradicate violence and 
ensure free and fair elections. 326 
Although the PAC did not attend the second PF Conference its resolutions 
united an overwhelming majority of the extra-parliamentary parties and 
organisations and threw their full weight behind the ANC/NP settlement deal 
and thus paved the way for a negotiated settlement. For that purpose a 
Multiparty Negotiating Forum met on 1 and 2 April 1993. The Forum brought 
together an even more representative forum of the political spectrum than the 
cross-section at Codesa. The Forum included notably both the right-wing and 
extreme left-wing parties - namely, the Conservative Party (and Afrikaner 
Volksunie) and the PAC respectively. Also, the Forum opened the door for 
traditional leaders such as the Zulu Monarch, King Goodwill Zwelithini. All in 
all 26 political parties and organisations were represented in the Forum. 327 
Hardly ten days after the sitting of the Multi-party Forum the Secretary-General 
of the South African Communist Party and an ANC (NEC) member was gunned 
by a Conservative element at his Boksburg home. The assassination of Chris 
Hani infuriated the black masses and brought the country to the brink of racial 
conflict. The situation was saved by Nelson Mandela's personal appeal and his 
declaration of a week-long campaign of mass protest, including a national stay 
away and memorial services. This campaign harassed the tide of outraged and 
thus prevented a highly possible outbreak of racial violence throughout the 
country. 
326 See ANC Negotiations Bulletin no. 23 5 April 1993. 
327 See Meredith South Africa's New Era 61-62. 
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The assassination of Chris Hani made demands for freedom more militant than 
ever before. In all gatherings the demand was that Hani's blood must deliver 
freedom and nothing else. His assassination was therefore a single event that 
provoked a dramatic shift in the balance of power and also proved to all South 
Africans, both black and white, that Mr Nelson Mandela did not only hold the 
balance of power but was also a guarantee of security. Mandela328 moved 
quickly to exploit his authority and demanded swift and tangible progress in the 
negotiations process. Henceforth, the negotiations process moved ahead swiftly. 
On 7 May 1993 the Negotiating Council (a joint Committee) established seven 
technical committees to facilitate multi-party talks. The Committees were 
divided into three categories, dealing respectively with violence, constitutional 
matters and the election. Two Committees were tasked to deal with 
Constitutional matters. The first committee dealt with fundamental human 
rights during the transition and the second with matters such as the form of 
state, the Constitution-making body/Constituent Assembly, the 
interim/transitional regional government and the future of the TBVC states. The 
other four technical committees dealt with electoral issues. At its meeting held 
on 18 May 1993 the Negotiating Council mandated its Technical Committee on 
Constitutional Affairs to place at the top of its agenda the issues of 
Constitutional principles, the form of State and self-determination. At the same 
meeting the Technical Committee on the Repeal of Legislation Impeding 
Political Activity and Discriminatory Legislation was mandated to study all 
existing laws and subordinate legislation in South Africa, the self-governing 
territories, local authorities and provincial administrations with a view to their 
repeal or amendment. 
A major breakthrough in the negotiation process came on the 3 June 1993 with 
the adoption of a "Resolution on an election date". The Resolution set the date 
for the first democratic election in South Africa for 27 April 1994. On 30 June 
328 Ibid 65. 
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22 out of 26 parties represented in the Negotiating Council adopted the so-called 
Resolution (21) on steps to be taken for the purposes of establishing a new 
Constitutional order adopted by the Negotiating Council. It was agreed that the 
Interim Constitution would provide for, inter alia, strong government on both 
the central and regional level, judicially enforceable fundamental rights, a 
Constitutional court/tribunal to ensure the justiciability of Constitutional 
principles and of the fundamental rights embodied in the Constitution itself. 
Meanwhile the negotiations process suffered a major - setback with the 
withdrawal of the CP and IFP and the formation of the Freedom Alliance which 
demanded the right of ethnic self-determination for its participating member 
organisations. Nevertheless negotiations continued and agreements were 
reached. 329 
In September 1993 the Negotiating Council adopted four bills which were 
enacted by the South African Parliament. These four Acts were: the 
Independent Electoral Commission Act, 330 the Transitional Executive Council 
Act, 331 the Independent Media Commission Act, 332 and the Independent 
Broadcasting Authority Act. 333 These legislation was intended to level the 
political playing field and create the framework for the conduct of a free and fair 
election. As there was no outside power like the UK in the case of Zimbabwe or 
the UN in the case of Namibia it was necessary to ensure that these transitional 
measures were adopted to ensure that no political party or organisation 
(especially the government and the TBVC administrations) did not have undue 
advantages in the run-up to and during elections. 
On 1 7 November 1993 the plenary session of the Multi-party Negotiating 
process finalised the interim Constitution Bill and the Electoral Bill. These bills 
were enacted by the South African Parliament during November and December 
329 See Willem de Klerk "The Process of Political Negotiation: 1990-1993" 8-9. 
330 Act 150 of 1993. 
331 Act 151 of 1993. 
332 Act 148 of 1993. 
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1993.334 On the 27 and 28 April 1994 general elections took place for both 
National and regional governments. The polling proceeded peacefully resulting 
in the establishment of a government of National Unity. 
In the following paragraphs we shall examine the main features of the New 
Constitutional State and in particular the impact of the dynamic concept of the 
rule of law and international human rights law in its creation. 
6.3.2 Structure of the new Constitution 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act 200 of 1993) was adopted 
in November 1993. It consists of 251 articles (divided into 15 chapters) and 7 
schedules. 335 It is not proposed to deal with all these articles and schedules, but 
rather to provide an overview of the Constitution based on the following themes: 
firstly, the nature of the state; secondly, fundamental rights and freedoms; 
thirdly, enforcement mechanisms; fourthly, organs of the government; and 
lastly, the constitution making process. 
The objects of this paragraph are manifold, namely: to identify the elements of 
international human rights law in the Constitution, and avenues of their 
incorporation; to identify elements of the Dynamic Concept of the Rule of Law 
in the Constitution; to asses the possible impact of the rule of law and human-
rights law on the interpretation of the Constitution and further constitution-
334 See Willem de Klerk "The Process of Political Negotiation: 1990-1993" 9. 
335 The chapters are entitled: Constituent and Formal Provisions (Chapter l); Citizenship 
and Franchise (Chapter 2); Fundamental Rights (Chapter 3); Parliament (Chapter 4); The 
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Commission, commission on Gender Equality and Restitution of Land Rights (Chapter 8); 
Provincial Government (Chapter 9); Local Government (chapter 10); Traditional Authorities 
(Chapter 11); Finance (Chapter 12); Public Service Commission and Public Service (Chapter 13); 
Police and Defence (Chapter 14) and General and Transitional Provisions (Chapter 15). The 
Schedules include: Part l; Definitions of Provinces, and Part 2; Contentious Areas (Schedule 
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and Affirmations of Office (Schedule 3); Constitutional Principles (Schedule 4); Procedure for 
Election of President (Schedule 5); Legislative Competence's of Provinces (Schedule 6) and 
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making processes; and to compare the impact constitutional principles in 
Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa on the right of peoples to self-
determination and equality. 
6.3.2.1 The Nature of the State 
The Preamble does not enjoy the same status as the other provisions of the 
Constitution, the Constitutional Principles and the Schedules. However, it 
embodies important features of the Constitution. It provides for the need to 
create a new order in South Africa after centuries of Colonial oppression and 
autocratic rule under the apartheid system. furthermore, the preamble 
prescribes the values of the new order, including:- a common South African 
citizenship; a sovereign and democratic constitutional state; and equality 
between men and woman and people of all races so that all citizens can enjoy 
and exercise their fundamental rights and freedoms. The preamble makes it 
abundantly clear that the 1993 Constitution is interim and thus also deals with 
the further constitution-making process, structures and constitutional 
principles.336 The idea of National Unity embodied in the preamble is elaborated 
on and further embodied in the National Unity and Reconciliation clause. This 
clause, together with concepts of a democratic constitutional State, equality, 
fundamental rights, national unity and reconciliation embody the essence of the 
new South African state.337 
• The concept of a Constitutional State (that is the Rechtsstaat of the European 
legal tradition) is traceable to the nineteenth century. 338 The concept was 
developed as a reaction to the horrors of National Socialism and found a definite 
and emphatic expression in the German Constitution of 1949. 339 As stated in 
336 See Dion Basson South Africa's Interim Constitution (1994) 2. 
337 See Dawid van Wyk "Tussentydse Gedagtes oor 'n Tussentyds Grondwet" in 3 1994 
THRHR368. 
338 See Blaauw "The Rechtsstaat idea compared with the Rule of Law as a paradigm for the 
protection of Rights 1990 SALJ 78. 
339 Ibid. 
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chapter 2 above, the ideal of a Constitutional State (or Rechtsstaat) requires 
that the fundamental rights of citizens should be properly protected against 
infringement, especially by the State authorities, and that government authority 
should accordingly be bound to give effect to the legal values of the equality, 
freedom and dignity of every citizen. 340 The ideal of a Constitutional State finds 
expression in Chapter 3 of the Constitution which protects fundamental rights. 
Also, the ideal of a Constitutional State gives effect to the legal value of 
representative government in terms of which participatory rights embodied in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are recognised. The Constitutional 
principles in Schedule 4 also give effect to and protect the legal value of 
representative government. However, it also protects the rights of political 
minorities in terms of the World Trade Centre agreement. 341 
6.3.2.2 The Form of State 
One of the most contentious issues at the World Trade Centre negotiations was 
the question on the form of state - namely, whether it should be a unitary or a 
federal state. It is not proposed here to open that debate, let alone enter into it. 
Suffice it to say that article 1 states that: 
"(l) The Republic of South Africa shall be one, sovereign state. 
(2) The national territory of the Republic shall comprise the areas defined in Part 1 
of Schedule l ." 
The word "sovereign state" refers to external sovereignty, that is, the state is 
sovereign and independent vis-a-vis other states.342 The idea of "oneness" of 
South Africa in this article (though apparently relating to a united, rather than 
a unitary state) rules out the possibility of South Africa consisting of more than 
one independent state as it was envisaged by the freedom Alliance during the 
340 See Johan Kruger "Regstaat, Kultuurstaat, Welvaartstaat: Bestanddele van 'n nuwe 
Staatsmodel" in 1994 1 Stellenbosch Law Review 16-17. 
341 See Basson South Africa's Interim Constitution 2. 
342 Ibid 3. 
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multi-party negotiations. It means, for instance, that the new South Africa 
cannot consist of independent states forming a so-called confederation of states, 
based upon a confederal agreement or treaty between the confederating 
states.343 Article 1 not only reunifies South Africa but also protects its territorial 
integrity in line with various United Nations and OAU Resolutions.344 
Accordingly, the national territory of the Republic of South Africa is the 
territory of one indivisible state. The fact that South Africa shall be one 
sovereign state is also one of the constitutional principles with which the final 
constitution will have to comply.345 
As said above, the words "sovereign state" refer to external sovereignty. It says 
nothing about the divisibility of internal sovereignty (that is sovereignty in the 
sense of the highest authority within the state) and accordingly it says nothing 
about the form of state proper, that is, whether South Africa shall be a unitary 
or a federal state.346 In a unitary state sovereignty is indivisible while in a 
federal state sovereignty is divided between the composite federating states and 
the central government. 347 
6.3.2.3 The Principle of Constitutional Supremacy and the demise of 
the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty 
As shown above,348 South Africa inherited the Westminster Constitutional 
system from Britain in 1910 (through the passing of the South Africa Act of 
343 This interpretation has serious implications for the Volkstaatconcept. We shall therefore 
come back to it when we deal with the right of peoples to self-determination and the Volkstaat 
concept under the interim Constitution. 
344 See in general pars. 5.2 & 5.3 supra. 
345 See Constitutional Principle 1 which reads: 
"The Constitution of South Africa shall provide for the establishment of one sovereign 
state, a common South African citizenship and a democratic system of government 
committed to achieving equality between men and women and people of all races." 
346 On possible Federal features of the interim Constitution see Basson South Africa's 
Interim Constitution 184-188. See also Constitutional Principles XVI to XXVII. 
347 On federalism see Kader Asmal "Federalism and the proposals of the National and 
Democratic Parties" in South Africa's Crisis of Constitutional Democracy (1994) 47 ff. 
348 See chapter 4 par. 4.1 supra. See also Harris v Minister of the Interior 1952 (2) SA 428 
[A), Minister of Interior v Harris 1954 (4) SA 769 [A) and Collins v Minister of the Interior 1957 
(1) 552 [A). 
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1909 by the British Parliament). Parliament was never democratically elected 
and became an instrument of oppression in the hands of a white minority who 
were the only persons allowed to vote. Again, when the 1983 Constitution (Act 
110 of 1983) was introduced, the black majority were expressly excluded from 
representation in Parliament, while provision was made for the inclusion of 
coloureds and Indians 
The exclusion of testing powers of the courts by the doctrine of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty subjected citizens to the whims of a racial minority which 
controlled the omnipotent Parliament and created a system of racial segregation 
based upon unequal treatment in order to retain power in the hands of the 
minority. This white minority regime did not hesitate to pass draconian 
measures which infringed upon human rights and freedoms in order to keep the 
illegitimate and iniquitous system intact. The Supreme Court merely had the 
so-called procedural testing rights in terms of which the courts were able to 
investigate whether an instrument which purported to be an Act of Parliament 
was passed according to the constitutionally prescribed procedure. 349 
These procedural testing powers, however, proved to be hopelessly inadequate 
to prevent widespread infringements upon human rights. Meanwhile, as far as 
testing of the area of power or contents of Acts of Parliament was concerned, 
Parliamentary Sovereignty remained fully in force. Thus the judicial organs of 
state remained largely impotent against the legislative onslaught on human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. 350 
The introduction of the principle of Constitutional Supremacy under article 4 
of the interim Constitution as well as a justiciable Bill of Rights (Chapter 3) 
349 See Basson South Africa's Interim Constitution 16-17. 
350 See the provisions pertaining to fundamental rights which are entrenched and protected 
judicially even against unconstitutional Parliamentary Acts (Chapter 3 and 7) as well as the 
provisions which entrench the provisions of the interim Constitution themselves by way of 
strictly prescribed procedures (involving special majorities) which are required for amendments 
to the Constitution (see the commentary on sections 62 and 74 by Basson op cit). 
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signalled the demise of Parliamentary Sovereignty. Article 4 makes provision 
for the Principle of Constitutional Supremacy in the following terms: 
"( 1) This Constitution shall be the supreme law of the Republic and any law or act 
inconsistent with its provisions shall, unless otherwise provided expressly or by 
necessary implication in this Constitution, be of no force and effect to the extent 
of its inconsistency. 
(2) This Constitution shall bind all legislative, executive and judicial organs of state 
at all levels of government." 
In terms of the provisions of this article the interim Constitution ranks as the 
supreme law in the hierarchy of laws. 
In other words, no law (including an Act of Parliament) ranks higher in status 
than the interim Constitution. The introduction of the principle of Constitutional 
Supremacy, therefore, marked a radical departure from the doctrine of 
Parliamentary Sovereignty. The supremacy of the Constitution is reflected in 
various other provisions of the interim Constitution. 351 The inflexibility of the 
interim Constitution entrenches the principle of Constitutional Supremacy and 
ensures that the Constitution cannot be easily amended by way of ordinary 
legislative procedures as was the case under the previous dispensation. 352 
In practice, the principle of the Supremacy of the Constitution means that in the 
event of any law or act being inconsistent with the interim Constitution, such 
law or act is of no force or effect unless otherwise provided, expressly or by 
necessary implication. the substantive testing powers of the courts apply to both 
the acts of the previous and present Parliament Article 232(2), however, 
provides for a presumption of validity, rather than invalidity. It requires that in 
the event of a law being primafacie inconsistent with the interim Constitution, 
351 See Basson op cit 7-8. 
352 On the effects of the declaration of invalidity of laws under the interim Constitution see 
Basson South Africa's Interim Constitution notes on section 98(6). 
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a more restricted interpretation is preferred if the law is reasonably capable of 
such an interpretation. 353 
As said above, the preambular paragraph mandates the Constituent Assembly 
to adopt a new Constitution in accordance with a solemn pact recorded as 
Constitutional principles. A question which arises is whether or not an act 
would be unconstitutional if it is inconsistent with the Schedules to the interim 
Constitution, and in particular Schedule 4 containing these principles? This 
question is answered by section 233(4) which states that a provision contained 
in any schedule (including the National Unity and Reconciliation clause) shall 
not by reason of the fact that it is contained in a schedule have a lower status 
than any other provision of the interim Constitution. 
6.3.2.4 Citizenship and the Franchise 
Under apartheid blacks associated with the TBVC states were deprived of both 
their citizenship and nationality. On the other hand, blacks associated with the 
self-governing states retained their South African nationality for external 
purposes, but lost their internal South African citizenship rights. 354 
Consequently, blacks were supposed to exercise all their political rights in the 
homelands and remain without any political rights, such as the right to vote 
and the right to own land, which are rights usually associated with citizenship. 
Moreover, When the TBVC states achieved "independence" blacks associated 
with them lost their South African citizenship and became citizens of these 
states. 355 The interim Constitution abandons these distinctions by providing that 
every South African shall be entitled to enjoy all the rights, privileges and 
benefits of South African citizenship. 356 It is clear that the rights of 
"citizenship" in this provision are intended to include the rights of citizens 
353 Ibid 8. 
354 See John Dugard International Law 348. 
355 See Basson South Africa's Interim Constitution 10. 
356 Section 5. 
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abroad, that is, the rights attached to nationality357 such as the right to a 
passport and the right to protection by one's state while abroad. 358 
The repeal of the National States Citizenship Act and the Status Acts which 
gave birth to the TBVC states restored South African nationality (and 
citizenship) to all persons who were deprived of their South African nationality 
as a result of the creation of the TBVC states contrary to international human 
rights law.359 This is confirmed by the Restoration and Extension of South 
African Citizenship Act 196 of 1993. As a result, the separation of nationality 
citizenship in South African law no longer exists. Thus South African nationals 
are those persons who have acquired South African nationality by birth, 
descent or naturalisation in terms of the South African Citizenship Act.360 They 
enjoy the full rights of citizenship, including the franchise. 361 The franchise 
allows black South Africans, in line with the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, to exercise their participatory democratic rights, that is, the right to 
vote. 
6.3.2.5 The Fundamental Bill of Human Rights 
6.3.2.5.1 The Reach of the Bill of Rights 
The South African interim Constitution contains a Bill of Rights362 and provides 
357 See Basson op cit l O. 
358 Ibid l 73. 
359 See Dugard International Law 348. 
360 Act 44 of 1949. This Act remains in force in terms of section 229 of the interim 
Constitution. 
361 See sections 5, 6, 20 and 21 of the interim Constitution. 
362 See Chapter 3 of the Constitution. 
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for the establishment of a Constitutional Court363 with the 
power to test the validity of all laws and executive actions against the 
prescriptions in the constitution. The Bill of Rights is justiciable and the 
fundamental rights contained therein are accordingly protected and enforced by 
the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court364 in terms of its concurrent 
jurisdiction. 
The introduction of Chapter 3 (the Bill of Fundamental Human Rights) heralded 
a fundamental break with our legal tradition. More specifically, it marked the 
transition from a constitutional system based on Parliamentary Sovereignty to 
a system according to which the constitution is supreme and judicial testing of 
Parliamentary Acts against the entrenched Bill of Rights became the norm. 365 
Section 7(1) of Chapter 3, like section 4, states that the Bill of Rights binds all 
legislative and executive organs of the state at all levels of government. 
However, unlike section 4, it does not include the judicial organs. A similar 
provision in the Canadian Constitution has been interpreted so as to include 
the judicial organs of the state.366 
The Bill of Fundamental Rights will have a major impact on our legal system. 
the Bill as enforced by the courts will act as a guarantor of the values and rules 
of our society. The Constitution, and more specifically the fundamental rights 
contained therein, will override the will of Parliament as expressed in 
-... legislation. As a result, the courts will have the last say on the validity of all 
legislation. The Courts will virtually become a third chamber of Parliament or 
~~ 
a kind of negative legislature. They will rule on contentious political, personal 
and economic issues, the rights of employers and employees, police officers and 
suspects, property owners and the landless and educators and scholars. 367 
In addition, and perhaps most significantly, the Constitutional Court rule on the 
363 See section 98(2). 
364 See section 101(3)(a). 
365 See Haysom "The Bill of Fundamental Rights: Implications for legal practise" February 
1994 De Rebus 125. See also Basson South Africa's Interim Constitution 14. 
366 See Haysom "The Bill of Fundamental Rights: Implications for legal practice" 125. 
367 Ibid. 
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democratic process itself. The constitution prescribes that the final Constitution, 
which will be drawn up by the Constituent Assembly, shall comply prescribed 
constitutional principles.368 The second Constitutional principle states:369 
"Everyone shall enjoy all universally accepted fundamental rights, freedoms and 
civil liberties, which shall be provided for and protected by entrenched and 
justiciable provisions in the Constitution, which shall be drafted after having 
given due consideration to inter alia the fundamental rights contained in 
Chapter 3 of this Constitution." 
In other words, the Constitution prescribes that internationally accepted 
fundamental rights shall be included in any future Constitution. 370 
The principle of judicial review oflegislation contained in the Constitution may 
take the form both of anterior review (article 98(3)) - that is, the submission of 
a Bill to the Constitutional Court to confirm the Constitutional validity of such 
a Bill prior to its promulgation, or posterior review - that is, review of existing 
legislation and Common Law by the courts.371 
The Constitution not only makes the Bill of Rights binding upon both the 
legislative and executive branches of government, but also explicitly introduces 
new requirements of procedural fairness in the field of administrative law and 
requires that any administrative action which affects the rights or interests of 
citizens must be justiciable in relation to the reasons given for it.372 
It follows from the foregoing paragraphs that the Bill of Rights will have a 
vertical application, that is, an application between the citizens and the 
government. A question which remains is whether the Bill of Rights will also 
apply horizontally? In other words, can one citizen bring an application that his 
368 Ibid. 
369 See Basson South Africa's Interim Constitution Schedule 4. 
370 See Johan Kruger "Die beregting van fundamentele regte gedurende die 
oorgangsbedeling" 57 1994 THRHR 397. 
371 See Haysom "The Bill of Fundamental Rights: Implications for legal practise" 125. 
312 Ibid. 
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fundamental rights have been infringed by another citizen? In this regard the 
Bill of Rights confines its reach to the law only, including the common law, 
which is contrary to the fundamental rights, in enforcing his or her rights 
against other citizens. The rights contained in the Bill of Rights are available to 
all natural persons. the question arises as to which of these rights will be 
available to artificial or juristic persons?373 
Section 7(1) provides that Chapter 3 of the Constitution is binding on all 
legislative and executive organs of the state. A similar provision in the 
Namibian Constitution reads:374 
"The fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in this Chapter shall be 
respected and upheld by the executive, legislature and judiciary and all other 
organs of the government and its agencies and, where applicable to them, by all 
natural and legal persons in Namibia ... ". 
In contrast to its Namibian counterpart the South African section 7(1) is silent 
on juristic persons. Section 7(1) should be distinguished from section 7(3) which 
reads: 
"Juristic persons shall be entitled to the rights contained in this Chapter where, 
and to the extent that, the nature of the rights permits." 
In other words, the fundamental rights, to the extent that they are capable of 
application to bodies corporate, extend, inter alia, to companies and closed 
corporations. 375 
As shown above, in its classical concept a Bill of Rights operates only as 
between state and individual. It restrains the state, generally speaking, from 
infringing, by way of legislative or executive act, any of the fundamental rights 
373 Ibid. 
374 See Chapter 8 section 5. 
375 See Monty Knoll "Challenges for the Judiciary arising from the new Constitution: 
business implications" May 1994 De Rebus 376. 
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of the individual which the bill enacts. This is what is generally known as 
"vertical" operation. In the interim Constitution there is a departure from this 
principle. 376 Section 33( 4) provides: 
"(T]his Chapter shall not preclude measures designed to prohibit unfair 
discrimination by bodies and persons other than those bound in terms of section 
7(1)." 
Those bound in terms of section 7(1) are "all legislative and executive organs of 
government". These last-mentioned words give expression to the principle of 
vertical operation. 
The departure permitted in terms of section 33(4) extends the operation of 
Chapter 3 to all bodies and persons other than the organs of state as does the 
Namibian Constitution. This is known as "horizontal" operation. Section 33(4) 
means that conduct or actions by groups (including juristic persons such as 
companies) or by individuals, which unfairly discriminate against an individual 
or group of persons, are prohibited - and of course, the prohibition is 
constitutionally entrenched. 
What constitutes unfair discrimination will no doubt depend on the 
circumstances of each case. in borderline cases the competent courts will have 
to grapple with the problem. In this task section 8(4) will be of assistance to the 
courts. It reads: 
"Prima facie proof of discrimination on any of the grounds specified in 
subsection (2) shall be presumed to be sufficient proof of unfair discrimination 
as contemplated in that subsection, until the contrary is established." 
Once the court finds discrimination on any of the grounds specified to have 
been proved prima jacie this clause shifts the burden to the defendant or 
respondent to prove that the discrimination was not fair. The grounds of 
376 Ibid. 
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discrimination specified in subarticle (2) of article 8 are: race, gender, sex, 
ethnic or racial origin, colour, sexual orientation, age disability, religion, 
conscience, belief, culture and language. Section 8 is the section of the Chapter 
on Fundamental rights which provides for equality before the law and equal 
protection of the law of every person. 
6.3.2.5.2 The Constitutional State and Fundamental Human Rights 
The principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty and its abuse by previous 
governments confirm: 
a) the need to protect the individual against the state; 
b) the need to prohibit the reduction of the subject to a mere object of state power; 
and 
c) the need to protect the individual as the weaker subject in public law 
relationships. 377 
These needs raise a normative question - namely, whether or not the individual 
subject (and his or her fundamental human rights and freedoms) are adequately 
protected against the abuse of state power? If the answer is in the affirmative 
(as it is under the interim Constitution) we have what is called due process of 
law (or Constitutionalism) in the United States of America and what is called the 
Rechtsstaat (Constitutional State) in European legal literature.378 
In essence, it means that the basic relationship in the state is a legal 
relationship governed or ruled by the law, where the government is bound by 
particular legal values in the exercise of its authority which ensures that the 
exercise of government authority results in not only a formally (or procedurally), 
but also a materially just situation. Hence, there is a distinction between a 
formal and a material Constitutional State. 
377 See Basson South Africa's Interim Constitution 18. 
31a Ibid. 
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The principle of a Constitutional State (Rechsstaatprinzip) is based on a 
normative or value-orientated approach to the law.379 This approach departs 
from the premise that there is a higher law (also known as Natural Law) which 
contains certain a priori legal values with which positive law must comply in 
order to be valid. 380 These legal values have been traced to a variety of sources 
including Western tradition (more specifically the Western religious, 
philosophical and moral convictions) as well as ancient Greco-Roman and 
African (Hermetic) philosophy. These legal values include freedom and equality 
(which underlie the concept of justice) both of which derive from the worth and 
dignity of the human personality. The third legal value which achieved 
recognition after centuries of struggle is the right to democratic governance. 
The principle of a Rechtsstaat (Constitutional State) is clearly a normative 
concept which rejects the notion of uncontrolled and arbitrary exercise of 
~ 
government power. The Constitutional State achieves this through a justiciable 
Bill of Rights. In other words, a Bill of rights is a constitutional mechanism 
whereby the individual subject can be assured that the state authorities have 
no choice but to treat him or her justly. Accordingly, the introduction of an 
entrenched and enforceable Bill of Rights was a sine qua non for the creation 
of a constitutional state in South Africa where the fundamental rights of the 
subjects of the state are protected against the abuse of government power by an 
independent and impartial judiciary and where legal values such as freedom 
and equality prevail. 
The interim Constitution places great emphasis on civil and political rights (the 
first generation or blue rights) which are associated with the so··called liberal 
democracies. As in the Namibian Constitution, South Africa's interim 
Constitution gives attention to the second and third generation human rights, 
although the attention given is by no means exhaustive. As shown above,381 the 
379 Ibid 19. 
380 See A C Basson "Die Ontwikkeling van Ekonomiese Regte" in South African Public Law 
vol. 8 no. 2 (1993) 219. 
381 See Chapter 3 par. 3.3.3.3 supra. 
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Banjul Charter brings out the interrelationships between the three generations 
of human rights quite clearly. It has been generally recognised and 
acknowledged that without the proper realisation of second generation human 
rights, the dignity of every person suffers where attention is not given to 
fundamental human rights such as the right to work, the right to shelter, the 
right to health and the right to education which are commonly associated with 
the welfare state. In other words, a Constitutional State must recognise all three 
generations of human rights, and not one at the expense of the others. 
Therefore, a Rechtsstaat must also become a Soziale Rechtsstaat. 
6.3.2.5.3 Locus Standi 
Section 7(4)(b) introduces innovative provisions regarding the issue of standing 
(locus standi) in cases where the courts have been called upon to deal with 
constitutional matters pertaining to the infringement of or threat to the 
fundamental rights contained in Chapter 3. Originally, the South African law 
pertaining to locus standi operated restrictively and a direct and substantial 
interest of a litigant (usually amounting to an infringement of a subjective right 
of the litigant) was required for locus standi. The interim Constitution has 
expanded the locus standi with regard to constitutional matters before the 
courts where the dispute relates to the alleged infringement of or threat to the 
fundamental rights enshrined in the interim Constitution. The Constitution 
introduces a class action, whereby a person acts in the interest of a class or 
group; and an actio popularis, where a person acts on behalf of the public, that 
is, in the public interest. As these kind of actions could be abused, the courts 
will have to develop criteria for limiting the actions so as to prevent frivolous 
cases. 
The Bill of Fundamental Rights of the interim Constitution incorporates a wide 
range of fundamental human rights derived from a variety of international and 
regional human rights instruments. 382 It is neither proposed to trace the origins 
382 See Dugard International Law - A South African Perspective 349-350. 
470 
of each clause or to discuss all the clauses as they have already been thoroughly 
canvassed by other authors.383 Here we only mentioned the rights concerned 
and then focused on those aspects that relate to the dynamic concept of the rule 
of law. 
6.3.2.5.4 Distinctive Features of the Bill of Fundamental Rights 
Chapter 3 gives effect to the notion of the fundamental equality of all men and 
women (irrespective of race, colour or creed)384 by providing that:385 
"[E]very person shall have the right to equality before the law and to equal 
protection of the law" 
and expressly prohibiting discrimination on a wide range of grounds386 subject 
to an affirmative action provision. 387 Chapter 3 protects all three generations of 
human rights which were so long denied the majority of South Africans. The 
Chapter protects a wide range of civil, political, economic and social rights. 
These include the right to life;386 human dignity;389 privacy;390 freedom and 
383 See Chachalia, Cheadle et al Fundamental Rights in the New Constitution (1994) and 
Basson South Africa's Interim Constitution 13 -58. 
384 This notion is derived from the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. 
385 See section 8(1). 
386 These grounds include race, gender sex (sic), ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual 
orientation, age, disability, conscience, belief, language and culture. See section 8 (2). 
387 The affirmative action clause (also found in the Namibian Constitution) provides:-
"(3) (a) This section shall not preclude measures designed to achieve the adequate 
protection and advancement of persons or groups or categories of persons disadvantaged 
by unfair discrimination, in order to enable their full and equal enjoyment of all rights 
and freedoms. 
(b) Every person or community dispossessed of rights in land before the 
commencement of this Constitution under any law which would have been inconsistent 
with subsection (2) had that subsection been in operation at the time of the 
dispossession, shall be entitled to claim restitution of such rights subject to and in 
accordance with sections 121, 122 and 123. 
(4) Prima facie proof of discrimination on any of the grounds specified in 
subsection (2) shall be presumed to be sufficient proof of unfair discrimination as 
contemplated in that subsection, until the contrary is established." 
388 Section 9. 
389 Section 10. 
390 Section 13. 
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security of person, 391 which includes the right not to be detained without trial 
(except during a state of emergency). The use of forced labour,392 torture of any 
kind or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is prohibited. 393 
As regards political rights, all citizens have the right to vote; to freely make 
political choices; the right to form, to participate in the activities of, and to 
recruit new members for political parties. 394 Also, Chapter 3 protects the rights 
to freedom of religion and opinion,395 assembly,396 association,397 movement398 
and residence. 399 In view of the draconian legislation that governed South 
Africa for decades and the resulting abuses suffered by many at the hands of 
the security forces, the authors of the Bill of Human Rights incorporated strong 
provisions relating to detention. 400 Thus every person detained has the right, 
amongst others, to be informed promptly of the reasons for detention; to be 
detained under conditions consonant with human dignity (including medical 
treatment at State expense); to consult with legal practitioner of his or her 
choice or be provided with one free of charge where substantial injustice would 
otherwise result, and to be given the opportunity to communicate with and to 
be visited by close relatives, a religious counsellor and a medical practitioner of 
his or her choice. 
Economic rights embodied in the Bill include the right of every person freely to 
engage in economic activity and to pursue a livelihood anywhere in South 
Africa;401 the right to fair labour practices402 and the right of workers to form 
391 Section 11. 
392 Section 12. 
393 Section 11. 
394 Section 21. 
395 Section 14. 
396 Section 16. 
397 Section 17. 
398 Section 18. 
399 Section 19. 
400 Section 25. 
401 Section 26. 
402 Section 27. 
472 
and join trade unions;403 the right to organise and bargain 
and to strike for the purpose of collective bargaining. 
The right to private property is dealt with concisely. The Bill recognises 
expressly the right to acquire, hold and dispose of rights in property subject to 
the power of expropriation for the public purposes upon payment of "just and 
equitable" compensation. A newly established Commission on Restitution of 
Land Rights will be entitled to investigate and mediate upon claims from any 
person or community concerning the restitution of the right in land from the 
National Government. 404 
Chapter 3 also recognises social and cultural rights which entitle all persons to 
basic education and equal access to educational institutions. It also recognises 
the right to establish where practicable educational institutions based on a 
common culture, language or religion provided that there is no discrimination 
on the ground of colour or race. 405 Academic freedom in institutions of higher 
learning is also expressly recognised. With regard to language rights the Bill 
provides that "every person shall have the right to use the language and to 
participate in the cultural life of his or her choice". 406 In addition there are 
detailed provisions for the development of language policy at national and 
regional levels. Unlike previous South African Constitutions, the interim 
Constitution makes English and Afrikaans just two of the eleven official 
languages at the national level. 407 
The rights of children408 are also specifically protected including the right to 
parental care and protection from exploitative labour practices. However, 
403 Ibid. 
404 Section 28. 
405 Section 32. 
406 Section 31. 
407 Section 3. See also J Hatchard "Statute Note: The Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa" in 1994 Journal of African Law vol. 38 7 4. 
408 Section 30. 
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family rights are not specifically addressed as in the Banjul Charter.409 As 
regards the rights of women, discrimination on grounds of sex is specifically 
prohibited and they are also covered by the affirmative action clause. 410 In 
addition, the Constitution provides for the establishment of a statutory 
Commission on Gender Issues and empowers it to make recommendations 
regarding proposed legislation on the status of women. Last but not least, the 
Constitution makes provision for the third generation rights - for instance, the 
right to healthy environment. 
6.3.2.5.5 Limitations on Fundamental Human Rights 
Fundamental rights are not absolute under the interim constitution. Section 33 
provides for a method (or mechanism) for the Courts to implement when they 
are called upon to decide the question of when a limitation on a fundamental 
right will be legitimate and valid. In other words, section 33 is a general 
limitations to be placed on all the fundamental rights contained in the Bill of 
Rights.411 
Section 33 guarantees that any limitation, which shall be only by law of 
general application, shall not negate the essential content of the right in 
question and shall be permissible only to the extent that it is an open and 
democratic society based on freedom and equality" In respect of certain 
specified rights (relating primarily to free and fair political activity) section 
33(l)(b) prescribes an additional strict requirement that the limitation must be 
"necessary". 
In addition to these limitations there are others placed upon some of the 
fundamental rights. 412 For instance, the affirmative action clause (section 8(3)) 
limits the equal treatment clause (section 8(2)); the socio-economic rights are 
409 Op cit. 
410 See section 8(3)(a). 
411 See Basson South Africa's Interim Constitution 49. 
412 Ibid. 
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sometimes limited by the word "basic" which indicate that only minimum 
standards are to be met or these rights are usually recognised only where it is 
reasonably practicable. Furthermore, the right to economic activity (section 26) 
is limited by socio-economic goals (section 26(2)) and the right to property is 
subject to expropriation, provided that the requirements which are spelt out in 
section 28(2) and (3) are met. 413 
Haysom414 observes that limitations on fundamental rights are either expressly 
provided for or necessarily implied by other fundamental rights. For instance, 
freedom of expression may stand in opposition to the right to privacy. Religious 
and cultural rights may stand in opposition to gender or equality. Freedom of 
association may stand in conflict with racial equality as section 33(4) expressly 
allows for the potential enactment of statutory measures to prohibit private 
discrimination, notwithstanding the freedom of association provisions. Finally, 
section 33(5)(b) serves to insulate much of the current labour legislation from 
the reach of the Bill of Rights until these laws are repealed or amended by the 
legislature. 
The South African courts415 with constitutional jurisdiction to protect the 
fundamental rights will be called upon to give content and meaning to the 
limitations clause (section 33) and to resolve the conflict between fundamental 
rights by ranking them in order of priority and by determining the extent of 
their utilisation and enjoyment. 
413 Section 28 provides that:-
"[l) Every person shall have the right to acquire and hold rights in property and, to 
the extent that the nature of the rights permits, to dispose of such rights. 
[2) No deprivation of any rights in property shall be permitted otherwise than in 
accordance with the law. 
[3) Where any rights in property are expropriated pursuant to a law referred to in 
subsection [2), such expropriation shall be permissible for public purposes only and shall 
be subject to the payment of agreed compensation or, failing agreement, to the payment 
of such compensation and within such period as may be determined by a court of law 
as just and equitable, taking into account all relevant factors, including, in the case of 
the determination of compensation, the use to which the property is being put, the 
history of the acquisition, its market value, the value of the investments in it by those 
affected and the interests of those affected." 
414 See Haysom "The Bill of Fundamental Rights: Implications for the Legal Practice" 128. 
415 Ibid. See also Basson South Africa's Interim Constitution 49. 
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In the interpretation of the limitations clause in section 33 the courts could 
benefit from decisions of foreign jurisdictions which contain similar limitations. 
For instance, section 1416 of the Canadian Constitution places fundamental 
rights subject to "such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society". Although by no means 
identical to the Canadian limitations clause, the South African limitations 
clause417 states that a fundamental right may be limited by a "law of general 
application" provided that such limitation is: 
"(l) reasonable; and 
(2) justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality ... ". 
A similar clause is found in some of the limitation clauses contained in the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. For example, article 9 of the Convention states that limitations must 
be "necessary in a democratic society." A similar clause is found in article 19(2) 
of the German Constitution. This clause mirrors section 33 of the South African 
interim Constitution requiring that a limitation shall not negate (violate) the 
"essential content" of the right in question. However, the South African 
limitations clause is unique in that it further requires that a limitation upon 
certain specified fundamental rights must pass the further (stricter) test of also 
being necessary. 
As the South African limitations clause is not precisely the same as the others 
the question arises whether or not the concept "necessary" (indicating a stricter 
test) should be given the same meaning as the same concept in the European 
Convention where the only difference is that the European Convention requires 
that the limitation must be necessary in a democratic society. To highlight the 
416 It reads: 
"The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set 
out in it subject only to such limits as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society." 
417 See section 33. 
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possible interpretations which the competent South African courts will attach 
to the limitation clause (section 33), it is necessary to refer to Canadian and 
European jurisprudence in this regard. The structure of the South African Bill 
of Rights is similar to that contained in the Canadian Charter of Rights. 418 The 
Canadian Supreme Court approached this structure by requiring a two-stage 
process of analysis. The first stage embodies an enquiry whether or not the 
impugned law violated any of the guarantees contained in the Charter. When 
this question was answered positively, then the question arose whether or not 
the law could still be accommodated in terms of the limitations clause. 419 In the 
case of R v Oakes420 the Canadian Supreme Court enquired whether or not an 
infringement constituted a permissible limitation under article 1. 
Turning to the limitation clause the Court held that the onus of proving that a 
limit on a right or freedom guaranteed by the Charter is reasonable and 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society rests upon the party 
seeking to uphold the limitation.421 The Court then went on to observe that: 
"to establish that a limit is reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society, two central criteria must be satisfied 
First, the objective, which the measures responsible for a limit on a Charter right 
or freedom are designed to serve, must be 'of sufficient importance to warrant 
a constitutionally protected right or freedom ... '. 
The standard must be high in order to ensure that the objectives which are 
trivial or discordant with the principles integral to a free and democratic society 
do not gain section 1 protection. It is necessary, at a minimum, that an objective 
relates to concerns which are pressing and substantial in a free and democratic 
society before it can be characterised as sufficiently important. 
418 This is because of the influence that the Canadian Charter exercised on the drafters of 
the South African Bill of Rights. See Cachalia, Cheadle et al Fundamental Rights in the New 
Constitution (1994) 5. 
419 It should be emphasised, however, that section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights is 
not identical to the South African limitations clause in section 33. 
420 26 DLR (4th) 200. 
421 See Basson op cit 50-51. 
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Secondly, once a sufficiently significant objective is recognised, then the party 
invoking section 1 must show that the means chosen are reasonable and 
demonstrably justified. This involves 'a form of proportionality test .. .'. Although 
the nature of the proportionality text will vary depending on the circumstances, 
in each case courts will be required to balance the interests of society with those 
of individuals and groups. There are, in my view, three important components 
of a proportionality test. First, the measures adopted must be carefully designed 
to achieve the objective in question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair or based 
on irrational considerations. In short, they must be rationally connected to the 
objective. 
Secondly, the means, even if rationally connected to the objective in the first 
sense, should impair 'as little as possible' the right or freedom in question .... 
Thirdly, there must be a proportionality between the effects of the measures 
which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the objective 
which has been identified as of sufficient importance." 
In the case of Sunday Times v United Kingdom422 the European Human Rights 
Court found an opportunity to interpret the concepts "reasonable", "justifiable" 
and a "democratic society". In this case the British Common-law rules relating 
to contempt of court were applied in such a manner that they prohibited the 
Sunday Times from publishing certain facts regarding a medicine while a case 
regarding it was sub judice. The Sunday Times approached the European 
Human Rights Court on the grounds that the Common-law rule in question was 
not a limitation clause as envisaged by the European Human Rights Convention 
as it was a Common-law, not a statutory, rule. The Court rejected the argument 
of the Sunday Times and found that the Common-law rule concerned a legal 
rule which sought to limit a fundamental right and is binding if 
422 Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979-1980) Z EHRR 245. For a discussion of the 
case see Diamond "Voorlopige aantekeninge oor hoofstuk 3 van die nuwe Grondwet" in May 
1994 De Rebus 343. 
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(a) it is adequately accessible to the public so as to enable them to be fully 
knowledgeable about it; and 
(b) if the rule is so accurately formulated that the subject can regulate his conduct 
accordingly. 
The Court found in the Sunday Times case that these two requirements were 
met. 423 Furthermore, it was found that the concept "reasonable" included the 
following elements: 
a) The legal rule must be rationally connected to a legitimate governmental 
purpose; 
b) The effect of the limiting legal rule must not result in a disproportionate 
limitation of the fundamental right. 
The concept of "justifiability" implies that the court should weigh three factors 
against one another. These factors are:-
(I) the importance of the Constitutional right under discussion; 
(II) the degree of the infringement on the fundamental right by the limiting rule; 
(III) the importance of the objective that the state wishes to promote. 
If the third factor weighs heavier than the first and second factors then the 
infringement will be justified. 
The concept "democratic society" refers to the values which democratic societies 
in general attach to a particular fundamental right. The concept "necessary" 
includes more than the concept "reasonable" and it has been found in judicial 
decisions that where "necessity" is required before an infringement could be 
justified there must be a "pressing social need" for such an infringement. 
Although the South African limitations clause is more detailed, Diamond424 
423 Ibid 
424 See Diamond note 422 supra. 
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suggests that the concepts discussed above will form the basis for its 
interpretation. 
6.4 Enforcement Mechanisms 
6.4.1 The Public Protector 
Section 110 makes provision for the establishment and appointment of the 
Public Protector. This office is usually referred to as an ombudsman 
internationally. In terms of section 243 the former Ombudsman (appointed in 
terms of the Ombudsman Act, 118 of 1979) will continue will continue his 
functions until the appointment of the first Public Protector in terms of section 
110. The Public Protector is appointed by the President from a nomination by 
a joint committee of the Houses of Parliament and approved by the National 
Assembly and the Senate in a joint sitting by a majority of at least 75 per cent 
of the members present. To ensure the impartiality and independence of this 
office, subsection (6) determines that the remuneration and other terms and 
conditions of employment of the Public Protector must be prescribed by an Act 
of Parliament and may not be reduced or altered during the Public Protector's 
term of office.425 Further, the Public protector may only be removed from office 
by the President and then only on the grounds of misbehaviour, incapacity or 
incompetence, which grounds are to be determined by a joint committee of the 
Houses of Parliament, and only after being requested to do so by both the 
National Assembly and the Senate. 
That the independence and impartiality of the Public Protector is highly valued 
is evident in section 111 which requires him or her to be both independent and 
impartial and to perform his or her powers and functions subject only to the 
interim Constitution and the Law. Further, subsection (2) prescribes that the 
Public Protector (as well as his or her staffl must "have such immunities and 
425 This provision is similar to that with regard to judges as prescribed in section 104(2). 
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privileges as may be assigned to them by an Act of Parliament for the purpose 
of ensuring the independent and impartial exercise and performance of their 
powers and functions." 
Further, all organs of state are enjoined not to interfere with the Public 
Protector in his or her task and must give reasonable assistance as may be 
required. 
The powers and function of the Public Protector are listed in section 112. They 
are aimed at securing the watchdog function over public functionaries and 
accordingly the Public Protector is empowered to act on his or her own initiative 
or on receipt of a complaint in matters involving amongst others: 
(I) maladministration; 
(II) abuse of power or unfair conduct (including undue delay); 
(III) corruption with regard to public money; 
(IV) improper enrichment or advantage (or promise thereoO in the public 
administration; and 
(V) any act or omission of a public functionary which results in improper prejudice 
to any other person. 
The Public Protector may: 
a) endeavour to resolve any dispute or rectify any act or omission by mediation, 
conciliation or negotiation, or advising on remedies, or any other expedient 
means; 
b) bring the matter to the attention of the relevant authorities charged with 
prosecution; 
c) refer any matter to the appropriate public body or authority affected by it or 
make an appropriate recommendation regarding the redress of any prejudice to 
such body or authority. 
Subsection (5) however makes it clear that the powers and functions of the 
Public Protector do not oust the jurisdiction of the courts to hear the matter or 
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cause. Further, to ensure accountability, the Public Protector must report once 
every year in writing on his or her activities to Parliament.426 
6.4.2 The Commission on the Restitution of Land Rights 
Section 122 makes provision for the establishment of a Commission on the 
Restitution of Land Rights by an Act of Parliament which shall:427 
"(a) investigate the merits of any claims; 
(b) mediate and settle disputes arising from such claims; 
(c) draw up reports on unsettled claims for submission as evidence to a court of law 
and to present any other relevant evidence to the court; and 
(d) exercise and perform any such other powers and functions as may be provided 
for in the said Act." 
A person or a community shall be entitled to claim restitution of a right in land 
from the state if they were dispossessed of such a right at any time after 19 
June 1913, and the dispossession was effected under or for the purpose of 
furthering the object of a law which would have been inconsistent with the 
prohibition of racial discrimination contained in section 8(2), had that section 
been in operation at the time of the dispossession.428 Further, no such claim 
shall be justiciable by a court of law unless the claim has been dealt with by 
the Commission on the Restitution of Land Rights. 429 
6.4.3 The Human Rights Commission 
The Human Rights Commission is established by section 115. The eleven 
members shall be appointed by the President from a nomination by a joint 
committee of the Houses of Parliament composed of one member of each party 
represented in Parliament and willing to participate in the committee, and 
426 See section 112(6). 
427 See section 122(1). 
428 See section 121(2). See also the Land Restitution Bill of 1994. 
429 See Section 121(6). 
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approved by a 75 per cent majority of the members present at a joint meeting 
of the National Assembly and the Senate. 
The powers and functions of the Human Rights Commission, listed in section 
116, are not a numerus clausus and further powers and functions may be 
assigned to it by law. In general its competencies and duties include the 
promotion of the observance of, respect for and the protection of fundamental 
rights and the development of an awareness of fundamental rights. 430 
Basson431 states that the Commission on Human Rights will be able to play a 
very constructive role in the promotion and protection of fundamental rights, 
including socio-economic and environmental rights (so-called second and third 
generation rights). Further, it is important to note that the Commission is also 
competent to monitor international human rights law which forms part of South 
African law or other relevant norms of international law, in that if it is of the 
opinion that any proposed legislation might be contrary to the above or Chapter 
3, it shall report that fact to the relevant legislature. 432 Another important 
function of the Human Rights Commission is to investigate at its own initiative 
or on receipt of a complaint any alleged violation of human rights and assist 
persons affected thereby to secure redress or direct a complaint to an 
appropriate forum. 433 The Human Rights Commission must report once every 
year to the President on its activities, which report the President shall cause to 
be tabled promptly in the National Assembly and the Senate. 434 
6.4.4 The Constitutional Court 
Without a doubt the most important enforcement mechanism is the 
43° For a more detailed analysis of the Commissions functions see Basson South Africa's 
Interim Constitution 169-171. 
431 Ibid 1 71. 
432 See section 116(2). 
433 See section 116(3). 
434 See section 118. 
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Constitutional Court. 435 It is not proposed to give a detailed analysis of the 
powers, functions and functioning of the Constitutional Court, save to highlight 
certain important provisions. 436 The Constitutional Court has jurisdiction as a 
court of final instance over all matters relating to the interpretation, protection 
and enforcement of the provisions of the interim Constitution, including:437 
"(a) any alleged violation or threatened violation of any fundamental right 
entrenched in Chapter 3; 
(b) any dispute over the constitutionality of any executive or administrative act or 
conduct or threatened executive or administrative act or conduct of any organ 
of state; 
(c) any enquiry into the constitutionality of any law, including an Act of Parliament, 
irrespective of whether such law was passed or made before or after the 
commencement of this Constitution; 
(d) any dispute over the constitutionality of any Bill before Parliament or provincial 
legislature ... ; 
(e) any dispute of a constitutional nature between organs of state at any level of 
government; 
U1 the determination of questions whether any matter falls within its jurisdiction; 
and 
(g) the determination of any other matters as may be entrusted to it by this 
Constitution or any other law." 
Further, the Constitutional Court has jurisdiction in constitutional matters in 
essentially three areas: first (as stated above) the Constitutional Court is a Court 
of Final Instance in all matters related to the interpretation, protection and 
enforcement of the provisions of the interim Constitution; secondly, it is a Court 
of Reference in constitutional matters regarding all the issues which fall within 
435 Although the Supreme Court also has concurrent jurisdiction with the Constitutional 
Court (in terms of section 98(3)) over certain constitutional matters, it is not proposed here to 
deal with these provisions. For a detailed analysis of these provisions see Basson South Africa's 
Interim Constitution 145-161. 
436 For a detailed analysis in this regard see Basson South Africa's Interim Constitution 
139-149. 
437 See section 98(2). 
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its exclusivejurisdiction;438 and thirdly, the Constitutional court may be a Court 
of Direct Access in constitutional matters which fall within its jurisdiction. 
6.4.5 The Commission on Gender Equality 
The Commission on Gender Equality is established in section 119. The object 
of this Commission is to promote gender equality and to advise and to make 
recommendations to Parliament or any other legislature with regard to any laws 
or proposed legislation which affect gender equality and the status of women. 
The composition, powers, functions and functioning of the Commission on 
Gender Equality are not spelt out in the provisions of the interim Constitution 
and an envisaged Act of Parliament will deal with these issues. 
6. 5 The Place of Public International Law in South African Municipal 
Law 
6.5.1 General 
Unlike its predecessors, 439 the 1993 South African Constitution expressly 
recognises international law and the role it has to play in municipal law.440 
Public international law features in four separate areas of the 1993 Constitution. 
The first is in chapter 3 (Fundamental Rights), the second in chapter 8 (dealing 
with the Human Rights Commission),441 the third in chapter 14 (dealing with 
Police and Defence),442 and the fourth in chapter 15 (which deals with General 
438 See Basson South Africa's Interim Constitution 144-145 on the Constitutional Courts 
exclusive jurisdiction. 
439 Since Union in 1910 South Africa has had three constitutions, the 1910, 1961 and 1983 
constitutions. In none of these documents is public international law mentioned eo nomine. 
440 See Dugard International Law 339 
441 Section 116(2) which provides: 
"If the commission is of the opinion that any proposed legislation might be contrary to 
chapter 3 or to norms of international human rights law which form part of South 
African law or to other relevant norms of international law, it shall immediately report 
that fact to the relevant legislature." 
442 See section 227(2)(d) which provides: 
"(2) The National Defence Force shall - ... 
(d) not breach international customary law ... ". 
485 
and Transitional Provisions). It is not proposed to determine the effect of Public 
international law in all four areas. 443 
Section 231(4) of the 1993 Constitution makes it abundantly clear that 
international law is to play a major role in the new South African legal order, 
particularly in the field of human rights. It provides that: 
"(t)he rules of customary international law binding on the Republic, shall, unless 
inconsistent with this Constitution or Act of Parliament, form part of the law of 
the Republic." 
This provision confirms the common-law position. However, as the 1993 
Constitution is the supreme law of the land, 444 the provision gives customary 
international law a more elevated status.445 
Under section 231(4) the status of customary public international law as part 
of our law is now firmly settled. It does not make any hierarchical distinction 
between common law, statute and customary international law and it may be 
accepted that the three will function together on an equal footing. 
Customary public international law is no longer subject to the stare decisis446 
principle (in that only the Constitution or an Act of Parliament may override it). 
Thus the courts will still be required to determine which rules of Customary 
443 For a discussion of the effect of Public International law on the police and defence see 
Neville Botha "The Role of Public International law in the South African Defence Act 44of1957" 
(Department of Constitutional and Public International law, Unisa) 
444 See section 4. 
445 See section 227(2)(e) which provides: 
"The National Defence Force shall - ... 
[e) in armed conflict comply with its obligations under international customary law and 
treaties binding on the Republic; ... ". 
See also Dugard International Law 34. 
446 In terms of this principle lower courts are bound by the decision of superior courts. In 
effect this means that if a superior court were to find that a certain principle did not constitute 
customary international law, all courts of equal or lower status would be bound by the decision 
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international law are binding on South Africa.447 Under the previous 
Constitutional dispensation customary international law was overridden by 
statute, common law, precedent and the so-called "act of state". Under the 1993 
Constitution only the Constitution itself or an Act of Parliament may prohibit 
the application of international customary law. The effect of this provision is 
that in the future a court of law will not be bound by a decision such as S v 
Petane.448 
In the past the attitude of the State towards humanitarian law 449 was extremely 
restrictive. The 1993 Constitution incorporates humanitarian law.450 In brief, 
humanitarian law resulted from the prevalence of wars of National Liberation 
Movements (NLM), which led to demands for the extension of the privileges 
attached to international armed conflicts to members of NLM's. Consequently, 
additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva Convention extends the application of the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 to451 
"armed conflicts in which people are fighting against colonial domination and 
alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-
determination." 
To benefit from this provision an NLM is required to deposit a declaration 
accepting the obligations under the law of Geneva with the Swiss Federal 
Council. 452 Members of the NLM then become entitled inter alia, to be treated 
as prisoners of war by the Colonial/racist power and not as terrorists. 
In 1980 Oliver Tambo, the late President of the African National Congress, 
deposited a declaration with the President of the Red Cross (and not the Swiss 
Federal Council) in which the ANC declared that it intended to respect and be 
447 Dugard International Law 340. 
448 Ibid. 
449 Botha op cit. 
450 See section 231[4)(e) supra. 
451 Article l [4) 
452 Article 9(3). 
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guided by the general principles of international humanitarian law applicable 
in armed conflicts and to respect the rules contained in the Geneva Conventions 
of 1949 and additional Protocol 1 of 1977 wherever practically possible.453 
South Africa was a party to the major humanitarian treaties, apart from the 
1977 Protocols. However, she never incorporated these treaties into municipal 
law by legislation. The 1949 Geneva Conventions were published twice for 
general information in the government gazette,454 but that did not constitute 
legislative incorporation. 455 Despite this, where our courts dealt with aliens they 
referred to both the Hague Regulations and the Geneva Conventions of 1929 as 
if they were part of our law. 456 
Interestingly, when they failed to accord the members of the NLM's the 
privileged treatment of prisoners of war. The South African government not 
only refused to sign the 1977 protocols, but also rejected this development in 
humanitarian law and continued to treat the escalating conflict as an internal 
war to which only the common article 3 of the Geneva conventions at most was 
applicable. The issue was raised before South African and Namibian court on 
a number of occasions. 457 
6.5.2 Treaties 
Section 231(1) governs the applicability of Public international law on pre-
Constitution and post-Constitution Acts of Parliament. Section 231(2) and (3) 
govern the position with regard to treaties. As with earlier constitutions, the 
President negotiates and signs international agreements.458 Under the 1993 
constitution, however, section 231 (2) provides that parliament decides on the 
453 See Dugard International Law 333-334. 
454 Ibid 335. 
455 Ibid. 
456 Ibid. 
457 Ibid 336-337. 
458 See section 82(l)(i). 
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ratification of or accession to treaties. Under the previous dispensation 
Parliament did not play this role. In other words, section 231 (2) gives the 
legislature a role which was previous played by the executive. 
Dugard459 draws a distinction between two types of ratification of treaties, 
namely the international and constitutional ratification. The former applies to 
those treaties, which apart from the signatory, also require ratification to bring 
them into force internationally. This does not, however, give the treaty National 
application. The latter (i.e. Constitutional ratification) gives the treaty National 
application. This represents a radical departure from previous practice and a 
democratisation of the treaty process. In effect, this treaty process will mean 
that far more treaties will form part of the law of South Africa and will have to 
be considered by both practitioners and the judiciary.460 
Whatever method is used to incorporate treaties, the number of treaties 
incorporated into municipal law will increase, and any human rights convention 
ratified by Parliament will immediately become part of municipal law. 
6.5.3 Avenues for the Incorporation of Public International Law 
In the preceding paragraphs we showed the convergence of constitutional 
options in South Africa. That Convergence was most evident than on the need 
for a Bill of Rights. Although the form and content remained contentious, it was 
quite evident that it would be inspired by international human rights law. This 
was borne out by the proposals of both of the major parties, namely the ANC 
and the NP. In the introduction to their Working document on a Bill of Rights 
for New South Africa, the ANC states that:461 
"[w]e have relied heavily on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
459 Dugard International Law 342-343. 
460 Botha op cit. 
461 See ANC Working Document on a Bill of Rights for a new South Africa (Centre for 
Development studies)(UWC) 1990 iii-v. 
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two International Covenants of 1966 and have also drawn upon the European 
Convention of Human Rights and the African Charter of Human and Peoples' 
Rights." 
Like the ANC, the South African Law Commission is indebted to international 
human rights law in both of its reports. 462 Also, and perhaps more significantly, 
the National-party government's proposals on a Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of2 February 1993 betrays the influence of these conventions. 463 Hence, Dugard 
maintains that IHRL will guide the interpretation of the South African bill of 
rights whether or not South Africa accedes to the major human rights 
conventions which comprise the corpus of IHRL.464 
During the apartheid era South Africa refused to subject itself to either 
Constitutional or international law restraints in the field of human rights. The 
situation has changed dramatically since 1990. Now South Africa accepts the 
need to protect human rights by both national and international means. The Bill 
of Rights contained in Chapter 3 of the 1993 Constitution not only provides 
evidence of South Africa's commitment to human rights but also lays the 
foundation for accession to major human rights conventions which comprise the 
corpus of IHRL. 465 
As shown above,466 chapter 3 (fundamental rights) of the 1993 Constitution 
includes very few second generation rights. 467 However, it would seem there is 
no obstacle in the way of South Africa's accession to the International Covenant 
on Economic Social and Cultural Rights as it only requires a progressive 
462 See Working Paper 25, Project 58 (Group and Human Rights) interim Report 1992. 
463 For instance, article 4 explicitly refers to the ICCPR. 
464 See Dugard International Law 230. For specific incorporation of international human 
rights conventions and foreign constitutions see Lourens Du Plessis "The genesis of the 
provisions concerned with the application and interpretation of the chapter of fundamental 
rights in South Africa's transitional constitution" 1994 TSAR 718. 
465 Ibid 349-350. 
466 See par. 6.3.5.3.4 supra. 
467 See sections 26 (economic activity), 27 (labour relations), 31 (language and culture), and 
32 (education) deal with second-generation rights. 
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realisation of the second-generation rights. 468 
Already international human rights Law has had a marked influence on chapter 
3 of the 1993 Constitution. For instance, several of its provisions are modelled 
on those of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and, in 
particular, the property rights clause (section 28) contains an expropriation 
clause that reflects international law standards. The provisions of Chapter 3 are 
sufficiently similar to those of the ICCPR and the European Convention to 
ensure that the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee and the 
European Court of Human Rights will guide South African Courts and 
lawyers. 469This appears quite clearly in section 35470 which provides that : 
"[l]n interpreting the provisions of this chapter a court of law shall promote the 
values which underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and 
equality and shall, where applicable have regard to public international law 
applicable to the protection of the rights entrenched in this chapter, and may, 
have regard to comparable foreign case law." (italics added) 
In addition, the Human Rights Commission471 is required to measure any 
proposed legislation against the Bill of Rights or norms of international human 
rights law which form part of South African law or other relevant norms of 
international law and to report any conflict between such norms and the 
proposed legislation to the relevant legislature. 472 Provision is also made for the 
recognition of humanitarian law governing armed conflict. 473 
The South African Bill of Rights is not only inspired by international human 
rights law, but also draws heavily on the language and structure of major 
human rights Conventions. Thus even if there was no reference to international 
468 See Dugard International Law 350. 
469 Ibid. 
410 Ibid. 
471 See section 115. 
472 See section 116(2). 
473 See section 227(2)(e). 
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law in Chapter 3 South African Courts would still be obliged to tum to 
international human rights law for guidance. 474 The Zimbabwean and Namibian 
Bills of Rights do not contain an express direction to apply international law. 
However, the courts of Zimbabwe and Namibian have not hesitated to draw on 
international human rights treaties, customary law, and the decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights to assist them in interpreting their Bills of 
Rights. 475 These Courts relied on, inter alia, the presumption in favour of 
compliance with international law,476 the similarity of the domestic provisions 
to those in international human rights conventions,477 or the legislative history 
of the Bill of Rights.478 Furthermore, section 35(1) strengthens the role of 
international law in the interpretative process as it obliges courts to apply 
international law where it is applicable. 
As every section of chapter 3 has some counterpart in an international human 
rights instrument or is governed by general principles of international law there 
will hardly be any situation where public international law is not applicable 
under section 35(1). 
Dugard maintains that section 35(1) does not limit a courts enquiry to treaties 
to which South Africa is a party or to customary rules that have been accepted 
by South African courts. He argues, firstly that the phrase "where applicable" 
does not impose such a limitation, and secondly, that the fact that the authors 
474 See John Dugard "International Human Rights" in Rights and Constitutionalism : The 
New South African Legal Order (unpublished manuscript) 193. 
475 Ibid. 
476 See Dugard International law 4 7 and 226. 
477 See S v A Juvenile 1990 (4) SA 151 (ZSC) at 155 G-1, 1591; Ex parte Attorney-General, 
Namibia: In re Corporal Punishment by Organs of State 1991 (3) SA 76 (NMS) at 87 B-C. 
478 See Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher [1980) AC 319 at 328-9. It this case Lord 
Wilberforce held that in interpreting the Bermuda Constitution Act it was necessary to recall 
that it was influenced by the European Convention on Human Rights and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, and that "these antecedents ... call for a generous interpretation, 
avoiding what has been called the 'austerity of legalism, suitable to give to individuals the full 
measure of the fundamental rights and freedoms' contained in the constitution." This dictum 
was approved in Minister of Defence, Namibia v Mwandi.nghi 1992 (2) SA 355 (NMS) at 362-3 
and ANC (Border Branch} v Chairman, Council of State of Ciskei. 1992 (4) SA 434 (CK) at 44 7. 
Also see the dictum of Friedman J in Nyamakazi v President of Bophuthatswana 1992 (4) SA 
540 (B) at 570 H. 
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of the constitution did not intend to qualify the applicable rules of international 
law is confirmed by section 116(2), which directs the Human Rights 
Commission to judge South African legislation by the "norms of international 
human rights law which form part of South African law." 
According to Dugard this means that South African Courts will be required to 
consult all the sources of international law recognised by article 38(1) of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice, i.e. 
"(a) international Conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognised by the contesting states; 
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
(c) the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations; 
(d) ... judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of 
the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law." 
Thus Dugard concludes that while a court is obliged to consider only bilateral 
treaties to which South Africa is a party, it is apparently required to consider 
all relevant general or multilateral treaties, whether South Africa is a party to 
the multilateral treaty in question or not. Dugard draws this Conclusion from 
the use of the term "public international law" without qualification in section 
35(1) and the language of section 116(2). He further points out that to limit 
multilateral treaties to those South Africa is a party to (or may become a party 
to) would prevent a court from considering the jurisprudence of the European 
Commission and Court of Human Rights, which provides a most valuable 
source of international human rights law. 
The guidance that South African Courts may obtain from the European Court 
of Human Rights is quite evident in Zimbabwean479 and Namibian480 case law 
479 See S v Ncube 1988 (2) SA 702 (ZS) at 714-717; S v A Juvenile 1990 (4) SA 151 (ZS) 
at 156, 161, 167- 168, 170-173. 
480 See Ex parte Attorney-General, Namibia: In re Corporal punishment by Organs of 
State 1991 (3) SA 76 (NMS) at 87-8, 90. 
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on human rights. Similarly, South African courts could obtain such guidance 
in the interpretation clause which directs the Courts to "have regard to public 
international law".481 Section 35(1) does not require the courts to conduct an 
enquiry into whether a particular principle contained in one or more human 
rights conventions is backed by sufficient practice (usus) and opinio iuris to 
qualify as a customary rule binding on South Africa. 482 
Thus South African courts may simply seek guidance in the language employed 
by inter alia the European Convention and the European Court of Human 
Rights.~his approach emerged quite clearly in the courts of Zimbabwe and 
Namibia on the question whether corporal punishment constituted a form of 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
In S v Ncube484 and S v A Juvenile485 the Zimbabwe Supreme Court invoked the 
decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Tyrer v United Kingdom486 
to support its finding on the unconstitutionality of corporal punishment. The 
supreme Court of Namibia adopted a similar approach in Ex parte Attorney-
General, Namibia: In re Corporal Punishment by Organs of State. 487 Also, the 
supreme Court of Zimbabwe relied on a judgement488 of the European Court of 
Human Rights and dissenting opinions in the Human Rights Committee on the 
death row question. The Supreme Court of Zimbabwe489 relied on this foreign 
human rights jurisprudence in holding that a prolonged period on the death row 
constituted inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in violation of the 
Bill of Rights. On the basis of this foreign jurisprudence the court set aside the 
death sentences imposed on four prisoners who had spent between 52 and 72 
481 See section 35(1). 
482 See John Dugard "International Human Rights" 194. 
483 Ibid. 
484 1988 (2) SA 702 (ZS) at 714-15, 719-21. 
485 1990 (4) SA 151 (ZS) at 156, 161, 167, 170, 171-3. 
486 ECHR, serves A, vol. 26, Judgement of 25 April 1978. 
487 1991 (3) SA 76 (NMS) at 87-88, 90. 
488 See Soering v United Kingdom ECHR serves A, vol. 161, Judgement of July 1989. 
489 See Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe v Attorney-General, 
Zimbabwe and Others 1993 Z SACR 423 (25). 
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months on death row and substituted sentences of life imprisonment. 
As the European Convention on Human Rights forms part of the municipal law 
of many European States it is applied directly by the municipal courts of many 
states. Seeing that these decisions constitute a source of public international law 
they will be relevant to the inquiry to be conducted under section 35(1) or 
alternatively they will qualify as foreign case law under this section. All in all, 
in interpreting the Bill of Rights South African courts are therefore required to 
have regard to treaties, customary law, general principles of law recognised by 
civilised nations, the writings of jurists and foreign case law. 
Section 35(1) does not compel South African courts to apply norms of 
international law. It merely obliges them to "have regard" to such norms, where 
applicable in their search for an interpretation of the Bill of Rights that will 
"promote the values which underline an open and democratic society based on 
freedom and equality ... ". However, when South Africa incorporates human 
rights conventions which comprise the corpus of International Human Rights 
law in terms of section 231(3) South African Courts will be obliged to apply 
them as they would an ordinary statute. Consequently, international human 
rights norms will then have a double statutory basis in municipal law. There 
could be no doubt, therefore, that the IHRL which has hitherto been disregarded 
by our courts and repudiated by the previous "Parliament and Executives alike 
will play a central role in Constitutional litigation."490 
6.5.4 Interpreting the 1993 Constitution 
In paragraph 8.3 it was shown how sections 35 and 231 provided avenues for 
the incorporation of public international law in the 1993 constitution. Here it 
is necessary to focus on the interpretation of the Constitution in general and the 
Bill of Rights in particular. 
490 See Dugard "International Human Rights" op cit 194 et seq. 
495 
Before the adoption of the 1993 Constitution the principle of literal 
interpretation was firmly entrenched in our law.491 However, section 4(1) of the 
1993 constitution states that the Constitution shall be the supreme law of the 
Republic. Section 35(1) of the Constitution provides for the following with 
regard to the Bill of Rights : 
"In interpreting the provisions of this chapter a court of Law shall promote the 
values which underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and 
equality and shall, where applicable, have regard to public international law 
applicable to the protection of the rights entrenched in this Chapter (3), and may 
have regard to comparable foreign case law." 
Section 35(3) which deals with the interpretation of legislation in general, 
provides that: 
"[i]n the interpretation of any law and the application and development of the 
common law, and customary law, a court of law shall have due regard to the 
spirit, purport and objects of this Chapter." 
These provisions challenge the principle of textualism or literal interpretation. 492 
The challenge to the principle of textualism is particularly significant as both 
the Constitutional Court and ordinary Courts will be concerned with the 
interpretation and the application of the Constitution in general and Chapter 3 
in particular. Section 103 of the Constitution provides that if a party before a 
court of law alleges that the legislation in question is in conflict with the 
Constitution, and the presiding officer is of the opinion that it is in the interest 
of justice, the case may be postponed to enable the matter to be referred to 
either the provincial or local division of the supreme court or the constitutional 
491 See Public Carriers Association v Toll Road Concessionaries 1990 (1) SA 925 [A) at 934 
J. 
492 CJ Botha "Interpretation of the Constitution" [paper read at a Conference entitled 
"Towards the New Constitution" organised by the Verloren van Themaat Centre for Public Law 
Studies, Unisa 28-29 March 1994) 1. 
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court for a decision regarding the validity of the legislation in question. Read 
with section 35(3) this means that all judicial officers could be called upon to 
interpret not only the Constitution, but also other legislation with due regard to 
the "spirit and objects of the Bill of Rights. "493 The purposive and flexible 
interpretative methodology flowing from the 1993 Constitution negate the above 
mentioned interpretation principle. 494 
The purposive methodology will require that the courts not only get acquainted 
with international human rights law in terms of section 35, but also reacquaint 
themselves with public international law in general, since it becomes part of 
South African Law in terms of section 231. As Botha correctly observed:495 
"[a) way must be found to reach the lost generations of international lawyers, 
judges, advocates, magistrates, attorney, students and law teachers. We will all 
be called upon not only to reconceptualise our notions of international law as 
such, but also to reassess the very basis from which our legal system operates. 
It is only to be hoped that we will be sufficiently open to meet these challenges." 
There are several reasons why the traditional South African approach to 
legislative interpretation cannot be applied to the 1993 Constitution. Firstly, the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty has given way to the principle 
constitutional supremacy. The Nazi notion of Law-is-Law has been abolished. 
The Constitution is the supreme law of the land, against which all legislative, 
executive and judicial acts will be tested.496 Secondly, the constitution is the 
fundamental law of the land and as such it embodies the values of society such 
493 See also Ntenteni v Chairman, Ciskei Council of State 1993 (4) SA 546 (CKGD) 5551-J 
and 556 A where Heath J stated that the constitution is the source of the fundamental rights, 
reflecting the norms against which the other legislation is to be tested. This applies to legislation 
and governmental actions, as well as to the judiciary in applying and interpreting the laws of 
the country. With regard to Criminal justice in the lower courts under a supreme constitution 
in South Africa, see Southwell and Van Rooyen "The procedural management of Constitutional 
issues in criminal trials in a future South Africa: a Cost - effectiveness study" 1993 CILSA 346-
351. 
494 See Neville Botha "The Role of Public International law in the South African Defence 
Act of 1957" (Department of Constitutional and Public International Law, Unisa) 
495 Ibid. 
496 Ibid 3. 
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as freedom, equality and justice. These values are embodied in the Bill of Rights 
which, like the Constitution, is fundamental, and thirdly, the courts will be 
bound by peremptory rules of International Human Rights law. 
As shown in the previous paragraph, in interpreting the Constitution South 
African courts could learn a great deal from their Zimbabwean and Namibian 
counterparts. The Supreme Courts of Namibia and Zimbabwe have made a 
successful transition from the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty to 
Constitutional supremacy. In a number of cases497 the courts in Namibia and 
Zimbabwe applied virtually all the international human rights instruments and 
case law applicable, and referred to a wide selection of foreign case law dealing 
with constitutional adjudication. Furthermore, it was interesting to note that a 
large number of the decisions referred to were from so-called "third-world 
countries" which have made the transition from parliamentary sovereignty to 
Constitutional supremacy. 
The principles of Constitutional interpretation expounded by Southern African 
Courts are briefly discussed below. As a general point of departure the police 
state based on the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty has now been replaced 
by a constitutional state (Rechtsstaat) based on the principle of Constitutional 
supremacy. The impact of this principle on Constitutional interpretation was 
expressed in definite and emphatic terms in S v Acheson. 498 Mahomed AJ 
summed it up as follows: 
"[T]he Constitution of a Nation is not simply a statute which mechanically 
defines the structures of government and the relations between the governed. It 
is a 'mirror reflecting the National soul'; the identification of the ideals and 
aspirations of a nation; the articulation of the values bonding its people and 
497 See Ex parte Attorney General, Namibia: In re Corporal Punishment by Organs of the 
State 1991 (3) SA 76 (NMSC); Ncube, Tshuma, Ndhlovu 1988 (2) SA 702 (ZSC) and S v A 
Juvenile 1990 (4) SA 151 (ZSC) (corporal punishment), Catholic Commissionfor Justice and 
Peace in Zimbabwe v Attorney General, Zimbabwe 1993 (4) SA 239 (death penalty as inhuman 
and degrading punishment); Ntenteni v Chairman, Ciskei Council of State 1993 (4) SA 546 
(CKGD) (limitation of state liability) and Nyamakazi v President of Bophuthatswana 1992 (4) 
SA 540 (BGD). 
498 1991 (2) SA 805 (NM) 813 A-C. 
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disciplining its government. The spirit and tenor of the Constitution must 
therefore preside and permeate the process of judicial interpretation and judicial 
discretion." 
The supremacy of the Constitution (including a bill of fundamental rights] 
requires that individual rights should prevail over the interests of the state. This 
means that, for the first time in South Africa, state absolutism will be buried 
forever subject only to the limitations provided for in section 33. 499 
A number of rules of Constitutional interpretation or Guidelines have been 
developed for courts which are entrusted with the awesome and onerous task 
of being the guardians of a constitution containing a bill of rights. 500 These rules 
(or guidelines] include: 
(a) all legislation must be consistent with the Constitution otherwise it will be ultra 
vires and the courts will declare it null and void and of no force and effect; 
(b) the Constitution must be liberally construed, taking into account its terms and 
spirit, the intention of the framers and the objectives and reasons for its 
legislation; 
(c) the Constitution must be interpreted in the context and setting existing at the 
time when the case is heard, and not when it was passed, otherwise the growth 
of society will not be taken into account; and 
(d) a law that ignores the legal and moral standards of the fundamental human 
rights contained in the Constitution cannot be just. If a violation of those rights 
cannot be justified by the limitation clause (section 33) it must be struck down. 
The onus to prove that the violation of a fundamental right is justified rests on 
the state. 
499 Unfortunately Galgut AJA in Government ofBophuthatswana v Segale 1990 (1) SA 434 
(BA) held the opposite and incorrect view that the legislature in 1977 did not intend that 
individual rights could take precedence over the interests of the state. This orthodox view was 
also confirmed in Mokwele v Government of the Republic ofBophuthatswana 1994 (1) SA 503 
(B). 
500 See Ntenteni v Chairman, Ciskei Council of State 1993 (4) SA 546 (CK) at 554-5. 
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Finally, South Africa has established a Constitutional State based on the 
dynamic concept of the rule of law. 
6.6 The Dynamic Concept of the Rule of Law and the Current 
Constitution-making Process in South Africa 
6. 6.1 General 
The 1993 South African Constitution is an interim or transitional Constitution 
and will only lasts for a maximum period of five years. The interim Constitution 
gives effect to the agreement reached at the Multiparty negotiation process 
(which produced the transitional Constitution) on a so-called two-phase 
constitution-making process whereby the said negotiation forum would draw up 
and adopt the interim Constitution which was then ratified by Parliament under 
the 1983 Constitution, Act 11 O of 1983. 501 This procedure was also followed in 
Zimbabwe where the Lancaster agreement was ratified by the Rhodesian 
Parliament to enable it to surrender sovereignty to the new state and terminate 
its own existence. 502 In South Africa, however, it is strictly speaking not the 
creation of a new State. 503 Hence, Van Wyk maintains that:504 
"the Constitution is, after all, an Act of Parliament under the old system, and as 
such it fulfils the crucially important requirement of Constitutional Continuity. 
On the other hand, however, it also represents a fundamental break with the old 
older of parliamentary sovereignty and its peculiar way of legislative drafting." 
The preamble of the interim Constitution provides binding guidelines for the 
writing and adoption of the final Constitution. The requirement of 
Constitutional Continuity is embedded in the preamble which makes it 
501 See Basson South Africa's Interim Constitution 1-2. 
502 See Chapter 5 par. 2.1.4.2 supra. 
503 As South Africa had been an independent State and a member of the United Nations. 
504 See Dawid Van Wyk "Introduction to the South African Constitution" in Rights and 
Constitutionalism: The New South African Legal Order (unpublished manuscript)l59. 
500 
abundantly clear that the 1993 Constitution provides for the continued 
governance of South Africa while an elected Constitutional Assembly draws up 
a final Constitution. 505 The preamble underlines the fact that the members of 
the Constituent Assembly [as the representatives of all the people of South 
Africa)506 are mandated to write and adopt the final Constitution in accordance 
with a "solemn pact" recorded as Constitutional principles. 507 This solemn pact 
and the provisions that require the Constitutional Court to certify that the new 
Constitution complies with the Constitutional principles are the only provisions 
of the interim Constitution which are entrenched and protected against any 
amendment whatsoever. 508 Furthermore, the preamble refers to the need to 
create a new order in South Africa [to replace the oppressive and autocratic rule 
that prevailed under apartheid Colonialism) and it prescribes the values of the 
new order. 509 
The Constitution-making process envisaged by the Constitution is part and 
parcel of a process that started in 1990 in an attempt to normalise the political 
situation and enable all the people of South Africa to realise their right of self-
determination and equal rights. Hence, it is proposed here to describe the 
constitution-making structures and procedures, the Constitutional principles 
governing the process and the values of the new order in order to determine 
whether or not the evolving Constitutional order will meets the requirements 
of the dynamic concept of the rule of law. 
6.6.2 Constitution-making Structures and Procedures 
At the Multi-party Negotiating Process [the MPNP) two diametrically opposed 
views were presented with regard to the structures and procedures for the 
505 See Basson South Africa's Interim Constitution 1. 
506 See the preamble last but one paragraph. 
507 These principles are contained in schedule 4 of the Constitution. This schedule has the 
same status as any provision of the Constitution. See Basson South Africa's Interim 
Constitution 348. 
508 See sections 73 and 7 4. 
509 See Basson South Africa's Interim Constitution 1. 
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writing and adoption of the new Constitution. 51°The liberationist group (led by 
the ANC) held the view that the Constitution should be drawn by a Constituent 
Assembly democratically elected by all the people of South Africa a.s the 
liberationist group and the International Community had demanded over many 
decades. This method of Constitution-making (also known as pouviour 
constituante) is the most democratic because the Constitution is drawn up and 
adopted by the representatives of the people who are chosen in terms of 
democratic elections (as occurred in Namibia). 511This method legitimises the 
Constitution as it would be based on the will of all the people as envisaged by 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and related human rights 
conventions. 512 
The "Establishment Parties" held the opposite view and argued for a 
Constitution to be drawn up by the MPNP itself. According to this group the 
final Constitution would be drawn up and adopted by the MPNP and then 
elections would be held in terms of that Constitution. This method (also known 
as pouviour constitue) was used in Namibia by the Turnhalle Conference and 
in Zimbabwe by the Lancaster Conference. The process of pouvour constitue 
differs from that of pouvour constituante in that the constitution is not drawn 
up at a certain historical moment by a newly-elected Constituent Assembly but 
originates from the colonial order through amendments to the Constitution 
which are effected by the existing structures. This process was rejected because 
the illegitimacy of the tricameral system and Bantustan system would tarnish 
the legitimacy of the new constitution. 513 In particular, it would encroach upon 
the rights of self-determination of all the people of South Africa. However, the 
MPNP did not accept the first process lock, stock and barrel. Instead they 
adopted a compromise two-phase process of Constitution-making which 
contained elements of both. 514 
510 Ibid 96. 
511 See Chapter 5 par. 2.2.9 supra. 
512 See article 21 of the UDHR. 
513 See Basson South Africa's Interim Constitution 97. 
514 Ibid. 
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According to this agreed two-phase process of Constitution-making the present 
interim Constitution was drawn up and adopted by the MPNP and enacted by 
the Tricameral Parliament. Elections were then held to elect the present three-
tier government of National Unity. The Constitutional Assembly (consisting of 
the Senate and National Assembly sitting together)515 has now began the task 
of drawing-up the final Constitutional for South Africa subject to prescribed 
majorities, Constitutional principles etc. The Constitutional Court must certify 
that the final Constitutional complies with the Constitutional Principles 
embodied in Schedule 4. 516 
6.6.3 The Nature of the State and Constitutional Principles 
The preamble of the interim Constitution prescribes the values which should 
underpin the final Constitutional - that is, the new South African Constitutional 
dispensation.517 It states that: 518 
"there is a need to create a new order in which all South Africans will be entitled 
to a common South African citizenship in a sovereign and democratic 
Constitutional State in which there is equality between men and women and 
people of all races so that all citizens shall be able to enjoy and exercise their 
fundamental rights and freedoms." 
More specifically, this provision replaces the autocratic apartheid rule based on 
the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty with a Constitutional State 
(Rechtsstaat) based on the legal values of democracy, dignity, equality and 
freedom, and furthermore, and perhaps more significantly, promoting the 
principle of national unity regardless of race, gender and so on. 
The fourth Constitutional Principle incorporates the principle of Constitutional 
515 See section 68. 
516 See section 71. 
517 See Basson South Africa's Interim Constitution 2. 
518 Ibid 1. 
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Supremacy that replaced the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty. This ils the 
principle that marks the break with the apartheid past. The principles also 
requires a legal system that ensures the principle of Constitutional Supren1acy. 
To achieve this the preamble ensures that the interim constitution is based on 
constitutional principles which shall also be binding on the Constituent 
Assembly when it draws up the final constitution. 
The underlying values of the new constitutional order were dealt with above, in 
particular, when chapter 3 (Fundamental Rights) was addressed. These legal 
values and the Constitutional Principles will shape the nature of our new 
Constitutional order. As the legal values have already been dealt with the focus 
will now shift to the Constitutional principles. 
The Constitutional principles contained in schedule 4 of the interim 
Constitution are of critical importance as no final Constitutional text will be of 
force and effect unless it has been certified by the Constitutional Court to be in 
compliance with them. 519 
The idea of Constitutional principles is not new to Southern Africa. In 
Zimbabwe and Namibia, as we saw above, 52° Constitutional principles were 
adopted. In South Africa the First Constitutional principles were embodied in 
the Declaration of Intent which was adopted by Codesa. However, to 
accommodate the "new" parties that joined the MPNP (which replaced Codesa) 
the "new" Negotiating Council began to investigate Constitutional principles 
that would form the essence of a future democratic dispensation. The principles 
identified by Codesa were not automatically accepted by the "new" parties that 
joined the negotiating process. On 2 July 1993, 17 November 1993, and again 
in March and April 1994, a set of thirty three Constitutional principles was 
accepted by the Negotiating Council. The Negotiating Council agreed that the 
519 See section 71 (1) and (2). 
520 See Chapter 5 paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2. 
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thirty-three principles would be applicable to the transitional as well as all 
future Constitutions, and that any Constitutional provision (whether on a 
National or provincial level) inconsistent with the principles would be invalid. 521 
6.6.4 Application of Constitutional Principles 
As shown above, 522 the MPNP adopted a two-phased approach to the 
Constitution-making process. Phase one entailed the completion of an interim 
Constitution that complied with the Constitutional principles. This Constitution 
came into force in April 1994 replacing the 1983 Constitution. The 
representatives that have been elected according to the interim Constitution 
have a dual function. On the one hand, they are acting as members of the 
National legislature and, on the other hand, are members of the ConsUtuent 
Assembly (which is made up of the National Assembly and Senate in a joint 
sitting) that is currently drawing up a final Constitution for South Africa. The 
second phase will end when the final Constitution becomes operational. 
The Constituent Assembly is required to draw up the final Constitution ·within 
two years.523 However, Constitutional Principles XXXII and XXX.111 entrenches 
the idea of a government of National Unity for 5 years. These principles 
determine how the National Executive shall be composed and that it shall 
function in the manner provided for by the transitional Constitution, 524 and that 
no election shall take place before April 1999 unless a motion of no confidence 
in the National executive is passed by Parliament. The following has been 
provided regarding the legal status of the Constitutional principles: 
(a) The Constitutional Assembly will be bound by the Constitutional Principles 
521 See Bertus de Villiers "The Constitutional Principles: Content and significance" in Birth 
of A Constitution 41. 
522 See Basson South Africa's Interim Constitution 96 ff. 
523 See section 73(1). 
524 On the National Executive in general see Basson South Africa's Interim Constitution 
107 ff. 
505 
which will Constitute a annexure to the Constitution;525 
(b) While the new Constitution is being drawn-up, any provision can be referred to 
the Constitutional Court at the request of one-third of the Constituent Assembly 
in order to obtain a ruling on whether the provision in fact complies with the 
requirements of the Constitutional principles;526 
(c) A new Constitution or any part of a new Constitution will become operational 
only once the Constitutional Court has certified that it complies with the 
Constitutional principles;527 
(d) The ruling of the Constitutional Court will be binding and no other court can 
have such a ruling investigated;528 
(e) The Provincial Constitutions will also have to comply with the Constitutional 
principles;529 
lO No amendment that is aimed at reducing the binding nature of the 
Constitutional Principles will be permitted. 530 
It follows from the solemn pact (i.e. Constitutional Principles) contained in 
scheduled 4 of the interim Constitution (and the experiences of Zimbabwe and 
Namibia) that representatives of all the people of a self-determination unit are 
entitled to limit their right of self-determination to accommodate the fears and 
aspirations of sections of the population. In paragraph 9.5 below we focus 
specifically on a number of the Constitutional Principles to determine the 
impact of the principles concerned on popular sovereignty or right of self-
determination. 
6.6.5 The Dynamic Content of the Rule of Law and the Content of 
the Constitutional Principles 
The Constitutional Principles consists of thirty-four items, of which the special 
525 Section 71. 
526 See section 71(4). 
527 See section 71(2). 
528 See section 71(3). 
529 See section 160(3). 
530 See section 7 4. 
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part on provincial government is made up of further subitems. These principles 
set out the most important elements of a Constitutional State. 
More specifically, the first principle incorporates the legal values of the new 
constitutional dispensation, while the second principle not only incorporates the 
idea of human rights, but international human rights law and obligates the 
Constituent Assembly to incorporate international human rights law into the 
final Constitution. The third principle endorses the UN Charter and Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights by specifically prohibiting racial, gender and other 
forms of discrimination, affirming equality before the law, an equitable legal 
process and affirmative action. 531 
The principles also incorporate the doctrine of separation of powers between the 
legislature, executive and judiciary including checks and balances designed to 
ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.532 The principle of 
Constitutional supremacy is reinforced by an independent and impartial 
judiciary that has the power and jurisdiction to safeguard and enforce the 
Constitution and all fundamental rights. 533 This justiciable Bill of Flights 
represents a radical departure from the law-is-law doctrine that was developed 
by our courts during the Constitutional Crisis of the fifties. 534 Principles VIII and 
XI incorporate inter alia, the legal values of an open and democratic goven1ance 
enshrined in article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other 
human rights conventions. They guarantee a representative government 
embracing multi-party democracy, regular elections, universal adult suffrage, 
a common voters roll, and, in general proportional representation. 535 
To safeguard an open, accountable and democratic governance the ninth 
531 See Constitutional Principle V. 
532 See Constitutional Principle VI. 
533 See Constitutional Principle VII. 
534 See Basson and Viljoen South African Constitutional Law (1988) 227-234. 
535 See Constitutional Principle VIII. 
507 
principle guarantees freedom of information. 536 In additional the tenth 
Constitutional principles guarantees procedural legality with regard to all law-
making activities by the three tiers of government. 537 
In line with article 27 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
Constitutional Principles XI and XII guarantee language, cultural and religious 
rights and afford the bearers of these rights collective self-determination in 
forming, joining and maintaining organs of civil society on the basis of non-
discrimination and free association. 538 
Provision is also made for the protection of political minorities by guaranteeing 
their participation "in a manner Consistent" with democracy.539 The principles 
relating to traditional authorities540and community self-determination541 seem 
to limit the right to democratic governance of all the people. 542 As this matter 
is more complex than meets the eye it will be addressed at some length below. 
One of the most contentious issues during negotiations on Constitutional 
Principles was the question of principle and detail. The COSAG Alliance 
demanded that the Constitutional Principles should contain a guarantee on the 
nature of the future Constitutional dispensation, namely that it should be a 
federation. For the COSAG Alliance it did not suffice that there should merely 
be a guarantee that there would be three levels of government with guaranteed 
powers. They insisted on the express use of the word "federation. "543 
A compromise was, however, hammered out and embodied in Constitutional 
Principles XVIII-:XXIII. These principles deal with aspects on the form of state 
including boundaries of provinces and procedures for their alteration. The 
536 See Constitutional Principle XI. 
537 See Constitutional Principle X. 
538 See Constitutional Principle XI-XII. 
539 See Constitutional Principle XIV. 
540 See Constitutional Principle XIII. 
541 See Constitutional Principle XXXIV. 
542 See Constitutional Principle XVII. 
543 See de Villiers "The Constitutional Principles : Content and significance" 40. 
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powers and functions of national and provincial levels of government shall 
include exclusive and concurrent powers as well as the power to peirform 
functions for other levels of government on an agency or delegated basis. 54,4 The 
allocation of powers between national and ·provincial governments shall be 
based on : (a) financial viability; (b) effective public administration; (c) the 
promotion of national unity and legitimate provincial autonomy and (d) the 
acknowledgement of cultural diversity. 545 
Provision is also made for specific criteria for the allocation of powers as well as 
the right to set norms and standards for the exercise of powers and performance 
of functions. 546 In summary, the criteria for the allocation of powers and 
functions makes the form of state neither unitary nor federal. 547 Provision is also 
made for a deadlock breaking mechanism in case of disputes regarding the 
allocation of powers and functions. 548 Furthermore, the principles deal with 
fiscal relations, 549 powers and functions of local government, 550 workers' and 
employers' rights, civil service551 and security forces. 552 
Most of the Constitutional Principles reflect proven democratic notions and 
values553 inherent in a Constitutional State based on the principle of 
Constitutional supremacy. Furthermore, and perhaps most significantly, the 
34th principle recognises the right of the South African people as a whole to 
self-determination.554 However, this right has been qualified in two respects. 
First, the right of democratic governance at all three levels of government has 
been tempered by a provision on traditional leadership which was inserted to 
544 See Constitutional Principle XVIII. 
545 See Constitutional Principle XX. 
546 See Constitutional Principle XXI. 
547 For a discussion of this question see Ron Walts "Is the new South African Constitution 
federal or unitary?" in De Villiers Birth of A Constitution 89 et seq. 
548 See Constitutional Principle XXIII. 
549 See Constitutional Principle XXV. 
550 See Constitutional Principle XXIV. 
551 See Constitutional Principle XXVIII. 
552 See Constitutional Principle XXXI. 
553 See Van Wyk "Introduction to the South African Constitution" 159. 
554 See Constitutional Principle XXXIV. 
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appease the IFP.555 This provision stipulates that the Constitution has to 
recognise and protect provincial provisions on the "institution, role, authority 
and status of a traditional monarch. "556 The right to democratic governance of 
all the people is further, and perhaps more seriously, limited by the right of 
ethnic/racial self-determination. 557 
6.6.6 Towards Ethnic Constitutionalism: Prospects and Obstacles 
6.6.6.1 General 
The interim Constitution and, in particular, the Constitutional principles 
preserves the territorial integrity and political national unity of the Republic of 
South Africa within the 1910 external boundaries. The form of the State 
developed is neither unitary nor federal. However, it opens the door for 
federalism and Conf ederalism as it recognises both the right of self-
determina tion of all the people of South Africa as well as ethnic (or Community) 
self-determination. 
In this regard the 34th Constitutional principle provides:-
"(1) This schedule and the recognition therein of the right of the South African 
people as a whole to self-determination, shall not be construed as precluding, 
within the framework of the said rights, Constitutional provision for a notion of 
the right to self-determination by any Community sharing a common cultural 
and language heritage, whether in a territorial entity within the Republic or in 
any other recognised way. 
(2) The Constitution may give expression to any particular form of self-
determination provided there is substantial proven support within the 
Community concerned for such a form of self-determination. 
(3) If a territorial entity referred to in paragraph 1 is established in terms of this 
555 See Van Wyk "Introduction to the South African Constitution" 159. 
556 See section 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Second Amendment Act 
3 of 1994. 
557 See Constitutional Principle XXXIV. 
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Constitution before the new Constitutional text is adopted, the new Constitution 
shall entrench the continuation of territorial entity, including itl? structures; 
powers and functions." 
Although this right of ethnic self-determination could apply to any community 
in South Africa (especially the Zulus as represented by the IFP) it seems to be 
limited to the Afrikaner Community. Hence, Chapter IIA provides for the 
establishment of a Volkstaat Council as a mechanism for the realisation of the 
Afrikaner right of self-determination. Section 184B(3) foresees an Act of 
Parliament to provide for the procedures to be followed by the Council in the 
pursuit of its objective, which is to promote a Volkstaat for those who want it. 
In this thesis it has been shown that all the people of South Africa (both black 
and white) are the bearers of the right of self-determination within the 1910 
external boundaries. The. recognition of Community (or ethnic) self-
determination raises two major questions. First, whether the universally 
accepted right of self-determination includes the right to secession and secondly, 
whether the recognition of ethnic self-determination would be compatible with 
the right of the people as a whole to self-determination and thirdly and finally, 
how will such a right affect the form of State? 
6.6.6.2 The Right of Ethnic Self-determination in the International-
Law Context 
Prior to World War II minorities received special protection including the right 
to self-determination.558 After World War II the authors of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights made the quantum leap into the new age of 
human rights for all, instead of particular groups. The new approach found a 
definite and emphatic expression in a study by the United Nations Secretariat 
which concluded its review of the League's system in 1950. The study 
558 See Patrick Thornberry Minorities and Hum.an Rights law (1991)12. 
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concluded that:559 
"this whole system was overthrown by the second World War. All the 
international decisions reached since 1944 have been inspired by a different 
philosophy. The idea of a general and universal protection of human rights is 
emerging. It is therefore no longer only the minorities in certain countries which 
receive protection, but all countries ... ". 
Hence, since the promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
the protection of minorities has more or less been absorbed into the wider 
concept of human rights. 560 
According to the new approach to minority (or group) rights the concept of 
human rights does not retain the Status of a separate institution of international 
law although the term minority is still used in treaty law. The first premise of 
the new system of human rights is that justice is meted out to members of 
minority groups on the basis of their basic humanity rather than as members 
of such groups. Thus they are entitled without discrimination to a full range of 
civil, political, economic, social and cultural rignts set out in the major human 
rights conventions have now become part of South African law, Members of the 
Afrikaner Volk are fully entitled and are already enjoying these rights as 
individuals. 561 
The shift of emphasis in the protection from group protection to the protection 
of individual rights and freedoms departed from the premise that whenever 
someone's rights were violated or restricted on the ground of race, religion or 
national origin or culture - the matter could be taken care of by protecting the 
rights of the individual, on a purely individual basis, mainly by invoking the 
principle of non-discrimination. This shift is rooted in the UN Charter562and the 
559 Ibid. 
560 Ibid 13. 
56t Ibid. 
562 See Article 1 (3) 
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Universal Declaration. 563 All of them incorporated the rule of non-discrimination 
on grounds of race, sex, language, religion or similar grounds. 564 
Proposals for the inclusion of an article on National minorities in the Universal 
Declaration were rejected. However, the General Assembly stated that the fate 
of minorities had to be considered. 565 Thus when the commission on human 
rights was established in 1946, it was authorised to create a sub-commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. This Committee 
played a critical role in the preparation of Article 27 of the Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights. The article provides: 
"In those States in which ethnic religious or linguistic minorities exist, person 
belongings to such minorities shall no be derued the right, in community with 
the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and 
practice their own religion, or to use their own language." 
There are different interpretation to article 27. Some argue that it deals with 
individual rights, and excludes direct protection of groups as envisaged by the 
UN Charter566and the Universal Declaration. 567 Others see the Wording of Article 
27 as an attempt to avoid giving any group an international personality.568 
Be that as it may, the protection of minorities by article 27 of the Covenant on 
Civil and political Rights seems to relate to Cultural, rather that political self-
determination. Hence, minorities are not accorded the requisite international 
personality and are required to exercise their rights to language, culture and 
religion within the existing State. As minorities do not have an international 
personality and the right of political self-determination they could therefore not 
have the right of secession. This question was addressed satisfactorily by the 
563 See Article 2 (1). 
564 See Natan Lerner Group Rights and Discrimination in International Law (1991)14 
565 See GA Res. 217 C III (1948). 
566 See Lerner Group Rights and Discrimination in International law 15 
567 Ibid. . 
568 Ibid. 
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Declaration on Principles oflnternational law Concerning friendly Relations and 
Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
(the "Declaration on Friendly Relations").569 Neither of the purposes set forth by 
the Declaration on Friendly Relations suggests that self-determination is 
intended to provide every ethnically distinct people with its own State. In fact 
(as Hannum570correctly observed) the particular mention of the "distinct" status 
of "a Colony or other self-governing Territory" suggests a limited scope for the 
right of self-determination. Similarly, Hannum571 suggests that the use in the 
same paragraph of the singular "people" suggests that various minorities within 
a territory may not enjoy the same right of self-determination as that possessed 
by the people as a whole. 
Hence, the Declaration on Friendly Relations places the goal of territorial 
integrity or political/National unity as principle superior to that of self-
determination. This goal, however, apply to those states which conduct 
themselves 
"in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples and (are) thus possessed of a government representing the whole people 
belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour. "572 
It follows from this that a State will not be considered to be representative if it 
formally excludes a particular group from participation in the political process, 
based on that Group's race, creed, or colour. 573For instance, as was the case in 
South Africa or Southern Rhodesia under the Smith regime. The new South 
Africa, on the contrary can be said to be representative of all the people as 
envisaged by the Declaration on Friendly Relations. It is also suggested that the 
language of the common article 1 of the ICCPR and ICESCR is evidence of the 
569 See Hurst Hannum "Rethinking self-determination" in Virginia Journal of International 
law (vol. 34 number 7 Fall 1993) 16. 
510 Ibid. 
571 
I Ibid. 
572 See GA Res. 2625. 
573 See Hannum "Rethinking self-determination" 17. 
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Universality of the right of self-determination and that the reference to "all 
people and the fact that the article is found in human rights treaties intended 
to have universal applicability suggest a scope beyond that of decolonisation. 574 
Furthermore and, perhaps more significantly, the interpretation of the common 
articles 1 of the ICCPR and ICESCR by the Human Rights Committee575makes 
it abundantly clear that the right of self-determination has two aspects - namely, 
the external and internal aspects. The former include the right of a nation to be 
free from external influence, and potentially the right to secession. The latter 
include the right to democracy, i.e. the right to participate in one's own 
government. The right to democracy (or democratic governance) has already 
won explicit recognition in the Helsinki Final Act576 Principle VIII of the Act 
States: 
"By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all 
peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they 
wish, their internal and external political status without external interference, 
and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural 
development." 
The Helsinki Agreement provides that "all" people "always" have the right to 
determine their own internal and external political Status. This goes beyond the 
terse formulation of the 1966 Covenants. However, this does not derogate from 
the Covenants. The formulation of the Helsinki Agreement must be understood 
in the context of the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. Thus Hannum 
correctly observed that the formulation of the Helsinki Agreement577 
574 Ibid 19. 
575 Ibid 25 note 105. 
576 See the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE Final 
Act"), adopted in 1975 in Helsinki by 35 European states, as a regional, political document 
rather that a Universal, legally binding agreement. The parties to the agreement included 
Canada and the United States but did not include Albania, Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe; Final Act, 1August1975, 14 ILM 1292. 
577 See Hannum "Rethinking self-determination" 29. 
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"must be understood in the Context of the principles of the inviolability of 
frontiers (principles III}and the territorial integrity of states (principle IV) also 
proclaimed in the Helsinki Final Act. Again, the proper interpretation of the right 
of self-determination turns on the definition of "peoples". There is no indication 
that sub-state groups are to determine their political status or pursue political 
and economic development without reference to the larger population of the 
State." 
This understanding found support in the November 1990 Charter of Paris578 
which reaffirmed 
"the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination in conformity 
with the charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of 
international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of States." 
Thus there was no suggestion at Helsinki or in subsequent CSCE meetings that 
the right of self-determination could justify secession by an oppressed 
minority. 579 
It appears from the foregoing discussion that the remedy for oppressed 
minorities is not secession, but the right to democratic governance. As Franck 
observed , 580 a right to democratic governance is emerging as a norm of 
customary international law. This right formed the content of the right of self-
determination and, in my view applies to both dependent and independent 
countries. Franck581correctly observed that: 
"The Covenant [on civil and Political Rights] clearly intends to make the right 
of self-determination applicable to the citizens of all nations, entitling them to 
578 See Conference for security and Co-operation in Europe : Charter of Paris for a new 
Europe Nov. 21 1990 30 ILM 190 1197 (adopted at the meeting of the heads of government of 
the participating States of the CSCE). 
579 Ibid. 
580 See Thomas M Franck "The emerging Right to Democratic Governance " in 1992 (86) 
American Journal of International Law, 46 and 52. 
581 Ibid note 144. 
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determine their collective political status through democratic means ... when the 
covenant came into force, the right of self-determination entered its third phase 
of enunciation: it ceased to be a rule applicable only to specific territories (at 
first, the defeated European powers; later, the overseas trust territories and 
colonies) and became a right of everyone. The right now entitles peoples in all 
states to free, fair and open participation in democratic process of governance 
freely chosen by each state." (italics added). 
In summary, the right to democratic governance has become one of the legal 
values underlying a Constitutional state based on the principle of Constitutional 
supremacy. This right applies to both dependent and independent countries and 
subordinates minorities to governments representative of all the people within 
a given self-determination unit. 
The right to democratic governance implies that the denial of a claim to self-
determination by only a portion of the entire population of the state (where the 
latter had already been recognised by the international community as 
representing its people as in South Africa) denial of self-determination to the 
Group (e.g. the Afrikaner Group) can be seen as merely supporting the self-
determination of the larger "people",582 that is, the people of South Africa as a 
whole as envisaged in the Freedom Charter. 
It must be noted, however, that secession is not presently recognised as a right 
under international law, nor does international law prohibit it. As Espiell puts 
it: 
''The express acceptance in ... (relevant United Nations resolutions) of the 
principles of the national unity and the territorial integrity of the State implies 
non-recognition of the right of secession. The right of peoples to self-
determination, as it emerges from the United Nations, exists for people under 
colonial and alien domination, that is to say, who are not living under the legal 
form of a State. The right to secession from an existing State Member of the 
582 See Hannum "Rethinking self-determination" 41. 
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United Nations does not exist as such in the instrument or in the practice 
followed by the organisation, since to seek to invoke it in order to disrupt the 
National unity and the territorial integrity of a State would be a misapplication 
of the principle of self-determination contrary to the purposes of the United 
Nations Charter." 
Other authors have argued for recognition of a "right to secession" as part of the 
right of self-determination, but such a right does not yet exist. 583 
The principle of uti possidetis limits the exercise of the right of self-
determination to the territory within existing borders. The main thrust of the 
rule is to avoid frontier conflict amongst neighbouring states and to maintain 
the political unity of states. The rule has been given approval by both the OAU 
and UN General Assembly. The Declaration on Friendly Relations States the 
rule as follows: 
"[n)othing in the foregoing paragraph shall be construed as authorising or 
encouraging any action which will dismember or impair totally or in apart, the 
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states 
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples described above and thus possessed of a government 
representing the whole peoples belonging to the territory without distinction as 
to race, creed or colour." 
In terms of this rule, therefore, separatist groups do not have the right to break 
away from their parent states, as by so doing they would be disrupting the 
political unity and territorial integrity of the parent states. 584 In other words, 
under international law the right to self-determination does not entail a 
corresponding right to secede. 
58.3 Ibid note 1 71. 
584 See Dumazi Manganye "The Application of uti Possidetis and South African's internal 
Border" in Codicillus vol. XXXV no 2 October 1994 54. 
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6.6.6.3 The Right of Ethnic Self-determination in Eastern Europe 
In the main the right of self-determination and claims to secession were 
addressed in the context of decolonisation. Recently the issue arose in the post 
colonial case of Yugoslavia. The former Yugoslavia consisted of six Republics 
and two autonomous regions. 585The Republics and provinces were populated by 
different ethnic groups. 586 
The Serbians were in the majority in the former Yugoslavia while the Croats 
and the Slovenes were in the minority. For fear of domination by the Serbs the 
Croats and Slovenes sought a loose federation to dilute Serbian influence. 
Conversely, the Serbian's sought tighter federation to preserve their centralised 
control of the economy and domination of Yugoslavian life. 587Failure to agree on 
the future of the Yugoslavian Federation led the Croats and Slovenes to declare 
independence on 25 June 1991.588 
The breakaway of Croatia and Slovenia was rejected by the international 
community which insisted that Yugoslavia remain intact to safeguard the 
principle of territorial integrity which prohibits unilateral amendment of 
boundaries. 589 The reluctance of the international Community to recognise the 
two republics was not only based on the rule of uti possidetis but also on the 
fear of violence in Europe and the precedence that independence would 
establish for the multitudes of separatist ethnic groups in Europe. 5oorhis fear 
was justified as the fall of communist regimes in 1989 had resulted in the rise 
of Nationalism and demands for recognition by many ethnic groups which 
585 See Weller "The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia" 1992 (86) American Journal of International Law 569. 
586 Ibid. 
587 Ibid 569-570. 
588 See Iglar "The Constitutional Crisis in Yugoslavia and the international law of self-
determination: Slovenia's and Croatia's right to secede" 1992 (15) Boston College of 
International and Comparative law Review 213. 
589 Ibid. 
500 Ibid. 
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either sought the restructuring of governments or redrawing of boundaries. 591 
Croatia and Slovenia based their right to self-determination and to secession 
under the 1946 Constitution. According to the Constitution the seceding 
republics required the approval of other republics and the federal government 
and in addition they had to negotiate a procedure for a transition acceptable to 
the other interested parties. 
Following armed clashes between federal Yugoslav forces and Slovenian forces 
and the seizure of substantial Croatian territory by Croatian Serbs, the 
European Community592 adopted "a common position on the process of 
recognition" of new states in Eastern Europe and Soviet Union: 
"The [European]Community and its Member States confirm their attachment to 
the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris, in particular the 
principle of self-determination. They aflirm their readiness to recognise, subject 
to the normal standards of international practice and the political realities in 
each case, those new states which, following the historic changes in the region, 
have Constituted themselves on a democratic basis, have accepted the 
appropriate international obligations and have committed themselves in good 
faith to a peaceful process and to negotiation." 
Therefore, they adopted a common position on the process of recognition of 
these new states, which requires: - respect for the provisions of the charter of 
the United nations and the commitments subscribed to in the Final Act of 
Helsinki and in the Charter of Paris, especially with regard to the rule of law, 
democracy and human rights; 
guarantees for the rights of the ethnic and national groups and minorities in 
591 See Manganye "The Application of Uti Possedetis and South Africa's internal border" 
note 41 
592 See Hannum "Rethinking self-determination" 52. 
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accordance with the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE; 
respect for the inviolability of all frontiers which can only be changed by 
peaceful means and by common agreements; 
commitment to settle by agreement, including where appropriate by recourse 
to arbitration, all questions concerning state succession and regional disputes 
the community and its Member States will not recognise entities which are the 
result of aggression. They would take account of the effects of recognition on 
neighbouring states. 
By Resolution 713 the United Nations Security Council endorsed the Declaration 
of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CASE) that no 
territorial gains or changes within Yugoslavia brought by violence would be 
acceptable. 593 
Thus the security Council confirmed the application of the uti possidetis rule 
outside the Colonial Context by protecting former provincial or federal 
boundaries from forcible change. 594 
Furthermore, and perhaps most significantly, it is noteworthy that the CSCE 
Declaration595does not refer to the right of self-determination and right of 
secession. Also, the cases of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union were formally 
considered both by the new states themselves and by the international 
community to be instances of dissolution rather that secession. 596 
In August 1991 the European Commission established an Arbitration 
Commission and tasked it, first, to determine the legal status of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and secondly, to decide whether the Serbian 
population in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were entitled to the benefits of 
593 See Weller op cit 50. 
594 See Manganye op cit 57. 
595 See Hannum "Rethinking self-determination" 53. 
500 Ibid. 
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self-determination. With regard to the first question the commission (a) found 
that the federation was in a state of disintegration597 (b)endorsed the principle 
of uti possidetis when it pointed out that in the absence of "an agreement to the 
contrary, the former boundaries acquired the character of international 
law"598and (c) the Commission went on to state that although the principle uti 
possidetis initially applied to the process of decolonisation it constituted a 
general principle of international law as declared by the ICJ. 599 
With regard to the right of self-determination of the Serbian populations of 
Bosnia and Croatia the Commission600observed that: 
"Whatever the circumstances, the right to self-determination must not involve 
changes to existing frontiers at the time of independence (uti possidetis) except 
where the States concerned agree otherwise." 
The Commission concluded that Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia had 
"the right to recognition of their identity under international law" and "where 
appropriate, the right to choose their nationality" but not the right to secede. 601 
Finally, the Commission interpreted the right of self-determination in the 
Common Articles 1 of the 1966 Covenants as serving to "safeguard human 
rights" furthermore, the Commission observed that "[b]y virtue of that right 
every individual may choose to belong to whatever ethnic, religious or language 
Community he or she wishes. 602It follows quite clearly from the Yugoslavian and 
other Eastern European cases that minority do not have the right to self-
determination and the corresponding right to secede. However, as part of their 
591 Ibid. 
598 See Hannum "Rethinking self-determination" 53. 
599 See Weller "The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia" 590-592. 
600 See Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission, Opinion no 2 Jan 11 1992 in 
Hannum "Rethinking Self-determination" note 214. 
601 Ibid note 215. 
602 Ibid. 
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right to internal democracy States representing the people as a whole have the 
right to provide for the right to secede subject to the consent of all the people 
and to certain procedures. Where no such agreement exists the minorities are 
only entitled to universally recognised human rights short of the right to self-
detennination. 
6.6.6.4 Ethnic Self-determination in the African Context 
As shown above603 the OAU and UN confirmed the rule of uti possidetis in the 
context of decolonisation. Thus separatist groups in Africa did not enjoy much 
support. For instance, the attempted secession of Biafra from Nigeria and 
Katanga from the former Belgian Congo. In the case of Katanga the United 
Nations even intervened in support of the Central Congolese government. 604 
Recently, however, Alemante G. Selassie 605has called for a new approach to 
constitutionalism in Africa which goes beyond the discourse of individual rights 
and embrace the collective rights of ethnic groups. 
Selassie606 argues that the particular rights that a State may choose to recognise 
will vary from country to country as the needs and characteristics of ethnic 
groups vary. Selassie uses the current approach of the Ethiopian Government 
to illustrate his point. The Ethiopian Transitional Period Charter that came into 
effect to lead the country through a transition to democracy following nearly 
two decades of military dictatorship and ethnic strife recognises the right of an 
ethnic group: 
(a) preserve its identity and have it respected, promote its culture and history, and 
use and develop its language; 
(b) administer its own affairs within its own defined territory and effectively 
603 See paragraphs 5.2 & 5.3 supra. 
604 See Hannum "Rethinking self-determination" 50. 
605 See Alemante G. Selassie "Ethnic Identity and Constitutional Design for Africa" in 
Stanford Journal of International Law (Fall 1992) 35. 
606 Ibid. Also See Douglas Sanders "Collective Rights" 13 Human Rights Quarterly 382. 
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participate in the Central government on the basis of freedom and fair and 
proper representation, and 
(c) exercise its right of self-determination of independence when the concerned 
[ethnic Group] is convinced that the above rights are denied, abridged or 
abrogated. 
The Ethiopian Charter also affirms individual rights contained in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights607 
According to Selassie the Ethiopian Charter indicate and emerging trend among 
Constitution-makers in Africa to Consider seriously the collective claims of 
ethnic groups. 608 
He claims that the Namibian Constitution of 1990 provides for similar rights but 
in a diluted form. 609In his view the affirmations of ethnic (or group)rights 
impliedly rejected the traditional African view that official recognition of ethnic 
diversity is incompatible with the goals of nation-building, political stability, and 
modernisation.610Selassie611 believes that recognition of both individual and 
Group rights is the means by which individual identity may be respected, 
collective survival ensured, and assimilation resisted. 
AS shown in the case of Yugoslavia international law does not recognise the 
right of self-determination and the corresponding right of secession for 
minorities within the framework of an existing state. Nevertheless, the 
Ethiopian Charter not only grant the right of self-determination to minorities, 
but also grants ethnic groups the right to secede when their rights are denied 
607 See GA Res. 21 7 (III). 
608 See Selassie "Ethnic Identity and Constitutional Design in Africa" 36. 
609 He cites Article 19 which provides that: "every person shall be entitled to enjoy practice, 
profess, maintain, and promote any culture, language, tradition or religion subject to the terms 
if this Constitution and further subject to the Condition that the rights of others or the National 
interest". 
610 See Selassie op cit 37. 
611 Ibid 38. 
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or abridged or abrogated. 612 
Creating a Constitutional right to secede is also inconsistent with the practice 
of modern federal constitutions. With the exceptions of the Soviet Union and a 
few Eastern European Countries, federal constitutions, including that of the 
United States, have been silent on the question of secession. Moreover, US 
Constitutional jurisprudence suggests that the acceptance of a federal 
Constitution mandates the establishment of a permanent and indestructible 
union. 
Furthermore, the US Supreme Court has rejected the argument that the nature 
of the federal union creates an implied right to secede. It would seem that the 
provision of the right of secession in the Ethiopian Charter is meant for cases 
of necessity as the separatist groups will be required to prove a denial, 
abridgement or abrogation of rights. 
6.6.6.5 Ethnic Self-determination in the South African context 
The policy of separate development in South Africa was based on the notion of 
ethnic self-determination which resulted in the establishment of the so-called 
TBVC and self-governing states. 613 This policy was rejected by the international 
Community as contrary to right of all the people of South Africa to self-
determination and equal rights. The balkanisation of the country was also found 
to be in conflict with the rule of uti possidetis and therefore a violation of the 
territorial integrity of South Africa. 614 Thus the interim Constitution has 
reincorporated all the Bantustans, retained the 1910 boundaries and 
redemarcated the country into new provinces.615 
However, in order to secure the participation of the white right wing in the first 
612 See Selassie "Ethnic Identity and Constitutional Design for Africa" 47. 
613 See chapter 4 par. 4.2.1.1 supra.. 
614 Ibid 
615 See schedule 1 of the interim Constitution. 
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elections the MPNP adopted Constitutional principle XXXIV which provides for 
community self-determination on a territorial basis. 616 Furthermore, the MPNP 
adopted an amendment which secures the recognition of a traditional monarch 
in the new constitution in fulf'tlment of the demand of the Zulu nationality for 
self-determination. 617 In addition, Constitutional Principles XI and XII 
guarantees the Afrikaner and Zulu Communities language and cultural rights 
as well as collective rights of self-determination in forming, joining and 
maintaining organs of civil society, including cultural and religious associations 
on the basis of non-discrimination. 618 
It follows from this therefore that the right of Community self-determination 
contained in Constitutional Principle XXXIV relates to the right of political self-
determination, not just to minority rights contained in Article 27 of the ICCPR. 
This raises the question whether the interim Constitution recognises the right 
of ethnic( or racial groups) to self-determination and secession. If so, it would 
mean that ethnic groups within South Africa reserve the right to opt for the 
Bantustan system. If not, one wonders whether the granting of the right of 
community self-determination is not superfluous as Constitutional principle XI 
and XII already guarantees minority rights. 
If Constitutional Principle XXXIV grants the right of political self-determination 
as envisaged in the Common Articles 1 of the 1966 Covenants, rather that 
Article 27 of the ICCPR, to the Afrikaners the exercise of the rights can be 
attained in various ways as long as all the people of South Africa Consent 
through the constituent Assembly. The Declaration on Friendly Relations ( 1970) 
makes provision for ways in which political self-determination can be attained, 
that is, by merger, free association and independence. But, these options are 
only available to peoples who have a territory separate from that of the state 
from which they wish to secede. The problem facing the proponents of the 
616 See Basson South Africa's Interim Constitution 345. 
617 See Act 3 of 1994 in GG 15681 of 26 April 1994. 
618 See Basson South Africa's Interim Constitution 345. 
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Volkstaat is that the Afrikaners do not have a separate territory and their 
individual members are part and parcel of the national territory of South Africa 
which is an internationally recognised self-determination unit. Any attempt to 
create a Volkstaat territory would result in massive relocations of whole 
communities and is likely to meet vehement opposition. Furthermore, it is 
difficult to imagine that the Volkstaat will be exempted from the operation of 
universally accepted human rights conventions within their territory if it wishes 
to be part of the international Community. 
Although the Volkstaat is not territorially defined in that the Afrikaners do not 
constitute a local majority in any given province or region, the supporters 
thereof are determined to achieve it, ifneed be by the use of force. However, we 
have seen that international law does not recognise any secession achieved 
through aggression. It is interesting to note that the demand of the Afrikaners 
to self-determination was addressed and rejected by the South African Law 
Commission which also placed the principle of territorial integrity above the 
claim of the Afrikaners to self-determination. Furthermore, it was realised that 
the secessionist groups such as the right wing groups and their black 
counterparts (led by the IFP) demanded a federal or confederal state to lay the 
foundation for future secession from a unitary of federal South Africa. 619 
If the Volkstaaters would accept a territory which is not exclusively white it 
could be argued that there could be better prospects for the creation of a 
Volkstaat. For instance, a tenth province could be created where Afrikaners 
could form a majority. But if the Province is not independent, the Volkstaat 
would have to extend all universally recognised human rights to all citizens and 
finally it would really make no difference whether there is a Volkstaat or not. 
Or, alternatively, if all the people agree such a Volkstaat territory could be 
excised and be granted independence. The criticism against the recognition of 
Community self-determination is that separation of one region not only leads to 
619 See Dugard "Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Post-Apartheid South Africa" in Licht 
& De Viliers (eds.) South Africa's Crisis of Constitutional Democracy (1994) 135-136. 
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the separation of other regions but also subjects the seceding unit to similar 
claims internally. 620 
If the reasons for secession are the denial, abridgement or abrogation of human 
rights of members of particular groups it could be argued that these fears are 
addressed by Article 27 of the ICCPR and that, therefore, instead of 
Constitutionalising the right to secede Article 27 of the ICCPR should be 
incorporated into a justiciable bill of rights. Furthermore, the right of self-
determination outside the Colonial Context means the right to democratic 
governance, that is, the right for every citizen to participate in the 
determination of their own government - by exercising the right to vote, to elect 
or to be elected, in a system that can actually change the government. In 
summary, the rule of uti possidetis prevents the Afrikaners or Zulus from 
exercising and external right of self-determination entitling them to their own 
state. However, the people of South Africa as whole (through the Constitutional 
Assembly) are entitled to grant such a right to them. But if the demand for a 
Volkstaat rests on the fear of denial, abridgement or abrogation of their rights 
it is submitted that these fears have been adequately addressed by 
Constitutional principles XI and XII as well as their right to participate in the 
democratic process. 
In other words Constitutional state based on the principle of Constitutional 
Supremacy addresses the fears of both individuals and groups and makes the 
recognition of individual and group rights unnecessary. 
6. 7 General Conclusions 
The Diceyan concept of the Rule of Law comprise a procedural and substantive 
aspects. Its substantive aspect incorporated only civil liberties. The weakness 
of this concept was that the individual was allowed the enjoyment of his or her 
620 See Selassie op cit 45. 
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civil liberties at the pleasure of the sovereign Parliament. After World War II the 
Rule of Law came to be linked not only with democracy through civil liberties 
but also with the first and second generations of human rights contained in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which not only derived from the UN 
Charter but also elaborated on its human rights provisions and incorporated 
them into the rule of law, in particular, by the International Commission of 
jurists which expanded the material (or substantive aspect of the rule law) 
filling it with the same values as the German Rechtsstaatprinciple. These legal 
values included the right to freedom and equality which comprise the notion of 
justice, the rights to democratic governance etc. Some of the legal values 
especially freedom, equality and justice became the higher law which all 
positive laws must comply with lest they become invalid. 
Meanwhile the right of self-determination evolved and became a principle of 
customary international law recognised by all nations. The right of self-
determination became an important weapon in the struggle for decolonisation 
as it gave colonial, oppressed and peoples under racist regimes the right to 
demand participation in the government of their countries either directly or 
through freely chosen representatives. The right of self-determination and the 
participatory rights inherent in it became a condition since qua non for the 
enjoyment of all three generations of human rights. It became applicable to both 
Colonial and non-colonial situations as a right to democratic governance. Thus 
the legal values of freedom, equality justice and the right to democratic 
governance came to comprise the dynamic concept of the rule of law which 
links human rights, democracy and the right of self-determination. 
The Dynamic concept of the rule of law, unlike its Diceyan counterpart, was not 
derived from the culture or traditions of any particular country. It derived from 
the principle of humanity (ubuntu) which holds that the legal values of freedom 
and equality and their corollaries of justice and right to democratic governance 
are inherent in the worth and dignity to the human personality. As every 
individual human personality is a bearer of this worth and dignity the legal 
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values and human rights deriving from that worth and dignity became a 
common heritage of the human family. Thus the fact that the development and 
Constitutionalisation of these notions started in particular countries came to be 
of no consequence. If fact, as shown in the thesis both the first and third worlds 
contributed to the evolution of the Dynamic Concept of the Rule of law which 
gave birth to the modem constitutional state based on the principle of 
constitutional supremacy. 
In practice the Dynamic Concept of the rule of law became universal through 
the UN system and the adoption of various international and regional human 
rights instruments. Today the essential elements of the Concept have become 
an integral part of the International Human Rights Law incorporated or adopted 
by the municipal laws of the majority of the UN Member States. 
During Colonial days the rule of law and its inherent human rights were not 
extended to colonial peoples. For instance, in Nigeria South Africa, former 
Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa. Thus in these countries a host of 
racially discriminatory laws were enacted which violated the dynamic concept 
of the rule of law and prevented colonial peoples from participation in the 
government of their countries. Instead separate institutions of government were 
established for colonial peoples to keep them outside the Central political 
processes. These institutions failed to satisfy the requirements of the dynamic 
concept of the rule of law and resulted in popular resistances and wars of 
liberation which speeded up the decolonisation process. 
During the sixties the UN played an active role in the decolonisation processes. 
But the former colonies of South Africa and Rhodesia relied on the domestic 
jurisdiction clause [article 2(7)) to prevent the UN from intervening against the 
colonialism and apartheid policies in Southern Africa. They argued that the 
domestic jurisdiction clause took precedence over the human rights provisions 
of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration. Meanwhile the National 
liberation Movements in Southern Africa increasingly relied on international 
530 
human rights instruments in their struggles and in fashioning their policies. 
Thus during the sixties and seventies numerous resolutions were adopted on 
the former Southern Rhodesia South West Africa and South Africa which gave 
the UN jurisdiction over the questions of former Southern Rhodesia and South 
Africa regardless of the domestic jurisdiction clause. These resolutions also 
made the corpus of international Human Rights law applicable to the situation 
in Southern Africa. Consequently, the UN was able to nullify the entire South 
African Constitutional order and demand the establishment of a non-racial, 
united and democratic state. Finally, all the former colonial countries 
acknowledged the jurisdiction of the UN and allowed it to play a role in the 
creation of new states. 
The constitutions of the new states of Zimbabwe and Namibia incorporated 
human rights and Namibia, in particular, adopted the modern concept of the a 
Constitutional State based on the principle of Constitutional supremacy. 
Last but not least South Africa accepted the winds of change and agreed to 
enter into negotiations which resulted in the interim Constitution of 1993. 
Although South Africa was not a classical colonial state it was decolonised in 
the sense that the right of self-determination was extended to all the people in 
line with the Declaration on friendly Relations. Now South Africa has a 
government representative of all its people and a Constitutional State based on 
the principle of Constitutional Supremacy. Like Zimbabwe and Namibia the 
South African Constitution is based on certain constitutional principles which 
were designed to accommodate the fears of the white minorities. All in all, 
however the Constitution has realised the dynamic concept of the Rule of Law 
making it a Grundnorm of all future Constitutions. 
The provision made for community self-determination in the interim 
Constitution does not seem to negate the right of self-determination of all the 
people as such a right, as we saw in the case of Ethiopia and Yugoslavia, is 
subject to the approval of all the people as part of their right to internal self-
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determination. However, in a Constitutional State where freedom, equality and 
justice and the right of democratic governance are guaranteed and enforceable 
there does not seem to be any justification for the right of community self-
determination outside the ambit of Article 27 of the ICCPR. It is suggested 
therefore that a Constitutional State based on the principle of Constitutional 
supremacy and which incorporates the corpus of international human rights 
law and a justiciable Bill of Rights offers adequate protection to both individuals 
and groups and therefore makes the right of community self-determination and 
the right to secession untenable. It is therefore further suggested that the right 
of self-determination should be redefined so as to apply to all the people of a 
given territory and that language, cultural and religious diversity should not be 
used as the basis for the right of self-determination which will dissolve many 
states in the name of freedom and democracy. Such a trend would negate the 
fundamental principles of non-racialism, non-discrimination and equality 
embodied in the corpus of International Human Rights law. 
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ANC 
APC/PCAM 
AWB 
AZAPLA 
BYIL 
CASE 
CILSA 
Codes a 
CSIR 
DP 
EPG 
GA 
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ICJ 
IFP 
IHRL 
MDM 
MK 
MPNP 
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NP 
NPA 
OAU 
PAC 
PF 
SACP 
SAJHR 
SAYIL 
TBVC 
TEC 
THRHR 
TSAR 
UD 
UN 
UNOMSA 
WG 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
African National Congress 
All-Party Congress/Pre-Constituent Assembly 
Afrikaner Weerstand Beweging 
Azanian Peoples Liberation Army 
British Yearbook of International Law 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 
Comparative and International Law Journal of South Africa 
Convention for a Democratic South Africa 
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research 
Democratic Party 
Eminent Persons Group 
General Assembly (UN) 
Human Science Research Council 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights 
International Commisssion of Jurists 
Inkhata Freedom Party 
International Human Rights Law 
Mass Democratic Movement 
Umkhonto we Sizwe 
Multi-party Negotiating Process 
National Executive Committee (ANC) 
National Party 
National Peace Accord 
Organisation of African Unity 
Pan African Congress 
Patriotic Front 
South African Communist Party 
South African Journal of Human Rights 
South African Yearbook of International Law 
Transkei/Bophuthatswana/Venda/Ciskei 
Transitional Executive Council 
Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 
Tydskrif vir Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
United Nations 
United Nations Observer Mission to South Africa 
Working Group 
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